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Abstract 
This thesis is about social suffering in developed English-speaking societies such as Britain and the 
British Overseas Territory of St. Helena. A principal aim of this research was to develop a social 
theory about social suffering in such societies. Cultural processes and relational settings mediate 
the impact of social structure on personal agency and this partly accounts for how distress becomes 
socially distributed in such societies. The experience, expression, and meaning of distress depend 
upon how the self is partly constituted in a cultural discourse on the self. TN'ý'o case studies are 
presented to develop these theoretical ideas. A critical-realist and interpretive methodology and an 
ethnographic approach to social research were used in a study of the social experience of distress in 
two developed English-speaking societies: the English city of Bristol and the south Atlantic Island 
of St. Helena. Accounts of personal distress (principally depression) were obtained from interviews 
with thirty-six informants in south Bristol and with forty informants on St. Helena. On St. Helena, 
interviews with informants were supplemented with ethnographic data collected from a range of 
sources. The data was interpreted using a discourse-analytic framework, paying close attention to 
narrativity, trope, intertextuality, ideology, and the constitutive force of discourse. Social suffering 
in developed English-speaking societies is conunonly produced by life events and relational 
settings that involve a disruption of agency or a breach in social relations. How distress is 
expressed, experienced, and interpreted in such societies depends on how social identity and 
agency are constituted through diverse cultural and symbolic processes. Lay discourse on distress 
employs metaphor, metonymy, and low levels of narrativity to depict distress as a socio-moral 
response to social adversity and as a breakdown in agency. Expert discourses on distress transform 
social suffering into an individual disorder organised around an illness metaphor. 
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This thesis is about the social experience of distress' and social suffering in developed English- 
speaking societies such as Britain. In Britain on the Couch, Oliver James expressed alarrn at the 
rising rates of psychiatric morbidity that have been seen in the UK since the 1950s, culminating in 
what he describes as an 'angst epidemic' (1998: 59). Whether they have risen or not, levels of 
personal distress in Britain do appear to be very high. For instance, in 1993, the first British 
Psychiatric Morbidity Survey (BPMS) found that around 14% (one in six) of adults (aged 16-64) in 
Britain and living in private households had a 'neurotic health problem' (Jenkins et al, 1997, 
1998). ' These findings were replicated in the second BPMS in 2000; around one in six adults living 
in Britain were reported to have a 'neurotic disorder' (ONS, 2001). Moreover, around one in four 
respondents reported 'hazardous drinking patterns'. 
Are these epidemiological symptoms of a sick social body? What do these findings say about 
British society? James believes that 'the modem malaise' has been partly caused by an increasing 
tendency to engage in maladaptive psychological processes of social comparison that result in 
lowered self-esteem and increased risk of depression. Karp (1996), on the other hand, has argued 
that the proliferation of depression in North American society is due to a complex combination of 
cultural factors and macro socio-economic processes. For instance, in his qualitative study of 
depression among white Americans, Karp concluded that: 
A necessary condition for widespread depressive illness is a culturally induced 
readiness to view emotional pain as a disease requiring medical intervention. The 
grounds for treating pain as an abnormal medical condition have been largely 
established through increasing incursion of medical and other therapeutic experts 
into literally every aspect of our lives. Doctors in particular have become explorers, 
discovering every conceivable aspect of the human condition as potentially 
problematic and warranting their intervention. Such a 'medicalisation' process has 
dramatically increased the number of uncomfortable or disliked feelings and 
behaviors that we now see as illnesses. 
Karp, 1996: 172-173 
Accounting for a putative historical increase in levels of personal distress and explaining the social 
distribution of suffering in late capitalist societies such as Britain requires the development of a 
social theory of social suffering and what Fabrega described as a 'social theory of the psychiatric' 
(1992: 91). According to Bourdieu, the challenge for contemporary social science is to develop an 
understanding of: 
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The true causes of the malaise that is expressed only through social signs that are 
difficult to interpret precisely because they seem so obvious. I am thinking of the 
outbreaks of senseless violence at sports events or elsewhere, about racist crimes, 
about the electoral success of the prophets of doom, eager to exploit and magnify 
the most primitive expressions of moral suffering that - as much as and more than 
by the poverty and the 'passive violence' of economic and social structures - are 
produced by the small privations and muted violence of everyday life. 
Bourdieu, 1999: 628-629 (Postscript) 
Anthropologists and cultural psychiatrists have produced a rich body of ethnographic evidence on 
social suffering across cultures. Despite the 'thickness' of these ethnographic accounts, the social 
theory of social suffering remains underdeveloped (Kleinman, 1996). Kleinman points out that 
without social theory 'it is uncertain how different ethnographies of the violence of everyday living 
can construct an ethnographic subject that differs from that of psychologists or novelists' (1996: 
241). 
The purpose of the research reported in this thesis is to contribute to the development of a social 
theory of social suffering by drawing together theory and research in medical anthropology and 
sociology. Kleinman et al point out that research on social suffering requires an interdisciplinary 
approach: 'The most interesting questions for theory and practice concerning social suffering are in 
the cracks between our categories and in the discursive processes that traverse our disciplines' 
(1996: XIH). By adopting an interdisciplinary approach, the research reported here set out to 
explore the interplay between cultural and symbolic processes, social structure, individual agency, 
and experiences of personal distress. The aims of the research were: 
(a) To investigate the processes through which 'social structure' and social adversity produce 
experiences of personal distress in developed English-speaking societies. As I will show, this 
requires the development of a social theory of social suffering in such societies. 
(b) To explore how cultural and symbolic processes partly constitute the experience of personal 
distress. ' This involves forn-iing an interpretation of the cultural discourses that are used to 
describe and interpret such experience. How do such processes shape the experience of 
distress and enter into its aetiology? 
(c) To exarnine how 'the self' and 'social identity' mediate the relationship between adversity 
and distress and how they influence the experience, expression, and response to such distress. 
How do experiences of distress rely on the provision of a cultural discourse on the self, body, 
and society? 
(d) To assess the relevance of the analytical concepts of 'agency", 'narrativity', and 'trope" for 
the interpretation of expert and lay discourse on distress. How can an interpretive focus on 
discourse facilitate an understanding of the relationship between culture and distress? What 
are the most effective ways of researching the relationship between cultural processes, social 
structure, and social suffering in late capitalist societies such as Britain? 
2 
Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first two chapters present a critical overview of how 
medical anthropologists and sociologists have sought to understand the relationship between 
personal distress and social suffering. They describe the theoretical framework employed in later 
chapters. Chapter I discusses the role of cultural and symbolic processes in 'social origin' 
explanations of distress in developed, English-speaking societies such as Britain. The chapter goes 
onto describe how contemporary medical anthropologists have sought to incorporate macro social, 
political, and economic forces into their cultural interpretations of illness and distress. 
Chapter 2 reviews some of the ways that medical anthropologists and cross-cultural psychiatrists 
have developed their thinking about the relationship between culture and distress. It draws on a 
range of examples to illustrate how cultural and symbolic processes influence the experience, 
expression, and meaning of distress. This includes a discussion of the anthropological concept of an 
'Idiom of distress' and its relevance to an interpretation of distress in developed English-speaking 
societies. The final part of the chapter introduces the idea of a cultural discourse on the self and 
argues that the communication, meaning, and social response to personal distress in such societies 
is partly contingent on such a discourse. 
Chapter 3 describes the methodological framework, research methods, and interpretive framework 
used in the empirical phase of the research. It includes a critical discussion of how medical 
anthropologists and sociologists have applied the concept of narrative in their research on illness 
and sickness. This is followed by the presentation of a discourse-based concept of narrative. The 
second part of the chapter presents an account of the research methods used and data-collection in 
both fieldwork settings: St. Helena and Bristol. 
Chapter 4 presents an interpretation of English discourse on distress among two samples of white 
English informants living in the English city of Bristol. The first section of the chapter presents an 
interpretation of informants' descriptions of their experiences of distress. The second part discusses 
how sufferers and former sufferers of distress evaluate, interpret, and represent their experiences in 
highly contextualised accounts of social experience that can be more or less coherent and more or 
less narrative-like. This chapter argues that, while such discourse may not always have a clear 
explanatory logic, it functions to articulate speakers' sense of moral agency. 
Chapters 5 and 6 present the findings from the second ethnographic case study (St. Helena). They 
present an ethnographically informed interpretation of discourse on distress among St. Helenians. 
Chapter 5 presents an ethnographic account of how cultural processes and macro socio-economic 
forces interact to produce a particular configuration of social suffering in St. Helenian society. 
Chapter 6 presents an interpretation of St. Helenian discourse on distress. St. Helenians' accounts 
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of distress and illness are used to explore how the socio-cultural context in which distress takes 
place constrains its discursive representation. 
Chapter 7 presents a synthesis of learning from the case studies and from the theoretical discussion 
of earlier chapters. The chapter presents an account of the dialectical relationship between expert 
and lay discourses on distress in such societies. The final part of the chapter re-engages with the 
theoretical themes discussed in the first two chapters, and describes how the interplay between 
socio-econorrfic forces and cultural processes produce particular configurations of social suffering 
in developed English-speaking societies. 
4 
Chapter 1 
Social Suffering and the Anthropology of Affliction 
Those who have only empty space above them are almost inevitably lost in it, if no 
force restrains them. 
En-dle Durkheim (1975: 257) 
This chapter is about personal affliction and social suffering. It describes some of the ways that 
medical anthropologists and sociologists have sought to understand such phenomena. The first part 
of the chapter describes how, over the past few decades, medical sociologists and social 
psychiatrists have sought to develop 'social origin' aetiological accounts of the 'neurotic disorders' 
and their social distribution within British society. These aetiological accounts draw upon a 
versatile vulnerability-stress explanatory system and form part of a broader expert discourse on 
distress. 
Using 'depression' as an example, it is argued that such aetiological models have neglected to take 
into account cultural and symbolic processes and the sociomoral dimensions of affliction and 
distress. A range of examples is used to argue that such processes are internal to the social 
aetiology of distress. Cultural processes and social structure interact to produce particular 
configurations of affliction in developed English-speaking societies such as Britain. This 
interaction partly accounts for how social suffering becomes socially distributed in such societies. 
Conversely, the second part of this chapter describes some of the ways that medical anthropologists 
have sought to take into account macro social, political settings, and economic processes in their 
cultural interpretations of suffering and affliction. It is argued that cultural processes and relational 
settings mediate agency and social structure in the production of affliction and personal distress. 
The concepts of social suffering, anomie, the social drama, and rituals of affliction facilitate an 
understanding of such processes. 
1.1 Culture and the social aetiology of depression 
In contemporary expert discourse on distress, at least four explanatory systems have been 
developed to account for the onset of depression and its social distribution among western 
populations: biological; psychological or cognitive; sociological; and composite explanatory 
systems (e. g. 'bio-cognitive', 'psychosocial' or 'biopsychosocial'). The ethnopsychiatric concept of 
stress and an expert explanatory system organised around the relationship between social 
'diathesis' and 'stress' underlies contemporary sociological and social-psychiatric explanations for 
depression (e. g. Monroe and Simons, 1991). This explanatory system depends on a particular 
interpretation of the ethnopsychiatric concept of stress. Kirmayer (1988) has pointed out that the 
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concept of 'stress' is the 'organising metaphor' for 'behavioural medicine'. Within this discourse, 
stress 'stands for the inexorable demands of the environment that can, at times, exceed the human 
capacity for mastery' (Kirmayer, 1988: 74). Contemporary psychiatric discourse on stress is 
organised around a bifurcation between an objective source of stress (e. g. 'stressor' or 'provok-ing 
factors') and its effect on the body or in the mind of the sufferer ('the stress reaction'). This 'stress 
reaction' can take either a physical (e. g. an increase in blood pressure) or a psychological form (e. g. 
'the feeling of being keyed up') (Gelder et al, 2003: 76). Gelder et al advise that these two 
meanings of stress should be distinguished in aetiological research: 
First, it [stress] is applied to events or situations, such as working for an 
examination, which may have an adverse effect on someone. Second, it is applied 
to the adverse effects that are induced, which may be psychological or 
physiological change. In considering aetiology it is advisable to separate these 
components. 
Gelder et al, 2003: 76 
In 'social origin' accounts of depression, distress is explained as a consequence of an interaction 
between: a vulnerability or predisposition to develop a particular disorder; an environmental stress 
(e. g. a difficult or traumatic life event that precedes onset); and ongoing 'perpetuating factors' (e. g. 
factors that prolong the course of disorder) (Gelder et al, 2003: 75-76). Over the past few decades 
researchers in medical sociology and social psychiatry have identified a variety of social 'stressors' 
and 'vulnerability' factors that partly account for depression and, therefore, its social distribution 
6 (Brown, 2003). 
Nonetheless, cultural processes mediate the aetiological gap between vulnerability factor (the 
'diatheses'), adverse life event (the 'stress'), and personal distress. The aetiological significance of 
life events depends on their meaning. For example, in narrative analyses of personal accounts of 
infidelity and divorce, Riessman showed how the way that negative relationship events are 
interpreted mediate their emotional impact. She drew some general implications for social-science 
research on stress: 
Investigators have not given sufficient attention to the meanings imputed by the 
social actor, that is, how individuals themselves interpret the stressors in their lives 
[ ... 
] It is in the interpretation of an event by the social actor that the significance 
may lie and, consequently, the potential for distress and disorder. 
Riessman, 1989: 749 
In addition, the impact of negative life events is partly contingent on social identity' and how 
agency has been constituted in relation to social setting. This is highlighted in attempts to explain C) 
why, in societies such as Britain, the prevalence of depression among women is greater than that 
among men. In recent British psychiatric morbidity surveys, women in Britain have been reported 
to be around one and a half times more likely as men to suffer from 'depressive disorder' and 
almost twice as likely to suffer from 'mixed anxiety and depression' (Jenkins et al, 1997; 
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Bebbington et al, 1998). Do such differences mean that women experience more adversity? 
Alternatively, do men articulate and respond to their experiences of distress differently? Some 
researchers have argued that women are more likely to be exposed to the kinds of adversity that 
result in depression because of the kinds of gender-typed social roles that they perform. For 
instance, in one British study, Nazroo et al (1987) explained gender differences in depression as the 
result of differences in the social roles of men and women. They found, for instance, that women 
were only at greater risk of depression compared with men when they had experienced a negative 
life event that involved children, reproduction, or housing. The correlations between gender and 
patterns of personal distress are partly a social and cultural construction. Schwartz (1991), for 
instance, pointed to a familiar picture of higher rates of 'acting out, anti-social' behaviour, alcohol 
and drug use among men and higher rates of depression among women. Based on survey data 
collected from a small sample of Jewish women in New York, she explained the difference in 
terms of culturally shaped 'sex-role norms' that govern how distress is experienced and expressed 
by men and women: 'The lives of men and women are both accompanied by stress which may 
engender psychopathological responses. But differences in the social context of their lives support 
different patterned responses to such stress' (1991: 138). In a community-based epidermological 
survey of depression among Anglo-Jewry in the UK, Loewenthal et al (1995) found an equal 
prevalence of case depression between men and women, but no difference in the risk of exposure to 
provoking agents or economic adversity. There were, however, other differences in their social 
roles. Women, for instance, were more likely to occupy a homemaker and carer role in the family, 
and were less likely to be earning. They were also more likely to report difficulties in concentrating 
and to experiencing self-deprecating thoughts. Loewenthal et al explained this apparent 
contradiction with reference to cultural and religious factors. The cultural value attached to a 
woman's role in family management buffered them from adversity: 
Amongst the Jews interviewed, the culturally-associated pattern of occupational 
characteristics, interacting with economic conditions, appeared to have resulted in 
economic stress which was an important factor contributing to depression among 
those interviewed. 
Loewenthal et al, 1995: 1061 
These explanations for observed differences in rates of depression between men and women point 
to the relevance of cultural and social processes in constituting identity, the experience of adversity, 
its meaning or significance, and the response taken to such adversity. A comparative study 
conducted by Brown and Prudo (198 1) further illustrates the limits of mechanical 'diathesis-stress' 
aetiological models and highlights the importance of taking into account the local socio-cultural 
contexts in which distress takes place. Brown and Prudo (1981) set out to test the validity of the 
aetiological developed by Brown and Harris (1978) in their original study of depression among 
working-class women living in Camberwell, south London. They chose the rural population living 
on the Hebridean islands of North Uist and Lewis as the subjects of a sociological comparison with 
the women included in the Camberwell study. Like in Camberwell, Brown and Prudo found that 
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depression was the most common psychiatric syndrome in women living on these islands. 
Nonetheless, compared with working-class women living in Camberwell, social class accounted for 
less of the variation in depression among Hebridean women. Rates of depression were highest 
among those who were least 'integrated' into a traditional way of life. In both rural and urban 
populations, the onset of depression typically followed an adverse life event. Nonetheless, the types 
of events that resulted in depression differed between the two populations. Prudo et al (1981), for 
instance, reported that depression was more likely to follow a death or imminent death of a close 
relative among women living in the Outer Hebrides compared with women in the urban sample. 
The experience of depression was also more likely to take a 'chronic course' and have a 'strong 
anxiety component' among the Hebridean women (1981: 610). Prudo et al cited an array of 'socio- 
cultural differences' in order to account for these differences between the two populations (e. g. 
family structure, marital position, degree of contact with relatives). 
One of the tasks for a social theory of social suffering is to form a theoretical account of how social 
structure and adversity become embodied in personal distress and how such distress becomes 
distributed across social categories. Cultural and symbolic processes are likely to be at least partly 
responsible for how distress is distributed in developed English-speaking societies. An 
understanding of these processes is likely to be important in deciding how to respond to such 
suffering. Good (1977) has points out, for example, that: 
Our understanding of the way in which psychosocial and cultural factors affect the 
incidence, course, experience, and outcome of disease is crucial for clinical 
medicine, both in the determination of the what data is clinically relevant and where 
the therapeutic intervention should occur. 
Good, 1977: 25 
A small but growing body of sociological, psychiatric, and anthropological research has sought to 
explore the role of social and cultural processes in the experience and understanding of psychiatric 
illness in developed English-speaking societies. ' In addition, critical medical anthropologists have 
sought to incorporate macro social and political factors into their interpretations of illness, distress, 
and social suffering. 
1.2 Social suffering and the anthropology of affliction 
The last section argued that medical sociological and social psychiatric explanations for 
psychosocial distress and their social distribution in societies such as Britain have taken insufficient 
account of cultural and symbolic processes. Conversely, during the 1980s, critical medical 
anthropologists mounted a critique of mainstream medical anthropology for marginalizing social 
relations and issues of power and for having become too 'medicalised' with the consequence that 
rriedicalisation had become a marginal concern as an area of research (Singer, 1989). Interpretive 
medical anthropology attracted criticism for paying too much attention to ideographic and nucro- 
cultural processes and for neglecting to take into account social structure, power relations, and the 
8 
broader political and economic contexts in which cultural practices are embedded (Lock and 
Scheper-Hughes, 1996; Jenkins, 1996). For instance, writing over two decades ago, Frankenburg 
(1980) recommended that medical anthropology go beyond the analysis of custom, social relations, 
and cultural practices at the local level and contextualise them in relation to broader social and 
economic processes and national and international political contexts. More recently, Jenkins (1996) 
has argued that anthropological studies of distress need to broaden their outlook from a focus on 
local intra-psychic analyses to consider the role of the state in constructing emotional experience. 
Critical medical anthropologists have sought to foreground social, economic, political, and 'macro 
level structures' in their interpretations of illness and distress (Singer, 1989; Singer and Baer, 
1995). They have developed sophisticated critiques of biomedical knowledge and practice, and 
have pointed to some of its social and ideological functions within late capitalist societies. ' 
Moreover, some have sought to understand how socio-political processes interact with cultural and 
symbolic practices to produce particular configurations of illness, suffering, and distress (Lock and 
Scheper-Hughes, 1996; Jenkins, 1996; Kleinman, 1996). For instance, Lock (1986) interpreted 
school refusal syndrome among Japanese children in relation to broad national concerns (e. g. 
nationalisation, cultural identity) as well as a culturally patterned response to local relational 
contexts (e. g. relationships between parents and children, the school system). Good (1977), for 
instance, has written about the 'state construction of affect' in Iran and investigated the nation 
state's role in the production of sentiments among Iranians. Within a Salvadoran context, Jenkins 
(199 1) highlighted the role of the state in the construction and regulation of affect. She investigated 
the mental-health consequences of life in El Salvador among a group of Salvadoran refugees living 
in the United States, a group whose 'life worlds are framed by chronic political violence, extreme 
poverty, unrelenting trauma and loss' (1991: 141). Jenkins argued that the state in El Salvador has 
played a covert and overt role in promoting and legitimating particular kinds of emotional 
discourse, shaping how political events and situations are perceived and evaluated. During the 
1980s, the state in El Salvador engendered dysphoric emotional reactions among the Salvadoran 
population through 'a system of affective interaction, generalised emotional atmosphere, and social 
control' (1991: 157). In El Salvador, the refugees in her study lived under a 'pervasive dysthymic 
ethos and a cultural of terror' that partly explained the high levels of emotional distress that was 
observed among them (1991: 149). 
Lock and Scheper-Hughes have argued that in oppressive political or social settings illness is 
regularly used 'to portray opposition - an Institutionalised space from which to communicate fear, 
anxiety, and anger' and often represents 'a form of protest against oppressive social roles and 
ideologies' (1996: 64-67). In ethnographic research in a Brazilian shantytown, for example, 
Scheper-Hughes showed how an ethnomedical illness category of 'nerves' (nervoso) was used by 
the poor and oppressed cane-cutters to express their hunger and 'as a collective and embodied 
response to the nervous political system' (1993: 186). As an ethnomedical illness category and a 
9 
metaphor for social suffering, nervoso represented a coded form of criticism of the prevailing 
political and economic where other means for the expression of dissent and discontent were 
unavailable. While nervoso expressed 'nervous hunger', it was also an 'embodied metaphor' for 
intractable social and economic difficulties and so represented 'an act of refusal, an oblique form of 
protest' (1993: 213). However, Scheper-Hughes found that nervoso had become medically 
appropriated (or medicalised) and was treated as a biomedical illness thereby disguising its socio- 
political origins and neutralising the 'hungry body' as a symbol of resistance. 
Kleinman (1980; 1986) investigated the ways that cultural processes, social structure, and political 
contexts interact to produce neurasthenia" and chronic pain among the Chinese. He found that 
most of the Chinese patients he interviewed had experienced social or personal difficulties shortly 
before the onset of their symptoms of neurasthenia. Otherwise, they had experienced 'ongoing 
difficulties'. He described how the Chinese share a sociocentric view of the self and an ideological 
view of social harmony. Emotional expression is used evaluatively to articulate a moral perspective 
on events and circumstances. The expression of depressive emotion therefore had political 
implications for Chinese patients and represented a challenge to the dominant ideological discourse 
in Chinese society; the expression of dysphoria was interpreted as 'disaffiliation, alienation, 
potential opposition' (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985: 468). The expression of dysphoric emotion 
was therefore considered 'shameful' and was socially stigmatised in Chinese society. Moreover, it 
was associated with highly stigmatised 'mental illness'. Kleinman and Kleinman maintained that 
'mental illness' and the psychological expression of distress were strongly discouraged during the 
Cultural Revolution. With the collusion of clinicians, 'frustration', 'demoralisation', and political 
disenchantment were canalised into more socially acceptable public idioms of distress: symptoms 
of bodily pain, clinically constellated into the ethnomedical category of neurasthenia. Patients used 
a somatic idiom to communicate 'otherwise unsanctioned personal or social distress in a 
legitimised bodily idiom' (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985: 439). 
Medical anthropologists have employed the concept of 'social suffering' to describe the negative 
impact that macro political, social, or economic forces can have on individual bodies (e. g. war, 
revolution, dictatorship, economic depression). For example, Kleinman et al describe social 
suffering as: 
An assemblage of human problems that have their origins and consequences in the 
devastating injuries that social force inflicts on human experience. Social suffering 
results from what political, econon-tic, and institutional power does to people, and, 
reciprocally, from how these forms of power themselves influence responses to 
social problems. 
Kleinman et al, 1996: XI 
So, what makes suffering social? Kleinman has defined the social experience of suffering as 'a 
universal aspect of human experience in which individuals and groups have to undergo or bear 
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certain burdens, troubles, and serious wounds to the body and the spirit that can be grouped into a 
variety of forms' (1996: 101). Kleinman and Kleinman point to two ways in which suffering is a 
social experience'. First, 'collective modes of expression' partly constitute experiences of 
suffering and shape how it is communicated. Second, social relations are part of the experience of 
illness and distress (1996: 2). Suffering is social in at least two other ways. Experiences of 
individual distress are partly produced by macro social, economic, and political forces. In addition, 
experiences of personal distress transform social relations and so influence how societies are 
organised. 
Bourdieu characterises 'social suffering' as the distress and pain that results from 'socio-structural 
violence'. Social suffering takes place along fissures in the social structure, suffering shared by 
many individuals or families because of their shared socio-economic circumstances. It involves 
subjugation; 'a being done to' as Monks (2000) puts it. Individual lives are structured in ways that 
cause them to suffer. In late capitalist societies such as Britain, a multiplicity of macro social and 
economic processes systematically generates social suffering in individual bodies. These processes 
include, for instance, inequalities in power or access to material and non-material resources; the 
role of state and commercial institutions in sustaining and reproducing social structure and in 
exploiting populations; political oppression; social and economic practices that systematically 
exclude some while including others. 
The impact of macro social and economic forces on individual bodies is conveyed by the local 
social contexts and personalised worlds that individuals inhabit. Somers (1994) advocates the use 
of the metaphorical concept of a 'relational setting' for thinking about this intermediate social 
space between structure and agency. A 'relational setting' refers to 'a pattern of relationships 
between institutions, public narratives, and social practices. As such, it is a relational matrix, a 
social network' (1994: 626). These settings are generated by macro political, economic, and social 
forces, and partly constitute individual agency and identity. 
Social structure" (e. g. race, class, and gender) systematically positions individuals in a way that 
places them at increased risk of personal distress. Kleinman et al describe how social suffering 
takes place in 'nested contexts of embodiment: collective, intersubjective, individual' (1996: 
XVH). For example, in the context of a discussion about the socio-political production of distress 
among the Chinese, Kleinman and Kleinman describe these local contexts of power that determine 
how 'risk, stress, and resources are configured': 'The local context itself can be thought of as a 
nested hierarchy of family, network, work, and community settings. This local cultural system 
systematically relates person to social structure, bridging physiological processes and social 
relations' (1985: 468). Psychosocial distress (e. g. depression, chronic pain, neurasthenia) therefore 
expresses the relationship between society and individual. These local contexts convey the impact 
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of large-scale social, political forces to individual bodies. Symbolic meanings mediate self and 
local context, body and self-connecting body and society (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985). 
The ten-n 'positional suffering' refers to the suffering associated with the experience of 
disadvantaged social position (Bourdieu, 1999). It is partly produced by 'the directly experienced 
effects of social interaction within these social microcosms (office, workshop, business, 
neighbourhood, in the extended family)' (1999: 4). Bourdieu points out that the suffering of those 
occupying an 'Inferior, obscure position in a prestigious and pnvileged universe' is 'all the more 
painful when the universe in which they participate just enough to feel their relatively low standing 
is higher in social space overall' (1999: 4). While visible levels of material suffering (e. g. absolute 
poverty) may have been reduced in late capitalist societies, the experience of 'ordinary' social 
suffering is distributed throughout the social field: 
This positional suffering, experienced from inside the rrdcrocosm, will appear, as 
the saying goes 'entirely relative', meaning completely unreal, if we take the point 
of view of the macrocosm and compare it to the 'real' suffering of material poverty 
(1a grande misere) [ ... J Using material poverty as the sole measure of all suffering keeps us from seeing and understanding a whole side of the suffering characteristic 
of a social order which, although it has undoubtedly reduced poverty overall 
(though less than often claimed) has also multiplied the social spaces (specialised 
fields and subfields) and set up the conditions for an unprecedented development of 
all kinds of ordinary suffering (1a petite misere). 
Bourdieu, 1999: 4 
It is through adverse 'nested contexts' and 'positional suffering' that social structure becomes 
embodied as personal distress. Kleinman and Kleinman have said, for instance, that 'social 
structures and social relations are deeply affective, thus embodied in the individual and his 
disorders' (1985: 427). Within late capitalist societies such as Britain, relational settings of 
subjugation, social disconnection, powerlessness, and entrapment 12 are systematically produced and 
inhabited by a large proportion of the population. Such adverse settings erode the agency of those 
who inhabit them, thereby placing them at risk of distress and, in some cases, more severe 
psychiatric illness. 
Durkheim analysed suicide data from several European societies and concluded that: 'Whenever 
serious adjustments take place in the social order, whether or not due to a sudden growth or to an 
unexpected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self-destruction' (1975: 246). He used the 
concept of 'anon-ýe' to explain this association between such change and higher rates of suicide. 
Durkheim maintained that anon-ýe is produced large-scale, industrialised societies by "society's 
insufficient presence in the individual. " It results from a breakdown in a society's capacity to 
'temper', regulate, or control individuals and their appetites and desires (1975: 248). The 'moral 
limits' set by society fail to be enforced so that individuals become 'unsocialised'. Anorrue is 
generated by 'disturbances in the collective order', 'disturbances of equilibrium', or breaches in 
social relations (1975: 246). Durkheim described two sources of anomie in his account of suicide; 
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first, where there is a breakdown in social relations (e. g. marital relationships); second, economic 
change (e. g. increasing prosperity) that 'disrupts social regulation and exalts the individual' ( 1975: 
253). 
Durkheim therefore characterised anon-iie as a delimitation of moral agency and as the sense of 
dissatisfaction and disillusionment that accompanies the 'futility of an endless pursuit' (1975: 256). 
In some cases, such 'futility' results in 'anomic suicide'. Merton (1957) further developed the 
concept of anomie to mean a disjunction between collectively shared values and the 'socially 
structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them' (Merton, 1957, cited in 
Deflem, 1989: 631). High levels of anornle in late capitalist societies such as Britain may account 
for much of the social suffering recorded in such societies so that anorme becomes individually 
embodied as anomic suffering. This anomic form of social suffering arises out of a disruption in 
personal agency, social disconnection, and breaches in social relations. Deflem (1989), for 
example, has argued that 'anoMie' (in Merton's sense) is a source of 'depression' ('anorriic 
depression') in such societies. 
Personal distress as social suffering is produced out of particular types of interaction between 
agency, social structure, and symbolic processes. Victor Turner's concept of the social drama 
provides a rich metaphor for understanding these relationships (Turner, 1975,1981) (the social 
drama is discussed in more detail in Appendix A3.3). For example, Turner (1967,1968) described 
how, in small-scale societies (e. g. among the Ndembu of Ghana), 'rituals of affliction' are 
commonly employed as a symbolic means of redressing social conflicts and breaches in the social 
order. 
Durkheim's theory of anomie reverberates through an editorial published in the Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, written in 1966 by the medical anthropologist Joseph Loudon. Loudon 
maintained, for instance, that high levels of social stability, integration, and the presence of 
'traditional customs and institutions' promote the mental well being of the members of such 
societies (1966: 101). Conversely, he maintained that rapid social change and modernisation could 
result in social disintegration, which he linked with heightened levels of psychiatric disorder. 
Rituals of affliction" provide a symbolic means of adjusting to the stresses that emanate from 
contradictions deep within society's social structure (Turner, 1968,1981; Loudon, 1966). 
According to Loudon, their principal function is to redress breaches in the social order and to 
resolve social conflict. Social conflict and breaches in social relations are often experienced as 
powerful negative emotions such as rage or anger. Rituals of affliction provide a safe cultural form 
within which strong disruptive emotions arising out of such conflict can be vented. They originate 
at the individual level and become institutional i sed and standardized as an acceptable way of 
expressing distress: 'Ritual gives controlled expression to personal emotions that demand some 
formal outlet as well as to the conflicts to which any particular set of social relations gives rise' 
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(Loudon, 1966: 103). These ritual displays of powerful negative emotions have a 'safety-valve 
function' in small-scale societies, acting out the stresses in the social system: 
Although there may be no exact correspondence, the links and the cleavages in the 
social system are often experienced in the individual personality system as 
friendship and hostility, love and hate. If we mean by cleavage a social relationship 
with a more or less distinctly hostile component [ ... 
I then rituals [ ... 
] may be said 
to act the links and stresses of the social system as well as to act out the positive 
and negative feelings of individuals. 
Loudon, 1966: 103-4 
The performance of such rituals therefore has a positive and negative function: to promote social 
unity and continuity and to prevent social 'schism' or a more permanent breakdown in the social 
order occurring (Turner, 1968,1981; Loudon, 1966). Loudon claimed that rituals of affliction 
provide a means of discharging powerful and 'potentially dangerous internal forces' through 
'controlled expression' (1966: 104). This reduces their potency and neutralizes any threat they 
might have to the social order. For example, in research among the Zulu, Loudon argued that 
conflicts in the social structure and tensions produced by power relations resonate in the individual 
psyche and these find cathartic 'release' in socially approved 'abreactive rituals'. Moreover, the 
'tensions' produced by the repression of women find 'release' in 'rituals of rebellion' through 
which fundamental conflicts in the community are acted out (1959: 367). Where no sanctioned 
modes of release are available, social tensions or difficulties are canalised into an illness called 
ufufanyana, an illness without biological cause and where the symptoms are precipitated by and 
amplified by social difficulties. 
The research described in this chapter suggests that instead of viewing personal distress as a 
discrete psychological event or as a response to a de-contextualised stimulus (e. g. 'a stressor'), 
such experiences can be interpreted as a type of social suffering that occur within the context of a 
society's 'overall functioning' (Littlewood, 1990: 321). It is clear from the anthropological and 
sociological evidence that cultural and symbolic processes play an important constitutive role in the 
social aetiology of depression. Such processes are therefore bound to influence how depression 
becomes socially distributed within developed English-speaking societies such as Britain. In such 
societies, macro social, political, and economic forces systematically produce the kinds of adverse 
relational settings that are associated with personal distress. These settings produce distress by 
undermining agency, disrupting relationships, increasing exposure to adversity, eroding resilience, 
and narrowing down the range of options available for coping and responding to adversity. Cultural 
and symbolic processes mediate between such toxic relational settings, adverse life events, and 
their embodied impact as personal distress. While cultural processes partly constitute agency, in 
their ideological mode, they also contribute to the reproduction of the power relations and socio- 4n) 
economic forces that produce these local settings. The relationship between these cultural and 
symbolic processes and distress is the central concern of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
Soma and Psyche 
All we have is a disposition to use the language of our ancestors, to worship the 
corpses of their metaphors. 
Rorty (1986) The Contingency of Language 
This chapter is about the relationship between culture and affliction. It builds on the last chapter in 
discussing how cultural and symbolic processes partly constitute the experience, communication, 
meaning, and social response to personal distress and psychiatric illness. Keeping with the example 
of depression, the first section describes how affliction and personal distress are re-worked in 
biomedical discourse in terms of a theory of disorder. Biomedical discourse on distress forms the 
basis for the response of an 'old cross-cultural psychiatry' to the existence of manifest variations in 
the experience, expression, and meaning of depression across different socio-cultural settings. The 
chapter goes on to review how medical anthropology and a 'new cross-cultural psychiatry' have 
sought to understand the relationship between culture and distress. The second section discusses 
how the idiom of distress concept has been developed by medical anthropologists to explore this 
relationship. The discussion centres on how the expression and experience of depression and 
emotional distress are influenced by cultural and symbolic processes. This includes a critical 
discussion of how a dualistic distinction between psychological and somatic idioms of distress has 
been used to characterise we stem/non-we stem differences in depression and dysphoria. 
In the final part of the chapter it is argued that how psychiatric illness and emotional distress are 
configured in any particular society is contingent on the cultural availability of an indigenous 
psychology and a local ethnopsychology of emotion. It is argued how personal distress and private 
affliction are experienced, communicated, interpreted, and responded to in developed English- 
speaking societies is contingent on a Euro-American discourse on the self and body. This implies 
that how social suffering is socially distributed across the populations of such societies is partly a 
function of how agency is constituted differently across the social field. 
2.1 Culture and distress 
The biomedical discourse that organises and provides the rationale for clinical practice and 
research depends on a view of diseases as: 'Universal biological or psychophysiological entities, 
resulting from somatic lesions or dysfunctions' (Good, 1994: 8). According to Gelder et al (2003), 
the biomedical concept of disease refers to an underlying biological or psychological malfunction. 
Within biomedical discourse, diseases are understood to produce observable physiological C- 
abnormalities as well as symptoms 'communicated as an ordered set of complaints' (Good, 1994: 
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8). It is the clinician's task to decode the patient's subjective or symbolic expressions of distress in 
terms of 'underlying somatic referents' (1994: 8). 
Biomedical discourse on distress is grounded in what Cangullhem (1989) has described as the 
positivist view of disease' and an analogy between the concept of mental disorder and that of a 
disease entity. Personal distress is configured as disorder, as qualitatively distinct from normal 
experience. For instance, in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4hed) 
the concept of mental disorder depends on a distinction between normal and abnormal 
psychological or behavioural functioning. 'Disorder' is defined in functional terms as: 
A clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs 
in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e. g. a painful 
syndrome) or disability (i. e. , impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering, death, pain, 
disability, or an important loss of freedom. 
APA, 1994: XXI 
Mental disorders (incorporating the 'neurotic disorders') are defined in terms of dysfunction or 
deviation at any of three levels of individual ontology: 'Syndrome or pattern must currently be 
considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the 
individual' (APA, 1994: XXI). As kinds of mental disorder, the 'emotional pathologies' are 
depicted as though they were an objective manifestation of an underlying biological or 
psychological disease-like dysfunction. 'Depression', for instance, refers to a syndrome, 
prototypically defined as a cluster of symptoms (APA, 1994; Harnmen, 1998). 
The disease metaphor provides the rationale for cross-cultural psychiatric thinking about culture 
and distress. Psychiatric illnesses in western and non-western societies are assumed to have the 
same underlying biological cause (Littlewood, 1998). Cheng (2001), for instance, adopts as his 
starting point the canonical biomedical distinction between 'subjective complaint' and 'objective 
symptom'. He then proceeds to argue that, while the idiom used to express 'psychological disorder' 
may be free to vary across societies, the underlying disorder (the objective symptoms) is not. Such 
assertions rely on a distinction between the universal (biological) 'form' of disorder and their 
particular 'content' (Kleinman, 1988; Littlewood, 1990). This distinction between objective 
disorder and subjective illness means that socio-cultural variations in the incidence and 
manifestation of distress are treated as surface variations that are believed to mask deep-seated, 
biological or psychological processes (Kleinman, 1988; Good, 1994). Cross-cultural psychiatrists 
have therefore interpreted depression as a biological disorder surrounded by 'a series of cultural 
encrustations' (Littlewood, 1998). Cultural processes and subjective meanings are thought to 
influence disorder only insofar as they configure the subjective experience of illness. The 
underlying disease-like disorder, on the other hand, the objective pathology and its aetiology, 
escape cultural contamination. Cultural differences are bracketed off, while underlying similarities 
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in symptornatology become the central focus of research (Kie, nman, 1987). According to 
Kleinman, this view of the 'pathogenic 1 ty/pathopl astic ity' of distress 'comes fairly close to being a 
professional orthodoxy' and represents an 'interpretive blas' In such research (1987: 450). 
Kleinman (1977) presented a powerful critique of what he described as the 'old cross-cultural 
psychiatry' in response to a review of cross-cultural studies on depressive Illness (Singer, 1975). 
Research within this paradigm has been characterised by a search for universal psychiatric disease 
entities and an attempt to validate ethnopsychiatric concepts designed for use in western clinical 
practice (Kleinman, 1977; Marsella et al, 1980). For example, in a World Health Organisation 
study of depression" across several western and non-westem societies, Sartorius et al report 'a 
remarkable absence of culture-specific symptoms, i. e. manifestations that would not fit the classical 
phenomenology of depressive disorders' (1983: 92-93). They claimed that 'although prevalence 
figures vary from study to study, from one investigator to another, there is at present little doubt 
that depressive disorders occur in all parts of the world' (Sartorius et al, 1983: 89). 
Cross-cultural differences in depression challenge biomedical assumptions about its universality 
and biological aetiology. Biomedically-oriented researchers must either modify these assumptions 
and their theory of disease-like disorder; else, they are constrained to attribute the cause of these 
cultural differences to measurement error or methodological irregularities. Cheng, for instance, has 
argued that differences in rates of mental disorders across societies are due to differences in 'case 
finding', measurement, and sampling. Without fully demonstrating exactly how such irregularities 
might have generated observed cross-cultural differences, he concludes that 'there is no sound 
evidence at present to support a real difference in major psychiatric disorders across cultures and 
societies' (2001: 2). Similarly, at the end of Marsella et al's (1980) review of the cross-cultural 
literature on depression, the authors concluded that no clear conclusions could be made about 
differences in incidence rates because of 'variations in conceptualisation'. Culture is washed out 
through thick epidemiological re-description. 
The emergence of a 'new cross-cultural psychiatry' dates back to Kleinman's challenge of the 
orthodox psychiatric view that there are universal depressive reactions (Kleinman, 1977). it 
dovetailed with the development of an interpretive paradigm in medical anthropology 16 grounded in 
American cultural anthropology. This interpretive paradigm was strongly influenced by 
Kleinman's research on Asian medical systems and somatisation in China (Kleinman, 1980). 'New 
cross-cultural psychiatry' is closely associated with and, in places, indistinguishable from medical 
anthropology, particularly in its allegiance to an ethnographic approach and its employment of an 
anthropological theoretical perspective (Littlewood, 1990,1998). Unlike medical anthropology, 
new cross-cultural psychiatry combines the ethnographic approach with clinical, case-based 
methods (Littlewood, 1990). 
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New cross-cultural psychiatrists and medical anthropologists have produced a sustained critique of 
western expert psychiatric discourse on distress. A positive and a negative strategy have been 
employed. The negative critique points to the cultural contingency of psychiatric discourse and 
practice and involves a cultural deconstruction of biomedical discourse on psychiatric illness and 
distress (e. g. Littlewood, 1990,1998; Gaines, 1992a, 1992b; Jadhav, 1996; Luhrmann, 2000). 
Littlewood (1990), for example, characterises the 'new cross-cultural psychiatry' as a 'set of 
related approaches which uses a variety of recent interpretative developments in the humanities and 
social sciences to examine psychiatry's claim to be a biological or psychological discipline, 
constantly pointing out the origins of psychiatric categories, theories, and practice in wider political 
and historical contexts' (1990: 308). 
Comparative epidemiological studies of depressive disorder operationalise psychiatric constructs 
grounded in western symptom configurations (e. g. Sartorius et al, 1983). Kleinman (1977) 
challenged the view that psychiatric diagnostic categories are objective and non-contingent and 
criticized the 'old cross-cultural psychiatry' for committing a 'category fallacy'; the 
superimposition of 'their own cultural categories on some sample of deviant behavior in other 
cultures as if their own categories were culture-free' (1977: 4). In contrast to this, Kleinman has 
characterised the 'depression syndrome' as 'a cultural category constructed by psychiatrists in the 
west to yield a homogeneous group of patients' (1977: 3). Moreover, the operational is ati on of 
western psychiatric categories in research within western societies is not immune from such 
'category fallacies'. 17 
The positive critique, on the other hand, involves the thesis that cultural and symbolic processes 
partly constitute experiences of psychiatric illness in ways that problematise the disease-entity view 
and the assumption that western psychiatric diagnostic categories have universal generalisability. 
This critique has involved a deconstruction of the form versus content distinction upon which the 
psychiatric concept of a mental disorder and the universality thesis both rest (e. g. Littlewood, 1990; 
Fabrega, 1992). Fabrega has asserted, for instance, that: "Culture is not only responsible for the 
'surface' content of behavior but also for part of its structure" (1992: 99). 
Over the past three decades, medical anthropologists and new cross-cultural psychiatrists have 
investigated the ways that cultural and symbolic processes influence the expression and meaning of 
distress and the therapeutic and social response to it. " This research on the relationship of culture 
and distress has been facilitated by the conceptual distinction made by Eisenburg (1977) between 
disease and illness, categories that the 'old cross-cultural psychiatry' had confused (Kleinman, 
1977). Kleinman has characterised disease as 'malfunctioning or maladaptation of biological or 
psychological processes' (1977: 9). Uness', on the other hand, is viewed as the subjective and 
cultural response to 'disease'. Kirmayer has emphasised that both categories are Infused with 
culture when he describes disease as 'the physician's biomedical interpretation of disorder' and 
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illness as 'the patient's personal experience of distress' (1988: 59). This distinction has made it 
possible to differentiate between, on the one hand, the study of the relationship between culture and 
biomedical discourse and practice, and, on the other hand, the study of how experiences of illness 
and distress are configured by cultural and symbolic processes. 
An understanding of the relationship between culture and distress in medical anthropology relies on 
an understanding of how cultural symbols relate to somatic experience (Good, 1994). In this 
meaning-centred approach to medical anthropology, Good charactenses illness experience as 'a 
syndrome of meaning and experience' (1994: 54) or as 'a set of words, experiences, and feelings 
which typically 'run together' for members of a society' (1977: 27). Symbolic processes are 
believed to mediate the relationship between society and the phenomenological world of illness. 
Good, for instance, describes how illness is produced out of the interplay between soma, psyche, 
and social reality: 'Meaning and interpretive practices interact with social, psychological, and 
physiological processes to produce distinctive forms of illness and illness trajectories' (Good, 
1994: 54-65). Similarly, Kleinman says how a 'symbolic pathway of words, feelings, values, 
expectations, beliefs and the like' connects 'affective and physiological processes and cultural 
events' (Kleinman, 1973: 209; cited in Good, 1977: 52). The meaning and expression of physical 
pain is patterned by this 'symbolic reality' so that physiological, psychological, and social 
processes interact to generate a 'complaint'. As Kleinman puts it: 'We learn how to identify and 
react to pain, how to label and communicate dysfunction Illness idioms crystallize out of a 
dialectic between bodily processes and cultural categories, between experience and meaning' 
(1988: 13-14). 
Cultural and symbolic processes strongly influence how psychiatric illness is expressed and the 
social and therapeutic response taken to it. According to Littlewood, psychiatric illness occurs 
within the context of 'a web of economic constraints, social relations and beliefs' whose impact is 
'mediated' by symbols (1998: 1). Good et al characterise depression as 'a disorder of the 
interpretive process, a disorder of 'perception and interpretation' and not just 'a result of culturally 
influenced interpretations of an underlying disease' (1985: 381). They point out that cultural 
representations and interpretations 'provide the means for responding to and interpreting 'reality" 
(1985: 382). Cultural or symbolic processes determine which events or stimuli count as 'stressors'. 
In a North American cultural context, depression has been characterised as a tendency to 
experience automatic, unintended, and negative thoughts about the self, world, and future (Beck, 
1976,1987). 'Dysfunctional' cognitive schemas or beliefs that shape how events and circumstances 
are interpreted generate such depressive thinking. The interaction of such a cognitive 'diathesis' 
and environmental 'stressors' is believed to cause 'non-endogenous unipolar depression' (Kovacs 
and Beck, 1978). Moreover, the power of events or circumstances to trigger depression depends on 
their subjective significance or meaning and the personality of the sufferer (e. cy. whether they are 
6relation, ship' or 'autonorny-oriented') (Beck, 1983). The emotions engendered by how the 
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ing, perception, environment is interpreted are partly constituted in a symbolic process of labell' 
categorization, explanation, and interpretation. In this way, again, symbolic processes are internal 
to the social aetiology of depression. Furthermore, as Rack pointed out, how sufferers interpret 
their experience of depression 'alters the quality of the expenence itself' (1982: 106). 
The meaning and interpretation of illness symptoms are based on shared cultural understandings 
(Kleinman, 1980; Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985). Society provides its members with a set of 
cultural symbols through which suffering can be articulated. Littlewood describes how 'public 
symbols' mediate the relationship between the public domain and individual embodied experience. 
The verbalisation of feelings 'draws upon certain stock expressions which are familiar to our 
audience' (1998: 239). Such symbols are used to express personal distress and partly constitute the 
form that it takes (1998: 219). 
Interpretive and critical medical anthropologists have identified at least six ways that cultural and 
symbolic processes constitute experiences of personal distress: " 
(a) Experiences of personal distress are categorised and typologised in local ethnomedical or 
ethnopsychiatric discourses. 
(b) The public expression or communication of personal distress depends on the cultural 
availability of idioms of distress and embodied metaphors. 
(c) Personal distress is represented, explained, and interpreted in 'explanatory models' or 'illness 
narratives'. 
The experience, expression, and meaning of personal distress are contingent on cultural 
discourses on the self and the body, and on an ethnopsychology of emotion. 
(e) Cultural processes constitute the phenomenological experience of suffering and distress and 
how it becomes embodied. 
(f) Cultural and symbolic processes influence the social and therapeutic response to distress, and 
how suffering is interpreted, evaluated, and responded to (e. g. Kirmayer, 1989; Csordas and 
Kleinman, 1996). 
One way that culture influences illness experience is through 'the cultural construction of illness 
categories' (Kleinman, 1980: 78). By analogy, many societies have their own 'ethnopsychiatry' or 
folk model of psychiatric illness, their own distinctive ways of categorising, classifying, and 
describing abnormal and deviant behaviour, bodily or social experience in accordance with local 
moral concerns (Gaines, 1992a, 1992b; Kleinman, 1990). In a bid to circumvent cultural relativism 
while taking into account the cultural contingency of psychiatric illnesses, Fabrega sought to re- 
conceptuallse them as 'human behavioural breakdowns'. Such breakdowns represent 'culturally 
distinctive psychopathological structures' defined relation to local cultural norms of experience 
and behaviour. They represent 'impairments in emotional well-being' or 'irregularities in social 
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identity and conduct' that tend to 'render work and relationships unproductive' and 'disrupt the 
social I ife of persons and their immediate co-members' (1992: 92-93). 
As Littlewood (1990) has argued, illness categories and representations are not 'pure cognitions'. 
Their use is often figurative rather than literal and they are embedded In local social practices in 
which they are rhetorically deployed by speakers to achieve diverse social ends. Like ethnomedical 
categories, ethnopsychiatric terms only make sense as part of a wider 'field of signs' (Good, 1994). 
For instance, among Iranians, 'heart distress' represents an ethnopsychiatric disease category that 
refers to 'a complex of physical sensations associated with particular feelings of anxiety' (Good, 
1977: 33). Good points out that such 'dis-ease' is experienced on a continuum fromrrUld excitation' 
to 'chronic sensations of heart irregularities'. The image of 'heart distress' is a 'particular 
configuration of stress' that draws together stresses, feelings, values, symbols, and social 
relationships. Its meaning partly resides in its rhetorical use in social situations as a way of 
communicating distress and obtaining treatment and relief (1977: 49). 
In western ethnopsychiatric discourse, depression as symptom (e. g. dysphoric affect) can be 
distinguished from depression as mental disorder or psychiatric syndrome (Kleinman and Good, 
1985). The latter can be distinguished from the employment of the term 'depression' in lay 
discourse on distress in which it is commonly used to signify a mood or emotion (Littlewood, 
1990). It is possible that the somatic symptoms associated with depressive illness are universal. 
Nonetheless, these symptoms are interpreted and responded to in very different ways in different 
societies (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985; Kirmayer and Young, 1998). Fabrega, for instance, says 
how members of small-scale societies 'select out, label, and amplify depressive reactions for social 
purposes' (Fabrega, 1974; quoted in Littlewood, 1998: 114). In non-westem societies, the etic 
category of 'depression' is rarely used as an ethnomedical illness category. Nor is it used as a label 
for a particular kind of emotion (Littlewood, 1998; Singer, 1975). Jenkins has argued that the 
relationship culture and distress can be understood within the context of a society's full range of 
emotional experience. 'Cultural styles of dysphoria', for example, can be usefully interpreted as 
elements of an 'ethnopsychological model of emotion' rather than as different versions of a western 
illness category of depression (1996: 84). In Trinidad, for instance, the term tabanka refers to a 
form of emotional distress experienced by men in response to desertion or loss of a spouse 
(Littlewood, 1988,1998). However, it is not regarded as an illness even though its 'vegetative 
symptoms' are similar to those of depression (Littlewood, 1998: 122). Obeyesekere (1985) has 
argued that the view of depressive affect (dysphoria) as a symptom of a psychiatric illness is not 
shared by Buddhists in Sri Lanka. In Buddhism, he says, suffering, sorrow, and pain are accepted 
as a part of what it is to live 'in the world' and, in Sri Lanka, such suffering is expressed in 
meditation and the religious practice of sil. Obeyesekere argues that Buddhist discourse on 
suffering, loss, and hopelessness can only be understood in relation to its wider context in Buddhist 
religious practices. Depressive affect is interpreted in existential terrns rather than as a symptom of 
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illness. In an anthropological study of emotions among the Kuall of Papua New Guinea, Schleffelin 
(1985) reports that 'depression' (as an emotion) is not recognised and there is no label for it. He 
shows how the social and cultural context within which emotional distress (e. g. anger, grief) takes 
place among the Kuali shapes its expression. Distress is experienced and articulated as part of an 
expressive order of emotion' so that what are interpreted as symptoms of 'depression' in western 
societies have a different meaning among the Kuall. The social and cultural order, he says, is 
implicated in 'the way people experience emotions, and in the symptornatology and structure of the 
types of depression they experience' (Schieffelin, 1985: 127). 
2.2 Idioms of distress 
Medical anthropologists have developed the concept of an idiom of distress to describe culture- 
specific ways of symbolising and expressing distress (Nichter, 198 1; Parsons and Wakeley, 199 1; 
Kirmayer and Young, 1998). For instance, in the context of an ethnographic study of psychosocial 
conflict among Havik Brahmin women, Nichter (1981) argued that ethnopsychiatric phenomena 
could be usefully conceptualised as idioms of distress. Such idioms refer to the 'modes' available 
in a particular socio-cultural setting for the expression and communication of distress. The meaning 
of such idioms derives from the context of their use, the social consequences of their employment, 
and their 'communicative force', and the social and cultural availability of alternative means of 
articulating distress (1981: 382,402). Good (1994) points out that the meaning of such idioms 
partly derives from their context within shared semantic networks or 'meaning complexes'. 
Kleinman (1986) has shown how such cultural modes of expression provide the means for 
articulating personal distress in socially sanctioned ways. Within medical anthropology and cross- 
cultural Psychiatry, discussion about idioms of distress has been organised around a distinction 
between somatic and psychological idioms of distress. 20 
Somatisation 
Medical anthropologists, sociologists, and medical researchers have found that somatic idioms of 
distress are common across non-western and western settings as a way of articulating distress and 
social adversity. Such an idiom is commonly used to articulate distress that has its roots in 
interpersonal, social, and economic difficulties (Raguram et al, 2001). Much of the discussion 
about somatic idioms of distress has constellated around the polysemous concept of 'somatisation'. 
'Somatisation' refers to a pattern of illness behaviour in which personal or social distress is 
expressed in 'an idiom of bodily complaints and medical help seeking' (Kleinman and Kleinman, 
1985: 430). According to a review of the literature on 'somatisation' by Kin-nayer and Young 
(1998), the current evidence suggests that 'somatisation' is 'ubiquitous' and is probably the most 
common means of articulating distress and adversity in both western and non-western settings. 
They argue that the high prevalence of 'somatisation' across societies challenges the view that it is 
a separate form of psychopathology (i. e. 'somatoform. disorders'). Nonetheless, there remain some 
marked differences across different sociocultural groups in the extent to which they employ a 
somatic idiom of distress to articulate distress, as well as the kinds of somatic idiom that are used. 
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The form that such idioms take, how they are used, and in what circumstances, are grounded in the 
local socio-cultural contexts of their production. They can be used figuratively and strategically to 
I Icy, communicate a range of meanings: somatic, social, moral, and emotiona (Kirmayer and Youn - 
1998). For example, Good (1994) showed how Iranians make use of an idiom of 'heart distress' to 
communicate their personal difficulties and concerns. 
Among Asian populations, distress is commonly expressed in a somatic idiom, rather than a 
psychological discourse on mood or emotion. " Krause (1989) found that Punjabi patients living in 
England drew on a somatic metaphor of the 'sinking heart' to express personal and social distress. 
Nichter found that multiple cultural idioms were available to Havik Brahmin women for expressing 
their distress and experiences of social affliction. These included, for instance, a 'food idiom'; a 
somatic idiom of 'dizziness' and 'weakness'; a socio-moral idiom of purity and devotion; and a 
magical idiom of 'evil eye' and spirit possession (1981: 382). Nichter found that public expressions 
of emotion within the family were discouraged and social mobility and autonomy outside of the 
family tightly restricted. There were few opportunities to express distress in a public setting ( 198 1: 
398). Nichter interpreted somatic idioms of distress as forms of 'somatization', as somatic 
symptoms of distress produced in response to social conflict, powerlessness, and feelings of 
vulnerability. He argued that such somatic idioms of distress articulated core values and norms 
within the Havik Brahmin community. For instance, metaphors of 'loss of balance' or 'overheat' 
were used to signify an infringement of the communal expectation that emotions be kept under 
control. In the recent EMPIRIC study in the UK, Nazroo and O'Connor (2002) explored the idioms 
used to express mental distress across different ethnic groups. 22 In comparison with other ethnic 
groups, they found that South Asian respondents were less likely to use a vocabulary of self- 
esteem, guilt, shame, or loss of confidence. A somatic idiom of 'pressure' was commonly used to 
describe their experiences of distress. For example, migrants from South Asia reported 'pressure in 
the head' or 'rising blood pressure' and described a range of other physical symptoms to 
communicate social affliction. 
While medical anthropologists have interpreted somatic expressive modes as idioms of distress, 
cross-cultural psychiatrists and biomedically-oriented researchers have interpreted somatic 
expressions of distress as symptoms of mental disorder (Kirmayer and Young, 1998). The focus 
here has been on 'somatisation' as a form of psychopathology. " For instance, in a review of the 
cross-cultural psychiatric literature on depression, Marsella et al (1980) concluded that depressive 
disorder in non-western societies is typically presented somatically. Psychological and mood 
idioms (e. g. guilt, self-deprecation, dysphoria) were reported to be rare. In a comparative study that 
explored the experience of distress among British and Indian patients, Jadav et al (2001) found that 
Indian patients spontaneously described distress using a somatic discourse. They surmised that 
these findings 'are consistent with widely accepted views of 'somatisation' outside of Euro- 
American cultures' (2001: 60), challenging the view of depression as a psychological entity 
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indicated by mood symptoms. Nonetheless, many patients also expressed their distress in 
psychological terms. This, they argued, challenges the distinction in DSM-IV and ICD-10 between 
somatoform and depressive disorders. In recent comparative psychiatric research in Zimbabwe, 
Patel et al (2001) found that no concept of depression or anxiety exists in Shona culture. Distress is 
expressed in a somatic idiom of headache and fatigue, rather than in a psychological idiom of 
emotion and mood. Nonetheless, Patel et al believed that such somatic idioms masked underlying 
psychological distress (e. g. 'depression') among Shona people: 
On inquiry, however, most patients freely admit to cognitive and emotional 
symptoms. Many somatic symptoms, especially those related to the heart and the 
head, are cultural metaphors for fear or grief. Most depressed individuals attribute 
their symptoms to 'thinking too much', to a supernatural cause, and to social 
stressors. 
Patel et al, 2001: 483 
Kleinman found that the ethnomedical category of 'neurasthenia' was commonly used by Chinese 
psychiatrists to diagnose patients who presented with headaches, insomnia, dizziness, and chronic 
pain. Chinese sufferers construed their distress as chronic or persistent pain and presented their 
problems in a somatic idiom. Chinese clinicians viewed their patients' illnesses as having a 
biological aetiology. 'Somatisation', then, was co-constructed by patient and doctor in a way that 
sanctioned "the patient's bodily idiom of distress" (Kleinman and Kleinman, 1985: 439). Kleinman 
(1986) reported that, among a sample of Chinese neurasthenic patients, the majority met criteria for 
diagnosis of 'major depressive disorder'. Only a small minority complained of depression. He 
believed that dysphoric emotion was 'suppressed' among these neurasthenic patients. Moreover, 
these patients rejected the label 'depression' when it was applied to them. Kleinman (1986) also 
investigated chronic pain (e. g. headaches and insomnia) in a Chinese primary-care setting, but 
among patients without a medical diagnosis. A significant minority of these patients did not meet 
criteria for psychiatric disorder (using western diagnostic schemes). Nonetheless, chronic pain was 
commonly linked to social difficulties and Kleinman interpreted it as a form of 'somatisation'. 
Are depressive disorders presented in a somatic idiom of distress the same as depressive disorders 
articulated in a psychological idiom? Kleinman and Kleinman maintained that 'neurasthenia' and 
'depression' represent 'distinctive cultural construals of the same psychobiological state', and that 
these 'labels are not creating out of nothing the difficult social reality patients face, though they are 
organizing that exigent reality in different (sometimes greatly different) ways' (1985: 438). The 
somatisation and psychologisation of depression refer to different illness experiences. Nonetheless, 
according to Kleinman, both are articulated upon a universal 'psychobiological and social' 
foundation of human experience. 
While personal distress and the response to adversity are principally articulated in a somatic idiom 
in non-western societies, the somatization of affecti and anxiety disorders also common among 
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the majority populations of developed English-speaking societies (Kirmayer and Young, 1998). 
Rack, for instance, observed that the 'somatisation of emotional distress applies to depression 
(whether endogenous or reactive) and to anxiety. It is by no means unknown among the indigenous 
British, especially the less articulate and the elderly' (1982: 101-2). A somatic idiom of distress is 
commonly used by North Americans and Europeans to express emotional distress (Kleinman and 
Kleinman, 1985; Kirmayer and Young, 1998). For example, in the EMPIRIC study, a somatic 
idiom of distress was common among all ethnic groups (including white Britons) (Nazroo and 
O'Connor, 2002). Across ethnic groups, respondents complained of difficulties sleeping, feeling 
tired, loss of interest or poor concentration, loss of motivation, headache, backache, and a loss of 
appetite. The World Health Organisation Cross-National Study of Mental Disorders in Primary 
Care showed that personal distress is clinically presented somatically in primary -settings across the 
world (Ustun & Sartorius, 1995). In secondary analysis of data from the World Health 
Organisation study, Simon et al (1999) found that somatic symptoms were associated with anxiety 
and depression in many of the 14 countries included in the World Health Organisation study with 
half of the patients diagnosed with depression reporting 'multiple unexplained somatic symptoms' 
and around one in ten denying that they had psychological symptoms of depression. They also 
report significant cultural variation across study sites in the frequency with which somatic 
symptoms were associated with depression. There were no differences, however, between western 
and non-westem sites in the degree to which distress was reported exclusively with somatic 
symptoms. 
Kirmayer and Young (1998) point out that patterns of somatisation of emotional distress across 
societies may reflect familiarity with and the degree of access to (western) healthcare provision. 
Contact with clinicians trained in biomedicine may work to amplify somatic idioms even where 
other idioms ('sociomoral' or other) are used in everyday life. Stigma may also explain why some 
patients articulate their distress somatically, rather than in other ways. Raguram et al (1996) found 
that among a sample of Indian patients suffering from depression, even though they experienced a 
high degree of psychological distress, most focused on their somatic symptoms. The latter carried a 
lower degree of stigma, while depressive symptoms were perceived as 'private and dangerous' and 
'socially disadvantageous' and so attracted a higher degree of stigma. This partly explained 
patients' tendency to present their distress somatically. 
Kirmayer (1988) has argued that emotional or social distress articulated in a somatic idiom 
challenges the rational order of biomedicine. It conflicts with a dominant Euro-American 
ethnopsychology that constructs emotion as deep psychological experience, as 'interpersonal or 
intrapsychic conflict' (1988: 329). Biomedical discourse is organised around a set of metaphysical 
dualisms that make it difficult to rationalise such phenomena. As Kirmayer puts it: 'Psychosomatic 
medicine, despite its aspirations toward wholeness, reproduces the same Cartesian split. Attributing 
symptoms to psychological causes attaches blame to patients or diminishes trust in their rationality' 
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(1988: 83). Even where a patient conforms to the norms of illness behaviour, Kirmayer points out 
that 'if medicine cannot explain or alleviate the illness, the patient may be blamed for its failure. 
These manoeuvres act to maintain the rationality and coherence of the biomedical world view even 
while they disqualify the patient's suffering or moral agency' (1988: 58). 'SomatIsation' represents 
an expert interpretation of lay discourse on distress where affliction is articulated in the language of 
the body, in feeling and sensation. This interpretation implies that depression is really a 
psychological or social phenomenon, rather than principally a biological one. 
Psychologisation 
Kirmayer defines psychological idioms of distress as 'modes of expression that explicitly refer to 
indigenous theories of mind, self and emotion' (1989: 330). Psychologisation is 'the obverse of 
somatization: patients with physical or social origins of distress focus on the emotional aspects of 
experience and attribute their symptoms to intrapsychic conflict' (Kirmayer, 1989: 330). Such 
idioms are more common among the majority populations of developed English-speaking societies 
and are grounded in a Euro-American ethnopsychology articulated in a cultural discourse on 
emotion and mood. For instance, Nazroo and O'Connor (2002) found that only White and Black 
Caribbean respondents spoke of 'mood swings' in their descriptions of personal distress. These 
informants also deployed a metaphorical discourse on 'stress', 'anxiety levels', and 'pressure' to 
describe the emotional impact of adversity. Idioms of 'nervousness', 'fear', and 'panic attacks' 
were also common among White respondents and they deployed an array of other metaphors to 
articulate their distress (e. g. 'feeling lost'). Nonetheless, Nazroo and O'Connor (2002) found that 
all ethnic groups used both psychological and somatic idioms of distress; across all groups, a 
vocabulary of 'stress', 'worry', 'hopelessness', 'depression', and 'anxiety' were used to describe 
mental distress. Discourse expressing low self-esteem (e. g. 'feeling worthless') or a loss of 
confidence was also common across all groups. All ethnic groups spoke about depression, anxiety 
and stress as short-lived or 'periodic' affective states, rather than as prolonged experiences. Many 
respondents differentiated between ordinary distress (e. g. 'worries', 'anxiety') and more severe 
experiences of distress. Metaphors of 'feeling down' or 'feeling low' were common. 
Another example comes from an Australian study that compared idioms of distress employed 
among two small samples, one drawn from the general population and the other drawn from among 
a sample of individuals seeking professional counselling support (Parsons and Wakeley, 199 1). 
Although both groups reported physical symptoms, such symptoms did not figure centrally in their 
accounts. Moreover, most informants did not connect their somatic experiences with their 
experiences of personal distress. Nonetheless, informants experiencing more severe distress were 
more likely to describe it using a somatic idiom. In some cases though, even where a high degree of 
physical suffering was present, distress was still described and explained in 'psycho-emotional' 47) 
terms. Parsons and Wakeley partly explained this in terms of an 'Australian Anglo-Celtic' cultural 
discourse on the self that includes 'the pervasive belief that distress is a psychoemotional 
phenomena somehow bereft of physiological manifestations' (1991: 127). This is combined with a 
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moral expectation that emotions be constrained or expressed in a 'rational/pseudo-rational manner' 
lest one appears 'weak'. Parsons and Wakeley suggested that the dualism that underlies lay 
discourse on distress maps onto biomedical and therapeutic responses where distress is conceived 
psychologically and illness is constructed as a somatic experience. In the Australian context, 
distress therefore becomes somatised partly as a consequence of the clinical encounter where 
4 patient and doctor collude in the presentation of disorder in bodily narrative' (1991: 127). 
Among the majority populations of developed English-speaking societies, emotional, and social 
distress is commonly expressed in a psychological idiom of mood and emotion (Jenkins, 1996; 
Kleinman, 1986,1988; Marsella et al, 1980). Jadhav et al (2001) explored discourse on depression 
among White Britons. Informants included a mixture of in-patients and outpatients. They were 
questioned about patterns of distress, perceived causes, help seeking, and their beliefs on 'mind- 
body-soul' (2001: 54). The majority of patients mentioned 'sadness' spontaneously (i. e. without 
further probing). Around two-fifths of their informants reported 'anxiety'. Only one in ten 
spontaneously described their distress in terms of 'somatic symptoms' (2001: 56). On further 
probing, however, most White British patients mentioned somatic symptoms. Moreover, in their 
narratives of distress, emotional and somatic descriptions of distress were closely juxtaposed. 
Jadhav et al argued that such accounts challenge the etic distinction between somatic and 
psychological symptoms. They concluded that: 'An emic analysis of narrative accounts of illness 
shows the complexity of patterns of distress and how the components overlap and interrelate' 
(2001: 61). Nonetheless, in a society where psychological modes of emotional expression are 
socially encouraged and 'amplified' in clinical encounters, it is more likely that depression will be 
expressed in such a form. 
There is some evidence that idioms of distress vary within the majority populations of developed 
English-speaking societies such as Britain. The psychologisation of distress is believed to be 
particularly common among the educated and middle-class members of such societies (Kleinman, 
1986; Jadhav et al, 2001). Kleinman says, for instance, that in contemporary western societies, 
affect is "culturally shaped as 'deep' psychological experience and rationalised into discretely 
labelled emotions (depression, anxiety, anger) that were previously categorized and felt primarily 
as bodily experiences" (Kleinman, 1986: 56). This understanding of emotion is rooted in a 
dominant Euro-American ethnopsychology and a psychologised cultural discourse on the self. 
Conversely, the use of a somatic idiom of distress has been associated with lower socio-econorruc 
status and poor levels of education (Kleinman, 1986). 24 
A clear message emerges from this body of research: somatisation and psychogisation are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, the populations of developed English-speakinto), societies employ 
both a somatic and a psychological idiom to express their experiences of distress. Nonetheless, 
there is significant variation in the type, frequency, and use of idioms of distress across 
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sociocultural groups (Kirmayer and Young, 1998). A psychological idiom of distress, for instance, 
is rarely deployed among the majority populations of non-western societies. While western and 
non-western societies have the body in common, an individualised psyche is constituted within a 
western cultural discourse on the self. This, in turn, influences how distress is expressed, 
communicated, and interpreted in societies such as Britain. If the accumulated evidence on 
somatisation and psychologisation point to anything, it is to the cultural and historical contingency 
of western expert discourses on the self, body, and distress. Where a sociocentric cultural discourse 
on the self predominates and where the expression of personal distress and social adversity are 
discouraged or attract a social stigma, a somatic idiom of distress may be the only socially 
sanctioned pathway left open for the expression of social suffering. Conversely, a psychological 
idiom of distress may be more likely among sociocultural groups and in speech situations where 
the physical expression of emotional or social distress is de-emphasised and devalued. 
Embodied metaphors of distress 
There has been a recent methodological and theoretical shift in medical anthropology from a 
concern with symbolism, meaning, and interpretation to an interest in phenomenology and how 
selves are embodied in different socio-cultural settings (Lock, 1993; Monks, 1996; Csordas, 1990, 
1994). The shift to a cultural phenomenology of illness and suffering signals a shift of emphasis in 
medical anthropology from cognitive or interpretive processes to symbolically mediated embodied 
experience. Lock and Scheper-Hughes, for instance, argue for an anthropological conception of the 
body that pays more attention to the existential, lived experience of the subject; what they describe 
as the 'the phenomenological sense of the lived experience of the body self' (1996: 45). On this 
view, the task for medical anthropology is to explore 'the relationship of cultural beliefs and 
practices in connection with health and illness to the sentient human body' (Lock and Scheper- 
Hughes, 1996: 44). This shift of emphasis away from symbolic processes to embodiment has 
involved a cultural deconstruction of the mind/body and psychological/somatic dualisms that 
organise both biomedical and medical-anthropological knowledge about illness and distress. 
Moreover, the distinction between psychological and somatic idioms of distress is grounded in this 
dualism. Lock and Scheper-Hughes rightly argue that "if mind and body are truly one, as even the 
most conventional medical anthropologists assert, then all diseases and bodily distress, without 
exception, are and must be psychosomatic because all are 'somatized' as well as 'mentalized"' 
(1996: 65). The goal for research is therefore to uncover the relationships between illness 
experiences, idioms of distress, moments of refusal, resistance, and the broader political and social 
order. Within this methodological paradigm, somatisation is re-interpreted as 'a dominant metaphor 
expressing [both] individual and social complaint' (Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 65). 
The discourse on somatisation described above remains caught within the biomedical antinomies 
described by Kirmayer (1988). For instance, Scheper-Hughes points out that anthropologists have 
tended to interpret nen, oso ('nerves') as somatisation of emotional distress originating In social or 
economic adversity. Within the somatisation model, she says, 'illnesses are understood as the 
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subjective, transparently psychological manifestation of real, identified physical diseases, else they 
are nothing at all' (1993: 65). Scheper-Hughes interpreted nervoso among the residents of a 
Brazilian shantytown as a 'polysen-& folk concept', an 'expansive diagnostic category of distress', 
a generative metaphor for expressing both social and physical distress, and as a 'folk conceptual 
scheme for describing relations among mind, body and social body' (1993: 173-186). The cane 
cutters of the Brazilian shantytown expressed hunger, poverty, anxiety, and other afflictions in an 
embodied metaphor of nervoso. This took the form of trembling, fainting, seizures, and paralysis. 
Nervoso, she argued, represented a 'metaphor and metonym for the socio-political system and for 
the weak position of the rural worker' (1993: 186). 
One way of interpreting somatic idioms of distress is to view them as discursive acts (e. g. 'acts of 
positioning') and as embodied metaphors of experience (Kirmayer and Young, 1998). On this 
view, idioms of distress are not necessarily literal 'presentations' of experience. Rather, they are 
discursive constructions that employ rhetoric and trope and only have meaning in relation to the 
sociocultural contexts of their production. Low, for instance, advocates a shift of emphasis from an 
interpretive-hermeneutic focus on idioms of distress, vocabularies, and symptoms, to lived 
experience as embodied metaphor. A defining property of such metaphors is that they articulate 
bodily sensations, while simultaneously conveying social and political meaning. As embodied 
symbolic processes, they work back onto the body to partly constitute the bodily sensations and 
feelings out of which they originate. Medicalisation, for instance, refers to an ideological, symbolic 
process through which medical metaphors are imposed on embodied experience, partly constituting 
such experience in a way that conforms with biomedical knowledge and practice (Low, 1994; 
Kirmayer, 1988). For instance, an embodied metaphor of nerves is common among some Central 
and Latin American populations as a 'way in which distress is embodied' (1994: 142). Figurative 
language and 'graphic and vivid bodily terms' are used to express nervous physical and emotional 
sensations including: fear, trembling, crying, headaches, upset stomach, insomnia, loss of appetite, 
dizziness, and a pounding heart (1994: 142-6). According to Low, the phenomenon of 'nerves' 
(nervios) also articulates social and political adversity and is used to express 'the lived experience 
of daily life as a metaphor of social, psychological, political or economic distress' (1994: 142). 
Among urban Costa Ricans, for instance, Low interprets nervios as an 'embodied metaphor of the 
self and the self's relation to the social system [ ... ] It embodies the breakdown of the individual's 
relations in the social system' (1994: 159). Nervios ('nerves') embodies the broken family ties and 
fractured social relations that form the basis of identity and selfhood and is simultaneously 
emotional, social, and embodied. It is metaphorically employed to symbolise 'the disintegration 
and breakdown of the self/society contract in explicitly bodily terms' (1994: 157). 
The ideational or referential meaning of discourse on distress is only one dimension of its meaning. 
Discourse on distress is constituted by its context in a wider conversation. It takes its meaning from 




idioms, ontological, and explanatory systems, a stock of stories, and an assortment of symbols. 
While discourse on distress is partly grounded in the phenomenology of the body, it is also 
grounded in a cultural discourse on the self and society and in social institutions, practices, and 
structures. Moreover, while metaphors may be embodied, they are also discursive acts deployed by 
speakers to accomplish a range of social ends; they have social force. 
2.3 The self in distress 
The self as an embodied symbolic process 
Medical anthropologists and cultural psychiatrists have applied the concept of 'the self' in their 
interpretations of illness and suffering across cultures as well as in western societies (Gaines, 
1992b; Kirmayer, 1989). Some anthropologists have suggested that 'the self is universal (Cohen, 
1992,1994; Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1996). Cohen, for instance, has argued that the concept of 
'the self' should play an axiomatic role in anthropological analysis and that such analysis is 
somehow contingent on such a concept. On this view, the self is essentially characterised by self- 
consciousness, autonomy, and creativity. Similarly, Lock and Scheper-Hughes define 'the self' in 
terms of its capacity for self-consciousness, its separateness, and independence. They also 
emphasise the embodied nature of 'the self'. This is captured in the concept of the 'body-self' 
described above (1996: 52). However, an entity metaphor underlies this concept, so that 'the self' 
collapses into the body. Instead of reifying the self as a thing in this way, it is more useful to view 
the self as partly constituted out of its own self-interpretations (e. g. Taylor, 1985). 'The self' might 
be usefully conceived as an embodied, symbolic process, an ongoing social accomplishment, rather 
than as a thing or entity. As Bruner puts it, selves are 'always in production' (1986a: 12). If selves 
are universal at all, then it is only because embodiment, symbolic processes, and the social relations 
through which bodies are constituted as selves are also universal. Such a concept of 'the self' 
provides a heuristic interpretive tool that facilitates social-scientific understanding of experience 
and action. 
As an interpretive process, the self mediates the relationship between society and somatic 
experience and is constituted through engagement in discursive and symbolic practices in social 
relations with other selves. For instance, social psychologists Potter and Wetherell maintain that 
'the very possibility of a self concept, is inextricably dependent on the linguistic practices used in 
everyday life to make sense of our own and others' actions' (1987: 95). In what Berger and 
Luckmann describe as 'primary socialisation', self-formation occurs through an ongoing 'societal 
dialectic' between the emerging self and others. This dialectic facilitates the internalisation of 
collective meanings (1971: 149). Rapport says, for instance, that individuals 'routinely dip' into 'a 
fund of clich6s' and 'consume cultural artefacts [ ... ] in order to create and develop themselves' 
(1992: 203). Cultural or symbolic processes do not so much 'mediate' the relationship between 
body and self. This is because they are part of the same process. Rather, symbolic and cultural 
practices bridge the gap between body and society through the configuration of agency. They work 
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through social relations to socialise the body, so that the self is the process through which the body 
is made social. 
Even if the self is a universal feature of every society, how selves are constituted and 
conceptualised is not universal. For instance, individuals come to define themselves in relation to 
the dornmant cultural model of the self in the society to which they belong (Rosaldo, 1984; Heelas, 
1981). Heelas, for instance, defines an 'indigenous psychology' as 'the cultural views, theories, 
conjectures, classifications, assumptions and metaphors - together with notions embedded in social 
institutions - which bear on psychological topics. These psychologies are statements about the 
nature of the person and his relations with the world' (1981: 3). Along similar lines, Jenkins 
defined an 'ethnopsychology' as an 'indigenous emotional categories, notions of the self and body, 
the relations between emotions and the contexts in which they occur; and the kinds of accounts that 
are given for emotional experiences' (1996: 74). 
Indigenous psychologies provide guidance on how to live and a framework for interpreting social 
action and for communicating experience. For instance, Shweder and Bourne say that a society's 
self-conceptions are the 'ideas, premises by which people guide their lives, and only to the extent a 
person lives by them do they have force' (1982: 193). Heelas says that indigenous psychologies 
'enable participants to make sense of what they are about, how they should judge others, how they 
can live up to their roles, how deviants should be handled, how, in general, the individual should 
operate in society' (1981: 15). As a prototypical cultural process, language is the principal medium 
in this hermeneutic process. Indigenous psychologies or ethnopsychologies are articulated in 
cultural or public discourses on the self, body, and society. Selves reflexively interpret and partly 
constitute themselves out of such discourses (Appendix A3.4 includes a discussion on the 
constitutive power of discourse in relation to experience, selfhood, and social relations). 
Ethnopsychology of distress 
Indigenous notions of the person, body, and society partly constitute the experience, expression, 
and meaning of personal distress and psychiatric illness (Marsella et al, 1985; Littlewood, 1990; 
Fabrega, 1992). Indigenous psychologies or ethnopsychologies mediate the relationship between 
social relations and phenomenological experience. The provision of a cultural discourse on the self 
is therefore a central way that culture shapes the experience and expression of emotional distress. 
Differences in how emotions are identified, interpreted, experienced, and expressed are grounded 
in different conceptions of the self and body (Jenkins, 1996; Rosaldo, 1984). Heelas, for instance, 
emphasises how cultural meanings partly constitute emotion experiences. How events are 
interpreted detern-iines their emotional impact: 
How we respond [to events] depends on how we use our knowledge of our 
emotional life, interpreting an episode as shaming, for example, because it accords 
with our understanding of the episode as being bound up with what we take shame 
to mean Meanings are necessary for the construction of emotions. 
Heelas, 1981: 235 
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Cultural understandings of body and self organise the interpretation and social response to illness 
experience (Good, 1994; Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1996). Gordon has shown, for instance, how a 
cultural discourse on illness among the Fulani is informed by their cultural identity. Their thinking 
on illness is fashioned by 'who the Fulani think they are' (2000: 297). Similarly, ethnopsychiatries, 
embodied metaphors, and idioms of distress are embedded in wider cultural discourses about the 
self, body, and society . 
2' According to Fabrega, for instance, 'human behavioural breakdowns' 
(HBBs) are breakdowns in what it is to be a person in relation to a particular cultural context and 
this is expressed in terms of the locally dominant discourse on the self and society. Fabrega, for 
instance, has argued that cultural and symbolic processes shape 'the experience and organisation of 
the self and social behaviour, and by extension, HBB and HBB illness' (1992: 100). On this view, 
'psychiatric illnesses' are 'disturbances of the self, deviations from what are collectively 
understood as normal behaviour or experience. These standards of normality are rooted in cultural 
understandings of what it is to be a person as articulated 26 in a cultural discourse on the self. 
Similarly, Marsella has argued that definitions of disorder depend on cultural understandings of the 
self and that 'the concept of the self offers a mediating link for relating cultural variables to mental 
disorder' (1985: 297). 
Cultural beliefs about body, self, and emotion mediate the relationship between culture and 
distress, and pattern social and therapeutic response. As Kirmayer says, for instance, 'the same 
ethnopsychological theories of mind, self and emotion that shape the expression of distress 
influence the social response to both psychiatric disorders and everyday forms of distress' (1989: 
328). Raguram et al (2001) have shown how the meaning of somatic symptoms of distress among 
Indian patients attending a psychiatric outpatient clinic in Bangalore depend upon cultural beliefs 
and values relating to illness and the body, including cultural conceptions of the healthy body. 
Krause showed that, among the Punjabi population living in the UK, 'sinking heart' is linked to a 
model of the emotional self in which the 'the heart is identified with the most private and 
individual aspects of the self' (1989: 568). Heart symptoms express the distress experienced in 
circumstances where the individual feels a loss of social or emotional control. Good et al 
interpreted the cultural meaning and experience of depression, sadness, loss, and melancholy (or 
'heart distress') among Iranians in terms of local understandings of the self, symbolized in the 
figure of the heart (1985: 385). Research carried out by Jenkins (1991,1996) on distress and social 
suffering among Salvadoran refugees in the United States showed that how they experienced and 
articulated their affliction was contingent on a sociocentric and kinship-oriented Salvadoran 
indigenous psychology. She described how cultural meanings mediated the impact of terror and 
traumatic events on bodily experience: 'Distress is a particular stance toward the situation; a 
consequence of the construal of terror as terror' (1991: 154). The way that Salvadoran refugees 
expressed their suffering was shaped by a 'Salvadoran ethnopsychology of emotion', a 'collective 4n 
ideology of affect' (1991: 149). They drew on a 'lexicon of emotions', including an idiom of 
'nervios', 'sadness', 'sorrow', and a metaphor of life as tragedy, to express their distress. Jenkins 
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interpreted somatic symptoms such as insomnia, loss of appetite, and *psychomotor agitation' as 
expressions of loss and mouming. Nervios was the principal idiom of distress used by the 
Salvadoran refugees and, according to Jenkins, it represented a mental, physical, and spiritual 
response to poverty and violence. 
Agency and Euro-Arnerican discourse on distress 
A hegemonic Euro-American folk psychology is organised in line with other dualisms of 
Modernism. From one perspective, the self is conceived as a body-object, a passive centre of 
experience, constrained, and determined by (depending on theoretical predilection) social, 
biological, or psychological forces that are outside its control and beyond its conscious awareness. 
From another perspective, the self is idealised as an agent; as an autonomous, individualised centre 
of consciousness and originator of action who is in control of his or her own destiny. Kin-nayer 
articulates this dualism when he distinguishes between two 6cultural templates, prototypes and 
meta-narratives of what it is to be a person and how the self should function' (2002: 726). He calls 
these the 'adamantine self' and the 'transactional self'. The former is characterised by its 'integrity, 
coherence, autonomy, self-definition, self-determination and self-control', the latter by 'its fluidity, 
responsiveness to context, heteronomy, multi-vocality, deference and yielding to or 
accommodating others' (Kirmayer, 2002: 726). These prototypes map directly onto stereotypical 
conceptions of masculinity ('adamantine') and femininity ('transactional') that define traditional 
gender roles in Euro-American societies. More generally, this dualism is rooted in relations of 
power; these different prototypical selves correspond with polarised social positions of subjugation 
and domination. 
Kirmayer's 'adamantine self' closely resembles Taylor's notion of the 'disengaged self' and a view 
of human agency that emphasises independence, control, freedom, autonomy, and the rational 
pursuit of self-defined goals (Taylor, 1985). This modem, liberal view of agency is manifest in 
Berlin's concept of liberty as freedom from constraints or impediments, rather than freedom to 
(Berlin, 1969). Taylor distinguishes this dominant view of a disengaged human agency from a 
humanistic view that has its roots in European idealist thinking. On the latter view, selves are partly 
constituted hermeneutically out of their self-interpretations or self-understandings. Human beings 
are 'beings for whom things matter'; they come to understand themselves in a 'space defined by 
distinctions of worth' (Taylorl985: 3). 
Cultural psychologists and anthropologists have distinguished western from non-western models of 
the self and have emphasised the individualism of the former and the sociocentricity of the latter 
(Heelas, 198 1; Shweder and Boume, 1982). According to Sampson, the Indigenous psychology of 
western societies is characterised by an ideology of 'self-contained individualism' in which the self 
is conceived as an autonomous, self-determining agent with an emphasis on personal control and 
with rigid self/non-self boundaries (1988: 19). Similarly, Marsella (1985) characterises the 
dominant western concept of the self as individuated, separate, detached, self-sufficient, and 
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autonomous. Shweder and Bourne have argued that the modem western view of the self is as an 
'autonomous distinctive individual li ving-I n -society [ ... ] free to choose and mind 
his own 
business'. Western individualism implies an 'egocentric contractual' relationship with soc, ety, the 
institution of privacy, and a sense of 'personal inviolability' (1982: 191-4). 
'The self' articulated in the ethnopsychologies of non-western societies has been characterised in 
terms of its sociability, 'social interdependency', and its 'diffuse' or 'un-individuated' nature 
(Marsella, 1985: 290). Sampson depicts such a prototypical (non-western) self as relationship- 
oriented, with fluid boundaries between self and other, and an external loci of control (1988: 16). 
Shweder and Bourne (1982) maintain that a socio-centric conception of 'the person' is more 
common in the 'holistic cultures' of non-western societies where there is a 'socio-centric organic' 
relationship between individual and society and high levels of interdependency. 
Nonetheless, the contemporary discourse on the self in developed English-speaking societies is 
composed of a plurality of discourses. While subordinate to the disengaged, individualised view of 
human agency, a socio-centric view of the self has a long tradition in European thought and culture. 
The social sciences are, after all, historically contingent on such a discourse. Moreover, the 
possibility of forming statements about cultural or historical differences about the self (the kinds of 
statements that cultural psychologists make) is premised on the self's sociability. Such a discourse 
depends on a social, hermeneutic view of the self as partly constituted linguistically and 
symbolically. Indeed, Taylor's preferred hermeneutic view of agency itself is grounded in such a 
Euro-American cultural discourse on the self, albeit a historically subjugated one. 
Rose has argued that the very notion of the self articulates a western concept of the person as an 
individuallsed psychological entity, as 'a naturally unique and discrete entity, the boundaries of the 
body enclosing, as if by definition, an inner life of the psyche, in which are inscribed the 
experiences of an individual biography' (1998: 22). This notion of the self implies an 
ethnopsychology in which emotions are constructed as distinct from thought or cognition and as 
reified psychological objects that occur somewhere deep in the privacy of the individual rn-Ind. This 
psychological or cognitive model of emotion contrasts with a view of emotions as fundamentally 
evaluative and as centrally located in social rather than psychological space. On this view, emotion 
talk provides speakers with a means of communicating core concerns and of making evaluations or 
judgements (Lutz, 1982,1988). 
As the discussion above on somatisation and psychologisation made clear, lay discourse on distress 
(including idioms of distress) in western cultural settings is contingent on a dominant western 
cultural discourse on the self, body, and emotion (e. g. Kleinman, 1986; Parsons and Wakeley, 
199 1). In North America, for instance, a psycholoýc--, ical idiom of distress relies on a psychologised 
self-discourse that locates the origins of suffering in 'inner moods and conflicting desires of the 
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individual' (Kirmayer, 1989: 330). Jadhav has shown how English discourse on distress depends 
on a view of the self as an entity that generates emotions or thoughts 'from inside a metaphorical 
three-dimensional space enclosed within firm boundaries and containing a substance' (1996: 5). 
The 'emotional pathologies' or 'neurotic disorders' form part of an 'ethnopsychiatry' grounded in 
this local ethnopsychology. Similarly, Littlewood maintains that, given a western ideology of the 
self and society, 'the locus of psychopathology is thus within the individual body, in its 
constitution, personality and history, and this is then the appropriate focus for psychiatric 
intervention' (1990: 316). If cultural identity and selfhood are at least partly expressed and 
constituted in terms of a dominant Euro-American cultural discourse on the self, then so must 
experiences of personal distress. An individualised psychological discourse that prescribes rational 
self-control has implications for how distress becomes embodied, and how it is interpreted and 
responded to. For example, such a discourse is internal to the 'Psychopathological process' 
associated with depression in that it influences how self and body are experienced and represented, 
and regulates the social response to dysphoria (Kirmayer, 1989). 
Cultural processes constitute personal distress in developed English-speaking societies through a 
double hermeneutic. First, symbolic processes and cultural practices contribute to the generation of 
suffering through partly constituting the agency of the sufferer. Second, the dominant cultural 
discourse on the self and body determines the social response to 'deviant behaviour or mental 
illness', including personal distress. This is because this discourse defines standards of non-nal 
(socially acceptable) behaviour and experience. As Kirmayer says: 'Where a person is defined in 
terms of an autonomous rational agency, as in the West, stigma may be less a shared social 
problem and various forms of marginality, short of complete extrusion, can evolve' (1989: 334). A 
stigmatising or negative social response to distress works to magnify such suffering and influences 
how distress is expressed and communicated. 
The experience, expression, and response to personal distress and psychiatric illness are contingent 
on cultural understandings about the self and agency. Psychiatric illnesses represent deviations 
from standards of normal behaviour and experience as defined in this dominant discourse (Fabrega, 
1992). In Euro-American cultural contexts, the dominant way that personal distress is articulated 
and conceptualised is in psychological terms and as a disruption of human agency. The breakdown 
in agency and functioning that often accompanies personal distress provides the grounds for an 
illness metaphor. This breakdown often makes it necessary for sufferers to seek medical help and 
entry into the sick role. 
Chapter 7 discusses how expert discourses on distress are constituted within this cultural discourse 
on the self and body. For example, expert discourse on depression has its genealogical origins in an 
English ethnopsychology of emotion. According to Jadhav (1996), the 'emotional pathologies' are zD I 
grounded in four emotions: depression, elation, anxiety, and fear. These underlie Bntish expert and 
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lay discourse on emotional distress centred on notions of guilt, energy, stress. and depression. 
"Depression", says Jadhav, "is primarily a 'disorder of mood' that rests upon a pathology of key 
emotions considered to arise within the 'mind"' (1996: 6). This ethnopsychology of emotional 
distress is bound to a 'white British and Western European' cultural and historical context and is 
4 enshrined' in western psychiatric diagnostic systems (i. e. as the 'affective disorders'). 
The first two chapters of this thesis have drawn on contemporary theory and research in medical 
anthropology and sociology in order to critically examine current understanding about the 
relationship between cultural processes, social structure, and distress in developed English- 
speaking societies. Macro social and economic factors generate the adverse relational settings that 
produce embodied distress. These relational settings commonly involve the disruption of social 
ties, social disconnection, loss of agency, powerlessness, and entrapment. While cultural processes 
and ideological practices partly constitute the individual experience of distress, they also mediate 
the relationship between local relational settings and individual bodies. One way in which they do 
so is through the provision of a cultural discourse on the self out of which individuals partly 
constitute themselves. The ideologically dominant discourse on the self in developed English- 
speaking societies is grounded in a view of human agency that emphasises autonomy, freedom 
from external constraint, disengagement, self-control, and independence. In such societies, personal 
distress and psychiatric illness involve a disruption of agency and therefore present a threat to this 
dominant ideological discourse on the self. 
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Chapter 3 
Discourse, Narrativity, and Ethnography 
The previous two chapters developed a critical theoretical understanding of the ways that cultural 
and discursive processes mediate the relationship between social setting, affliction, and distress. 
The next four chapters draw on two ethnographic case studies in order to explore these theoretical 
themes and questions in more depth. Fieldwork was conducted in two different English-speaking 
sociocultural settings: the English city of Bristol and the South Atlantic Island of St. Helena. This 
chapter presents an overview of the methodology, the research methods, and the interpretive 
strategies used in this empirical phase of the research. 
The chapter has four sections. It begins with an account of the methodology employed in the 
research. This includes a description of the approach taken to interpretation. A discourse-based 
interpretive framework is described and an account is presented of how this interpretive framework 
evolved as the research proceeded. Close attention is paid to the discursive concept of narrative. 
This includes a discussion of some of the ways that medical anthropologists and sociologists have 
employed the concept of an 'illness narrative'. The second section summarises the social-research 
methods used in the fieldwork (e. g. an ethnographic and case-study based approach and extensive 
use of in-depth interviewing). The third and fourth sections present an account of the fieldwork in 
both settings. 
3.1 A discourse-based approach to interpretation 
The theoretical discussion in Chapters I and 2 pointed to the relevance of both an interpretive- 
hermeneutic and a critical realist approach to social science (Bhaskar, 1989; Keat and Urry, 1975). 
Keat and Urry characterise a realist social science as the 'science of social life and social 
formations' (1975: 228). Its aim is to develop the theoretical 'description of structures and 
mechanisms which causally generate the observable phenomena, a description which enables us to 
explain them' (1975: 5). A longstanding theme in social theory has been the relationship between 
social structure and subjective experience. According to Keat and Urry, this constitutes the central 
problem for social theory: 
At the level of substantive theory, the primary problem is how to develop theories 
that satisfactorily synthesize the structural analysis of social formations, and the 
explanation of human action in terms of subjective states and meanings. 
Keat and Urry, 1975: 228 
In Truth and Afethod, Gadamer (1989) presented a non-positivist perspective on social-sclentific 
investigation grounded in hermeneutics, the interpretive procedure deployed in historical research. 
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The principal method of interpretive social science is verstehen, the hermeneutic understanding of 
cultural products, lived experience, and its expressions (Dilthey, 1986; Outhwaite, 1975). 
According to Dilthey (1986), the central aim of hermeneutics is to understand subjective 
experience through interpreting its 'life-expressions', e. g. stories, performances, symbols, and 
texts. In ethnographic research, the interpretation of these life expressions occurs at two levels 
(Bruner, 1986a: 10). First, individuals interpret their own experience using culturally available 
expressive forms. Second, the ethnographer sets out to interpret these expressions. Instead of 
drawing a sharp line between some objective reality and its symbolic representation or subjective 
experience, it is perhaps more useful to view both as part of the same encompassing reality. A 
realist perspective would require that subjective states and meanings be granted the same reality 
status as material social and economic structures. This attention to both meaning and personal 
experience, on the one hand, and social processes and structures, on the other, warrants a multi- 
disciplinary and an interpretive or hermeneutic approach to social research (Gadamer, 1988,1989; 
Ricoeur, 1981a, 1991). 
Explanatory models and illness narratives 
Medical anthropologists and sociologists grounded in the 'sociology of health and illness' 
tradition" have developed an interpretive repertoire" of discursive concepts to facilitate their 
interpretation of illness experience. These include, for instance: vocabulary and lexicon; idiom and 
metaphor; grammar and rhetoric; explanatory model; illness narrative. 
The idea of an explanatory model, for instance, has been developed as a means of interpreting how 
patients make sense of illness experience and its consequences (Kleinman, 1980,1988); these 
models depict the patients' understandings of cause, course, prognosis, onset, treatment, coping 
strategies, consequences, diagnosis (Garro, 1994; Kleinman, 1988). " The experience and meaning 
of illness and patients' help-seeking are partly constituted by these 'lay explanatory models' (Good, 
1977; Kleinman, 1988: 49). However, this explanatory model interpretive framework has been 
criticised for being too narrowly tied to clinical settings, for being too 'medically orientated', and 
for focusing on illness, cause, process, and treatment to the 'exclusion of broader contextual 
meanings' (Garro, 1994: 776). This approach has also been criticized for overemphasising the 
degree of rationality present in lay discourse on illness and sickness. Writing at the beginning of 
the 1980s, Young criticized the explanatory-model approach in medical anthropology for 
reproducing an ideological view of the subject as a 'rational man', as a kind of lay scientist (198 1). 
The construct of an explanatory model focuses attention on informants' statements of causality to 
the exclusion of other (often less coherent) features of their discourse. Young used Piaget's 
distinction between operational and pre-operational thinking to make his case against medical 
anthropology's 'rational men'. 'o Medical anthropologists, he argued, conunonly assume that their 
informants think 'operationally'. Young pointed out, however, that the thought processes and 
theoretical knowledge of 'a large proportion of people living in industrialised societies' are 
characterised by a mixture of operational and pre-operational processes (1981: 329). He also 
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criticised the 'embedded theoretical knowledge' of medical anthropology: this knowledge consists, 
for example, of assumptions about the relationship between thought or belief and its linguistic 
representation. For instance, he claimed that medical anthropologists tend to reduce infon-nants' 
discourse on illness or sickness to cognitive structures (e. g. explanatory models). 
Medical anthropologists and sociologists have turned to the concept of narrative as a framework for 
interpreting talk about illness, distress, and suffering. " A narrative-based approach provides a 
means of exploring the relationship between illness or distress and the biographical or social 
contexts in which they take place. Narrative is a common discursive form used by patients to 
describe, account for, and interpret illness experience. Illness narratives describe what happened 
during an illness, the actions taken in response to it, and they provide an account for how illness 
has affected the speaker's life (Garro, 1994). Narratives are thought to bring coherence, form, and 
meaning to the experiences of illness and distress: 
Narrative is a form in which experience is represented and recounted as having a 
meaningful and coherent order in which activities and events are described along 
with the experiences associated with them and the significance that lends them their 
sense for the persons involved. 
Good, 1994: 139 
For instance, according to Hyden, narrative provides a way to make sense of 'the illness disruption' 
by fitting it into 'a temporal framework' and by situating such experience into 'a context that 
encompasses both the illness event and surrounding life events and recreates a sense of 
interrelatedness' (1997: 53). In this way, illness narratives facilitate the reconstruction of biography 
in response to a disruptive illness event (e. g. Williams, 1984; Hyden, 1997). For instance, Bury 
says how narratives provide a means of making sense of the disruptive experience of chronic 
illness 'in terms of past social experience and to reaffirm the impression that life has a course and 
the self has a purpose or telos' (1984: 179). Similarly, Good emphasises how narratives 'reflect and 
rework' illness experience and how they are one of the 'primary reciprocal processes of both 
personal and social efforts to counter this dissolution and to reconstitute the world' (1994: 188). 
Williams (1984) has argued that explanatory models need to be re-conceptualised as narrative 
reconstructions and showed how those who suffer from chronic illnesses employ narrative as a 
means of making their life intelligible again, of reconstructing their biography in response to the 
disruption caused by the illness: 
Narrative reconstruction is an attempt to reconstitute and repair ruptures between 
body, self, and world by linking-up and interpreting different aspects of biography 
in order to realign present and past and self with society. In this context, the 
identification of 'causes' creates important reference points in the interface between 
self and society. 
Williams, 1984: 197-198 
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Some anthropologists and sociologists of health and illness have emphasised how narratives partly 
constitute illness experience and the response to illness. Since narratives inscribe 'cultural scripts', 
they are an important way that illness-related experience and behaviour are brought into line with 
collective norms and values (Mattingly, 1998; Kleinman, 1988; Good and Good, 1994). Finally, a 
few researchers have emphasised the rhetorical function and social force of illness narratives (e. g. 
Riessman, 1990a; Monks, 1996; Hyden, 1995a, 1995b). These researchers have demonstrated how 
illness narratives are used by sufferers to present themselves in some ways rather than in others and 
as a way of making moral claims. Bury (2001), for instance, has shown how illness narratives are 
used to express a patient's moral viewpoint on their illness in terms of a relationship between self, 
body, and society. 
Examining 'narrative reconstructions' of biographies ruptured by illness also provides researchers 
with a means of investigating how culture influences the experience of illness and distress (Good, 
1994; Kleinman, 1988). Good and Good, for instance, have emphasised how 'illness narratives' are 
'one of the specific (discursive) forms through which culture mediates experience' (1994: 841). 
Garro (1994) has pointed out that illness narratives are grounded in cultural knowledge. For 
instance, in order to explain or account for illness, patients construct their stories around 
texplanatory' or 'cultural models' of illness (Garro, 1994; Kleinman, 1988). Moreover, illness 
narratives draw on culturally available genres, metaphors, and rhetorical fon-ns in order to 
communicate suffering and its personal or social significance. " For instance, Good et al point out 
that: 'Explanatory logics, available therapies, narrative forms, and the norms governing the telling 
of such narratives vary across cultures' (1985: 837). 
Two difficulties are associated with the concept of an 'illness narrative' as it has been used in such 
social-science research. First, the implied rationality underlying the concept of an explanatory 
model re-appears in the concept of the illness narrative. The function of illness narratives may not 
always be to explain illness experience, even though an explanatory logic may sometimes run 
through them. Good (1994), for instance, has warned against treating illness narratives as 'beliefs' 
or 'explanations for illness'. As Chapter 4 will argue, discourse on illness and distress can be more 
or less coherent, more or less narrative-like (Parsons and Wakeley, 199 1; Spicer, 1998). In some 
cases, a lack of coherence and a low level of narrativity may signify something important about the 
nature of disruptive experiences where rationality has been momentarily suspended. The second 
difficulty is that the concept of narrative is sometimes used as an analogue for cultural model or 
explanatory scheme; in this way, narrative becomes reified as a cognitive entity. This makes it 
difficult to interpret discourse about illness or distress that varies in its degree of narrativity. A 
possible antidote to this is to view narrative as a kind of discourse unit, as a form of talk, rather 
than as a latent cognitive structure. Similarly, explanation is also a discourse unit; for instance, 
explanations are produced in discursive acts of explaining. Such explanatory acts are used to 
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accomplish a range of social tasks: accounting, justifying, legitimising, and making moral claims 
(Antaki, 1988; Heritage, 1988). 
Discourse and narrative 
Linde defines a 'discourse unit' as a 'segment of spoken language, longer than a single sentence, 
with socially recognised initial and final boundaries, and a formally definable internal structure' 
(1984: 186). A 'text' is discourse that has been fixed in writing (Fairclough, 1992). For example, a 
transcript generated from a research interview is a text. Narrative and explanation, for example, are 
discourse units. Discourse can have a variety of levels. Linde defines the 'discourse level' as the 
'linguistic level at which social action and exchange take place' (1986: 184). Discourse units are 
embedded and produced in social practices that involve language use, in what Fairclough (1992) 
calls 'discursive practices'. Linde extends Hymes' notion of a speech event" to include 
'discontinuous contexts' in which discourse units are produced. She distinguishes between two 
kinds: 'units consisting of all interactions by a participant on a particular topic, and units consisting 
of the history of interactions between specified participants' (1986: 184). An example of the latter 
type of discourse unit includes extended public conversations on a particular topic or theme 
produced in 'discontinuous contexts'. For instance, Linde maintains that expert social-science 
discourse is a type of public discourse, an 'extended and discontinuous conversation, carried on by 
experts' (1986: 196). Other examples of such public discourse include the discourse produced in 
countless social interactions and 'discontinuous contexts' by members of a particular society 
around the themes of selfhood, the body, gender, illness, or emotion. 
According to Linde, narrative is the 'prototypical discourse unit' (1986: 184). Narrativity provides 
English speakers with a means of interpreting experience and action by relating it to agency, 
biography, and social setting. Somers, for instance, says that: 'Narrativity demands that we discern 
the meaning of any single event only in temporal and spatial relationship to other events' (1994: 
616). Riessman describes three ways that the analytic concept of narrative has been employed in 
the social sciences: as discrete narrative excerpt; as personal narrative; and as biography (2002: 
698). Four levels of narrative discourse can be distinguished. The first three levels broadly 
correspond to Riessman's tripartite categorisation. Each of these levels of narrative deploy 
narrativity in different ways. 
First, narrative can refer to a discrete unit of discourse embedded in a speech event. For instance, 
Watson loosely characterises narrative as 'an account of an event or series of events' (1973: 243). 
Linde depicts Labov's formal definition of a discrete narrative discourse unit as 'a recapitulation of 
past experience and its meaning using a sequence of past tense main clauses whose order is taken 
to mirror the order of events' (Linde, 1986: 186; Labov, 1976). According to Riessman, in this 
restricted (socio-linguistic) sense, narrative refers to a 'brief, topically specific stories organised 
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around characters, settings, and plot. These are discrete stories told in response to single questions; 
they recapitulate specific events the narrator witnessed or experienced' (2002: 697). 
This formal Labovian definition of narrative depends on a theory of meaning that foregrounds the 
referential function of language. Events in the narrative proceed according to narrative time while 
the events being related occur in real time. The temporal relation between them involves a 
compression of temporality and maintenance of chronological order. Meaning is reduced to a 
homological relationship between narrative discourse and the events if depicts. However, narrative 
discourse can have a variety of meanings depending on its social, expressive, or constitutive 
function. Labov (1982) has corrected for this in later models where he has placed more emphasis 
on discourse and narrative as speech acts. 
Second, over the course of a conversation, another narrative unfolds. Here, narrative refers to 
discourse units at a higher level than the discrete narrative excerpt. These are presented in extended 
stretches of talk so that narrativity is co-constructed with the interlocutor dialogically facilitating 
the process of narration. Riessman characterises personal narrative as a series of stories (e. g. 
episodes) that emerge over the course of a conversation(s): 'Large sections of talk and interview 
exchanges - extended accounts of lives that develop over the course of interviews [ ... ] an evolving 
series of stories that are framed in and through interaction' (2002: 698). Narrative episodes, bursts 
of narrative discourse, typically pepper such dialogue and are used by speakers to accomplish a 
range of social tasks within them. Moreover, the audience employs narrative as a framework for 
interpreting what is being recounted. 
Third, a self-narrative or life story is a discontinuous discourse unit composed of all the narratives 
that an individual produces about their life during the course of their life. Linde (1986) notes that it 
is possible to form an understanding of an individual's life story by attending to a small subset of 
such discourse. Life stories, biography, or biographical segments have been routinely used in 
ethnographic and social-historical accounts in anthropology and oral history (e. g. Tonkin, 1992; 
Thompson, 1978; Riessman, 2002). Biography and life history have become a central concern of 
sociologists (e. g. Josselson & Lieblich, 1993). Life events or more discrete narrative episodes are 
contextualised within biographical or life narratives. " 
Fourth, at an even higher level of discourse, public narratives or what Linde calls 'group stories' 
refer to 'discontinuous' discourse units that are told by a group or a society. According to Linde, 
such stories of group life are 'built up both by the public discourse of history books, civic texts, 
articles about sociology, political speeches, etc., as well as by private oral narratives' (1986: 199). 
Such stories articulate the cultural identity of individuals who are party to the conversation. 
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Narrative discourse units are often organised around an explanatory system (Linde. 1986). 
Following Linde, explanation as a discrete discourse unit can be distinguished from an explanatory 
system, 'the assumptions about the world which the speaker uses to make events and evaluations 
coherent' (1986: 188). In addition, Linde distinguishes between 'common-sense' or 'popular' 
explanatory systems and 'expert explanatory systems'. Explanatory systems are one of the 
principal ways that coherence is achieved in discourse. Personal and public narratives, for instance, 
are often organised around an explanatory system. While narrative and explanation are both types 
of discourse unit, narratives can be built-up around explanatory systems and theories. 
The explanatory systems used in lay discourse are often popular versions of formal theories and 
expert systems. For instance, expert explanatory systems historically evolve out of common-sense 
or lay theories as well as pre-existing expert theories and explanatory systems. Through a process 
of diffusion, these feed back into popular discourse forrrUng 'senu-expert explanatory systems' 
(Linde, 1986: 194). In the final stage of this process, these expert systems can sometimes become 
part of 'common sense', a society's view of reality: 'As a given explanatory system becomes better 
known and more widely held, it begins to move closer to common sense, and may eventually come 
to form part of common sense' (1986: 195). Expert discourses are discontinuous discourse units 
that encompass the 'extended conversations' of experts, academics, and professionals on a 
particular topic, theme, or set of practices. For instance, biomedicine and anthropology are expert 
discourses and are partly characterised by their distinctive explanatory systems or modes of 
rationality. 
Four features of the relationship between agency and narrative are worth highlighting. First, a 
speaker's agency drives the discursive processes of narrativisation (See Appendix A3.3). This also 
applies to the listener who must follow the story and re-construct the narrative logic embodied in 
the plot in order to make sense of it. The meaning of personal experience is articulated in the 
process of narrativisation and the reflexive interpretation of experience is an expression of agency 
in Taylor's hermeneutic sense. Second, narrating is a speech act and, as such, has social force. " For 
instance, narrative is used to perform a variety of social functions: it can explain, legitimise, justify, 
convince, or facilitate understanding. Third, narratives depict agency. Narrative is used to portray 
action, its relationship with events and the settings in which they take place. Plot carries the action 
in narrative so that it is through plot that the dynamic relationship between context and agency is 
played out. Fourth, narrative discourse plays a constitutive role in relation to agency, social 
identity, and selfhood. 
Interpretive framework 
The chapters that follow draw on a variety of different approaches to discourse analysis including 
thematic, narrative, and rhetorical approaches. Each of these is described in more detail in 
Appendices A3.1 to A3.4. The interpretive framework used in this thesis evolved during the course 
of the research. Later approaches came to encompass or build on earlier ones without erasing them. 
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The evolution of this repertoire of interpretive concepts is traced out In the Appendices. The), 
represent the background detail or scaffolding for the discussion presented in the body of the text. 
This methodological development represents one of the central themes of the thesis. 
In the early stages of the research, a combination of qualitative analysis and narrative analysis was 
planned (See Appendices A3.1 and A3.2). As the research progressed, other features of discourse 
and forms of rhetoric (particularly metaphor and dramatisation) became more prominent (See 
Appendix A3.3). The prominence given to certain features of discourse was determined by the 
disciplinary context of the research. The discursive categories of narrative, explanation, idiom, 
metaphor, account, and the dramatic metaphor have become a central part of the interpretive 
repertoire of medical anthropologists and sociologists. Thematic coherence, narrativity, and 
rhetoric (e. g. trope, explanation, positioning, and dramatisation) were selected for detailed 
interpretation partly because of their relevance to theory and research in medical anthropology and 
sociology. Finally, discourse analysis provided a way of exploring these different features of texts 
under a common interpretive framework (See Appendix A3.4). 
According to Riessman, the aim of narrative analysis is to identify 'forms of telling about 
experience, not simply the content to which language refers' (2001: 697). It is therefore useful in 
the interpretation of texts produced in in-depth interviews. It represents a systematic approach to 
achieving what Bruner (1986,1990) described as narrative understanding. In this thesis, narrative 
analysis is viewed as a kind of discourse analysis that provides a conceptual framework for the 
systematic interpretation of the structure and content of discrete narrative discourse units and 
personal narratives (Labov, 1976; Riessman, 1993,2002; Mishler, 1986a). As such, the 
interpretation of narrative discourse can be combined with the interpretation of other features of 
discourse, including discourse without a narrative structure (See Appendix A3.2 for the interpretive 
framework used in the analysis of narrative and a definition of the prototype concept of 
6narrativity'). 
Narrative analysis can also be used as a kind of social analysis. According to Somers (1994), social 
analysis involves the systematic analysis of the relationships between four domains of social 
reality: lived experience or an individual's 'ontological narrative'; the 'public narratives' or cultural 
scripts that partly constitute individual lived experience; the local 'relational settings' that 
individuals inhabit; and the macro social forces that constrain the lives of individuals and partly 
determine these relational settings. A central argument of Chapters I and 2 was that these 
relationships are mediated or are partly constituted by symbolic processes and cultural practices. 
Narrative analysis can be used to examine such relationships as they appear in informants' 
discourse. Riessman, for instance, has employed narrative analysis to achieve an understanding of 
the relationships between disruptive life events and macro-level social processes (1993,2002). 
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A central aim in the interpretation presented in Chapters 4 to 7 is to examine the relationship 
between personal accounts of distress and public discourses on distress (e. g. expert, common- 
sense), what Fairclough (1992) refers to as 'Intertextuality'. Particular attention is paid to the social 
force of discourse, its interpersonal function, and its constitutive power. " Symbolic and cultural 
practices are assumed to have a formative function such that multiple, often irreconcilable 'worlds' 
become possible (Goodman, 1978). Discourse is conceived as a symbolic social practice with the 
power to partly constitute worlds: objects, subjectivities, selfhood, social identity, social relations, 
institutions, experiences, actions, and lives. Appendix A3.4 discusses the constitutive power of 
discourse in more detail; how discourse partly constitutes experience, self, and social relations; and 
how ideological discourse contributes to the reproduction of social structure and helps to distribute 
power unequally throughout the social field. These theoretical assumptions about the constitutive 
force of discourse underpin the argument presented in Section 2.3 about the constitutive power of 
cultural discourses on the self and body. 
3.2 Research methods 
Qualitative methods provide a means of researching the relationship between illness, distress, and 
the sociocultural settings that partly constitute these experiences. The theoretical perspective 
described in Chapter 2 and the interpretive approach described in Section 3.1 is compatible with the 
following research methods: 
An ethnographic approach to social research 
Person-centred or experience-centred ethnography 
A case-study approach 
" In-depth interviewing 
" An analytic focus on discourse and narrative 
An ethnographic approach to social research 
Ethnography typically employs multiple methods and data collected from a range of different 
sources including: participant observation; informal and in-depth interviewing; documentary 
research, and a range of other data-collection techniques. " Its aim is to form an understanding of 
how people in different social and cultural settings make sense of action and experience, or, as 
Geertz maintains, ethnography aims to form an account of the 'formulae they use to define their 
experience' (1993: 15). According to Geertz, the thick ethnographic description of cultural and 
social practices partly involves the social analysis of symbolic action: 'In the study of culture the 
signifiers are not symptoms or clusters of symptoms, but symbolic acts or clusters of symbolic acts, 
and the aim is not therapy but the analysis of social discourse' (1993: 20). 
The social research reported in this thesis draws on both sociology and anthropology to develop a 
theoretical understanding of social suffering in developed English-speaking societies. Social theory 
and ethnography are central to both disciplines. As a strategy for collecting social and cultural data, 
participant observation and a prolonged period of field work abroad has defined the 
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anthropological project from the outset and is a way that anthropologists have differentiated their 
work from other social scientists (La Fontaine, 1999; Peirano, 1998). Sociologists, on the other 
hand, have typically studied large-scale, developed societies using the social survey as the principal 
research instrument. Anthropologists have avoided conducting research at home partly because of 
the difficulties associated with applying participant observation and ethnographic research in such 
societies. This has meant that sociologists have traditionally studied us, while anthropologists have 
studied them. 
Goody (1966) challenged this division of labour when be criticized the division between the 
sociological study of complex developed societies and the social anthropological study of exotic, 
small-scale societies. Moreover, the idea that an extended period of fieldwork abroad is a necessary 
condition for anthropological research has been challenged by anthropologists who have conducted 
ethnographic research in their countries of origin (Peirano, 1998). Such research has come to be 
known as 'anthropology at home' or, in medical anthropology, 'medical anthropology at home' 
(Peirano, 1998; Van Dongen and Fainzang, 1998). Peirano (1998) points out that the degree of 
emphasis placed on home-based anthropological research varies from country to country. In 
addition, medical sociologists working within the 'sociology of health and illness' paradigm have 
also conducted in-depth qualitative studies of illness and suffering within western social settings, 
often with methods, concerns and research questions that overlap with those of medical 
anthropologists (e. g. Bury, 1991,2001; Conrad, 1990). " 
The empirical social research reported in this thesis has aimed to strike a balance between the 
theoretical and the empirical. The empirical dimension of the research involved two small-scale 
ethnographic case studies of social suffering in two developed English-speaking societies. In 
neither case was the aim to conduct a traditional ethnography (in the anthropological sense). 
Rather, the purpose of this social research was chiefly theoretical: it was intended to facilitate an 
exploration of the theoretical issues presented in the first two chapters of this thesis. 
Person-centred ethnography and the anthropology of experience 
An empirical exploration of the theoretical questions and themes around which this theses is 
organised requires a research methodology that foregrounds personal experience and close 
attention to 'experience-near concepts' (Geertz, 1983). Bruner maintained that the possibility of 
hermeneutical understanding of 'life expressions' presupposed lived experience. He grounds an 
'anthropology of experience' in Dilthey's notion of erlebris or 'lived through' experience, a 
primary reality of 'thought and feeling, as word and image' (1986a: 5). Cohen has argued that the 
anthropological interpretation of experience is bound to 'proceed from the premise of the self' 
(1992: 237). He argues that this is because individuals everywhere come to understand themselves 
as selves and such self-conceptions run through all experience and action (1992: 230-232). Person- 
centred ethnography is grounded in such a methodological perspective and is concerned with the Z: ý 
production of 'thick descriptions' of subjective experience grounded in detailed interpretation of Z_. ý 
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individual case studies (Hollan, 1997). The analytic focus is on 'experience-near concepts', rather 
than reified abstract concepts such as society or culture. This involves developing 'experience-near 
ways of describing and analysing human beings', so that ethnographic analysis aims to generate 
interpretive categories that are grounded in the experiential lives of subjects (LeVine, 1982: 219). 
A person-centred approach to ethnography is well adapted for research in the field of cross-cultural 
psychiatry, where the central aim is to explore the relationship between cultural processes 
psychiatric illness and distress (Hollan, 1997). 
In-depth interviewing 
In what has been described as 'New British Ethnography', in-depth interviews have tended to take 
precedence over participant observation as the principal means of collecting social data (Hockey, 
1999). In-depth interviewing is the preferred and sometimes the only available means of 
conducting ethnographic research in large-scale, developed societies (LaFontaine, 1999; Hockey, 
1999). The social research reported in this thesis involved the collection of data on personal 
experiences of distress and illness using in-depth, informal, and semi-structured interviewing. '9 The 
use of in-depth interviewing and a case-study approach has a natural affinity with an analytic focus 
on narrative (e. g. Mishler, 1986b, 1991; Riessman, 2002). The approach to interviewing was 
influenced by the biographical-interpretive method of in-depth interviewing that has been used to 
collect life stories in European settings (Holloway and Jefferson, 1997). This approach can be 
summarised as follows: the use of open-ended questions; the elicitation of narratives; attentive 
listening; identification of themes and their ordering; following up responses using respondents' 
own phrasing and ordering; avoiding asking 'why' questions; beginning the interview with a single, 
open question (Holloway and Jefferson, 1997). In listening to narratives, narrativity works as an 
interpretive principle, facilitating an understanding of the connections between events. 
A case-study approach 
Case-study methods were used in the social research reported in this thesis. Case-study methods are 
commonly used in qualitative sociology and anthropology as a way of exploring the relationships 
between social practices, cultural processes, action, and experience. 'O In qualitative social research, 
field sites and samples are rarely selected with the aim of forming generalisable conclusions about 
a population. Theoretical or judgemental sampling is typically used to select locations, cases, and 
data. " Selection of case material took place at three levels. Selection of case material at all three 
levels was 'purposive' and was driven by theoretical questions and categories. First, two different 
social settings were selected as 'cases'. Second, within these settings individual cases were selected 
for in-depth interview. The case-study approach applied at this level involved a reliance on detailed 
transcripts of discourse recorded during in-depth or open-ended interviews, detailed interpretation 
of individual cases, and the examination of similarities and differences between informants' stories 
(Riessman, 2002). Third, in the chapters that follow narratives and instances of discourse were 
selected for detailed interpretation and to illustrate core themes. 
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3.3 Case Study 1: Bristol 
The initial phase of the fieldwork aimed to investigate the experience of distress and the discourse 
used to articulate it among a small sample drawn from among the white English population living 
in the English city of Bristol. No assumption was made about the representativeness of this sample 
in relation to the English population of the city as a whole. This fieldwork was exploratory and did 
not aim to make broad empirical generalisations about social suffering among the English 
population as a whole. Nonetheless, the research did aim to facilitate the development of theoretical 
generalisations about the social experience of personal distress and the discourse used by sufferers 
and former sufferers to express it. The aim of the fieldwork was also methodological: to develop 
innovative ways of interpreting discourse on illness and distress. 
The initial problem was to identify a small sample of English informants living in a defined 
geographical area who had experienced psychosocial distress. Two different selection strategies 
were used in order to cover a wide range of experience. One sample of informants was selected 
directly from the community. A second sample was selected through a general practice situated in 
an area of south Bristol serving a predominantly white English population. 
The initial phase of the fieldwork began with recruitment of a small sample of self-selected 
volunteers. Advertisements were placed in a newsletter of a local mental-health charity. These 
advertisements explained the purpose of the research and used the word depression in the text. 
Eleven informants responded. Four were male, seven female and they ranged in age from 29 to 45 
years. Most of these informants lived in the south and central areas of Bristol. All informants 
believed that they had experienced at least one episode of depression in the past, although two 
informants had not received any formal diagnosis of their complaint. In-depth, exploratory 
interviews using the 'biographic-interpretive' method were conducted with each of the informants 
using an interview schedule (the topic guide used in these interviews is presented in Appendix 
A3.5). This guide was grounded in the research questions (see Introduction) and covered the 
following themes: the experience of distress; the meanings associated with this experience; social 
and biographical context; social and personal consequences; encounters with healthcare 
practitioners; experience of treatment and recovery. All informants were interviewed about their 
experience of personal distress (typically 'depression') at least twice and on no more than four 
occasions. Most of these interviews took place at the informants' homes. Where this proved 
inconvenient, a few of the interviews were conducted at the researcher's office. Each interview 
lasted around an hour and, in most cases, was tape-recorded. All interviews were fully transcribed 
verbatiM. 42 Two infon-nants requested that the interviews not be recorded so that notes were taken 
instead. 
The second, larger sample was selected through a general practice situated in an inner city area of 
south Bristol. All registered patients who had been identified by a doctor as showing sio--ns of 
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depression were identified by one of the practice doctors. This list of several hundred patients was 
stratified by age and sex and 120 patients were selected randomly from this list. The list was then 
filtered by a practice doctor who removed the names of patients whom he felt should not be 
contacted as part of the research. A letter was then sent to each patient explaining the nature and 
purpose of the research and inviting them to participate. Twenty-five patients consented to take part 
in the research and interviews were arranged. All informants were white English, predominantly 
female (17 female, 8 male) and aged between 24 and 55. Interviews were conducted using the 
interview schedule used to interview informants in the first sample (See Appendix A3.5). 
Informants were interviewed on a single occasion either at the clinic or at their own homes. Again, 
each interview lasted around an hour and in all cases they were tape-recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Appendix A3.6 gives presents an account of how this qualitative data was analysed. 
Given the way in which informants were selected, it was anticipated that patients would vary 
widely in their experience of distress. In many cases, informants had experienced a minor, brief 
episode of distress in response to a difficult life event. In a few cases, informants reported more 
severe and prolonged experiences of distress. It was clear from their accounts that all had 
experienced a period of severe personal distress at some point in the recent past. Most informants 
described an episode of 'depression' or of 'feeling depressed' in combination with 'anxiety', 
6panic', or 'stress'. Some had not fully recovered, so that their experience of distress remained a 
central feature of their lives. A few informants did not believe that they had experienced 
'depression' at all, even though they reported 'feeling depressed'. One informant, for instance, 
reported experiencing 'panic attacks' without any mention of 'depression'. Another informant 
reported a variety of distressing feelings including 'anxiety', but without any mention of 
depression. 
3.4 Case Study 2: St. Helena 
As the Bristol fieldwork proceeded, the limits of an ethnographic approach relying solely on in- 
depth interviews became clear. A purely interview-based study conducted in an urban western 
setting would not make it possible to explore some of the central theoretical themes guiding the 
research; for instance, how personal distress is partly constituted through the dynamic relationship 
between agency, cultural processes, and social structure. A broader ethnographic approach would 
be required to explore the central questions guiding the research. Another field-site was sought. 
One of my supervisors suggested Tristan da Cunha" as a possible field site for this purpose. Her 
own doctoral supervisor, Dr Joseph Loudon, had undertaken a cultural epidemiological study of 
psychosocial distress among the inhabitants of the island in the 1960s (Rawnsley and Loudon, 
1964). The possibility of conducting fieldwork on Tristan da Cunha was explorcd, but I developed 
reservations about the remoteness of the island and the practicability of conducting such research in 
49 
such a setting without having prior links with the island population and without the degree of 
access that Dr. Loudon's clinical status may have afforded him. 
However, background research on Tristan da Cunha had brought the south Atlantic island of St. 
Helena to my attention. St. Helena is an island situated in the mid-Atlantic (16'South, 5'45 west), 
1,600 km from the west coast of Africa and 2,700 krn northwest of Cape Town. The island 
measures 10 by 6 miles with a land area of 47 square miles. According to the 1998 Census of St. 
Helena, there were around 5,000 St. Helenians resident on the island. ' St. Helena has no 
indigenous population and the resident population originated from Africa, Britain, China, and 
India, as well as having Malagasy and Huguenot ancestry (Evans, 1994). At the time the fieldwork 
was conducted, however, St. Helenians did not possess full British Citizenship. Since then, British 
Citizenship has been restored to the Islanders. St. Helena is a British Overseas Territory and, 
although the language spoken is English, St. Helenians (or 'Saints') speak with a distinctive St. 
Helenian dialect. The island is hilly and difficult to access from the ocean, with the highest peak 
(Diana's Peak) at 820m. Temperatures vary between 16-27C in the winter and 21-31C in the 
summer. There is no airport, and access is only possible by sea. 
Like Tristan da Cunha, St. Helena is also very remote. Nonetheless, it has a much larger 
population. After some initial exploratory research about the Island, I decided to write to the 
Governor of St. Helena and St. Helena's Public Health Department with a tentative proposal for 
conducting research on the island focusing on the role of social and cultural factors in St. 
Helenians' experience of psychosocial distress. On receiving a positive response to the proposed 
research, I then proceeded to make contact and meet with a few individuals linked with St. Helena 
and who were based in Britain in order to find out more about the island. For instance, I met with 
the island's Chief Medical Officer, Dr David Bagley, while he was on leave from duty and 
discussed my proposed research in more detail. After this meeting, a decision was made to proceed 
with a period of fieldwork on St. Helena. 
Six months were spent on St. Helena conducting fieldwork commencing in January 2000. The 
principal aim of the fieldwork was to explore the role of cultural, social, and economic factors in 
the experience of psychosocial distress on the island. Another aim at the outset was to document 
and develop an ethnographic understanding of St. Helenians' discourse on distress. It was 
anticipated that such research would also need to encompass St. Helenians' interpretations of 
illness experience as well. The research questions that guided this fieldwork therefore included: 
0 How do St. Helenians articulate and express experiences of distress and illness? 
0 How do local cultural discourses on the self, body, and society influence the experience and 
expression of distress amonrc,, St. Helenlans? 
How do St. Helenians interpret, evaluate, and respond to distress and illness? 
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0 What role does St. Helena's remoteness and its socio-econornIc difficulties play in experiences 
of personal distress? 
What kinds of adversity do St. Helenians experience and how do these relate to macro social 
and economic forces? 
How do macro social and economic processes generate socIal sufferIng through their impact 
on the lives of individuals? 
How do St. Helenians express their core concerns and how is their sense of agency constituted 
by the relational settings within which they live their lives? 
A variety of data-collection methods were used within a general ethnographic approach: these 
included participant observation, informal interviewing, and documentary research. Such methods 
were used to learn about the general social and cultural context of life on St. Helena and the local 
cultural meanings and understandings associated with personal distress, illness, and 'mental 
illness'. They included: in-depth interviews; a community survey; observation and listening; 
documentary research. Each of these is discussed in turn below. 
In-depth interviews 
No formal criteria were used to select informants for in-depth interview. Selection took place 
through local healthcare and social-welfare services, informal social connections, and through a 
small-scale screening survey conducted in one of St. Helena's outlying districts. In-depth 
interviews were conducted with 40 St. Helenians who had experienced or who were experiencing 
personal or social distress (10 male; 30 female; aged between 29 and 70 years). Most informants 
linked their experience of distress to social adversity. In a minority of cases, the experience of 
social distress was compounded by chronic illness. Informants were interviewed on more than one 
occasion where a single interview was insufficient to cover all of the themes listed on the schedule. 
The maximum number of interviews with any single informant was five. The topic schedule used 
in these interviews was based on the interview schedule used in the Bristol interviews. This was 
extended in an ongoing fashion as new themes emerged during the course of fieldwork (See 
Appendix A3.7). Where consent was granted, interviews were tape-recorded. Where consent was 
not granted, notes were taken. Interviews were usually conducted in informants' homes or at their 
place of work. In a few cases, interviews were arranged at an outlying clinic and, in a few cases, 
interviews took place at the General Hospital in Jamestown. 
St. Helenian informants used either a sociomoral idiom of 'worry' or they deployed a somatic 
'al concerns. Th idiom and an illness metaphor to express their feelings of distress and their soci is 
made it necessary to develop an understanding of both social and economic adversity on St. Helena 
and St. Helenian illness discourse. For example, I interviewed ten St. Helenians about their 
experience of chronic illness. I conducted informal interviews with St. Helenians who had 
experienced social or economic adversity or who were socially excluded in some other way. " I also 
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conducted life-history interviews with some of the residents of the Island's nursing home for the 
elderly as well as elderly people living in outlying areas. The aim of these interviews was to learn 
more about the life course among St. Helenians and about the island's recent history, for which few 
documentary sources are available. I also interviewed or consulted with many key figures on the 
island on a range of issues including illness and distress, the island way of life, and St. Helenians' 
socio-economic difficulties. These informants included religious figures, government officials, 
healthcare staff, development consultants, researchers, lay people, and community-based workers. 
A few St. Helenians became 'key informants'. I met with these informants regularly during the six- 
month period of fieldwork and discussed a range of themes with them relating to island life. 
A small-scale community survey 
However, the fieldwork on St. Helena was not without its challenges. Difficulties associated with 
the fieldwork included, for example, the close-knit nature of the community and a high degree of 
reticence and a pervasive suspicion of outsiders. This was compounded by the island's remoteness 
and a high level of stigma attached to social adversity, the public expression of distress, and 
anything to do with 'mental illness'. There were also difficulties in identifying and recruiting 
informants. For instance, one way of selecting informants that was attempted was to contact them 
through the doctors and the community nursing team. I composed information sheets for the 
doctors, community nurses, and developed criteria for selecting patients. However, this approach 
was not successful partly because the doctors failed to inform patients about the research and 
because many of the community nurses were not engaged in the research. St. Helenian society was 
found to consist of a network of villages or settlements in different geographical areas. Mid-way 
into the fieldwork, I was therefore forced to narrow down my focus to a smaller, more bounded 
geographical district. 
In order to identify a small sample of individuals who were experiencing distress, I undertook a 
community survey of all the adults in one outlying district of the island. The district was chosen for 
the survey partly on the advice of the CMO, partly because of its size", its remoteness from 
Jamestown, and because it was one of the more disadvantaged areas of the island. Details of the 
screening instrument used and the survey response can be found in Appendix A3.8. The results of 
the survey are reported in Appendix A6.1. Of the 70 cases who responded in this survey, around 22 
indicated the presence of distress. The majority of these informants were followed up for interview 
and some were interviewed on multiple occasions. 
ObservationAistening 
Apart from ongoing dialogues with key informants, I learned about island life by participating in 
the island's social life. Everyday conversations with St. Helenians were a rich source of learning. I 
also spent much time talking with St. Helenian families, particularly in the outlying districts. I 
attended events of historical or social importance (e., o,. attended traditional dances, fishing with 
52 
local fishermen, participated in community social events, attended various religious services and 
meetings, and so on). 
More focused observation was also undertaken. For instance, I spent time shadowing the island's 
community psychiatric nurse, the island's social welfare officer, and a commun, ty-work supervisor. 
I visited and spoke with staff at the island's hospital for adults experiencing mental-health 
difficulties (Sundale), a nursing home for the elderly (The Haven), and visited conu-nunity clinics in 
outlying areas. Fieldnotes consisted of notes from unrecorded interviews and informal 
conversations, notes from observation, interpretive comments, and notes on primary documentary 
material. 
Documentary research 
Documentary material both on the island and in the UK was collected from a variety of historical, 
socio-economic and health-related sources: the St. Helena Government's Archives; the UK 
Government's Foreign and Commonwealth Office Library; the British Library; private collections. 
A separate set of notes was kept on primary documentary material. 
Appendix A3.7 presents an account of how this ethnographic data was interpreted and includes a 
description of the framework used to interpret informants' discourse on distress. 
The next three chapters present two sets of interpretations. First, Chapter 4 presents the 
interpretation of discourse on distress among the samples of English informants. Second, Chapters 
5 and 6 present an interpretation of the data collected in the St. Helena fieldwork. 
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Chapter 4 
'The Usual Classic Symptoms' 
This chapter presents an interpretation of the discourse on distress employed among a sample of 
white English informants living in the English city of Bristol. The interpretation of this discourse Is 
approached from two angles. The first section presents an interpretation of informants' descriptions 
of their experience of distress. While the central focus is on informants' discourse on depression, 
the interpretation also explores other features of informants' descriptions; for instance, how 
narrativity and metaphor are used to depict experiences of distress where agency has been 
disrupted. The second section is concerned with how informants sought to interpret and account for 
these experiences. It examines how they contextualised their experiences of affliction within 
personal narratives and how trope and narrativity were used to depict the relationship between self, 
distress, and relational settings. 
Section 3.3 and Appendix A3.6 present an account of how this data was collected and analysed. 
The qualitative analysis of the data collected in in-depth interviews with informants yielded seven 
core sub-themes under the broad thematic domain: 'Experience and expression of distress'. Most 
informants described a single experience of personal distress (e. g. a prolonged period of 'feeling 
depressed', 'low' or 'down'). A few informants labelled their experience of distress as 'panic 
attack' or 'anxiety', but not 'depression'. Informants' descriptive discourse on distress was 
organised into the following thematic categories (i. e. recurring domains of content): 
Metaphors of mood (e. g. 'feeling low', 'feeling depressed') 
A vocabulary of emotional distress (e. g. sadness, hopelessness, emptiness) 
Idioms of distress (e. g. 'anxiety', 'panic', 'fright', 'stress', 'worry') 
The loss of agency and human behavioural breakdown 
" The embodiment of personal distress 
" Social disconnection and biographical disruption 
" Ethnopsychiatric categories (e. g. 'depression', 'panic attacks', 'stress', 'mania', 'nerves', 
6 neurosis', 'psychosis'). 
Each of these discursive domains was organised around a set of 'root metaphors"', ontological 
concepts, and symbolic associations. The material presented below was selected in terms of how 
well it illustrates these core themes. I have parsed narrativised discourse into clauses for 
presentation and referencing purposes. Some detail in the accounts has been changed to protect the 4D 
privacy of the informants. 
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4.1 English metaphors of distress 
Personal narratives of illness or distress are commonly composed of a mixture of both descriptive 
and explanatory discourse. Where the speaker's purpose is explanatory, then descriptive discourse 
is employed in the service of explanation. In this section, the discussion centres on how speakers 
descfibed their experiences of personal distress and the metaphors they used to articulate it, rather 
than on how informants explained or accounted for such experiences. The analytic focus is 
therefore on discrete units of discourse that depict, describe, and that partly constitute experiences 
of personal distress. 
The creative deployment of metaphor gives form to what is ambiguous and inchoate in terms of 
what is already familiar (Fernandez, 1982). Fairclough points to the constitutive power of metaphor 
when he says that 'metaphors structure the way we think and the way we act, and our systems of 
knowledge and belief in a pervasive and fundamental way' (1992: 194). Culturally available 
metaphors amplify some features of experience, just while they silence others. For instance, the 
metaphors employed by sufferers in their discourse on illness and distress have the power to 
constitute experiences of personal distress in some ways and not in others (See Appendix A3.3 for 
definitions of 'metaphor' and the other 'tropes'). 
Metaphors of mood are a central feature of English discourse on distress. 'Mood' here is taken to 
mean a prolonged, embodied emotional state (Keyes, 1985), what one informant described as 
'happy, sad, sort of grumpy, the way I feel'. Metaphor makes it possible for creative language users 
to articulate experiences where existing linguistic resources are unavailable. Given the ineffability 
of suffering, metaphor and what Fernandez (1986) describes as the 'play of tropes' make it possible 
for sufferers and former sufferers to communicate their embodied experiences. Low, for instance, 
points to how metaphor 'allows for the communication of otherwise senseless and unspeakable 
suffering' and 'provide flexible, creative, and strategic language for the expression of suffering' 
(1994: 142). 
Informants distinguished between two kinds of personal distress in their accounts. First, 'ordinary 
suffering' refers to everyday experiences of feeling 'down', 'low', 'depressed', 6anxious', 
'stressed', 'up and down'. Second, 'illness-like suffering' refers to more severe personal distress 
that involves a breakdown in personal agency (e. g. depicted as a 'loss of control' or 'inability to 
cope') or a disruption in everyday functioning and the fulfillment of usual social roles. Within 
informants' accounts, the latter kind of distress was commonly depicted with a strong somatic 
component and was described using a cluster of quasi-expert and ethnopsychiatric terms such as 
6panic attacks', 'anxiety attacks', 'nerves, 'mania', and 'depression'. Informants distinguished 
illness-like suffering from ordinary suffering both dimensionally and categorically. As I will show, Z__ 
the underlying 'root metaphor' used to depict more severe experiences of personal distress was that rýl 
of chronic illness. 
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Informants described their embodied experiences of both ordinary and illness-like suffering using 
the embodied metaphors of 'height', 'depth', 'weight', 'energy', and 'pressure'. This metaphorical 
discourse provides English speakers with a kind of physics of experience; a set of symbolic tools 
for configuring embodied experience in a wide range of ways. The most common ways that 
informants articulated their experiences of ordinary suffering (using terms such as 'low', 'down', 
or 'depressed') were grounded in these metaphors. Their discourse on distress was structured 
around an orientation metaphor that mapped out a spectrum of mood states that ranged between 
'high' and 'low', 'up' and 'down'. This 'root metaphor' of 'mood' provided speakers with a 
dynamic means for communicating fluctuations in motivation and emotional experience. 
The language of personal experience (e. g. 'thought', 'feeling', 'action') in developed English- 
speaking societies is organised around set of dualisms and 'root metaphors'. The latter also 
constitutes Anglo-American discourses on health, illness, and distress. Writing within a North 
American context, Lakoff and Johnson point out, for instance, that orientation metaphors (e. g. the 
'root metaphor' of 'verticality') are grounded in bodily experience. They cite the example of space 
metaphors that are used by English speakers to articulate emotions (1980: 14). For instance, 
'happiness', 'control', 'rationality', 'consciousness', 'health', high social status, and positive 
emotional states are 'up'. Conversely, 'down' is associated with 'Illness', negative emotional states, 
'unconsciousness', 'loss of control', 'irrationality', and low social status. Lakoff and Johnson argue 
that the embodied experience of emotion has 'systematic correlates' with 'sensory-motor 
experiences' so that 'up' becomes associated with 'happy'. Such metaphors provide a language for 
articulating mood and emotion; they 'allow us to conceptualise our emotions in more sharply 
defined terms and also to relate them to other concepts having to do with general well being (e. g. 
health, life, control, etc. )' (1980: 58). While such metaphors are grounded in bodily experience, 
they are also constructive; they provide a way of 'partially structuring one experience in terms of 
another' (1980: 77). 
This metaphorical system was employed by English informants to articulate the distinction between 
ordinary suffering and illness-like suffering. Many informants' discourse on distress articulated a 
spectrum of suffering ranging from 'severe' or 'deep' ('feeling very depressed') to 'n-lild' or 'low' 
('feeling a bit fed-up'). In this discourse, they distinguished normal fluctuations in mood (e. g. 'ups 
and downs') from more severe distress (e. g. 'depression') in terms of the depth, prolonged 
duration, and degree of intractability associated with the latter. 
Informants commonly distinguished 'feeling depressed' from 'depression', with the latter being 
used as an ethnopsychiatric illness term. It was therefore possible to 'feel depressed' either within 
the context of a depressive episode/illness or outside of that context, within the context of everyday 
fluctuations in mood. This distinction mimics (and is mirnicked by) the clinical distinction between 
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dysphoria and depressive disorder described in Section 2.2. For example, some informants used the 
phrase 'feeling depressed' to refer to ordinary suffering. In line with the underlying root metaphor, 
synonyms for 'feeling depressed' included 'feeling down' or 'low'. One informant described her 
experience of 'feeling depressed' as being 'on a downer'. A woman in her 50s depicted 'feeling 
low' as an ongoing expefience of emotional vulnerability: "So, I'm not feeling as low. No, I can't 
say I'm feeling : yeh, I could cry at the drop of a hat. But, I feel more fed-up, than low". In Text 1, 
a woman in her 20s uses the term 'depressed' as a metonym for a prolonged feeling of 
6 unhappiness', rather than as an illness term: 
Text I 
I just sort of say 'depressed'. I just use it like a word. I just say I'm depressed. I 
don't think deep down think that I am. I haven't had anyone confirm that I'm 
depressed. I just sort of see it as just sort of being unhappy all the time. 
Similarly, in Text 2a middle-aged woman uses a mood metaphor of 'feeling down' as a synonym 
for 'feeling fed up': 
Text 2 
Down is to be fed-up with life Just sort of fed up really. Your husband gets on 
your nerves and you don't want to bother with 'im. Again, I just feel like just shut 
the door. Find somewhere to run out of the way of it all, y'know. But, I think 
everybody gets like that. 
Some informants sought to make a categorical or qualitative distinction between ordinary suffering 
and more severe forms of distress. One informant referred to her experience of ordinary suffering 
as 'the downers' and categorically distinguished it from depression. In Text 3, for example, a man 
in his 30s distinguishes between 'feeling depressed' from 'feeling cheesed-off'. The fon-ner is 
associated with more severe distress and illness-like suffering (e. g. 'depression') and is 
differentiated from ordinary suffering: 
Text 3 
1 think there's a fine line between saying, 'I'm depressed', or you're actually 
feeling low. I think there's a big difference [ ... ] If you're feeling low, I mean 
somebody can say: 'Erm, fancy a pint, fancy a chat, or you need a good night out'. 
You're just cheesed-off basically. 
The dimensionality underling the English metaphors of mood described above made it possible for 
infon-nants to characterise illness-like suffering ('depression', 'feeling very low', 'being at rock 
bottorn') as a more extreme form of ordinary suffering (e. g. 'feeling a bit low', 'being on a bit of a 
downer', 'up and down'). For instance, one female informant said that to 'feel depressed' meant to 
'feel very low'. Another informant equated 'depression' with 'feeling really low in yourself'. A 
man in his 50s defined 'depression' as 'being as fed-up as you can imagine'. A man in his 20s 
described his experience of 'depression' as 'feeling really low, just feeling really unhappy about 
things'. One informant said that during her experience of 'depression' she felt 'very, very low'. 
Another informant differentiated 'low ones' from 'really low ones'. A middle-aged woman said 
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about her experience of 'depression': 'You just get very low. Your moods get very low and it's 
very hard to pick it up because you're totally engulfed by your own emotions and problems'. 
Another man in his 50s equated 'depression' with 'feeling really low in yourself. A woman in her 
40s described her experience of 'depression' as 'mood swings. I was just feeling very down'. Other 
informants described their experience of 'depression' as being 'at the bottom', 'at rock bottom', or 
I in a deep depression'. For example, a woman in her 50s used such metaphors to characterise 
feelings of hopelessness associated with 'depression' (Text 4): 
Text 4 
Depression to me is : I'm gonna sound :I feel really really down, rock bottom. I 
can't get no further. And you think: 'Is this what life is all about? It's gotta be 
better. ' Erm, you don't necessarily feel physically ill : but you're just so, so : you 
can't imagine smiling again, being happy again. 
In these examples, the metaphors of ordinary suffering ('feeling low' or 'down') were not 
categorically distinguished from 'depression'. They were used as synonyms for 'feeling depressed'. 
As ordinary suffering became deeper, it became more illness-like; it became more like 
'depression'. 
These metaphors were not the only ways that informants depicted the severity of their distress. The 
intractability and prolonged duration of distress was also used to form a qualitative distinction 
between ordinary, everyday experiences of personal distress and more severe illness-like suffering. 
For example, a middle-aged woman in her 50s who had experienced several episodes of 
'depression' distinguished the 'ups and downs', short-term and recurrent feelings of sadness or 
despondency, from "the depression that doesn't come and go [ ... ] the kind that you can't shake 
off'. A man in his 50s reported experiencing 'peaks and troughs', depressed feelings that 'come 
and go'. He differentiated this labile movement from a steady state of prolonged 'depression'. In 
Text 5, a woman in her 30s distinguishes between those individuals with a 'depressive' disposition 
who are prone to ordinary suffering, from those 'with depression' who are 'down all the time': 
Text 5 
1 seem to think if you're depressive you can go along for a while okay and then you 
go down, and then you go back up. Like you're on a zigzag line - you're up and 
down, up and down all the time. I suppose if you 'ad depression, you'd be down all 
the time, but whether :I seem to think if you're depressive you're up and down. 
That's what I seem to be is up and down. 
Similarly, in Text 6, a middle-aged woman implicitly distinguishes between everyday or ordinary 
suffering ('a bit depressed') from a state of 'depression': 
Text 6 
And, if I did feel a bit depressed one day, It might not 'ave been depression. It 
might just've been a bit of a downer like everybody gets. It'd terrify me: 'Oh, I'm 
going down again. Oh, I'm going back again. ' But, then, it would wear off. [ ... II 
don't get the downers so much. I can cope with a lot more things. I feel better in 
meself. Some mornings I wakes up and I thinks: "Oh, I'm pissed off. I've gotta go a 
work. And I've got to listen to everybody moaning at me. " Y'know. But, once I'm 
at work or at the first house, it goes. 
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In Text 6, 'depression' or 'the downers' is distinguished from a 'bit of a downer like everybody 
gets'. Being 'a bit depressed' is a transient experience that 'wears off. For this speaker, everyday 
fluctuations in mood, 'ups and downs', signal a possible return of 'depression' and are hedged with 
fear. She metaphorically describes the transition from ordinary suffering to a more intractable 
experience of 'depression' as a downward movement. She then elaborates with narrative detail in 
order to contextualise these feelings of being 'a bit down'. Moreover, she normalises her 
experience of distress by situating it within the context of her everyday activity. 
The embodied concepts of weight, depth, and verticality provide the metaphorical grounding for 
the ethnopsychiatric concept of depression. Some informants described the experience of 
'depression' metaphorically as a downward journey, with pressure increasing the lower that they 
travelled. A metaphor of 'falling' or 'going downhill' was sometimes used to describe the process 
of becoming 'depressed': 'I suppose you find your own way to cope. You either spiral down, or you 
kind of : you bottom out and you get up and you start climbing back up'. In Text 7, a woman in her 
50s emphasizes the intractability of her experience of 'depression' and describes the process of 
recovery using an extended metaphor of falling and climbing: 
Text 7 
The trouble is is if you go too far, it's gonna take you a hell of a lot longer to get 
out of it again because it's like climbing that bloody ladder - you get right to the 
top and you fall down a few more steps and then you gotta try it again. And that's 
just how it is. 
Similarly, a woman in her 30s described the process of becoming 'depressed' using a metaphor of 
uncontrolled falling (Text 27). Conversely, some informants used a metaphor of ascent to describe 
the process of recovery. For example, a woman in her 40s who had experienced prolonged and 
recurrent experiences of depressive illness described the process of recovery as follows: 
Text 8 
It's superficially erm : it's getting you to slow yourself down to pick yourself back 
up, do you see what I mean? You've got to go down before you go back up again, 
before you can sort of feel more positive. 
In Text 8, feeling 'down' is associated with negative agency and precipitates entry into the sick 
role. 'Up', on the other hand, is associated with recovery and the restoration of a positive sense of 
agency. 
Feeling 'depressed' is more than just feeling 'low'. It is also to feel under a weight. For instance, 
one informant said that 'depression' was "some'ing being depressed, pushed down". Another 
informant described the state of 'depression' as 'unshakeable'. Similarly, another said that 
'depression is that bloody cloud just above your head, it follows you everywhere'. 
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A container or entity metaphor was also common in informants' accounts. Like the orientation 
metaphors described above, Lakoff and Johnson argue that such metaphors are grounded In the 
embodied experience of everyday objects. The metaphorisation of 'the self' as an object or 
psychological entity opens up a diversity of ways for describing personal distress (e. g. metaphors 
of 'fragility', 'emptiness', 'cracked'). For instance, the ethnopsychiatnc concept of 'depression' is 
partly constructed out of a container metaphor. This metaphor is generally employed in English 
ethnopsychological discourse as a way of describing emotion or mood states as something one 'is 
in' or as a substance or liquid that one 'sinks into'. For instance, a middle-aged woman used a 
container metaphor to express this feeling of intractability: "I 'ad depression terrible. And I really 
went down, and I thought: 'I'm not gonna get out of this"'. 
Informants did not represent their experience of 'depressive illness' as a tightly bounded event with 
a tidy beginning, middle, and end. Moreover, informants' experiences of personal distress 
commonly involved a process of experience, rather than a static one-off event. An analogy can be 
drawn here with Turner's re-description of social process as a 'social drama' (Turner, 198 1). 
Among these informants, illness-like suffering took the form of a personal drama: a breach occurs 
in normal, everyday experience; a build-up follows culminating in a crisis; a fall or breakdown take 
place; redress is sought; if the measures taken to redress the situation are effective, there is a 
'climbing back', a recovery; this restoration of agency is associated with an interpretive 
reconstruction of the suffering that has taken place and a search its meaning. The metaphors of 
mood afforded speakers with the linguistic resources to articulate this personal drama as a dynamic, 
embodied process. The rhythm of this process was sometimes depicted as fluctuations between 'up' 
and 'down' (e. g. Text 12). These vicissitudes of mood were captured in the metaphorical concept 
of a 'mood swing'. For example, one woman said: "I'm constantly up and down mood wise [ ... ]I 
still feel low. I'm getting better. I'm learning how to deal with things better. I have my high and 
lows. I go through a lot more highs now". Similarly, a man in his 30s used this dynamic metaphor 
('up and down') to describe his 'bad mood swings' (Text 9): 
Text 9 
1 could be quite positive and a little bit up. And you kind of notice things about 
yourself [ ... ] You could be quite hyper, and over-the-top happy. Erm, it wasn't a 
true happiness, don't get me wrong [ ... ] I'd say over that period of time, I'd say, I 
suppose it was a bit erm : constant. But, I'd say it was probably up and down as 
well. 
Some informants reported a cycle of 'depression and mania', of 'lows and highs', of 'flipping 
between the two'. Otherwise, they spoke of 'feeling high' after a prolonged perio Id of 'feeling low' 
or 'feeling depressed'. Conversely, they described periods of illness-like suffering (e. g. depression) 
that was followed by feeling intensely 'high' or 'manic'. A woman in her 30s, for example, 
described how she 'gradually started to get better, but after two, three months of apparent 
normality, I just went to a higher state straight on. I suffered a manic state'. The dimensional 
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concept underlying informants' discourse on mood is clear in the following excerpt (Text io) in 
which the speaker describes oscillations between 'depression' and 'mania' over time: 
Text 10 
It didn't stay the same. Like erm there's been periods where I've felt like it's got 
loads better. But these 'ave been quite small periods compared to the depression. It 
almost feels like it could be slightly manic. But, I mean, I definitely don't go off the 
other end of the scale. But, I do into these phases where I just feel really good. 
For some informants, 'depression' or 'feeling down' was a continuous experience, sometimes 
becoming more severe than at other times. There was no clear differentiation between normal and 
abnormal, sickness and health in some inforinants' discourse. For example: 
Text 11 
Well, you think you're plodding along okay, and you're quite happy, and it can go 
on for like two months. And then som'it stupid'll just set you off [ ... J You think 
you're better and on an even keel and you go right back down again. I don't think 
I'll ever get that where I'm fine day-in, day-out for a long period. [ ... ]I usually 6 ave one bad day a week, and then, every two or three months, I'll 'ave a bad week. 
There'll be a whole week of it, and it really takes some picking up. 
Others reported one-off experiences of 'depression' or other form of illness-like suffering such as 
'panic attacks'. Again, these were clearly distinguished from ordinary suffering in terms of depth, 
duration, and the degree of disruption that they caused. Some informants reported experiencing 
recurrent episodes of 'depression' or 'anxiety' that took place over a longer period and, again, these 
experiences were articulated in terms of their duration, severity, depth, frequency, and lability (e. g. 
Text 12). For these informants, the experience of illness-like suffering could last for a few days or 
several years. For instance, a male informant reported experiencing repeated 'bouts' or 'spells' of 
'mild depression'. A woman in her 30s said that her experience of 'depression' had begun 
continuously and then occurred in sporadic 'bursts'. Another informant used the term 'depression' 
as a synecdoche for his entire experience of illness-like suffering; he only ever felt 'better' against 
a 'background of depression'. Some of those who had experienced 'depression' on multiple 
occasions had become conscious of patterns or rhythms in their experience. In Text 12, for 
instance, a woman in her 30s depicts her experience of personal distress as if it were 'a cold' that 
she catches every now and then: 
Text 12 
They all take about a year. Yeh, it just seems like it's another illness. A cold is three 
days here, three days. To me, it just seems like depression: one year. 
It's blips going down and then up, and down a bit further, then up, and then down a 
bit. 
Each time it gets longer and deeper. C) 
I sort of see that with every one I got worse. So. I'm sort of thinking: 'Oh the next 
time, what's it gonna be? How much worse can it geff :1 
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In addition to a discourse on mood and illness, informants' discourse on distress employed the 
ethnopsychiatric categories of 'stress', 'anxiety', and 'panic' and a vocabulary of negative emotion. 
There is no space to present a full account of this discourse on distress. Nonetheless, a few key 
themes to emerge from the interpretation of this discourse are worth highlighting: 
First, some informants used an idiom of 'stress' or 'worry' to articulate their moral concerns. 
Section 4.4 illustrates how these ethnopsychological categories played an important evaluative 
function in some informants' discourse on distress. 'Anxiety' and 'panic' were used to index highly 
physicalised experiences of distress that occurred in response to adversity. Although often linked, 
informants distinguished such distress from 'depression' or 'feeling depressed'. Like 'nerves' 
among Costa Ricans (e. g. Low, 1994), 'stress', 'anxiety', and 'panic' represent embodied 
metaphors of distress. 
Second, while metaphors of mood frequently appeared in informants' discourse on distress, a 
psychological vocabulary on emotion was much less common. A vocabulary of 'guilt', for 
example, rarely appeared in informants' discourse on distress. A vocabulary of negative emotion 
peppered informants' discourse; e. g. a vocabulary of 'sadness', 'unhappiness', 'low self-esteem', 
'worthlessness', 'hopelessness', 'disconnection', and 'loss of interest'. Some informants associated 
'sadness', 'hopelessness', and 'unhappiness' with 'depression'. For example, a middle-aged 
woman reported feeling "hopeless because you don't see an end to it". Similarly, a woman in her 
30s described her experience of 'depression' as: "No hope. Erm, a lack of hope Everything is 
hopeless, pointless [ ... ]I can't see any future. " 
Third, an ethnopsychological concept of 'low self-esteem' plays an explanatory role in both expert 
and lay discourse on distress. For instance, some informants reported feeling 'low self-worth' as 
part of their experience of suffering rather than its cause (Text 13): 
Text 13 
I'd failed, y'know. I didn't feel worth in myself Basically, started to get very 
dunno. I just felt terrible. 
I just felt worthless. 
I just hated my life. 
You don't give a shit about nothing, not even yourself. 
That was how I understood depression: people who suddenly find themselves 
feeling worthless, bad, err, but without really understanding why. 
A middle-aged woman who had been 'depressed' for several months used a metaphor of colour to 
communicate the emotional experience of 'depression' as 'that feeling where everything feels 
worthless and, erm, everything feels very black'. 
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Fourth, a few informants associated 'depression' or 'feeling depressed' with a generalised feeling 
of emotional disconnection and disinterest. For instance, a woman in her 30s said that she had felt 
'like an iceberg' when she had been 'depressed'. Similarly, a man in his 40s reported that, when he 
had been 'very depressed', at the 'bottom of the pit', he was incapable of expressing any emotion. 
A few informants reported a 'loss of interest' (e. g. 'You get to that stage that you got interests'). 
For example, a middle-aged woman reported experiencing a generalised lack of positive feeling 
when she had been 'depressed': 
Text 14 
If somebody said to you - it's hard to verbalise - if you : I'd say being depressed : if 
you won a lot of money on the lottery, or if you won a holiday that was going to 
take you abroad for two weeks, so what? You don't feel great about it. You don't 
feel great about anything yourself. Mentally, emotionally, spiritually, you're low. 
You're kind of zombified. 
A metaphor of being 'zombified' (Text 14) expresses a dampening down of emotion and a loss of 
personal agency. 'Feeling low' is associated with a negative evaluation of the self and the world 
more generally. 
4.2 Loss of agency and human behavioural breakdown 
A society's discourse on distress is formed in relation to its dominant discourses on the self, body, 
and society. Experiences of personal distress are articulated, evaluated, and interpreted in terms of 
a cultural discourse on distress. Personal distress is therefore partly constituted in terms of a 
society's dominant cultural discourse on the self. In addition, if social identity and selfhood are at 
least partly constituted in terms of the latter, then so must experiences of personal distress. 
Chapter 2 characterised a dominant Euro-American discourse on the self. This discourse prescribes 
a view of human 'agency' as 'autonomy', 'self-control', 'independence', 'objectivity', and 
'rationality'. According to Kirmayer, this view of agency is associated with a concept of the self 'as 
a rational agent, which occupies a space within the body, which itself dwells within the social 
world The person is identical with that rational agency that establishes its unique worth by 
promoting its own goals over those of others' (1988: 79). Chapter 2 pointed to another subjugated 
view of agency in developed English-speaking societies. A sociomoral or hermeneutic view of 
6agency' is associated with a view of 'the self' charactensed by its sociality, its core concerns, and 
its distinctions of worth (Taylor, 1985). An implication of this view is that self-efficacy is partly 
contingent on a capacity to evaluate and interpret. The power to act (as opposed to merely behave) 
is contingent on the formation of positive evaluations about the self and world. Z: ) 
The discursive forms and genres that informants drew upon to describe and interpret their 
experiences of distress were rooted in these public discourses. While Informants rarely Interpreted 
their suffering as psychiatric illness, personal distress always involved some disruption in agency in 
their accounts. Embodied metaphors of mood and an idiom of agency were the principal figurative 
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devices used to depict such disruption. In some cases, a breakdown of agency provided the 
grounding for an illness metaphor that, in turn, warranted entry into the sick role. In many cases, if 
personal distress had not disrupted agency so profoundly, then there would been no need to visit a 
doctor. This disruption in agency had five dimensions. Each of these corresponded with a different 
dimension of agency (as defined within Euro-American discourses on the self and body): 
" Moral agency: a breakdown of agency in the interpretive and evaluative sense; 
" Embodied agency: a breakdown in the capacity to physically act, to move one's body into 
action; 
Volitional agency: a breakdown in motivation; 
0 Behavioural agency: a breakdown in functionality and in the capacity to act in a controlled or 
co-ordinated fashion; 
Social agency: a breakdown of sociality, social disconnection, and social exclusion. " 
Demoralisation: the loss of moral agency 
The 'emotional pathologies' involve a disruption of a positive sense of agency. Within English 
ethnopsychology, a vocabulary of mood, emotion, and feeling are used to account for and interpret 
action and behaviour. Similarly, in English discourse on distress, a disruption of mood and emotion 
(a breakdown in agency in the interpretive or evaluative sense) was regularly used to account for a 
loss of behavioural control, a loss of functionality, or breakdown in sociality (e. g. Texts 28,29, & 
33). In some cases, feelings of emptiness, disconnection, or a negative evaluation of the self or 
future had negative implications for the capacity for action or the inclination to engage with others. 
For example, a man in his 20s reported feeling disconnected from his emotions and therefore 
lacked motivation (Text 15): 
Text 15 
It was more like I was cut off from all these nice feelings that really keep you 
going, that keep you doing. The things you like. So, I was almost acting out from 
memory of what I used to do, y'know [ ... ] It felt like everything that I'd ever 
valued in life, y'know, the value that they had, had gone. 
This speaker's capacity to form positive evaluations or distinctions of worth was disrupted. He uses 
the metaphor of an empty container to express this feeling of emptiness (Text 15). For instance, he 
described himself as 'an empty shell that's incapable of feeling'. This negativity was generalised 
leaving him without a positive grounding for action ('I suppose just every aspect of my life was 
tainted by how I felt'). 
A loss of a sense of agency was central to informants' experiences of illness-like distress. This can 
also involve a disruption of personal or social identity. For example, a woman in her 40s associated 
her experience of depression with a breakdown in her social identity and this was associated with 
withdrawal and social disconnection and the loss of a valued social role: 'I just seemed to lose my 
identity completely'. She went from being "quite a successful, articulate career person, to * týl just 
somebody who just didn't do anything I didn't go out vvith my friends. I didn't J 
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want to. All I wanted to do was get into the safety of my home and stay there". Similarly, in the 
low-narrativity, habitual narrative below (Text 16), a rrfiddle-aged woman describes the loss of 
identity that had accompanied her first experience of depression: 
Text 16 
When I experienced the first deep, very deep and very 
dangerous depression, 
I suddenly couldn't recognise the places that 
I: where I was. 
I was feeling very scared 
and I: suddenly: 
I just couldn't talk. 
Not because : not because I was de de deaf. 
If somebody asked my name, 
I didn't know. 
I didn't even know my name. 
And people who knew me asked: 
'How are youT 
I couldn't even answer. 
I was just terrified. 
This excerpt (Text 16) tells of a breakdown in the capacity to communicate or talk, symbolised by 
the forgetting of her own name. Again, the metaphor of 'depth' is used to articulate the severity of 
the distress. 
A disruption of embodied agency 
Chapter 2 described how the distinction between 'somatisation' and 'psychologisation' is 
contingent on a dominant Euro-American folk psychology. This discourse is organised around a set 
of western metaphysical antinomies. Yet, these antinornies collapse in the face of embodied 
distress. Such distress starkly clashes with a dominant Euro-American discourse on the self and the 
institutions and practices grounded in this discourse. As Chapter 2 showed, somatic and 
psychological idioms of distress are commonly used to articulate personal distress among western 
populations. In fact, the dominant 'idiom of distress' employed in developed English-speaking 
societies is 'a discourse on agency'. English speakers (e. g. 'feeling low' or 'feeling depressed', 
6anxiety', 'panic', 'mania') are constrained to articulate suffering as a disruption and, in more 
severe cases, a complete breakdown in embodied agency and behavioural functioning. "" 
English lay discourse on distress has assimilated a biomedical discourse on distress to a high 
degree. A poor degree of fit between this official discourse on psychological suffering and the 
embodied experience of distress forced the creative deployment of trope in informants' accounts. In 
some informants' discourse, the psychological and the somatic domains were depicted as though 
they were independent. As informants' stories unravelled, it became clear that their experiences of 
personal distress had had a strong somatic component. They therefore employed metaphor to 
physicalise their descriptions. These descriptions involved a metonymic reduction from intangible 
and inchoate feelings and sensations into concrete and tangible representations; bodily feelings 
were selected out and amplified in concrete metaphors and embodied symbols. Some informants 
described how their distress had involved a disruption in their appetites (e. g. 'eating not quite so 
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good'; 'I couldn't eat'; 'I lost half a stone'). Some disruption of sleeping patterns was also 
common. For instance, a woman in her 20s described how her experience of 'depression' had 
started with a disruption in her usual sleeping patterns and this had precipitated a visit to her doctor. 
In Text 17, another female informant describes how 'stress' had disrupted her sleep: 
Text 17 
I think that maybe once you are stressed and you are very wound up, maybe that, in 
my case, was altering my sleep pattern. Once you can't sleep, you feet pretty crap. I 
think you don't have time for yourself, you don't have time to sit, not necessarily 
think, 'cos, in my case, I think that makes me worse. 
Many inforrnants reported 'feeling tired' or 'lacking in energy' (e. g. Text 33). A woman in her 50s 
described how she 'would wake up in the morning and feel that I'd had no rest'. A man in his 50s 
said that his experience of 'mild depression' had involved difficulties in sleeping and had begun as 
a feeling of 'tiredness'. 'Feeling depressed' had left him without 'mental energy' and, therefore, 
'physical energy'. Once he 'felt tired', he no longer had the energy to resolve his problems, so they 
began to 'build up'. He could see 'no way out'. Similarly, one middle-aged female informant 
described how she had 'just felt physically and mentally exhausted' when she had been 
'depressed'. A man in his 20s used a psychological idiom of mood to describe his experience of 
'depression' and then, at the end of his account, listed the somatic features of his illness as though 
they were independent of its psychologisation: "Physically, it's, y'know, no energy, losing weight, 
not sleeping properly, not much of a sex drive". A man in his 30s described his experience of 
'depression' as 'my very bad illness' which left him in a 'a terrible, terrible state' so that he 
"couldn't coordinate", was unable to sleep ("I didn't sleep at night for six months. I used to sleep in 
the morning"). It had left him feeling 'completely drained', 'a physical wreck'. 
Some informants used a vocabulary of 'pain' to depict their experiences of personal distress. For 
instance, a man in his 30s described his experience of 'depression' using an idiom of 'mental pain': 
'All you've got is pain in your nund'. Similarly, a vocabulary of 'mental pain' was prominent in 
the account of a female informant in her 40s: "I don't know how anybody can think that anything 
in the mind is painful", she said, "but it is so painful. It's like pain : I've never experienced pain 
like it". Finally, a woman in her 50s who, while reflecting on her experience of 'depression' many 
years before, described how it had first manifested itself as a pain or tension in the head: "I had a 
bad head [ ... ] Everything was in my 
head. So, my head was so, so tense". 
Agency is embodied so that the physicalisation of distress had implications for informants' Z: ) I 
functionality and their capacity for action (e. g. Texts 27). In many cases, this precipitated an initial 
consultation with a doctor. For instance, a woman in her 40s said how, once she had become 
'depressed': "I just couldn't do anything I just couldn't function at all. Everything I was doing 
was on automatic pilot". Text 18 is taken from the personal narrative of a woman in her 40s. She 
was one of the few informants to describe her experience of 'depression' as a 'mental illness': 
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Text 18 
It is very difficult to define your feelings about it all, because it's not a physical 
thing. Although it does have a physical bearing on your physical ability to do things 
[ ... ] You're not moving around as quickly as you would 
do if you were positive. 
So, the debilitating thing about mental illness is that it slows our body down. ( ... ] It 
disables you even to wanting to motivate yourself in the mornings, because, 
sometimes, you just feel so weak physically. 
This informant went onto describe how her experience of depression also involved 'panic attacks' 
and how these further disrupted her agency. She said, for example, that she was 'not able to 
function on a daily basis - doing the normal routine things, being able to hold down aj ob - because 
I get panic attacks'. While her experience of distress is interpreted as a mental phenomenon (Text 
18), it had physical consequences; it was associated with a breakdown in embodied functioning (as 
'disabling' or 'debilitating'). This undermined her ability to carry out her usual social roles, to 
work, and to maintain social relations with others. This illustrates how the embodied and 
debilitating nature of depression provides the grounding for the illness metaphor configured in an 
ethnopsychiatric illness category 'depression'. Continuing with this theme of how distress becomes 
embodied, Text 19 presents the low-narrativity narrative of a man in his 50s: 
Text 19 
11 was never shy about speaking to nobody 
2. and I noticed 
3.1 was getting like erm 
4.1 was going there [to the meetings] 
5. and I was starting giving it this like 
6. [gestures with shaking hands] 
7. and I thought: 
8. 'Oi up, what's going on 'ereT 
9. That's when it all started coming on, 
10. and I started thinking about it. 
11. Then when we started 'aving meetings 
12. and I started getting tight for breath, 
13. a bit of heavy breathing like. 
14. And I 'ad my heart checked out 
15. and everything like that. 
16. Nothing wrong with me 'eart. 
17. That's just how it started con-ling on. 
18. It was like one thing after another. 
19. Y'know, I thought: 
20.1 used to say to the n-lissus: 
21. "I'm sure blokes go through the same things as women, 
22. like a menopause, or whatever they calls 'ern - 
23. I'm sure some blokes go through it. " 
24.1 used to say: 
25. "Well, what's the matter with you? " 
26.1 got nothing to worry about. 
27. My house is paid for. 
28. I've got plenty of money in the bank. 
In this 'generic narrative', the speaker employs 'narrativity' to dramatize his experience of distress 
in relation to its social setting (Text 19). The meaning of distress in interpreted in terms of its 
consequences. Experience is presented in a way that is consistent with a masculine identity. The 
speaker's suffering presents a threat to the preferred version of himself. He symbolically associates 
emotional distress with women (lines 20-21). Discourse on emotion or mood is absent. His 
suffering is presented as a highly physicalised experience (e. g. as tightness of breath and shaking) Z-- -- C) 
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and it is presented as a medical mystery, as if it were an unexplained illness. The force of this 
discourse is to persuade the listener that these unexplained symptoms could not be psychogenic in 
origin. Since he symbolically associates 'worry' with financial difficulties, and given that he has no 
such difficulties, he cannot be worried (lines 25-27). Since he has no 'worries', his physical 
symptoms cannot therefore be psychogenic in origin. 
As the last example showed, 'depression' is associated with a disruption in normal bodily 
experience and embodied agency that makes it appear illness-like and so distinguishes it from 
ordinary suffering. Like chronic illness, it involves a breach in normal bodily experience and in the 
ability to perform usual roles and routines. For instance, a woman in her 40s differentiated 
'depression' as an illness from 'feeling down' in terms of its physical impact. In Text 32, for 
instance, she describes how 'the whole body can shake' when she is 'depressed'. In a small number 
of cases, the early signs of personal distress had been somatic. Possibly as a consequence of 
medical encounters, these informants came to view these somatic signs as psychogenic in origin. 
Personal distress (e. g. 'depression') was interpreted as the underlying cause of these somatic 
symptoms because no organic cause could be found. For example, a man in his 40s described how 
the early signs of 'depression' had been embodied as a pain in his leg. The doctors could find no 
physical cause for this pain. On receiving a diagnosis of 'depression', he formed a psychogenic 
interpretation of this physical pain (e. g. 'The pain in my leg was more of a symptom of being 
depressed'). In another case, a woman in her 40s initially experienced 'a pain in the jaw' for which 
her dentist could find no physical basis. On consulting a doctor about her pain, she described how 
she had 'just burst into tears'. After this medical encounter, the pain in the jaw vanished. She 
therefore depicted her physical pain as a metonym for her personal distress. 
A breakdown in motivation 
The experience of 'depression' often involved a loss of motivation, despondency, a loss of interest, 
and demoralisation (e. g. Texts 20 and 27). This was often embodied as 'tiredness' or a 'lack of 
energy'. For instance, a female informant in her 40s said that when she had been 'depressed', she 
"didn't wanna do anything", "didn't want to go out", and "didn't wanna talk to anyone". Similarly, 
a female informant in her 30s said that when she felt 'really unhappy'; she had 'no motivation to do 
anything'. In Text 29, a man in his 20s describes a breakdown in motivation and a state of 
generalised despondency. The phrase, 'staying in bed', was used metonyn-tically by some 
informants to describe this lack of motivation and loss of agency. For example, one woman 
described how 'depression' had taken control of her life to such an extent that she was unable to get 
out of bed and lost all motivation (Text 20): 
Text 20 
1 think last week I felt really low. Some days it was an effort to get out of bed. And 
in retrospect, thinking back to how those days were [when she was depressed], 
every day was like that for me - every day from beginning to end. Because there 
were days when I didn't go out at all. It was hard to get out of bed. 
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The lay metaphors of mood ('low', 'down', and 'depressed') can now be re-interpreted as been 
grounded in both psychological and somatic experience as embodied metaphors of agency. English 
discourse on mood depicts agency and its vicissitudes, the 'ups and downs' of motivation and 
inclination. The informants included in this study invoked these mood metaphors in order to depict 
how their agency had broken down. For example, a woman in her 30s used a metaphor of mood to 
describe her experience of recurrent 'depression' and emphasised how this feeling had been 
associated with feelings of disconnection: I was ust really : really low I didn't wanna go 
out". For instance, the following excerpt (Text 21) was extracted from a narrative account of a 
woman in her 20s and describes the impact of 'depression' on her life: 
Text 21 
It [feeling depressed] restricts me from doing things that I would like to do because 
I haven't got the confidence to do them f ... ]I could just get up and do something. But I can't. [ ... II get lower and lower. It stops when I might be in a particularly 
good mood and then I'll do some'ing that I wouldn't usually do. And that'll perk 
me up. And I'll start making more of an effort then, and doing things that I 
wouldn't usually do. But, then, if I get tired or something or if I 'ave a bad day at 
work, then I won't. And I won't do it again. And, then, it'll start all over again. So, 
I'm constantly up and down moodwise. 
Text 21 illustrates how English discourse on mood provides way of symbolising the contingent 
relationship between action and embodied agency. A 'good mood' is to be 'up' and is associated 
with positive action. 'Feeling low' or 'down', on the other hand, is associated with tiredness, 
lethargy, inertia, a feeling that one's capacity for action has somehow become constrained. In 
English discourse on distress, disruptions in feeling or mood are used to account for breakdowns in 
action. Conversely, this breakdown in the capacity or inclination to act has implications for how a 
person feels and how they evaluate and interpret themselves and the world. 
Idioms of agency: 'coping' and 'control' 
Lutz has argued that a 'rhetoric of control' figures strongly in American discourse on the self and 
emotion. Emotions are constituted as 'something in need of control', to be coped with, dealt with 
and managed (1987: 7 1). In his characterisation of the dominant cultural discourse on 'the Western 
self', Kirmayer maintains that 'self-control' 'implies rationally guided behaviour'. 'Self-control' 
and independence are proscribed within the hegemonic discourse on the self within developed 
English-speaking societies. This proscription is gendered so that, as Kirmayer puts it, 'the claim to 
be out of control carries far more stigma for men in North American culture. While an out of 
control woman brings to mind someone weeping, an out of control man is likely to be imagined as 
aggressive or violent' (1988: 71). Not being able to 'cope' or not being 'in control' are therefore 
evaluated negatively and attract a social stigma. Moreover, as Lutz (1987) points out, the open 
expression of emotion is viewed as a sign of irrationality and weakness. 
English informants in the study reported here regularly used a metaphor of 'control' and an idiom 
of 'coping' to describe their experiences of personal distress. The self was typically positioned in a 
passive mode relative to the events depicted in their accounts. For example, a middle-aged woman 
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described her experience of 'depression' as: 'The feeling of not being in control of things. 
Everything going on around you, and you're not In on jit, you're not a part of It. Things out of 
control'. Similarly, a middle-aged man told how his experience of 'depression' involved 'a loss of 
control'. In order to recover, he 'had to control it. But for a while it did control me, because my life 
was terrible. I think it becomes so much you: it kind of takes your body over. Because I think it was 
such a deep, deep depression'. A man who had recovered from a prolonged experience of 
'depression' used an idiom of 'control' to articulate how he had regained his sense of agency: 
"Now I've learnt to be able to control it and it's still there, but it's not controlling my life 
anymore". The following sequence of quotes (Text 22) illustrate the use of this idiom of 'coping' 
as a way of expressing this loss of a sense of agency and control: 
Text 22 
1 couldn't deal with my life. I couldn't cope with things. 
I just couldn't cope. 
I just could not cope with other people. And I was finding it really difficult to cope 
with my own children. 
You can't cope with your life. You just can't handle things that you would nonnally 
handle quite easily : it's sort of hopelessness. And, yeh, it's not : not able to carry 
on. 
Text 22 illustrates how more severe experiences of personal distress sometimes undern-lined the 
performance of social roles that represent an important source of a positive social identity. Personal 
distress can disrupt the ability to 'cope' at work, in the home, in everyday life. What it means to 
4cope' is relative to the roles and identities that an individual performs. For instance, in Text 23 a 
middle-aged woman uses an idiom of 'coping' to describe an experience of distress that occurred in 
response to a family crisis: 
Text 23 
1 felt I was going really mad. I couldn't cope. I couldn't talk to anybody. I was 
crying. I was screaming. Totally strung up and totally :I felt that I had no support 
whatsoever and nobody understood. Nobody. Just totally on me own with a 
situation I knew very little about. I couldn't cope with it. 
In this excerpt (Text 23), an idiom of 'coping' is used to express distress that was experienced as a 
'loss of control'. In Text 24, a man in his 40s describes his experience of 'depression' as a 
breakdown in 'coping': 
Text 24 
The feeling that I couldn't really cope with everything And, then, I talked it 
through, and stood back a little bit: 'No, I can normally cope with that job'. It's just 
that everything else sort of piled in on me. 
This speaker's difficulties in coping meant that he had been forced to give up his Job, precipitating 
a temporary social withdrawal (Text 24). In Text 25, the same speaker goes on to differentiate 
'depression' (a breakdown in 'coping') from 'stress' (still trying to 'cope): 
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Text 25 
1 tend to think of stress as being an agitated state; when things are eating away at 
you and you get very agitated, like you don't withdraw and stuff: 'I cannot cope 
with this'. You maybe try and cope with it. Things seem to be coming at you from 
all angles. But, you are in some way dealing with it. With depression, things maybe 
coming at you and you withdraw and think : go into a shell, if you like. You don't 
7 
try and deal with them head on. 
'Stress' and 'depression' disrupt personal agency in different ways and to different degrees (Text 
25). 'Stress', for instance, is associated with difficulties in 'coping', but there is no complete 
breakdown of agency. With 'depression', on the other hand, there is a complete 'withdrawal' from 
the world associated with a breakdown in 'coping'. The latter is associated with a disruption of 
identity analogous to the 'loss of self' sometimes associated with the experience of chronic illness 
(Charmaz, 1983; Nochi, 1998). 
Exactly how agency breaks down is partly a function of the sufferer's social identity. For example, 
Text 26 presents a generic, low-narrativity narrative of depression belonging to a woman in her 
30s. The speaker is married and performs a gendered domestic role in the home, caring for her 
children and maintaining the family home. The text illustrates how social position and identity 
influence the way that personal distress is experienced and communicated: 
Text 26 
1. I was really, really tired. 
2.1 couldn't move my arms, my legs. 
3.1 just : to get out of bed in the morning 
4. was such an effort. 
5. It really was. 
6. It is sometimes now. 
7. But, back then, it was day-in day-out, every day. 
8. Erm, that's the main thing 
9.1 can remember being really, really tired and miserable. 
10. And I'd be shouting at the kids all day. 
11. I'd just be shouting 
12. an' whatever they was doing: 
13. if they'd one toy out, 
14. I'd go mad 
15. because they were messing up the house. 
16. And I just couldn't stand 'em 
17. messing up the house. 
18. And erm, that would drive me mad, 
19. and I'd be shouting at them 
20. I'd be like : 
21. erm, I 'ad this compulsive need - 
22. when he'd [her partner] come in from work, 
23.1 'ad to 'ave the tea on the table for 'im. 
24. No matter what the children were doing, 
25. I'd make sure 
26.1 cooked 'im that meal, 
27. and made 'im see I was coping, 
28. and could do it, 
29. that it wasn't bothering me. 
30.1 think it was mainly like the cleaning where 
31. I've never been one for housework anyway. 
32. But, yeh, I think 
33. that was the main thing: the cleaning and the tiredness. 
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In Text 26, narrative clauses depict the linkages between recurrent, generalised events that occurred 
at an unspecified point in the past. A central theme Is the speaker's difficulty in coping ýNith her 
usual social responsibilities as a mother and home keeper. It begins with a description of a 
breakdown in her embodied agency and a loss of motivation (lines 1-9). This became manifest as 
an overperformance of her domestic duties. This had negative implications for her relationships 
with other family members (lines 10-20). Her abi ity to cope in her domestic role was signified by 
the daily preparation of an evening meal for her partner (line 26-29). How her agency became 
disrupted was partly constituted by her social role and the social identity associated with it. 
Discourse on illness and distress does not always conform to culturally defined narrative 
prototypes. In informants' discourse on distress, the self was often positioned in a passive role in 
relation to the action and the locus of control depicted exogenously, as external to the self. In 
'dramatistic' terms, the agent-scene ratio was weighted towards the scene. " For example, in the 
following low-narrativity narrative (Text 27), a woman in her 30s tells of her struggle against 
falling into a state of 'depression': 
Text 27 
1. I tend to get really anxious 
2. before I get a depression. 
3. I'm really struggling not to get like that, 
4. but, it's almost : 
5. I'm like, erm, like a swan, 
6. y'know, under the water, 
7. with the legs going, 
8. trying not to sort of slide into this depression. 
9. And, I'll do everything 
10.1 can to try and make: y'know. 
11. 'cos the minute I sort of go on this slidey slope 
12. down to a deep depression, 
13.1 can't seem to get back up again. 
14. It's like another year or so. 
15. So, there's real, y'know, panic. 
16. But erm: then I take, 
17.1 take : everything goes out, 
18. completely out of co : completely out of 
19. what's the word I'm looking for - out of 
20. Idunno. 
21. Everything small seems large. 
22. It's like, y'know, 
23.1 get really worried. 
24.1 get really worried 
25. that I can't, say, pay bills 
26. or do normal things. 
27. Then, I started having these, these stupid routines like 
28. writing it down in my book 
29. to forget : 
30. to remember that - 
31. normal things that I would do in my stride - 
32. and I would be writing them down in a book, say, 
33. and trying : y'know, 
34. trying to keep tabs on 
35. 'cos everything just seemed out of control 
36. and it was : 
37. it was just awful. 
38. And I just : 
39. it was like, leading up to the depression, 
40. everything's just like going out of control. 
41. And, then, one day, it's like: 
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42.1 can't cope. 
43. And it's, y'know: 
44. And I just slide. 
45. And that's it. 
46. Pien, I just don't do anything. 
47. And I just sit there like a vegetable. 
In Text 27, the speaker portrays her embodied experience of distress as a breakdown in agency. 
The discourse deviates from the definition of a prototypical narrative; narrative clauses are rare 
(there are two - at lines 27 and 41) and a low level of narrativity is used to portray the disrupted 
nature of the experience being recounted. The description has a loose event structure and tells of 
generalised experiences that are repeated with unclear boundaries. The present tense and 
continuous aspect are used to emphasise the repeated and habitual nature of these experience. A 
loose plot line traces an inexorable slide into a depressive state. This contrasts with a struggle to 
maintain control and to prevent such a slide. There is a turning point at line 41 that marks the 
beginning of a descent to a point where agency has broken down altogether. 
How does the speaker position herself and portray her agency in the text? On the one hand, she 
presents herself as someone who struggled to resist a descent into depression, desperately trying to 
maintain control. On the other hand, the self is presented as someone who is unable to 'cope', as 
'out of control'; in this case, she depicts herself as a passive object of experience rather than as an 
agent of change. On another occasion, she used an idiom of 'coping' to depict the 'loss of control' 
associated with a fall into a solid state of 'depression': "I was struggling not to slide into this 
depression. Then, again, it happened. One day, I thought: "I just can't cope anymore'. I slid. And 
then it's almost like, once I've slid, I can't go back". 
Gergen and Gergen's (1984) distinction between 'regressive' and 'progressive' plot lines is useful 
here. 'Regressive' plots arrange narrative events in relation to a negative end state while 
6progressive' plot lines delineate a movement towards a positively valued ending. In this sense, 
narratives can be viewed as articulating distinctions of worth, the shared moral values of a 
community, and thus articulate human agency. Given the low level of 'narrativity' in Text 27, 
coherence is achieved through a regressive plot line that is configured out of the root metaphors of 
depth and descent towards a negatively valued end state. An inanimate object is used as a metaphor 
to figure the speaker's embodied experience of human behavioural breakdown. The speaker 
portrays herself as descending through a series of subject positions: from agent status, the 
experience of 'losing control', to being 'out of control', and ending in an inanimate position. 
Agency is located in an indefinite object it that drives the descent. This breakdown in agency 
foreshadows her subsequent hospitalisation and entry into the sick role. A don-finant Euro- 
American cultural discourse on 'the self' is latent in the account, a discourse that associates the 
idealised (healthy) self with autonomy, self-control, and independence. Personal distress is 
presented as a breakdown of self and agency. If narrative depicts agency, then narrative t-1) 
incoherence and low narrativity are available to English speakers for depicting its break down. 
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Social disconnection 
A breakdown of agency was commonly associated with a disruption In social relationships in 
informants' discourse on distress. This was sometimes a function of a breakdown in sociality, in 
the disposition and capacity to engage in positive social relationships. For example, a few 
informants associated feelings of loneliness with 'depression'. One young woman said that the 
central feeling in her experience of 'depression' had been of feeling 'completely alone'. Similarly, 
a man in his 30s described his experience of 'depression' as 'an eternal feeling of loneliness [ ... ] 
utter loneliness'. Metaphors of disconnection were common in informants' discourse on distress 
(feeling 'withdrawn', 'shut off', or 'cut off). For example, one informant described 'feeling 
depressed' as 'a withdrawn, reclusive feeling'. A woman in her 40s who had suffered from 
depression said: 'I went to hide on my own, shut myself off from people'. For some informants, 
social withdrawal and self-exclusion had been a conscious strategy. For instance, a man in his 50s 
had retreated 'into a shell' because he felt unable to cope. A woman in her 30s described how she 
had felt "really tired, really withdrawn. I wouldn't go out. I never took'em [her children] to 
playgroups of anything like that. I just wouldn't go out the house". A middle-aged woman 
described how she had cut herself off from the world completely when she had been depressed: "I 
used to just get up in the morning and sit in a chair, and I didn't go to see friends. I'd cut off all my 
friends then. Cut off the television. Cut off the news". She would avoid anything 'that would stir up 
what was already going on in my head'. 'Cutting off' was a way of coping with her vulnerability 
and a strategy for restoring the control she had lost. A woman in her 20s described how she had 
shut herself away in her bedroom and stopped doing 'normal chores' like shopping. Similarly, in 
Text 28, a woman in her 40s describes how she avoided others as a way of coping with her distress: 
Text 28 
1 had completely shut everybody out then. I thought that if I can cope with my own 
little world, in my own home, then I'll be fine. Nobody else can upset me was 
no good socially at all. 
These accounts support Karp's interpretation of 'depression' as a 'disease of disconnection' (1996: 
178). Based on qualitative research among a North American sample, he argued social 
disconnection is intrinsic to depression. It is also one of its chief consequences: 'The pain of 
depression arises in part because of the separation from others; from an inability to connect, even 
as one desperately yearns for just such connection' and 'the inability to remain socially connected 
is a chief consequence of the illness' (1996: 26-27). Karp also highlighted the close relationship 
between social disconnection and a breakdown in agency: 'The self loses its social foundation, 
begins to wither [ ... I It is 
in depression's vicious feedback loop - the downward spiral of 
hopelessness, withdrawal, the erosion of the self, the still more powerful feelings of hopelessness, 
the even greater impulse to withdraw, and so on - that we witness, in its most negative form, the 
dialectic of self and society' (1996: 16). 
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This negative dialectic was also an organising theme in discourse on distress among some English 
informants. For instance, in Text 28, a breakdown in agency coincided with a breakdown in 
sociality and a desire to avoid social contact. Similarly, in Text 29, a man in his 20s depicts his 
distress as a gradual process of social disengagement: 
Text 29 
1 did just spend most of my time in bed 
4cos I did get a job. 
Well, it was very boring - mundane and boring. 
And, erm, I just started thinking 
it was all I've got 
to look forward to in life 
6 cos I can't do anything else. 
Erm, y'know, so I was very negative then. 
Well, yeh, totally despondent. 
And, I think it was this time 
that I really lost contact 
with a lot of my friends 
I started getting into 
where I was just really, 
I dunno, 
sort of going a bad way. 
I was just like watching TV, 
whatever was on. 
Just really shut off. 
This generic, low-narrativity narrative (Text 29) depicts a generalised loss of interest. This resulted 
in a breakdown in embodied agency and sociality so that ongoing relationships became disrupted. 
The excerpt also describes part of the social context of his distress; the absence of a fulfilling, 
stimulating job further exacerbated his feelings of despondency. 
'Human behavioural breakdowns' are also breakdowns in social agency. Like chronic illness, 
'depression' and the other 'emotional pathologies' often disrupt biography. For instance, in a 
British survey of people who had experienced a mental-health difficulty at some point (Rogers et 
al, 1993), respondents were asked how such difficulties had affected their lives. The vast majority 
said that it had had a negative impact on their self-confidence, relationships, employment, and their 
financial situation. Similarly, in the research reported here, personal distress was commonly 
associated with social and sometimes economic exclusion in informants' accounts. In many cases, 
the loss of agency associated with distress further deepened the adversity that had produced their 
distress in the first place (e. g. Text 29). Social disconnection and exclusion meant that access to 
sources of support could become more limited. 
A 'loss of control' or a breakdown in 'coping' meant that some informants had found it difficult to 
hold down a job or perform their usual social roles. For example, a female informant in her 30s 
used an idiom of 'coping' to depict the negative impact of her distress on her social relationships, 
particularly with her children: "I just could not cope with other people. And I was finding it really 
difficult to cope with my own children. If they questioned something, I would just scream at them 
or just cry: 'Go away"'. A woman in her 40s described how a disruption in her embodied 
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functioning had underrmned her capacity to engage socially: "Sometimes, I don't know what to say 
to my friends or my family. You're like in a world of your own sometimes [ ... ] You're totally 
engulfed by your own emotions and problems [ ... ] You're just 
disorientated. It just goes over your 
head - conversation - because you're not there. You're not functioning properly. " Other 
informants highlighted how a disruption in their sense of agency had had a negative impact on their 
employment status. For instance, a woman in her 30s described the effect of social anxiety on her 
social and work life: "I suffer from paranoia, anxiety [ ... ] I've been unemployed for about ten 
years. I find situations when I'm around people very stressful [ ... ]I found it hard to function in the 
outside world. " Sirrularly, a man in his 30s described how a prolonged experience of depression 
had disrupted his biography ('absolutely turned my life completely upside-down') so that he was 
unable to hold down a job ('I didn't work for about nine months'). In another case, a woman in her 
50s described how the loss of control associated with her distress resulted in her losing her job: 
"Well, I lost everything, I lost my job. I lost my home [ ... ]I just lost control of the whole situation 
then. I can't : looking back now I can't even remember it". 
4.3 The illness metaphor: loss of agency and social disconnection 
Along with metaphors of mood and a discourse on agency, the illness metaphor was a common 
way that personal distress was articulated among these English informants. Bury's distinction 
between 'spectral' and 'categorical' illness concepts" applied to the way that they conceptuallsed 
their experiences of personal distress. Section 4.1 showed how individual experiences of personal 
distress were located on a spectrum that stretched from 'ordinary suffering' at one pole through to 
more severe illness-like distress at the other. Informants applied a dimensional concept of distress 
to emphasise how it could have a more or less negative impact on agency, social engagement, and 
embodied functioning. More severe distress was characterised in terms of depth, duration, and 
intractability. In many cases, informants therefore drew a categorical or qualitative distinction 
between illness-like distress and ordinary suffering, although exactly where and how this line was 
drawn varied considerably. 
What is the grounding for this illness metaphor? Section 4.2 drew on informants' accounts to argue 
that the experience of personal distress in developed English-speaking societies typically involves a 
disruption or breakdown in agency and that this can take a variety of forms. Medical sociologists 
have shown how chronic illness in western settings commonly involves a breakdown in agency and 
a disruption in social relationships (Bury, 1982; Charmaz, 1983). Bury, for instance, has described 
how chronic illness is experienced as 'a disruptive event', 'a critical situation', and has 
characterised it as a 'form of biographical disruption' (1982: 169). Chronic illness can disrupt the 
&structures of everyday life' and dislodge social relationships, challenging the sense of self, and 
forcing a re-examination of existing goals and projects. Social relationships and the ability 'to 
mobilise material resources' can become disrupted (Bury, 1982). Charmaz (1983) and Nochi 
(1998) ha\, e interpreted this breakdown in agency associated with chronic illness as a 'loss of self'. 
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Charmaz describes how chronic illness results in a 'restricted life' and a withdrawal from usual 
social roles resulting in 'a diminished self-concept', a 'crumbling away' of 'fonner self-Images 
without simultaneous development of equally valued new ones' (1983: 192). 
Illness-like distress resembles chronic Ifflness In that it disrupts everyday routines, personal agency, 
and social relationships. It is also associated with a more or less severe and stereotyped set of 
somatic symptoms that prototypically distinguish one ethnopsychiatric category from another. 
These symptoms can be more or less pronounced depending on the severity of the distress. 
Drawing on a prototypical concept of chronic illness (i. e. as a prolonged physical complaint that 
disrupts everyday functioning and requires biomedical intervention), many informants pointed to 
the somatic concomitants of personal distress in order to warrant its status as an illness and as a 
way of legitimising their suffering. Section 4.1 showed how an ethnopsychiatric illness category of 
'depression' was regularly employed by these English informants to refer to more severe, 
intractable, and prolonged experiences of personal distress. They distinguished 'depression' as 
illness from ordinary suffering both dimensionally and categorically; 'depression' represents a 
severe form of ordinary suffering and is qualitatively distinct from such suffering. For example, a 
man in his 30s described his experience of 'depression' as 'those bad feelings my very bad 
illness'. In Text 30, a man in his 50s characterizes 'depression' as an illness, but not a disease: 
Text 30 
I think I see it as a mental illness, but it can have physical effects, maybe in 
tiredness, en you actually feel that you've got no life in you. You can't do anything 
[ ... ]I definitely consider it an illness. I see it as err quite a serious 
illness, although 
you can come of it [ ... ]I wouldn't call it a 
disease. I suppose I make a distinction in 
my mind: an illness is a bit less serious than a disease. When you think of diseases 
you think of, erm, like sort of : plague's a disease or that type of thing [ ... ] The 
word 'disease' to me has a far-reaching sort of connotation, with whole populations 
affected by it. 
The prototypical concept of 'disease' employed here is that of a contagious germ. Depression, 
though, is not contagious and is less serious than a disease (Text 30). The illness metaphor is 
grounded in the embodied nature of the distress. Depression is believed to be serious in that it has a 
negative impact on embodied agency, thereby qualifying it for biomedical intervention. In the next 
example (Text 31), a woman in her 40s interprets her distress using the folk psychiatric noun- 
phrase, 'clinical depression', and seeks to categorically distinguish it from ordinary suffering: 
Text 31 
It was only because I've heard that mentioned so much. I mean people in everyday 
life say they are 'depressed' I think: 'You don't even know what the bloody word 
means I expect. ' Because to me, what I imagine people mean by 'clinical 
depression': they treat it as an illness. 
Text 31 distinguishes between the ordinary use of the term 'depressed' and 'depression' as illness 
or 'clinical depression'. The speaker went on to negotiate the meaning of her experience as an 
instance of 'clinical depression'. The reflexive medicalisation of her distress conferred moral 
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legitimacy upon her suffering. The rhetorical prefixing of the term 'depression' with the adjective, 
4 clinical', signals that her distress is a biomedical responsibility or concern. 'Clinical depression' is 
'depression' as illness; it involves a physical 'breakdown', medical treatment, and can involve 
admission into hospital. In Text 32, she went on to characterise 'depression' as a 'mental illness', 
as qualitatively distinct from ordinary suffering: 
Text 32 
We can all say: 'We're depressed'. But there is such a difference in saying: 'Oh, I 
feel down. I feel depressed', when really you just feel down. You've had a hard 
day, a hard week, and you feel, y'know : it's not : whereas ours is clinical 
depression, because ours is something up here [gestures to her head]. So, it is : that 
[ ... ] something up here [gestures to her head again] that's making us feel that we 
really have got something wrong with us [ ... I The whole body can shake, and so that has gotta be the clinical depression. Whereas, depression you just :I feel down 
in the mouth and everything's an effort, or it's an effort to get out of bed, and that 
you need to be motivated. But there is a hell of a difference. 
Ordinary suffering is distinct from 'clinical depression' in that the latter has physical consequences 
('the whole body can shake'), is associated with a breakdown in agency, and is ontologically 
located in the head (Text 32). The persuasive force of this discourse is to convince the listener that 
'clinical depression' is an illness just like other chronic illnesses. The discourse works to position 
the speaker as someone who suffers from an illness: it portrays and partly constitutes an illness 
identity. 
How does illness-like distress become socially recognised as an illness? How is personal distress 
re-constituted as an object of biomedical concern? What is the social process through which 
ordinary suffering is transformed into a sickness? On the one hand, the representation of personal 
distress as illness experience is symbolically and socially produced. On the other hand, the illness 
metaphor is grounded in the embodied nature of personal distress. Section 4.1 showed how a root 
metaphor of verticality organises English informants' descriptive discourse on distress. This root 
metaphor articulates dominant cultural concerns within English society. English metaphors of 
distress form part of a wider moral discourse that encodes collective concerns. For instance, Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980) have highlighted how orientational and spatialised metaphors have an 
evaluative component. 'Up', for instance, is symbolically associated with action, mind, reason, 
agency, and is positively evaluated. 'Down', on the other hand, is associated with passivity, 
irrationality, body, emotion, lack of self-control, and is evaluated negatively. Illness experience and 
personal distress are sirrillarly located on the devalued side of this dualistic system (Kirmayer, 
1988). They therefore become subject to a powerful conjunction of therapeutic and normalising 
practices. These antinomies organise biomedical discourse on distress and are institutionalised in 
the social roles of doctor and patient. 'Chronic illness' becomes a cultural template for expressing, 
experiencing, interpreting, and responding to personal distress. Psychiatric discourse fixes the 
somatic concomitants of personal distress and social suffering into an organising illness metaphor: 
that of a 'mental disorder'. On encountering such discourse, the sufferer is then placed under 
pressure to take on an illness identity in order to gain entry to the sick role and access scarce 
78 
palliative resources. In this social and symbolic process, personal distress is metaphorised into a 
sickness. 
Personal distress represents a deviation from normative notions of the self as articulated in a 
dominant Euro-American discourse on the self. It is experienced, expressed, and interpreted as a 
breakdown in agency, a loss of control, an inability to cope, and a loss of dependence. The 
experience of 'depression', for instance, is represented both as a breakdown in functioning and as a 
disruption of social ties and usual roles. Such distress is the symbolic inverse of idealised notions 
of the self in western societies that partly explains its pathologisation. To feel 'down' (as opposed 
to feeling 'up') is symbolically associated with a breakdown in embodied agency, a 'loss of 
control', on the one hand, and with being a patient, with illness, on the other. 
Kirmayer maintains that the concept of the 'sick role' is a 'prototype in both lay and professional 
52 thinking about illness' (1988: 62). He describes how the disruption caused by chronic illness 
precipitates entry into the 'sick role' and the passage from social agent to medical patient. Illness 
becomes sickness. Analogously, the accounts of English informants above show how the severity 
of personal distress is partly indexed by the degree to which agency and functioning have become 
disrupted. On this view, the severity of distress is signified by the presence of somatic symptoms, 
the signs of bodily illness. A disruption or breakdown in agency and the somatic signs of distress 
place sufferers under pressure to seek: first, legitimate release from usual social roles which are 
likely to become increasingly difficult to maintain (e. g. entry into the 'sick role'); second, 
therapeutic redress. In developed English-speaking societies, access to the sick role is restricted to 
those who suffer from a medically recognised illness, disorder, or dysfunction. This is because 
medical doctors are the formal 'gate keepers' to the 'sick role'. They have the state-enforced 
authority to confer legitimacy upon individual suffering and to sanction the sufferer's release from 
usual social roles, duties, and expectations. They also control access to scarce therapeutic 
resources. Sufferers are therefore under pressure to articulate their suffering in a way that is 
consistent with biomedical meanings and definitions of distress as illness or disorder. An extension 
of this is that they are also under social pressure to conform to biomedical treatment regimes. The 
clinic is a social space in which a variety of social and symbolic practices work to transform 
embodied social misery into illness. 
There were some indications in English informants' accounts that the categorical distinction 
between ordinary suffering and illness-like distress (e. g. 'depression') was partly configured in 
medical encounters. The biographical disruption and breakdown in agency associated with illness- 
like distress was a commonly cited reason for consulting a doctor. Contact with a medical 
practitioner often marked the transition from feeling unhappy to illness. Moreover, for some 
informants, this marked the first point of entry into the sick role and the taking up of an illness 
identity. For example, a woman in her 20s reported that 'feeling depressed' involved a prolonged 
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feeling of 'unhappiness', until she was eventually persuaded to visit her doctor by members of her 
family. 'I was just fed-up. I just couldn't go on feeling so miserable and so unhappy. So, errn, after 
lots of persuasion from my like parents, I decided to come and see him [the doctor]'. In Text 33, a 
woman in her 30s warrants her decision to visit the doctor: 
Text 33 
Erm, I was really, really tired. I was really lethargic with my arms. I was really 
tired, was really miserable. All I wanted to do is stay in bed all day. That's why I 
first came to the doctors with it [ ... ] He said it was 'depression'. 
In this excerpt, a breakdown in the speaker's embodied sense agency warranted a visit to the 
doctor. In the process, her embodied misery was reconstituted as an illness experience (i. e. 
'depression'). 
Kirmayer depicts the predicament of 'the sick person' as follows: 'The sick person is a reminder to 
others of the limits of reason. Sickness is violent and capricious; it erodes the sense of self-control 
and threatens the exchanges that maintain family life and social structure' (1988: 60). This could 
equally well be said of 'the distressed person'. For instance, the English informants included in this 
study often performed their distress according to an illness script. They sought help from their 
doctor when they became conscious of a serious disruption in their agency, in their non-nal social or 
somatic functioning. The metaphorical reconfiguration of distress into illness experience 
sanctioned informants' occupancy of the sick role, socially legitimized their suffering, and granted 
them access to scarce therapeutic resources and sources of professional support. Moreover, the 
cultural provision of the illness metaphor provided the warrant for biomedical intervention as 
though personal distress were a disease to be cured. Through this social and symbolic process, a 
dimensional relationship between ordinary suffering and illness-like distress becomes concretised 
in a categorical division between the normal and the pathological; personal distress becomes an 
illness experience. The illness metaphor then comes fully into play, re-organising informants' 
interpretations of body and self. Once they have taken up the illness perspective (and they are 
under considerable pressure to do so), sufferers then amplify and select out particular features of 
their distress that conform with the illness prototype: personal distress is expressed as a breakdown 
in functioning with a strong somatic basis. 
Yet, there is a gap between expert discourse and the lived experience of personal distress. The 
'Illness metaphor' does not quite fit. For example, in Text 6, a middle-aged woman implicitly 
distinguished between 'feeling down' ('a feeling that 'would wear off) and 'depression'. In Text 
34, this same speaker portrays her distress using an illness metaphor: 
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Text 34 
You do get mood swings. You can be quite all-right one minute, quite high, and 
then down the next minute. You never know. It's a very crafty illness, a very sly 
illness. You don't know what thoughts you're gonna get next. But if you know the 
nasty thoughts you're getting are part of depression, then you don't get so 
frightened [ ... 
j It's when you go to the doctor's and they say: 'Hmm, take these for 
six weeks'. And you thinks: "Oh, I got depression. What's bloody depression? But I 
got all these other feelings as well. What are they? Are they because I'm physically 
ill, or mentally ill? " [ ... 
I It's worse than a physical illness, it really is. 
This speaker expresses a lack of clarity about exactly what 'depression' is (Text 34). On the one 
hand, she describes it in psychological terms (e. g. as involving unpredictable, labile moods and 
negative thinking); this brings it into conformity with a definition of 'mental illness'. On the other 
hand, she depicts 'depression' as a highly physicalised experience that involves a breakdown in 
embodied agency. This brings it closer to a prototypical concept of 'illness'. Moreover, the 
phenomenology of her 'depression' included many other somatic experiences apart from 'feeling 
depressed' or 'down', including 'fear', 'anxiety', and an array of unpleasant bodily sensations. 
Expert discourse on distress, and the antinomies that organise it, does not fit with how she 
experienced suffering: as embodied psychological experience. 
Moreover, not all informants described their distress using illness terms or even believed that they 
had been ill. Almost all informants made a distinction between ordinary suffering and more severe, 
intractable distress, between 'feeling low' and 'depression', or, analogously, between 'worry' and 
6anxiety', or 'panic attacks'. In most cases, 'the illness metaphor' organised informants' discourse 
on distress and so contrasted it with 'wellness'. Only a few informants articulated their distress as 
6mental illness'. None considered themselves to have a disease and few accounted for their distress 
in biological or medical terminology. For instance, one informant expressed ambivalence about 
'depression' as an illness term. A man in his 50s rejected the diagnostic label 'clinical depression' 
and the illness metaphor altogether: "When I say 'depressed', I think 'pissed-off' is a better word, 
'cos 'depressed' is a clinical word. " Rather, he saw 'depression' as part of life, as a natural 
response to life's difficulties. The term 'depression' was used as a metaphor for his lived 
experience, what he described as 'this sort of mundane existence'. Moreover, a minority of 
informants avoided using any medical or illness categories including the illness term 'depression'. 
They did not use the illness metaphor to interpret their suffering. A male informant in his 50s, for 
instance, denied that he was ill: "No, no I'm not ill. I don't know 'ow to define my health. 
Somebody with som' it with kidney problems, liver problems, heart problems, things of that nature, 
I call illness [ ... ] But, quite often, 
I do feel quite low in meself. " 
Jadhav et al have pointed out that 'psychiatric illnesses differ from other medical disorders insofar 
as the social context and patients' beliefs shape the very pathology to a greater extent, and this 
tendency is particularly notable for minor psychiatric disorders' (2001: 47). Similarly, Kleinman 
emphasises that the way that distress is symbolised 'feed back to influence the experience of 
distress' (1988: 15). In his descriptive account of Buddhist beliefs about suffering, Obeyesekere týl 
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(1985) maintained that the disease/illness distinction breaks down in 'depressive Illness' since the 
disease is the illness. The disruptions in agency, identity, and sociality that are commonly 
associated with the 'emotional pathologies' are more than just consequential to the illness-, they are 
part of the illness itself. The 'emotional pathologies', including 'depression', are sicknesses based 
on a parody of illness. As such, they are social sicknesses. The illness metaphor articulates the 
somatic nature of personal distress and provides a socially sanctioned means for articulating social 
suffering, personal distress that is rooted in a breach in social relations or in a breakdown in 
personal agency. The contribution of social and symbolic processes to the production of such 
suffering are rendered invisible by its medicalisation. 
4.4 Contingency and indeterminacy in English discourse on distress 
Chronic illness often disrupts biography, destabilises usual social roles, and can therefore threaten 
to undermine the sense of self. This means that chronic illness calls for symbolic expression 
perhaps more so than other forms of experience. For instance, Williams has described how 
rheumatoid arthritis 'assaults the taken-for-granted world and requires explanation' (1984: 197). 
Monks has shown how a diagnosis of 'multiple sclerosis' brings 'into play meanings, practices, 
feelings which require new ways of interpreting the self' (1996: 2). Bury points out that 'the search 
for the cause of the illness [ ... ] is at the one and the same time a search for its meaning' (1982: 
179). Similarly, Littlewood says how individuals who have experienced a 'mental illness' 'are 
driven by a quest for meaning' (1998: 243). Karp describes how experiences of 'depression' 
represent 'critical turning points in identity' and so call forth 'special efforts to figure out how the 
past has shaped us and what our prospects for the future might be' (1996: 15). 
Karp exaggerates the rationality implicit in personal narratives of 'depression' when he describes 
his North American informants as 'theorists' who sought to explain their experiences of 
'depression': 'Efforts to come to grips with depression turn on its presumed causes [ ... ] Everyone 
suffering from depression inevitably becomes a theorist as they try to give order and coherence to 
their situation' (1996: 166). His informants commonly attributed their experiences of 'depression' 
to either biographical or biological causes. Nonetheless, on occasions they presented contextuallsed 
interpretations of their suffering, depicting them 'as resulting from the subtle interplay of personal 
history, recent life events, and chemical imbalances' (1996: 166). Moreover, these interpretations 
rarely took into account the wider cultural or social n-iilieu in which such suffering took place: 
'Even those who name situational causes for their emotional problems typically restrict their 
conceptual vision to the immediate and local circumstances of their lives' (1996: 166). 
However, experiences of personal distress are often indeterminate. Contingency and 
contextual isat ion are therefore more likely to appear in lay discourse on distress than quasi- 
scientific 'explanatory models'. Clear-cut causal relationships are difficult to decipher where 
experience is disorganised and inchoate. Instead, meaning is achieved by contextualisIng distress in 
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relation to biographical and social expenence. For example, research within a British context has 
shown how experiences of personal distress are frequently contextualised In loose, fragmented, and 
partially narrativised discourse units organised around what are often contradictory popularized and 
expert explanatory systems. For example, Jadhav et al analysed the kinds of explanations employed 
in the depression narratives of a sample of white Britons. They found that explanations for distress 
were presented in a 'highly contextual, overlapping, and dynamic fashion' (2001: 64) and they 
identified fifty-five different types of explanation in these narratives. Contrary to Karp's findings, 
only one in ten of the white Britons included in Jadhav et al's study attributed a biological cause to 
their experience of 'depression'. Instead, they incorporated a 'wide range of diverse explanations, 
far removed from biomedical theories' (2001: 65). Some informants blamed their distress on fate, 
chance, or on supernatural forces, and some cited early biographical experience as a possible causal 
factor. Nonetheless, a combination of social and psychological explanations was most common. In 
addition, 'thoughts', 'worries', and 'stress' were often cited as causes, usually in combination with 
other kinds of explanation. Similarly, in another recent British study, Fenton and Karlsen (2002) 
found that both white British and minority ethnic respondents accounted for their experiences of 
personal distress in terms of an array of interconnected personal and social difficulties: 
Often, though, problems were discussed in a manner that suggested that they 
occurred in clusters of chains, with further problems arising because of earlier 
negative experiences, or operating to intensify the impact of the already difficult 
situation. 
Fenton and Karlsen, 2002: 25 
In an earlier British survey of individuals who had had some experience of in-patient psychiatric 
care, respondents were asked why they had first made contact with mental-health services (Rogers 
et al, 1993). Respondents cited a variety of different kinds of social and personal adversity in their 
response; these included, for example, relationship difficulties, work, study-related stress, 
bereavement, loss, and illness. Only one in ten respondents said that they had contacted services 
because of a 'mental illness'. These responses reflected patients' self-understandings; they 
expressed their agency and their core concerns. Rogers et al (1993) pointed out that: 
Descriptions are merely given and perplexity remains about any pertinent 
antecedent events [ ... ] Patients sometimes only described a series of events but at 
other times alluded to a variety of life circumstances surrounding their initial 
problem. 
Rogers et al, 1993: 25 
Rogers et al argued that these findings highlight a gap between 'the basic way in which Cý 
professionals and users of services construe the fundamental problem' (1993: 22). These studies 
show that, at least within a British context, sufferers and former sufferers of personal distress 
commonly interpret such distress as a response to social or personal adversity. They also point to a 
gap between expert discourse (including social-science discourse) and lay discourse on distress. Z: ý 
83 
Apart from the 'framework analysis' of informants' experiences of distress presented in Section 
4.1, two other thematic 'framework charts' were produced. The second of these charts explored 
how informants interpreted and accounted for their experiences of distress either in explanatory or 
narrative discourse. Some key points to emerge from this analysis are summarised below. A third 
'framework chart' was produced to examine informants' experiences of treatment, coping, 
experience of contact with healthcare professionals and their experience of recovery. The results of 
this analysis are not presented in this thesis. " 
Sections 4.2 to 4.3 presented an interpretation of descriptions of personal distress among two small 
samples of white English informants. This discourse was more or less coherent and exhibited more 
or less narrativity. Such experiences were often repeated, generalised, overlapping, disruptive, and 
involved a breakdown in agency. Their quality constrained their discursive representation; their 
repeated, inchoate, and disorganised nature disrupted their temporalisation and emplotment. 
Informants depicted their experiences of personal distress in generic, habitual, and pseudo- 
narratives (Linde, 1992; Carranza, 1998). At this level of discourse, little explanatory or narrative 
logic was visible. 
In Chapter 3, a number of different levels of narrative were distinguished. Discrete discourse units 
were differentiated from discontinuous discourse or personal narratives produced by speakers in 
extended stretches of talk (e. g. conversations, research interviews). Informants sought to portray 
the significance of their distress by contextualising them in higher-level or extended discourse 
units. While they depicted their experiences of distress in a discourse on agency, mood, and illness, 
they sought to depict its moral significance by situating it in relation to a variety of adverse social 
settings and biographical experiences. A mixture of common sense and expert explanatory systems 
were employed in two ways in these extended accounts. First, some informants accounted for their 
suffering in discrete explanatory statements. 54 These were rarely produced spontaneously, but were 
presented in response to questions about what had caused informants' experiences of distress. 
Biological or physiological explanatory statements were rare. Informants were more likely to 
attribute the causes of their distress to a mixture of biographical factors (e. g. childhood or early 
family relationships); character-based or dispositional factors; and social factors (e. g. social 
adversity; relationship difficulties and breakdown; distress related to the fulfilment of social roles). 
Second, informants' interpretations typically took the form of 'contingent narratives' (Bury, 
2001). 11 Informants cited an array of contingent factors embedded in extended stretches of partially 
narrativised talk that emerged over the course of a conversation(s). These factors were typically 
adverse biographical events, breaches in social relations, and disruptions in agency. In these 1_5 
interpretations of distress, informants deployed the rhetorical strategies of positioning, narrative, 
trope, and explanation to depict the moral significance of their suffering and to present preferred 
versions of themselves. Varying degrees of 'narrativity' were used to portray temporal and 
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contingent relationships between personal distress, biographical events, and social setting. 
Nonetheless, the explanatory systems embedded in such talk were often Incomplete, ambiguous, or 
incoherent. 
Although it was clear that most informants were not distressed at the time that they were 
interviewed, a few were in the midst of their suffering or had recently recovered from a period of 
distress. Illness narratives are constructed retrospectively. They represent an application of a 
present perspective on past biographical experience. However, such narratives often lack an ending 
(Spicer, 1998; Good, 1994). Turner points out that: 'Meaning is apprehended by looking back over 
a temporal process' (1981: 153). It is difficult to make sense of ongoing experiences of suffering 
without an ending that has arrived, or an ending in sight, to frame their meaning. Indeterminacy 
surrounds the meaning of experiences that have yet to be concluded. Indeterminate experience is 
therefore represented in the 'subjunctive mode, since it is that which is not yet settled, concluded, 
and known' (1981: 153). Good (1994), for instance, found that Turkish epilepsy narratives were 
commonly presented in the 'subjunctive mode' so that narrative closure was not achieved and the 
future was left open-ended and indeterminate. " While in the midst of suffering, the construction of 
narrative discourse units is problematised because 'biographical reconstruction' has yet to take 
place and a point of view on what is taking place is more difficult to achieve. In addition, the 
production of narrative discourse depends on the speaker's agency in order to drive the plot 
forward. Where agency has become disrupted, discursive practices (including narrativisation) are 
also likely to become disrupted. 
The root metaphor in most informants' extended stretches of talk was that of the 'drama of human 
relations' (see Appendix A3.3). This represents a culturally available rhetoric of agency that is 
commonly deployed by English speakers in their everyday moral accounting for action and 
experience. Informants' personal narratives of distress typically dramatised their suffering as the 
outcome of the interplay between agent qualities (e. g. 'vulnerability' to distress), actions, events, 
and the scene of these events (e. g. 'stress' or social adversity). In Burke's 'dramatistic' 
terminology, experiences of personal distress are 'motivated' by 'ratios' between agent, action, and 
scene (See Appendix A3.3 for an account of the 'dramatistic' framework). By seeking to dramatise 
their suffering, informants sought to communicate its moral significance. Nonetheless, this 
discourse rarely took a prototypical narrative form. The discursive representation of this interplay 
between individual, Setting, event, and distress was often disorganised and fragmented. This 
signified the indetem-iinate and contingent nature of the suffering depicted. 'Motivation' in these 
accounts was typically represented as external to the self and was located in the social setting. 
Informants rhetorically positioned themselves passively, as vulnerable to distress. Distress 
responses were presented as inevitable and natural by emphasising their contingency on ambient 
social circumstances and events. 
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By situating their distress in 'contingent narratives', informants were able to interpret their 
suffering, despite its indeterminacy. Informants did this in two ways. In the first type of contingent 
narrative, they interpreted their distress by contextualising it in 'thick descriptions' of social 
experience that concatenated adverse situations and events one on top of the other. The rhetorical 
force of these descriptions was to warrant and naturalise suffering in relation to social adversity. In 
the second type of contingent narrative, infon-nants accounted for their distress in relation to social 
and personal difficulties, but attributed efficacy to a particular event, or to features of their personal 
or social situation. These interpretations relied on a distinction between background and 
foreground. Biographical and broader social settings represented the background of distress in 
contrast to specific events or situations that were foregrounded and identified as having triggered a 
distress event, often within a broader context of social adversity. Social situations and life events 
that were threatening, humiliating, that disrupted core relationships, or that undermined agency in 
some way were identified as the local contexts of suffering. Informants evaluated the moral 
significance of their suffering in terms of their core concerns and distinctions of worth. 
Medical sociologists and social psychiatrists have demonstrated that socio-economic disadvantage 
increases the risk of exposure to adversity: e. g., disruptions in valued social ties, social 
disconnection, humiliation, loss of agency, and powerlessness. In both types of 'contingent 
narrative' described above, a range of exogenous difficulties were metonymically associated with 
personal distress. These included, for example: 
0 Economic or financial difficulties 
0 Career or work-related difficulties 
0 Relationship or family difficulties 
0 Social disconnection and isolation 
0 Chronic illness (self or relative) and loss 
Personal distress typically occurred as a response to adverse social and economic circumstances 
(e. g. unemployment; financial difficulties; social disconnection; constrained career opportunities; 
entrapment). Such adverse 'relational settings' produced distress by placing informants at an 
increased risk of adverse life events or difficulties and eroded the ability to cope with such events 
or difficulties when they did occur. 
'The self' mediates the impact of these relational settings, life events, and their impact on the body. 
How distress is expressed, interpreted, and evaluated is a function of social Identity and how the 
self is constituted. The kinds of difficulties that informants associated with their distress were 
partly a function of their social position and identity. For instance, some female informants 
emphasised the contingency of their distress on their identity and role as a carer. Nonetheless, male 
and female informants identified work and relationship difficulties as central sources of concern 
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and personal importance so that disruption in these domains was used to account for personal 
distress. 
Social identity is partly constituted by the same social and cultural processes that play a role in the 
production of personal distress as well as its interpretation. This mediating role of the self and 
identity was illustrated in informants' moral or evaluative responses to adverse events and 
circumstances. Metonyms of 'stress' and 'worry' played a key role in some informants' accounts as 
a way of articulating their evaluations and moral concerns in relation to their circumstances. Where 
they featured in informants' accounts, they were used to account for how adverse life events and 
difficult relational settings had resulted in a breakdown in agency. 'Stress' had a double reference. 
On the one hand, the term 'stress' was used metonymically to stand for social or personal 
difficulties, as a way of articulating core concerns and distinctions of worth. On the other hand, 
6stress' was used to signify the embodied response to adversity or to 'stressful' situations. For 
instance, a middle-aged woman reported that she 'was really stressed out. I just wanted to cry all 
the time'. A man in his 40s drew a categorical distinction between 'stress' and 'depression'. He 
used the term 'stress' to refer to an agitated physical state ('it eats away at you'), while 'feeling 
depressed' was characterised in terms of feelings of 'withdrawal'. 
An idiom of 'worry' played an analogous accounting function to that of 'stress' in some 
informants' accounts. For instance, a middle-aged woman associated 'worrying' with 'feeling 
depressed' or 'down'. However, she also deployed an idiom of 'worry' to express her agency and 
her core concerns and described how her 'worrying' had made her vulnerable to more severe 
distress (Text 35): 
Text 35 
If I get depressed now, it's over certain things, and it's nearly always a worry over 
my children. And if I start worrying over them, if they've got a problem, and I 
worry over them, for three weeks I'm down, and then I know the anxiety's gonna 
hit me. And the anxiety attacks are horrendous. 
In Text 35, 'worry' articulates the speaker's core concerns about her health and her children's 
welfare. She says that she gets 'depressed' 'over certain things' and that "it's nearly always a worry 
over my children". Another example comes from a man in his 50s for whom 'worrying' was 
described as part of his experience of 'feeling depressed'. He described 'worry' in psychological 
terms as a 'constant mulling it over', as 'obsessive thoughts'. Similarly, another man in his 50s 
used an idiom of 'worry' to articulate his core concerns, the same concerns that made him 
vulnerable to 'feeling depressed'. In Text 36, he reports: 
Text 36 
Feeling worried most of the time. Quite worried about a lot of different things. The 
major things, obviously I worry about more, like the wife, money. I mean she 
comes first, and the kids, before any money, or my health. Worrying a lot. I am 
quite a worrier. Erm, I don't worry about money myself, for me, and personal 
possessions. I got everything I needs. I got a TV. I got a lovely wife. I got nice kids. 
I got lovely grandkids. I got everything a man could need in that respect. t-I 
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In Text 36, 'worry' metonymically links the speaker's distress to his core concerns and his 
problems of living. Moreover, these concerns express his social identity as a man, just at the point 
that it is denied. 
Some informants made rhetorical use of 'stress' and 'worry' in their accounts of personal distress. 
For instance, a woman in her 40s said that when she gets 'stressed out', she experiences 'panic 
attacks'. Another woman identified her 'worries' as the source of her distress: 'Everyone has got 
their worries, their problems, ' she said, 'but nothing to make me as low as I felt'. In each of his 
episodes of 'depression', a man in his 40s identified a different source of 'stress' that had triggered 
each episode of 'depression'. These included, for instance, a broken relationship, a disruption in his 
career progression and work-related 'stress'. A woman in her 40s cited her doctor's explanation for 
her 'panic attacks' and 'depression' as being due to 'extreme stress'. She believed that 'stress' had 
been a response to her father's illness and subsequent death. A man in his 30s deployed a metaphor 
of 'stress' as a metonym for his adverse social circumstances and used it to account for his 
'depression' (e. g. 'The stress of all that has told on me honestly'). Similarly, a woman in her 30s 
used 'stress' to account for her 'panic attacks' (e. g. 'It was just an enormous amount of stress that I 
was under'). In Text 37, a woman in her 50s uses 'worry' to account for her experience of 'anxiety 
attacks' and 'depression': 
Text 37 
A worry : oh it can be so stupid That can bring on an anxiety attack. If I sit and 
think about it too long, then I can 'ave an anxiety attack. 
They don't just come out of the blue for no reason. It's just over a worry. Stupid 
things. Stupid things. 
But, sometimes, when I 'ave just an anxiety attack, it's because I 'aven't been 
worried for weeks. It's just I've 'ad a worry for a couple of days. And, then, bang! 
I'll 'ave an anxiety attack. 
It would worry me, so I'd get depressed and down, and then the anxiety would start. 
If I've been worried for three weeks, and I've been very down, and I think to 
myself. 'Oh, I've got a bit of depression 'ere'. Err, then I know I'm gonna get 
anxiety attacks. 
The examples depicted in Text 37 demonstrate the close relationship between 'anxiety', 'feeling 
down', and 'worry'. 'Worry' triggered 'anxiety attacks', but its relationship with 'depression' is 
less clear. This informant would feel 'worried' or 'down' and then experience an 'anxiety attack'. 
'Worry' fades into feeling 'down', and more prolonged 'worrying' eventually becomes 
'depression'. 
English lay discourse on distress (e. g. feeling 'depressed', 'down', 'low', 'fed up', 'worfied', or 
4stressed') provides an array of metaphors and tropes for articulating the embodied impact of 
sociomoral concerns and social adversity. This discourse forms a 'symbolic bridge' between the 
body and adverse relational settings. The discursive relationship between adversity and distress is 
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typically metonymic (rather than causal) and is mediated by subjective and moral meaning. 
Through a double reference, metonyms of distress index informants' evaluative responses to 
adverse life events and ongoing difficulties. 'Worry' and 'stress', for instance, stand for both 
adversity and the embodied response to adversity. Among the English informants included in this 
study, these metonyms of distress were used to represent the concerns of everyday life. To have 
such concerns is to have agency, and, to possess agency, is to be vulnerable to one or other of the 
6 emotional pathologies'. Personal distress expresses agency just as it depicts its breakdown. 
This chapter has illustrated how English lay discourse on distress is commonly characterised by 
ambivalence, contradiction, diffuse event boundaries, and high levels of metaphorisation. 
Interpretations of suffering deploy an array of culturally available expert and lay explanatory 
systems that are embedded in overlapping, contextualised description. Overlapping and often 
competing half explanations, fragments of rationality, are cobbled together in personal narratives of 
distress often with a loose explanatory logic, varying degrees of narrativity, and more or less 
coherence. The incoherence, indeterminacy, and irrationality of suffering are suppressed in the 
rationality implicit in the analytic concepts of 'illness narrative' and 'explanatory model'. 
Researchers' projections of these 'modes of rationality' onto sufferers' discourse is likely to 
overestimate the degree of coherence that has been achieved. 
Personal distress and psychiatric illness are experienced and expressed in terms of a society's 
cultural discourse on the self. A cultural discourse on the self, body and society articulates a 
society's indigenous psychology and the Euro-American folk discourse on 'the self' is organised 
around a set of metaphysical dualisms that generate two ideologically opposing views of human 
agency. The dominant ideological discourse in developed English-speaking societies partly 
constitutes agency in terms of independence, self-control, autonomy, and disengagement. A 
second, partly subjugated discourse on the self articulated agency in terms of distinctions of worth, 
sociality, as a centre of meaning and evaluation. In late capitalist English-speaking societies such as 
Britain, these features of emotional suffering partly account for its medicalisation. 'Human 
behavioural breakdowns', breakdowns in 'coping' and 'control', and deviations from prescribed 
roles and normal experience, often result in a medical encounter and entry into the sick role. The 
transformation of embodied social adversity into illness takes place because the sick role provides a 
legitimate social position open to individuals experiencing 'human behavioural breakdown'. Entry 
into the 'sick role' requires that a person be ill and this requires formal diagnosis by a medical 
practitioner. It is, therefore, no coincidence that chronic illness provides the 'root metaphor' for the 
expression, interpretation, and response to personal distress, whether this is expressed somatically 
or psychologically. Individuals who experience personal distress may partly take up an illness 
identity in order to access the sick role, the scarce medical resources, and the opportunity for 
recovery that it affords. 
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The next two chapters explores these questions about the social and moral significance of personal 
distress and the nature of the discourse used to articulate it within an altogether different social 
setting: the south Atlantic island of St. Helena. 
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Chapter 5 
Social Suffering and the St. Helenian Predicament 
It is certainly not outside the bounds of possibility that with victory [in World War 
11] St. Helena may again become the focal point of world interest as an Island 
Siberia, the most perfect natural fortress in the world, where those war criminals 
who escape death shall be held in exile. 
Colonel Josiah Wedgwood MP (Cited in King, 1945: 105). 
Just as millions of anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do 
thousands upon thousands of individual acts of insubordination and evasion create a 
political and economic barrier reef of their own. 
Scott, 1985: 36 
The next two chapters aim to develop the theoretical themes of the previous chapters by drawing on 
fieldwork conducted on the South Atlantic Island of St. Helena. They present an ethnographically 
informed interpretation of discourse on distress among St. Helenians (or Saints as St. Helenians call 
themselves). 
The travel writer-journalist Simon Winchester has described St. Helena as ringed with cliffs and 
inhospitable mountains, giving it 'a wild, prison-like aspect' (1985: 153). In the centuries that 
followed its permanent settlement by the British in 1673, the island was used as a place of 
confinement (Gosse, 1938; Royle, 1998; Kauffman, 1999). The prison metaphor has been 
overplayed in representations of St. Helena. St. Helena is not a prison. Nor is it a place of exile. It 
is a home to an island community of more than 5,000 St. Helenians. Moreover, this community is 
spread over four islands. According to the 1998 Census, around four-fifths of St. Helenians were 
living on St. Helena (81%). Around 19% of the total St. Helenian resident population lived on 
Ascension Island (12%), the Falkland Islands (5%), and a small number were training or working 
in Britain (DEPD, 1999a). 
This chapter is about social suffering on St. Helena. Its purpose is to explore how social adversity 
and cultural and symbolic processes interact to produce experiences of personal distress. " The 
chapter begins by describing St. Helena's communal ideology and briefly presents an interpretation 
of St. Helenian cultural identity as articulated in a cultural discourse on the self and society. This 
discourse partly constitutes agency by forming a symbolic bridge between social and economic 
structure and the embodied self. The chapter goes on to highlight a stark contradiction between St. 
Helena's dominant communal ideology and the lived experience of most St. Helenians creating the 
conditions for 'anomic suffering'. This is followed by an exploration of the ways in which this 
contradiction is played out in the lives of individual Saints. Case studies and excerpts from 
informants' accounts are used to illustrate these key themes. I have parsed narrativised discourse 
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into clauses for presentation and referencing purposes. Some detail in the accounts has been 
changed to protect the privacy of the informants. Section 3.4 and Appendix A3.7 present an 
account of how the data used in these two chapters was collected and Interpreted. The framework 
used to interpret informants' discourse is described in Appendix A3.1 to A3.4. 
5.1 The Communion of Saints 
St. Helena and its 'Britishness' 
Despite a history of migration, British colonial policies, social and political structures have 
dominated the historical development of St. Helenian society (Gosse, 1938). Yon points out, for 
instance, that wherever they came from, settlers to the island were 'submerged in a dominant sense 
of Englishness' (1998: 9). In the post-colonial era, partly because of St. Helena's economic 
dependency on Britain, the British Government (UKG) has continued to wield a high degree of 
control over St. Helenian affairs. St. Helena's current political status is as a British Overseas 
Territory. St. Helena's Governor and Chief Executive are appointed by UKG and sit at the apex of 
executive power within the St. Helenian Government (SHG). Many of the other key positions in 
SHG are filled by British expatriates. Britain provides considerable economic, developmental, and 
technical support to St. Helena (UNDP, 1999). 
The political identity and affiliation of St. Helena has always been British (Turner, 1996,1997). 
Indeed, many of the St. Helenians who I spoke with politically aligned themselves with the British 
flag and, when asked, claimed to hold a British 'citizenship identity'. In the early 1990s, Royle 
(1992) undertook a survey of St. Helenian school children and found that 70% described their 
nationality as British. Nonetheless, at the time of the fieldwork, St. Helenians were not British 
citizens. 
Since 1659, St. Helena has been continuously settled by the British (Turner, 1997). The British 
East India Company controlled the island until an Act of Parliament in 1833 transferred 
responsibility for governance of St. Helena to the British. St. Helena was transferred to the Crown 
in 1838 (Gosse, 1938: 301). St. Helenians enjoyed British Citizenship and the right to live and 
work in the UK until the 1981 British Nationality Act removed their citizenship status (Turner, 
1997). This Act specified that permanent residency in Britain was only available to individuals if 
they were born in the UK and a parent was a British Citizen at birth. St. Helenians became British 
Dependent Territory Citi--ens and received St. Helenian passports (Turner, 1997). In a travel guide 
to St. Helena, Phillips claims that: 'The effect on the island was devastating' (1998: 10). Saints 
could no longer work, live, or study in the UK, so that their rights and freedoms became severely 
restricted. 
The 1981 British NationalitY Act clashed with the view shared among many St. Helenians that they 
are British, both in terrns of their political affiliation and in terms of their cultural identity and 
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historical heritage. It was therefore resented and bitterly contested by many St. Helenians. For 
instance, a middle-aged Saint woman said: "I believe that we are British. We had that right and 
they take that right away from us. 'Cos, okay, we under British law and everything else. I see no 
reason why we shouldn't be British". In response to the removal of citizenship, the former Bishop 
of St. Helena, John Rushton, established The Citizenship Commission in 1992. Its principal aim 
was to restore British citizenship to St. Helenians through lobbying and research (Turner, 1996, 
1997; George, 1999). Saints, they argued, should be restored British citizenship and St. Helena 
granted the status of a British island and not regarded as a 'colony'. 
At a conference of the Dependent Territories Association in 1998, the Foreign Secretary, Robin 
Cook, proposed a white paper on Britain's relationship with its existing 'Dependent Territories'. 
After a series of Commons debates, this white paper (UKG, 1999) was presented to the House of 
Commons on 17 th March 1999. It granted full citizenship rights to those people living in Britain's 
Overseas Territories. No conditions were attached to the restoration of citizenship. It specified that 
St. Helenians would be free to determine their constitutional relationship with the UK. The 
Overseas Territories Act came into force on 2 I't May 2002. British citizenship was fully restored to 
occupants of all 14 British Overseas Territories, including St. Helena and its dependencies. " Saints 
once again have the right to live and work in the UK. 
The historically dominant public discourse on St. Helenian identity depicts Saints as both 
politically and culturally British, as possessing a British 'root identity"' and a British 'citizenship 
identity'. A view of Saints as British, however, does not preclude the possibility of having a St. 
Helenian identity as well. As Yon says, the localised identity is 'being British and Saint' (1998: 
21). Nonetheless, in traditional representations of St. Helena, Saints are represented as principally 
British. This view is particularly common among older St. Helenians and in representations of St. 
Helenian society in the writing of British observers, visitors, and expatriates. For example, after a 
visit to the island in the 1950s, the British MP Cledwyn Hughes (1958) asserted that Saints have a 
British cultural identity: 
These people are a British people in their upbringing, education, attitudes and 
everyday needs. Their language is English, they eat, dress and live, so far as they 
can, on a European Standard. Their small, clean and frequently overcrowded houses 
are furnished as British cottages would be. In the most meagre and drab shacks, 
[there are] several photographs of the British Royal family. 
Cledwyn Hughes, 1958: 2 
More recently, the authors of a UNDP report on St. Helena" claimed that 'St. Helenians regard 
themselves as British': 
Indeed unlike most colonies which despite the influence of their colonisers retained 
their own identity, culture and way of life, on St. Helena the identity, culture and 
way of life is completely British adapted by local circumstances. 
LTNDP, 1999: 4 
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Similarly, in an SHG investment guide to St. Helena, Hoole asserted that 'we hold to British 
cultural tradition' (1990: 4). A former Chief Medical Officer of St. Helena observed that: 'Island 
culture is essentially British' (Aldridge, 1994: 790). Some writers have positioned St. Helena as a 
stronghold of 'Britishness'. According to the writer and journalist, Simon Winchester, St. Helena is 
British 'in every apparent way' (1985: 164). An English medical researcher writing in the late 
1970s compared St. Helena to a pre-War English village community: 'The modem St. Helenians 
form a relatively uniform cultural group which socially resembles the more stable rural society that 
was common in the Western World prior to the World Wars' (Moyes, 1978: 6). He went on to 
emphasise St. Helenians' Englishness: 'Despite the varied racial origins of the St. Helenians, the 
striking features of modem society are its uniformity and the absence of elements from cultures 
other than English' (1978: 3). Similarly, Winchester muses: 'This island has become a rock of exile 
for a British way of life -a way of life now only to be found in Britain's isolated rural retreats 
unwittingly the St. Helenians have preserved it' (1985: 167). 
It is true that in the past, and perhaps among older St. Helenians today, there was a strong loyalty to 
Queen and Crown. In official circles, the Queen's birthday is still celebrated on St. Helena. In a St. 
Helena Day address, Mrs Lillian Crowie declared that'we still look to Britain as our Motherland, 
and have great love and loyalty for the British Crown'. ` In an interview with a St. Helenian man in 
his 60s, I noticed the picture of the Queen hanging on the wall and two plastic Union Jacks. When I 
asked him about the picture on the wall, he explained: 'That's the tradition that the Saints live 
under'. 
However, the traditional emphasis on a British cultural identity may have obstructed the emergence 
of a distinctive St. Helenian root identity and a distinctively St. Helenian voice. Moreover, this 
traditional view ideologically exploits the polysemy in the term 'British' by confounding 
citizenship identity with root identity. This identity discourse represents Saints as prototypically 
British, as 'more British than the British' and rhetorically works to deny Saints a cultural identity 
of their own. Timm, for instance, wrote that there is 'a total lack of any culture roots' (1977: 44) 
and 'there is no indigenous culture on the island, the different races had to adjust to this small 
community environment' (1977: 78). Culture is projected onto the outside, symbolically 
represented by England, while the inside is depicted as devoid of culture. In the context of a debate 
about whether or St. Helena has a culture of its own, a contributor to the St. Helena News" 
articulated this issue: 'We on this island lack a true identity. We call ourselves British, yet we are 
not of Britain. We practice shallowly the British cultural beliefs and in the process deny our roots' 
(Robertson, 1999). The contributor pointed out that this emphasis on a British cultural identity is 
partly the result of St. Helena's dependency on Britain. 
A St. Helenian root identity 
Nonetheless, among many St. Helenians, a strong affinity with a St. Helenian root identity63 Co_ 
exists with a political and, in some cases, cultural alignment with Britain. It has been argued, for 
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instance, that the possession of a British national identity does not preclude the possession of a 
distinctive local identity within the context of a wider 'Britishness' (e. g. Turner, 1996,1997). For 
instance, the Citizenship Commission's central argument for the restoration of citizenship 
depended on the view that St. Helenians are socially and culturally British and that, in the political 
sense, St. Helena has always been a British island: 'St. Helena is entirely British, and has never 
been settled by any other county. St. Helenians are British, and have never been anything else' and 
'it is self-evident to all St. Helenians that they are British and always have been' (Turner, 1997: 
13). This is demonstrated by the fact that they are 'unwaveringly loyal to the Queen' and that they 
share the same language, institutions, values, social and political practices, religious institutions 
and education system, 'the same culture and influence and interest. It is a British society' (1997: 
12). 
However, while emphasising St. Helenians' 'Britishness', Turner writes that 'St. Helenians are 
British, but this does not make them any less St. Helenian' (1997: 16). While Saints have an 
'intense loyalty to their island', a strong local identity is consistent with the possession of a British 
national identity: 'To be St. Helenian is to be British' (1997: 16). For example, in a recent study of 
St. Helenians' 'spatial identity', Hogenstijn and van Middelkoop (2002) argue that a St. Helenian 
'island identity' co-exists with a British 'national identity', and that, even without British 
citizenship, it is still possible for Saints to feel part of a wider 'Britishness'. 
According to Yon, there is an ambivalence in St. Helenians' feelings of belonging towards their 
island home. On the one hand, many St. Helenians claim to 'follow England' and some express a 
view that 'we don't have a culture' (1998: 13). On the other hand, they recognize that their way of 
life is different from the British (1998: 11) and that 'St. Helenian history and cultural identity are 
unique' (1998: 9). This paradox is associated with ambivalence about belonging to both St. Helena 
and to the outside, symbolised by Britain and 'Britishness'. According to Yon, a desire to leave, to 
'break away', co-exists with a desire to stay and a sense of belonging to their island home (1998: 
11). There is a tension between coming and going, leaving and staying. Yon illustrates this 
'ambivalence in belonging' with quotes from young St. Helenians. For example, one young Saint is 
quoted as saying: 'I'm bored here'. Yon contrasts this sentiment with a quote from another young 
Saint who said: 'Here is where I fit in' (1998: 22). "In these ambivalent ways", Yon argues, "one 
can identify with 'them' of the cultural representations that circulate through the television while at 
the same time affirming an identification with 'us' as 'Saints"' (1998: 22). 
A third view on St. Helenian 'root identity' has become more common in recent years. There is an 
emerging sense of being 'a Saint' as distinct from being British. This shift in affiliation is 
particularly strong among younger St. Helenians (Yon, 1998). This view de-emphasises 
'Britishness', and foregrounds a distinct St. Helenian 'root identity', that the Saints are somehow 
different from the English, while acknowledging that English culture, social practices, and political 
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structures have been a dominant influence on the St. Helernan way of' lif'e. Iýor instance, sonic of' 
Hogenstlin and van Middelkoop's British informants expressed this view of St. I IcIcillan 'root 
idciltity': 'They are Saints first, and British second' and 'Feelings of Britishriess can be a bit doublc 
edged' (2002: 6.1). 
The removal of British citizenship in the early 1980s, globalisation, and de-colonialisation, and, 
more recently, greater economic independence from Britain have combined to produce this shift in 
affiliation and this has strengthened the local cultural identity. A distinctively St. liclenian voice is 
beginning to be heard. In this nascent identity discourse, England and the English are positioned as 
'other' (as 'them'), while 'us' refers to the community of Saints tied by bonds of' blood ('Saint 
blood') and ancestry and a strong symbolic identification with the Island of St. Helena. The criteria 
that need to be met to be classified as a Saint are partly set politically through a strict immigration 
policy (SHG, 1986). To be a Saint, one must be born and raised on St. Helena and at least one 
parent must be a Saint. It is almost impossible for ail outsider to become a Saint and it is rare for 
individuals to settle permanently on St. Helena unless they marry an indigenous St. Helcrilan. For 
instance, Hogenstijn and van Middelkoop quote an expatriate UKG employee oil St. Helena who 
observed that 'you will never be accepted as a Saint here, unless you are born and brought up here' 
(2002: 4.3). As one St. Helenian woman put it: "They've got this thing here: a Saint is a Saint". 
It is possible that a strong 'Saint' identity will gradually work to weaken the sense of 'Britishriess' 
described above. Indeed, some of the St. Helenians I spoke with on this therne only saw themselves 
as British in the citizenship sense, while they asserted a 'root identity' that was distinctively St. 
Helenian. When asked whether he thought himself as British or not, a St. Helenian mail in Ills 40s 
replied: "Well, it's hard to say. I would see myself as a Saint in that way - not been off the island so 
far". Another St. Helenian woman said that although her religion is 'Church of England', she 
considered herself St. Helenian and not British. She warranted this identity claim by saying that she 
was born on St. Helena and that everything she owns is on the island. A St. Helenian mail in his 
40s said: "I don't really see myself as being British. I'm St. Helenian. I was born here". 
Nonetheless, when he fills in forms that request information about his nationality, he always states 
that he is 'British'. A St. Helenian man in his 30s was clear that he was not British and that lie was 
St. Helenian. However, when I asked him what the difference was between being a Saint and being 
British, he replied: 
Text I 
It's where you live, where you were born, where you live mainly. If it comes down 
to who feeds you, yeh, I'm British. Err, other dhan that, err, I don't think so. No. I 
mean : Okay. Fair enough. It's a: it's a British island. Err, still, it don't make it 
British. Enn, I'm all for a: I mean y'know : they'll get my vote for the : the erm, 
erm, the British passport. They would, y'know, err :I mean the erm : with a British 
passport I'd look to go somewhere else. Don't have to be in Britain. It should still 
be possible [ ... I [Referring to St. Helena] It's not much, err : but, I ain't seen 
it all 
yet. Why? Because there's some places I like to go twice, three times, and more. 
I've still got a lot to see of St. Helena, y'know, without takin' a boat to go on the 
outside. 
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In Text 1, the speaker makes a distinction between a British citizenship identity and a St. I lelenlan 
root identity grounded in a view of St. Helena as home, as a place nnbued with sentiments of 
belonging. He understands himself to be British in the political sense and that lie lives on in island 
that is dependent on and partly 'ruled by' Britain. On this view, there is a clear distinction between 
being a British citizen and the possession of a St. 1-1clenian 'root identity'. While there is in 
emerging ambivalence about being British (in tile Cultural sense) among St. flelenians, there is no 
ambivalence about the possession of a British citizenship identity (See Section 5.2). In addition, 
Britain ('Overseas') and British citizenship are symbolically associated with a centrifugal pull 
away, to the outside, and away fi-orn home. This is offset by a centripetal pull Inwards, back toward 
St. Helena; there is no ambivalence about being a St. Helcillan and the attachment to their island 
home remains very strong indeed. 
A St. Helenian public narrative 
Although the community of Saints are dispersed across a wide geographical area, they retain a 
strong connection to their island horne (Hogenstijn and van Middelkoop, 2002). St. Helena's 
communal ideology plays an important role in maintaining this sense of coliesion. It articulates the 
values and distinctions of worth shared by most St. Helenians and it incorporates an idcalized self- 
representation articulated in a variety of different public tbra and niedia. " The communal ideology 
is the blueprint for the social Structure, for how social and personal life should be conducted. It 
functions to legitimise the status quo and to maintain cohesion despite the challenges facing the 
island and the existence of deep-seated contradictions in the social structure. Social relations on St. 
Helena arc partly constituted and legitimised by the provision of a dornmant C01111111.1rial ideology 
and a cultural discourse on the self. This discourse prescribes what It is to be a St. Heleman, the 
proper social roles of men and women, articulates the relationship between individual and society, 
and includes a public narrative about St. Heleman society and its past. 
St. Helena was uninhabited when it was discovered in the 16"' Century by a Portuguese navigator 
(Gosse, 1938). The motif of an 'Atlantic paradise' has sometimes been deployed to represent the 
island. Writing in the 19"' Century, Melliss deployed this motif when he wrote: 
No hunian eye ever saw this rocky spot in its prinieval grandeur until the 21st of 
May in tile year 1502, when one of tile earliest and bravest navigators, Commodore 
John de Nova Castella, commanding a Portuguese flect oil its return from India, 
discovered it. Ile found there no aborigines, nor was any trace of man's work to be 
seen. This celebrated voyager with his companions had, however, the satisfaction of 
seeing the Island in all the pristine beauty of its native vegetation. 
Melliss, 1875: 1 
On many occasions during the fieldwork, I heard the view expressed that St. Helena is somehow 
unique and that St. Helenians have a unique way of life. The preferred image of St. Helenian 
society is of idyllic island life and civility. The following description of St. Helena cornes from an 
SHG investment guide and articulates the key features of this idealised view of island life: 
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Living on St. Helena is similar to living in any small rural C0111111LInity albeit 
accentuated by its isolated position. So, everyone knows who you are and what you 
do. The range of products and services available, while they have expanded 
considerably in recent years with well known UK supermarket brands available, is 
obviously less than in major urban centres. There are few laid on entertainments. It 
is impossible to get away for a short break and a large proportion ofany tinic away 
fi-orn the island is spent travelling to and from it. '['he upside is that this creates a 
true community spirit and thc vast majority ofpcople who have come to work here 
have greatly enjoyed their stay. Saints are a very friendly and supportive people. 
The climate is plcasantý crime is relatively minimal; there is stunning countryside, 
the local produce is of excellent qualityý and there is a surprisingly wide range of 
activities to keep one occupied. 
Sl IG, 2000: 14"5 
In Section 2.3, 'the self' was characterised as an embodied process that mediates the relationship 
between social structure and sorriatic experience and symbolically constitutes the relationship 
between society and body. A central part of a communal ideology is a discourse oil tile sell' that 
specifies what it Is to be a person (relative to social position and role). Heelas ( 1996) differentiates 
between the indigenous psychologies of traditional societies and contemporary western societies. 
The former are associated with a socio-centric discourse on the self in which individual expression 
is discouraged, the individual is subordinated to a wider whole, subjectivity is de-ci-riphasised, and 
traditional duties and obligations move to tile foreground. The cultural discourse on the self on St. 
Helena is 'traditional' in this sense. This discourse forms part of a broader traditional communal 
ideology that configures cultural idcritity and the proper relationship between individual and 
society and works to legitimise the prevailing social order and distribution of power. There is a 
strong sense of solidarity with the extended family and to the wider community of Saints. 'The 
self', for instance, is defined in socio-centric terms, in terms of social ties, role, and position (e. g. 
family ties, occupational role, gender, marital status), rather than in individualistic or psychological 
terms. 
St. Helenian ideological discourse on self and society articulates both a shared St. Helenian cultural 
identity and a matrix of social identities attached to social positions and roles. Social identities on 
St. Helena are fixed within a matrix of traditional social roles and positions defined by the social 
structure: gender, familial affiliation, occupational position, social class, age, district, education. 
Agency, then, is forged out of a dialectical relationship between social position and a cultural 
discourse oil the self. Family and individual identity are closely interwoven and Saints characterise 
themselves and other Saints in terms of their family of origin; personal qualities and attributes are 
attributed to individuals based on their family membership. Extended families in turn are associated 
with a particular geographical district of the island. Social identities are uniform and more clearly 
defined compared with the more hybrid social identities in late capitalist English-speaking societies 
such as Britain. 
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St. Helena is a socially conservative society and many Saints are inistrustibi of' change. One St. 
Helenian wornan, for instance, expressed the belief' that Saints dislike anything new or anything 
that 'rocks the boat'. This partly has its origins In the soclocentric view of' 'the sell' described 
above. Public discourse on St. Helena depicts St. Helenlan society as it lioniogencous, harmonious, 
unified, and cohesive whole. For instance, in a public address on St. Helena, one prominent 
member of the community emphasises this unity: 
One of the joys of believing in the Communion of' Saints is that, llevcr mind how 
far separated we may be from one another by timc, distaricc, or even dcath, we 
know that, in praying for one another we arc one in Christ, and that wc have our 
Union in Him. 
Mrs Lillian Crowic in a St. I Iclena Day address"" 
Homogeneity is prescribed; heterogeneity is proscribed. Hogenstijn and van Middelkoop point out 
that this conservatism is associated with a high level of social control so that it 'is hard to be 
different' (2002: 4.3). They observe that 'the island has an image of social homogeneity: there are 
hardly any sub-cultures' (2002: 4.3). 
Moreover, as a community of Saints, St. Helenian society is rich in social capital. " For instance, a 
St. Helenian woman observed: 'if you haven't got something, then the neighbours will help You'. 
In the quote from an SHG investment guide cited above, Saints are described as a 'very friendly 
and supportive people' (SHG, 2000: 14). Timm describes St. Hclcnians as 'a friendly, kind, 
hospitable, and trustworthy people. They in turn trust and believe in others' (1977: 54). Similarly, 
the authors of a United Nations Development Repot-t on St. Helena observed that the 'population 
strikes all visitors as one that is friendly, welcoming and accommodating. They have a basic charity 
of spirit and sympathy for others. They would never see anyone going hungry and there is a 
willingness to share produce grown at home' (1999: 35). 
Perceptions of the outside shape how Saints view themselves and their way of life. England, 'the 
outside world', is perceived to proceed at a rapid pace. By contrast, many Saints expressed the 
view that life on St. Helena is 'set back' and has a slow, 'relaxed' pace of life. A St. Helenian 
woman said that in St. Helena one 'can safely walk down the road and know you are safe'. She said 
that the way of life is different on St. Helena than Britain. The pace of life is slower, and 'there's 
no rushing around'. In informal conversations, Saints sometimes expressed the view that England 
is unsafe, that it is overrun with crime in comparison with St. Helena. Conversely, St. Helena was 
depicted as safe, secure, and free of more serious crime. Timm writes, for instance, that 'crime is 
almost non-existent' aside from 'petty pilfering' (1977: 54). 
The public narrative that holds most sway is one of an integrated people free of social schism, 
without segmentation by class or race. For instance, Timm writes that there is 'no recognized class 
distinction' (1977: 44). In her public address, Mrs Lillian Crowie articulated this strand of the 
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dominant public narrative: 'We remain ail island and a people free from racial or national prejudice 
and always willing to exercise our ministry of hospitality to anyone who finds us as they sail across 
the seas'. One visitor to the Island observed that 'there's complete racial harmony' (Phillips, 1998: 
21). Similarly, in an investment guide to St. Helena, Hoole wrote that 'there are no racial divisions 
on the island' (1990: 4). In his research on tile history of' the Church on St. Helena, Ascension 
Island, and Tristan da Cunha, Edward Cannan, a former Bishop of St. Helena, observes that: 
In the IS"' and 19"' centuries there were two social classes, the I-, ngI ish settlers and 
the rcstý today there are no remaining racial groups, all are St. liclenialls of' 
whatever shade ot'colour, and decidedly British. 
Cannan, 1992: 16 
Nonetheless, Yon points out that, while 'race thinking is absent on St. lielena', there is certainly 
'colour-consciousness' (1998: 15). This is supported by the authors of tile UNDP report who 
maintain, for instance, that "skin colour is a sensitive issue with examples of prejudice due to the 
colour of people's skin both because it is too light and because it is too dark" ( 1999: 43). 
Instead of emphasising dependency, one facet of St. Helenas public narrative eniphasises Saints' 
strengths and portrays a positive sense of masculine agency. On this story, Saints, particularly St. 
Helenian rnen, are positioned as resourceful, strong, adaptable, practical, resilient, and in control 
(e. g. George, 1994). In response to tile contribution to the St. Helena News cited above, a 
prominent St. Helenian submitted a letter that was printed in a subsequent edition of the island 
newspaper. The letter pointed that St. Helenians 'already have a St. Helenian culture' which needs 
to be positively promoted; he pointed out, for instance, that permeating St. Helenian history is a 
relaxed 'Philosophical approach to life' combined with a 'high degree of resiliency which enables 
us to continue smiling while struggling to survive in the face of adversity' (George, 1999: 4). 
George writes that 'resourcefulness is an island way of life', that 'one of the characteristics that 
identifies a Saint is his resource fu Iness in dealing with practical problems', and that 
'resourcefulness is at the centre of St. Helenian identity and culture. This is why today tile St. 
Helenian values practical skills above academic knowledge' (1999: 4). Similarly, the authors of the 
UNDP report write, for instance, that 'the people have a capacity for resourcefulness and personal 
strength and an ability to bear hardship' (1999: 35). This represents a positive source of masculinity 
for many St. Heleman men. St. Heleman men pride themselves on their practical skills, rather than 
being strong on 'theory'. Adapting to life on such a remote island with scarce natural resources has 
meant that Saints have become highly resourceful; they live on whatever washes in from the sea 
and they make the most out of it. Saints are good at fixing things, making a part that fits, making 
do. Writing in the 1960s, for instance, Shine observed that 'most men were able to farm, fish, play 
the guitar, cut hair, make an efficient watering can from a margarine tin, mend shoes and build their 
houses' (1970: 21). 
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Diglossia on St. Helena 
Dialect is another important marker of St. Helenian 'root identity'. Some Saints have depicted St. 
Helenian society as having an 'oral' or 'verbal culture' (Timm, 1977; George, 1994). Although the 
only language spoken on St. Helena is English, most islanders speak in a dialect that is unique to 
St. Helena, what I have called 'St. Helenian English'. " The strength of a St. Helenian dialect is 
associated with the speaker's socio-economic position, district of origin, and the social context of 
the speech act. 
'Diglossia' pertains where two varieties of the same language are used within the same speech 
community under different conditions by the same speakers or by different speakers according to 
their social status (Ferguson, 1959). '9 Diglossias typically have a 'high' and a 'low' variety. " In St. 
Helena, the superposed variety is Standard English. The low variety is 'St. Helenian English'. 
Public discourse is dominated by the 'high variety'. There is some specialisation of function; 
Standard English is more likely to be used in formal discourse or for conversing with outsiders. 
Saints often switch between a St. Helenian dialect and Standard English depending on the social 
context or on whom they are speaking with. According to Trevor Hearl, a British scholar of St. 
Helenian society, 'St. Helena speak' has two forms. " First, Saints use 'formal English' to 
communicate with outsiders. Second, Saints use an 'informal banter' among themselves and which 
outsiders strain to understand. 
In speech communities characterised by diglossia, the 'higher form' of the language is typically 
regarded as superior and has a social function as a mark of education and distinction (Ferguson, 
1959). The dominance of Standard English in British society has characterised the modem period 
(Leith, 1983; Fairclough, 1992). Fairclough (1992) points out that within British society, it is an 
overt marker of hierarchy and status, and expresses power asymmetries. This means that public or 
official discourse on St. Helena tends to be practiced in standard English and is commonly used 
among high-status and educated St. Helenians and among members of the civil service elite closely 
attached to the Castle. As in Britain, dialect is a marker of power and status on St. Helena. 
Moreover, the historical subjugation of St. Helenian identity and voice is reflected in the view that 
the way that Saints talk is somehow less correct than Standard English pronunciation. Timm 
acknowledges the existence of 'social differences' in how Saints talk with 'some speakers 
recognized as using the language better than others do' (1977: 44). This statement implies that 
Saints' way of talking is viewed as somehow less correct than Standard English. One St. Helenian 
woman believed, for instance, that: 'We [Saints] don't talk properly'. Timm says that Saints 
employ a limited vocabulary to express themselves and rely heavily on 'social expressions and 
gestures' to communicate with one another (1977: 54). 
Where diglossia pertains, the 'higher form' of the language becomes standardized and it becomes 
the language of diction and grammar. There is typically no accepted orthography for the lower 
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variety (Ferguson, 1959). Indeed, George (1994) points out that St. Helenian children find it 
difficult to write in standard English given that the way that they speak is so different from 
standard English. Ferguson (1959) points out that diglossia comes about where literacy is limited to 
a small elite and then several centuries come to pass. 
5.2 The 'St. Helenian Predicament' 
There is no agreed view of the predicament St. Helena is in. Some blame the British. A few blame 
the island itself. Others do not see a predicament at all. Yon has pointed out that the Saints 'occupy 
a social space and are parties to a local culture which in some sense is geographically isolated' 
(1998: 22). St. Helena is geographically remote, with the postal ship (the RMS St. Helena) the only 
means of access save from occasional passing trade ships or yachts. One visitor to the island 
described St. Helena as a 'pinpoint of inaccessibility, unbelievably remote' (Winchester, 1985: 
148). This remoteness has been a powerful determinant of St. Helena's economic, political, social, 
and cultural development (Royle, 2001). The main features of St. Helena's predicament and its 
social structure are as follows: 
0 Geographical remoteness. 
0 Economic fragility and economic dependency on Britain. In addition, there is a high degree of 
reliance on remittances from overseas work to fund local development. 
0 Limited training and employment opportunities, high levels of state employment and 
unemployment, and a highly gendered labour market. The private sector on St. Helena is very 
limited. 
0 Relative economic disadvantage and hardship. 
0 High levels of labour migration. Escalating rates of outward migration over the past decade, 
particularly among young people and skilled workers. 
0 The remnants of a colonial political structure and continued British political and economic 
control over some of the island's affairs. 
0A powerful state apparatus and bureaucracy with a large public sector; this is reinforced by the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of economically active St. Helenians resident on St. 
Helena are employed by SHG or SHG-controlled organisations and agencies. 
0A social structure stratified along lines of social class, employment status, gender, extended 
family ties, and geographical district. The emergence of new economic and social inequalities. 
0A traditional domestic division of labour. 
0 Rapid social, cultural, political, and technological change over the past decades. 
SourceS72: UNDP, 1999; DEPD, 1999a, 1999b; Royle, 1993,2001; St. Helena News, 1990-1999; Hogenstijn & van 
Middelkoop, 2002; St. Helena Government reports and documentary material (see bibliography). 
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The remainder of this section aims to show how St. Helena's remoteness, its social and political 
structures, ongoing economic difficulties, and the policies of both UKG and SHG have contributed 
to producing St. Helena's current predicament (Appendix A6.3 describes public health and mental- 
health provision on St. Helena). 
The Castle 
The dominant influence on the evolution of St. Helenian society and culture over the past century 
has been British colonialism (Gosse, 1938). Economic dependency translates into political 
dependency on Britain. Saints have little control over some of the key issues that affect their lives. 
An ossified colonial government apparatus tightly regulates island society and the governing 
hierarchy (including an elite of high-ranking St. Helenians) constitutes the backbone of St. 
Helenian social structure. Phillips depicted Government of St. Helena as 'an oligarchy where an 
unelected Governor, advised by unelected civil servants retain full power' (1998: 17). Executive 
power is concentrated in the office of the UKG appointed Governor and Chief Executive (Royle, 
2001), although on key decisions the Governor is required to consult with an elected Legislative 
Council composed of St. Helenians. The authors of the UNDP report point out that UKG 
(prescribes a number of policies as a condition for the level of aid provided and this is a matter of 
frustration and resentment for local politicians' (UNDP, 1999: 4). Turner, writing on behalf of the 
Citizenship Commission, describes the dependency on 'an aid programme' as 'demeaning' and 
(alienating' (1997: 44). Decades of economic dependency and political disempowerment have 
undermined St. Helenians' sense of agency and autonomy. 
The consequences of remoteness, economic underdevelopment, and dependency have affected the 
lives of every St. Helenian and have constrained the development of local community-based 
organisations, political, and social institutions. Because of the close relationship between St. 
Helenian statutory organisations and the wider society, UKG's changes in policy towards St. 
Helena had a far-reaching impact on St. Helenian society. These changes coincided with rapid 
technological development during the 1990s. These developments have been associated with the 
introduction of new communication and other technologies in recent years (e. g. television, videos, 
internet, telecommunications, internal communications, information technology) (UNDP, 1999; 
Yon, 1998). 
Economic straits 
St. Helena's economic situation is weak and there are limited economic opportunities (Royle, 
2001). Royle, for instance, has said that St. Helena's 'economic position is dire' (1997: 331). St. 
Helena has a static economy with a low GNP; low levels of productivity; the import-export ratio in 
1994 was 43: 1; the wages are very low relative to the cost of living, especially relative to food and 
transport CoStS73; St. Helena has a 'depressed labour market 974 with high levels of unemployment 
(Royle, 1993; DEPD, 1999a, 1999b). There are several reasons for St. Helena's economic 
weakness: remoteness-, limited natural or other resources; a small scale and highly regulated 
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internal market; a poorly developed infrastructure for business; a lack of skilled human resources 
partly because of labour migration of skilled and trained workers; high transport costs (Royle, 
1993,1997,2001; DEPD, 1999b). Nonetheless, there is a small fishing industry and a sizable 
proportion of the island's income is generated by the sale of fishing licences. In addition, St. 
Helena produces of a range of foodstuffs principally for domestic consumption. Coffee is an 
exception and is principally produced for export, although production remains on a small scale. 
There is a limited tourist trade and a fledgling service industry dominated by Solomon and Co. 75 
and a small number of family businesses (Royle, 2001; UNDP, 1999). Given the high cost of 
goods, there is a high degree of dependence on an informal market for home produce and the 
informal economy plays a vital role in the sustenance of many St. Helenian families. St. Helena has 
achieved a degree of self-sufficiency in the production of some foods (DEPD, 1999b; Agriculture 
and Natural Resources Department, 1999). 
Moreover, such economic fragility has meant that St. Helena is economically dependent on the UK. 
In 1997/98, almost E6 million was allocated to St. Helena by UKG. In 2000, this contributed to 
around 30% of SHG's annual recurrent budget (UKG's 'grant in aid' to St. Helena). UK 
development assistance to St. Helena also includes support with large-scale capital investment and 
infrastructure projects; a technical assistance programme that includes provision of specialist skills 
and knowledge; provision of key administrative and technical posts; funds for improved 
governance; and a shipping subsidy (UKG, 1999: 7.5). 
During the 1990s, St. Helena underwent rapid social, economic, and political change. This was 
partly driven by the political decisions of UKG. First, British citizenship was withdrawn in 1982. In 
the mid-1990s, UKG's Overseas Development Agency (ODA) came under pressure to reduce its 
budget. Because of St. Helena's dependency on economic assistance from the ODA, St. Helena 
would be disproportionately affected compared with other aid recipients. " UKG decided to 
progressively reduce the recurrent aid budget available to St. Helena without increasing its 
development budget so that aid to St. Helena declined in real terms by 20% during the 1990s 
(UNDP, 1999: 15). In the late 1990s, UKG's political and economic policy regarding the Overseas 
Dependent Territories was described in a UKG White Paper, A Partnership for Progress and 
Prosperity. " It stated that UKG would promote self-sufficiency, economic growth and sustainable 
development among the these Territories: 'The Government recognises its responsibility to provide 
necessary and appropriate development support to these territories, up to the stage when they can 
be said to have achieved economic self-sufficiency' (UKG, 1999: 7.5). This would be achieved 
through the promotion of 'sensible economic and financial management' and the development of 
cefficient and well regulated markets'. This also marks a shift of emphasis from 'aid' to 
'development' (UKG, 1999: 7.3). 
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The 'carrot and stick' policy of UKG towards St. Helena involved a reduction and restructuring of 
economic assistance during the 1990s followed by the re-granting of citizenship in 2002. In the mid 
1990s, existing aid was tied to the implementation of far-reaching changes in its economic and 
social policies. Not only was UKG aid to St. Helena reduced in the 1990s, but SHG was also 
placed under pressure to undergo a process of 'structural adjustment' beginning in 1995. " The 
savings made in this process were presumably intended to offset the reduction in the UKG aid 
package. SHG undertook a review of the public sector and began implementation of a 'public 
sector reform programme' involving: a rationalisation of public services justified in a rhetoric of 
'efficiency', 'value for money', and 'efficient pricing'; privatisation of UKG services; and a 
private-sector development programme" (Chief Secretary to St. Helena, 1996; UNDP, 1999). The 
thrust of this programme clearly came from UKG's desire to promote sustainable development on 
St. Helena. A statement by the Chief Secretary to St. Helena to SHG's Legislative Council" made 
it clear that this policy would involve 'voluntary redundancy' and 'redundancy', and would be 
combined with efforts to promote offshore employment: 'Offshore employment makes a significant 
contribution to the economy and hopefully this would continue'. 
Social structure and labour market 
St. Helenian social structure consists a series of crosscutting and bivalent lines of stratification 
according to labour-market position, kinship, regional affiliation, and gender. The principal axis of 
'schism' in St. Helenian society defining the social structure is that between an elite St. Helenian 
civil service class, St. Helenians with English ancestry, and British expatriate workers, on the one 
hand, and the remainder of St. Helenians on the other. St. Helena's political and economic elite are 
closely linked with the island's bureaucratic centre of power, the Castle in Jamestown and therefore 
with the British administration of the island. This constitutes the apex of the social structure. The 
backbone is constituted out of a set of employment positions and statuses. For instance, writing in 
the late 1970s, a medical researcher observed that: 'There is only a small managerial and clerical 
class, the vast majority being manual workers' (Moyes, 1978: 3). The labour market forms the 
principal structural basis for inequalities in income. " According to the 1998 Census, around two- 
thirds of St. Helenians in employment worked for SHG, SHG enterprises or para-statal 
organisations (DEPD, 1999a). Around three in every ten economically active St. Helenians worked 
for 'commercial organisations' including the island's largest company, Solomon & Co. An 
important line of stratification divides those Saints who are in full-time, permanent technical, or 
administrative government positions from those who are in low-paid, untenured, or unskilled 
manual jobs. The latter can be further distinguished from those Saints who are unemployed, who 
are on the SHG's workfare scheme (the 'three-day week'), or who depend on insecure and meagre 
social-security payments in order to survive. A determinant factor in generating the social structure 
is therefore the social and cultural processes through which individuals are allocated to these social 
positions. The socio-economic status of family of origin partly determines access to economic 
resources and employment opportunities. For example, the authors of the UNDP report observe 
that socio-economic position is associated with skin colour: 
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Historically, it seems as though darker skinned people have been poorer and less 
well educated. Also historically, the individuals and families who have had most 
power and money tend to be lighter skinned or white. Perhaps as a result, few 
darker skinned people have traditionally worked in shops or Government offices. 
UNDP, 1999: 43 
These observations suggest that the underlying social process that determines access to the 
economic resources on St. Helena and scarce high-status employment is partly influenced by 
family of origin. 
Unemployment 
Due to St. Helena's economic predicament, levels of unemployment have historically been very 
high on St. Helena. The overall impact of the reduction in grant aid from UKG and SHG's reform 
programme was to reduce the number of employment opportunities available on the island (UNDP, 
1999: 15). Between 1990/91 and 1999/00, expenditure on 'Public Works' dropped from 33% of 
Government (SHG) spending to 18% of its annual experience (UNDP, 1999: 16). As part of this 
reform program, relatively large numbers of St. Helenians (principally unskilled and semi-skilled 
men) faced redundancy or were made to retire early. However, St. Helena has a poorly developed 
private sector and there remain significant social and economic barriers to private sector 
development (Hogenstijn and van Middelkoop, 2002). The private sector was therefore unable to 
provide employment for these newly redundant workers and the unemployment rate shot up 
sharply in the mid-90s. According to the 1998 Census, around 18% of an economically active 
population of 2,386 were classified as 'unemployed' 82 , almost two-thirds of whom were men. The 
restructuring of the public sector had hit St. Helenian men particularly hard, as the former SHG 
policy had been to guarantee a job to all men, but not to women. Most of the jobs shed in the 
SHG's efficiency and reform programme were in unskilled and semi-skilled manual work. While 
men made up almost 70% of the unemployed in 1999, a decade before, around 70% of the 
unemployed had been women (UNDP, 1999). This meant that a high proportion of St. Helenians 
and their families were dependent on receipt of a basic income in the form of social-security 
payments. For adults who are able to work, receipt of such income is contingent on compulsory 
participation in the island's 'workfare' Programme (locally known as the 'three-day week'). " 
Migration 
Given the limited economic opportunities and high levels of unemployment, migration has become 
a way of life for many St. Helenians. Over the past century, there have been several other waves of 
outward migration from St. Helena driven by poverty, hardship, and economic depression (Cross, 
1980; Gosse, 1938; Hughes, 1958). Given the lack of economic opportunity and a high cost of 
living relative to incomes, many Saints seek work overseas: to Ascension Island", the Falkland 
Islands and, to a lesser extent, Britain. It is frequently those Saints with training, education, scarce 
skills, and the most experience who are able to find overseas work that offers them far higher 
salaries than they can hope to attract on St. Helena (UNDP, 1999: 10)). For many Saints, the 
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alternative is to stay on the island in low-paid, insecure work on long-term dependency on 
unsustainable benefit incomes with the possibility of work on the 'three-day' week. Most normally 
go overseas for a few years 'most commonly while savings are gathered to pay for a house to be 
built' (UNDP, 1999: 37). Not all leave for economic reasons alone, or even as a principal 
motivation. Younger St. Helenians often leave because they desire to see what possibilities the 
(outside' has to offer them. Others seek to escape the confines and social constraints of living in a 
small tight-knit community. Many do not return. Comparisons between the results of the most 
recent Census of St. Helena in 1999 and the Census of 1987 suggest that the rate of migration 
escalated during the 1990s (DEPD, 1988,1999a). In 1998, there were 2,453 economically active 
adults living on St. Helena and over 1,200 worked overseas, so about one third of the economically 
active population were working abroad (UNDP, 1999). St. Helenians who opt to find jobs overseas 
are more likely to be male", single, trained, or skilled workers (UNDP, 1999; CMO, 1999). 
There was, therefore, a clear relationship between increased levels of migration, unemployment, 
and SHG's 'public sector reform program'. These changes were ultimately driven by shifts in 
UKG's policy towards St. Helena, the progressive reduction in the aid budget during the 1990s, and 
the imposition of a process of 'structural adjustment'. 
Poverty, affluence, and new inequalities 
86 In a 1958 report, the British MP Cledwyn Hughes said that St. Helena suffered a 'continued 
depression'. He reported observing 'poverty of the most distressing kind and amongst a large 
section of the community' (1958: 12). He noted that around 30% of the working population were 
unemployed (1958: 12). Moreover, 'poverty, low wages, and the lack of prospects have combined 
to produce a fairly universal desire to emigrate amongst young people' (1958: 24). In 1999, 
however, the authors of a UNDP report on St. Helena state that there are no 'real indications of 
poverty' on St. Helena. Somewhat paradoxically, they add, however, that 'there are of course poor 
people who struggle to make ends meet but there is no starvation and every one who wants it has 
access to adequate shelter and clothing' (1999: 39). In response to a request by the SHG Legislative 
Council, in 1999 an investigation was carried out by a United Nations Volunteer with the support 
87 of the Chief Development Officer and Social Security Officer (DEPD, 1999b). Using existing 
evidence on St. Helena's labour market, incomes and expenditure on St. Helena, it concluded that 
there was some evidence of relative, but not absolute poverty, on St. Helena. 88 Anecdotal references 
to poverty on St. Helena can be found in some of the accounts of visitors to the island. For instance, 
in a recent account, Phillips observed that 'too many people are below the poverty line' (1998: 24). 
One St. Helenian man living in an outlying area confessed that most people on the island and 
including himself were living in a 'poverty situation'. 
During the 1990s, wages in the public sector dropped by 16% implying that the improvements in 
many St. Helenians' material standard of living (e. g. house building and expenditure on consumer 
durables) was driven by the high rates of overseas employment (UNDP, 1999; DEPD, 1999b). The 
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remittances returning to the island from overseas work partly offset the reduction in aid available 
from UKG. " There have been positive material Implications for many St- Helenians and their 
families. These remittances have enabled many St. Helenians to build new homes and reduce their 
dependence on SHG and, therefore, UKG. This source of income has brought increased levels of 
material prosperity to many St. Helenian families so that average living standards have risen 
(DEPD, 1999b: 10). For example, a St. Helenian man in his 50s maintained that a positive 
consequence of increased overseas employment to the Falkland Islands and Ascension Island had 
been increased levels of house ownership among Saints. For the first time, he said, many St. 
Helenians are beginning to support themselves and St. Helena is developing rapidly. The informant 
saw this as an example of Saints' resourcefulness, St. Helenians' capacity to adapt to adversity. 
Nonetheless, while a minority of St. Helenian families have become newly affluent, many others 
continue to experience hardship. One St. Helenian man in his 50s expressed the frustration that 
goes along with such disparities when he complained about the high prices, the low wages, and the 
fact that there are 'big people' on St. Helena, 'business people' who 'get rich'. He was unhappy 
with the state of things and finds it hard to pay the bills. Yet, new inequalities are gradually 
supplanting old ones. The income generated by overseas employment and the 'rationalisation' of 
public services has generated new inequalities and fresh sources of relative deprivation (UNDP, 
1999: 44; DEPD, 1999b). Not everyone has being able to share in the wealth generated by the 
increased employment opportunities in the Falkland Islands. 
Some Saints expressed a concern about recent changes on St. Helena and had developed a 
sophisticated understanding of recent social change on St. Helena. For instance, one St. Helenian 
woman described how, in the past, the unity of the extended family prevented social exclusion. 
Relatives would provide financial and other forms of support where necessary. A quarter of a 
century ago, there had been full employment on St. Helena. " Back then, there had been enough to 
live on for everyone, and Saints lived in a state of sufficiency. Moreover, she believed that there 
had been a greater degree of material equality and the extended family was stronger than it is today. 
The local labour market was undermined by the collapse of St. Helena's flax industry in the 1950s 
and 1960s so that Saints were forced overseas to work. Work in the Falkland Islands became 
available at a time when routes to UK were being closed down through the withdrawal of British 
citizenship in the early 1980s. She believed that: 'The St. Helena economy would have collapsed if 
it wasn't for the Falklands'. Saints could command relatively high wages on the Falkland Islands 
and Ascension Island and could send back thousands of pounds. This was also because there was 
nothing to spend the money on and food and accommodation were often included. This brought 
increased wealth to many St. Helenian families at a time when aid from the UK was been cut back 
and possibilities of working in the UK curtailed. 
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She highlighted two main effects of this overseas work. First, St. Helenians have become less 
community orientated. In recent years, she said, the importance of the extended family, the security 
it once provided, and the support it had once offered has eroded. Second, this erosion of 
community values the extended family has partly been caused by the fact that St. Helenian society 
has become more materialistic. She described how the dominant values have shifted from an 
emphasis on community and reciprocity towards a concern with material consumption. She argued 
that those younger Saints who opt to go overseas rationalise these less socially acceptable 
materialistic aspirations by claiming to assist their families. She pointed out, however, that they 
often leave their families behind. She said that many of those who depart are already 'comfortable' 
before they leave. 'Why goT she asked. She believed that one of the main reason why Saints go 
overseas to work is so that they can earn money so that they can build a new house, buy a new car, 
and go on holidays. Saints who have not gone overseas to work have seen these offshore workers 
returning with money and material possessions and so have become discontented with a way of life 
that Saints had previously accepted. She believes that this marked a cultural shift towards 
materialism: 'Everyone wanted more'. She said that remittances from overseas work have recently 
been declining" and used this to warrant her view that there has been a loosening of family ties and 
a turn to a set of more materialistic set of values. 
The emergence of new inequalities and relative deprivation threatens social cohesion in a different 
way than migration. There was some evidence to suggest that income inequality in St. Helena may 
have increased during the 1990s with the gap between highest and lowest average earnings 
widening during this period. " While more earners moved into higher income bands during this 
period, this was offset by an increase in the number of lower earners generating a widening gap. 
While migration disrupted the lives of many families, the difficulties faced by those individuals 
(and their dependents) who have not been able to share in this new affluence deepened. While 
fewer opportunities were available on St. Helena due to a tightening up of SHG spending, many St. 
Helenians had no way of obtaining access to the employment opportunities available overseas and 
were placed in a vulnerable position, a position of 'entrapment'. This included individuals working 
in unskilled, manual, insecure, poorly paid jobs; older St. Helenians; lone parents with young 
dependants; those men who had been made redundant during the 1990s and who were living on 
social-security benefits. 
It is likely that social and economic change on St. Helena has been matched by a shift in St. 
Helenians' core concerns. For instance, the authors of the UNDP report observed an 'increasing 
materialism and a disinclination to do something for nothing' and the presence of a 'more 
materialistic attitude' among St. Helenians (1999: 37). 
Gender 
The structure of employment on St. Helena is highly gendered. Men were four times more likely to 
be self-employed, twice as likely to be unemployed and slightly more likely to be employed in full- 
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time positions (DEPD, 1999a). Men's employment is heavily concentrated in technical, manual 
(skilled and unskilled) and 'elementary' occupations, engineering, labouring, craftwork and 
production, fishing, or overseas work on Ascension Island or the Falkland Islands. " Going to work 
on these islands has become an integral part of St. Helenian masculinity, a 'rite of passage' through 
which young men acquire both social status and material security. 
Women, on the other hand, tend to be concentrated in service and sales jobs, clerical and 
administrative work, health, teaching, and care work. " Women occupy many of the senior position 
in SHG, although almost all St. Helena's elected councillors are men (UNDP, 1999; DEPD, 
1999b). Many women go to work overseas, particularly to the UK and the Falkland Islands. 
Despite the fact that women have come to dominate certain areas of labour market-activity, the 
authors of the U`NDP report point out that this co-exists with 'a high degree of sexism' on St. 
Helena. With many men working overseas and without qualifications, women increased their 
presence in the labour market during the 1990s. " 
Traditional male and female roles in the home are rigidly defined. Men's typical domestic role 
involves house building, collecting firewood, gardening, informal economic production, and 
physical labour. Despite increased participation in the labour market (DEPD, 1999b: 7), women 
continue to perform a traditional domestic role in the home that includes caring for children and 
elderly relatives, cooking, cleaning, washing, and 'keeping home'. Almost all those classified as 
6economically inactive' in 1998 Census were women (DEPD, 1999a). Nonetheless, many women 
are expected to carry out both domestic work and seek paid employment. This places some women 
under considerable strain. 
Given an historical dependency on manual work, masculinity has come to be associated with 
physical work and a more practical orientation. According to the authors of the UNDP report on St. 
Helena, boys are not as motivated as girls to learn at school (1999: 54) and this may be partly 
because, in the past, men were guaranteed a job by SHG. Men are therefore less likely to obtain the 
qualifications required for the more secure and well-remunerated jobs in SHG (e. g. administration 
and clerical work, health, education). 
5.3 "It's just one thing over and over" 
St. Helena's communal ideology emphasises family duty, harmony and homogeneity, strength and 
independence, social connectedness, and an absence of social schism or adversity. St. Helena's 
predicament during the second half of the 1990s was characterised by high levels of migration and 
unemployment; an erosion of the traditionally high levels of social capital; economic hardship and 
relative deprivation, entrapment; and an emerging communal ideology of materialism and 
individualism. This predicament was partly produced by the removal of British citizenship rights 
and a programme of SHG reform during the 1990s. These changes have placed the community of 
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Saints under considerable strain. The consequent breach in the received order of things directly 
conflicts with St. Helena's communal ideology. It therefore works to undermine an allegiance to a 
British root identity that partly depends on this ideology. 
As a consequence of rapid social and economic change, St. Helena has become caught in a liminal 
space, somewhere between the modem and the traditional, between a St. Helenian future and a 
British colonial past. Moreover, such change has been associated with a nascent materialism and 
individualism. A liberal, individualistic ideology that emphasises the rights of the individual (e. g. 
to free expression, liberty, participation, and privacy) is not wholly consistent with St. Helena's 
public narrative and a traditional socio-centric discourse on the self. In conjunction with rising 
material expectations, this ideology sanctions the desire of younger Saints to exit from traditional 
social constraints and socio-economic adversity to seek their fortune overseas; it represents a 
release from the rigid social hierarchies that characterise St. Helenian society. 
The remainder of this chapter explores how this predicament translates into anomic and social 
suffering among many St. Helenians. It highlights the mediating role of communal ideology and 
other cultural processes in constituting such suffering. 
Macro socio-economic forces constitute the local relational settings inhabited by Saints and their 
families. Through adverse relational settings, social structure systematically impinges upon the 
lives of some individuals and families in ways that disrupt their social relationships, constrain their 
agency, or entrap them in situations of social and economic disadvantage. The examples that follow 
illustrate how such adversity can produce social and anomic suffering. They also show how the 
impact of such adversity on individual bodies is mediated by cultural processes and through the 
provision of a communal ideology. 
St. Helenians' experiences of distress included contextualised descriptions of adverse life events 
and ongoing social and economic difficulties. In most cases, this discourse exhibited a low degree 
of narrativity. In a few cases, Saints' discourse on social suffering took the forrn of contingent 
narratives (See Chapter 4). A small number of informants situated their suffering in their biography 
as a whole or formed an interpretation of their suffering in terms of more general features of St. 
Helenian society. Three core categories of adversity emerged from informants' discourse on 
distress: 
A breach in social relations (e. g. social disconnection, social conflict) 
" Economic adversity (e. g. 'financial worries', hardship) 
" Disruption of agency (e. g. entrapment, anomie) 
A breach in social relations 
Macro political and economic forces have forced rapid socio-cultural change on St. Helena. These 
changes were amplified by the introduction of new technologies and St. Helena's changing 
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geopolitical context. 96 The recent waves of emigration that took place during the 1980s and 1990s 
have been a mixed blessing for St. Helenians. While many Saints have become more prosperous 
and less dependent on SHG (and therefore UKG), large-scale outward migration has undermined 
social cohesion and has had a negative social impact on core relationships and social ties and has 
eroded traditional sources of social capital (e. g. UNDP, 1999). For instance, many households in 
St. Helena are missing 'significant individuals' because of overseas employment. " The authors of 
the UNDP report maintain that 'offshore employment may have contributed to the dislocation of 
families' and that 'the cohesion of the extended family is not as secure as it was in the fairly recent 
past' (UNDP, 1999: 37). Similarly, a middle-aged St. Helenian man believed that many Saints had 
been forced to go offshore during the 1990s to find work because of a lack of employment 
opportunities on the island and relationships and marriages had broken up as a result. In many 
cases, these men had left behind dependent children. This informant also expressed a concern about 
rising crime. Five years ago, he said, there had been an occasional theft from a shop. Nowadays, he 
protested, 'they are taking from their own'. He believed that the rising rate of crime was because 
increasing numbers of St. Helenian children are growing up without any parental control or 
authority. 
It is likely that St. Helen's predicament, compounded by escalating levels of outward migration and 
unemployment in the second half of the 1990s, have had a negative impact on the public health and 
well being of St. Helenians. " Plummeting fertility rates on the island over the past two decades 
have been blamed on the social effects of migration. " For instance, the authors of the UNDP report 
claim that high levels of offshore employment: 
Results in a severe strain being placed on family life. Children are often left in the 
care of grandparents and relatives while parents go away, there is a very high 
proportion of single people as marriage is not an attractive option when partners can 
be away for years at a time overseas and illegitimacy and divorce rates are higher 
than the United Kingdom despite the relative conservatism of the society. 
UNDP, 1999: 35 
Divorce rates have increased in recent years (DEPD, 1999b) and a relatively high proportion of 
resident St. Helenians remain unmarried well into adulthood (DEPD, 1999a). 
The evidence from the UK context indicates that personal distress is more likely when social 
relations have been disrupted and agency is constrained. It is possible that rapid socio-economic 
change and the 'St. Helenian predicament' have produced high levels of anomic and social 
suffering among St. Helenians. For example, in the CMO's annual report for 1998, a direct 
connection was made between emigration, social ffragmented families') and personal distress 
('stress-related syndromes'): 
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17he number of fragmented families is increasing and set to increase further with the 
current situation in emigration. This is leading to a number of stress-related 
syndromes in both children and adults that we have no means of successfully 
managing. 
CMO, 1999: 25 
The social and health impact of these changes among St. Helenians is unknown. Evidence is scant 
and anecdotal. 
The immediate relational setting of many St. Helenians' experiences of personal distress are 
characterised by (a) Social exclusion, social disconnection, and disrupted relationships; (b) Social 
conflict. 
(a) Disrupted relationships and social disconnection 
Relationship breakdowns were sometimes cited as a source of distress among female informants. 
For instance, one St. Helenian woman said that her personal distress had been caused by "the 
break-up of me an' my friend, aye. Many a time I here by myself, I sit down an' cry. Many a time". 
Some St. Helenian women cited the emigration of a partner as a reason for relationship breakdown 
and personal distress. For example, a woman in her 20s had a boyfriend who had left the island 
leaving her to live in poverty with two young children to care for. She had 'cracked up' in response 
to this experience of abandonment. According to one St. Helenian healthcare worker, many Saints 
who set out to work overseas are married or in a relationship at the time of their departure. Many 
women are left alone at home with young children. She believed that some of these women become 
socially isolated, receiving a phone call or a letter perhaps only once a month from their partners. 
She also believed that some of these women become 'depressed'. Others have affairs. At any rate, 
she believed that such relationships often break down. 
According to one St. Helenian man, the public sector reform programme forced through by SHG 
and UKG during the 1990s meant that relatively large numbers of St. Helenian men were made 
redundant (See Section 5.2 for an account of this program). The avowed intention was that these 
workers would be re-employed in the private sector. However, he explained that whereas SHG 
would have employed ten workers to do a particular job, the private sector would only hire five. 
The other five became unemployed and ended up on the 'three-day week'. He said that men who 
could not find steady, paid work became 'fed up' with being on the 'three-day week' and went 
overseas. Husbands and fathers have been forced to leave their home in order to work leaving their 
families behind. In many cases, they had not wanted to leave. This, he explained, has had a 
negative effect on the cohesion of many families and, in come cases, has caused relationships and 
families to break up. He believed that it is common for a woman to find another partner while the 
man is overseas and the children 'stray' as well. He cited examples where St. Helenian men had 
returned from overseas to find that their partners had left the island to work overseas, leaving their 
children with another member of the family. 
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Although only a few St. Helenian men were interviewed about their experience of distress, in 
informal conversations with St. Helenians, relationship difficulties, breakdown, and difficulties in 
finding a partner or starting a family were often cited as a source of suffering among men. The 
expression of such suffering, however, is discouraged. For example, one elderly St. Helenian man 
said: 'Say a woman leaves a husband It build him up, aye. Under pressure. So he become 
weak'. 
High levels of outward migration also disrupt other social relationships and erode extended family 
networks. This removes a pivotal source of social support and results in a sense of loss among 
some of those who remain. For instance, a woman in her 40s who had suffered from 'headaches' 
described how her children's departure from St. Helena to find work had been a source of sadness 
for her (Text 2): 
Text 2 
1 mean, he glad he go off the island. We miss 'im. 'I like my children', I always 
say. It was all against me like [ ... ]I miss that one, y'know [ ... ] He most was at home all the time, 'cos he didn't have no work. So, he was jus' gettin' off the social 
service, y'know [ ... ] It's jus' certain times when I by myself But, I mean, he write, he phone, y'know. It's alright. 
An important consequence of the high levels of offshore employment is that the extended support 
networks that Saints have traditionally depended upon have come under threat. Many Saints are 
forced to face the consequences of the 'St. Helenian predicament' alone. 
St. Helena's geographical remoteness amplifies social processes that work to marginalize and 
exclude. Many individuals or families are victims of a double exclusion. Not only do they live on a 
remote island, but they also feel isolated and excluded because they have become socially 
marginalized. In a society where family is everything, the breakdown of family connections 
through conflict, exclusion, or migration can have profoundly negative personal, social, and 
economic implications. For example, a widow in her 60s reported 'feeling depressed'. She 
expressed how much she valued social contact, yet most of her family had emigrated, and she lived 
on her own: 'Down here by myself so far, I get bored sometimes been on my own. ' 
Similarly, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s reported feeling under 'stress' (e. g. "I've got a lot of 
problems to be under the stress that I am under today"). She had a chronic illness that severely 
constrained her embodied sense of agency (e. g. I can't light my stove or anything like that. I can't 
strike a match"). St. Helena's communal ideology prescribes a strong sense of belonging to an 
extended family, filial duty, and social support. Over the course of her life, this infon-nant had come 
to invest her social identity in her social role as a mother. She emphasised the central importance of 
family relations in her life (e. g. 'I gotta a lot of feelings for my children') and equated 'happiness' 
with 'a happy family'. However, she had been separated from her former partner for many years, 
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and, after a recent fall, she was unable to venture outdoors unassisted. She did not feel confident 
that, if she were ever sick, there would be someone there to support her. She felt alone. vulnerable, 
and unsupported by her grown-up children. A breach in filial duty and a lack of family support 
were the central sources of her distress. She felt that the care she had once provided to her children 
when they had been growing up had was not been reciprocated now that she was in need of care 
herself. Her distress arose partly out of a discrepancy between her current social adversity and her 
core concerns; between her social disconnection and the value that she placed on reciprocity and 
family relations. She reported feeling unhappy in her own home: "All those things upset me [ ... ]I 
don't feel happy like what sort of love have I got". If she were physically able to, she said that she 
would leave her current situation behind: "I would prefer to do it [to leave] because I would be 
myself again [ ... II could be more happier, 'cos I'm very unhappy, and I could feel better if I was 
away from here. " She was unable to travel on her own because of her chronic illness, so that it was 
difficult for her to leave the island: 'I just stuck here now. Just stuck'. This informant felt entrapped 
in an adverse situation characterised by social disconnection and isolation, an infringement of her 
normative expectations about social reciprocity, chronic illness, and financial difficulties. These 
sources of adversity had systematically eroded her sense of agency, resulting in personal distress. 
One group of informants shared a common pattern of social adversity and distress characterised by 
a dependency on meagre social-security benefits; the presence of one or more dependent children; 
low levels of family support; poor housing conditions; economic hardship; a lack of employment 
opportunities; social disconnection and ostracism; the experience of loss, abandonment, divorce, or 
separation. For instance, a lone parent in her 30s inhabited such a relational context. Living under 
such conditions had left her feeling devalued and excluded: "Most of the time, " she said, "you feel 
that you're missing out on something - unwanted. " Another lone parent in her 30s lived in a similar 
set of adverse life circumstances. She felt entrapped by this adversity: 'The same thing happens all 
the time [ ... ] You never seem to 
be free of it'. She would like to work, but cannot find a job. She 
feels socially excluded: 'When Saints at the top, they push you down as far as they can push it 
depending on who you is'. She reported receiving little support and that her voice had not been 
heard: "Sometimes, I feelin' I want to cry. Like, there's nobody there. Like, you're fighting and 
fighting, trying to make people see what you're trying to say. Crying for help". 
Similarly, another lone parent in her 30s reported several episodes of 'depression'. She was not in 
paid employment, lived in a situation of econormc hardship, and most of her days were spent shut 
up in her home taking care of her dependent children. She reported feeling 'all cooped up' and 
employed a prison metaphor to depict her predicament: "I sometimes feel like I'm in a prison 
system. " She expressed the desire to work, but could not get into Jamestown. She had no transport 
of her own and there is no public transport on St. Helena. Her image of happiness was of a 'happy 
family' - being married with children. Almost all of her immediate farmily had already left St. 
Helena and, partly because of this, she had lost contact with some of them. She reported that she 
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had few friends on the island and felt socially 'cut off'. Given such adversity, she described feeling Z: ý 
highly vulnerable, portraying herself as a 'sitting duck'. Her exclusion translated into a feeling of 
being oppressed, that 'everyone is against her'. She reported feeling trapped on St. Helena and 
described how she often thought about leaving, but could see no way of getting off the island. Her 
responsibility for her dependent children limits her mobility; she has no career, nor the financial 
resources that would make exit possible. She described 'depression' as being "really unhappy about 
the situation you're in. " 
The next extended case study illustrates the relationships between these emergent themes of 
entrapment and social disconnection. Text 3 is an extract from a series of conversations with a St. 
Helenian woman in her 20s whom I call Ann. Ann is not in paid work and lives alone with her 
young child. In Text 3, she describes her domestic routine. Her daily activity, and so her identity, 
are tied up with her role as a mother and a carer: 
Text 3 
Well, get out of bed. 
Get [name of her child] ready for school. 
And after they go off to school, 
then, I start to clean up the house. 
So, erm, doing the clothes. 
And, after that's finish, 
then go out, 
and hang the clothes out. 
Go out to do the shopping. 
That's about it. 
And do the cooking 
[In the evening] I jus' sit down. 
Jus' listen to the radio sometimes. 
I don't worry with telly much. 
That don't bother me. 
And, arm, I jus' sit down 
and jus' listen to the radio. 
Then go to bath, 
and go to bed after. 
Most of Ann's immediate family have left St. Helena to work overseas. She is unsure whether any 
of her family will be returning home and her social network is limited (Text 4): 
Text 4 
They [her family overseas] hardly ever phone me. I feel quite down about that. 
They should call me up often. [name of relative] hasn't called me in two months. 
She hasn't called me and I feel quite down about that, 'cos she should call us and 
see how everything going' with me [ ... ] Home is too much for me to handle [ ... ][name of relative] she's in [names place abroad] and she hasn't been home for a long time. She's putting all the strain on me. When I do go out, I do talk to friends 
and that there. But, it's not like friends who come in your house. I don't have many 
friends. I just have to go on living like that. There's nobody here. It's just me and 
[name of her child]. And, I do have a lot of work on my hands. There's no one else 
here to do the work. 
What matters to her are positive social bonds, particularly with members of her family. However, 
Ann has little access to social support and sums up her social situation when she says 'there's 
116 
nobody here'. Text 5 portrays her experience of social disconnection. She recognises that her social 
circumstances have made her vulnerable to 'depression': 
Text 5 
1 never go out there and enjoy myself like other girls do, although they got children. 
Other girls that got children go out and have a good time, aye. And people been 
tellin' me too: 'You got no life'. I don't go out and enjoy myself [ ... ] Everybody 
tell me I should be out of the house and mixing with other people. And, then, 
probably I would come 'round and be alright and get out of this depression. 
Another of her core concerns is employment. She expresses a desire to work, but believes that she 
would not have any chance of getting a job (Text 6): 
Text 6 
1 would like to go out to work. The problem is : like: erm, somebody : like a person 
who said to me that I should go out and try to work. But, I think, erm, if I go out 
and try for work, that the person who picked the people [ ... I they won't choose me. [ ... ] So far, I haven't had a good few jobs because I know I got a child there I 
would like to go out to work. 
In Text 6, Ann expresses the feeling of being trapped in an adverse social and economic situation 
that limits her autonomy and constrains her agency; her circumstances mean that it is impossible 
for her to travel, work, go out, enjoy herself, and form social bonds. She does have agency in the 
sense that things matter to her. What matters to her, her core concerns, express her social identity as 
a woman and articulate her sense of agency. However, a breach has opened up between these core 
concerns and her experience of social adversity. The personal impact of Ann's social circumstances 
is mediated by their meaning; how she evaluates this context is a function of her social identity and 
her agency. She therefore forms a negative evaluation of her life circumstances from the 
perspective of her core distinctions of worth. This discrepancy is the source of her 'worrying' 
which she believes is responsible for her 'depression'. Such 'worrying', for instance, is exacerbated 
by her experience of social isolation, tight constraints on her autonomy, and an adverse relational 
setting. 
Ann's suffering can partly be understood in relation to the domestic and social division of labour 
between the sexes (See Section 5.2). Her experience of personal distress is situated in a relational 
setting that is systematically produced by macro social and economic forces that are outside of her 
control (e. g. migration, high levels of unemployment, social ostracism, social structure). As a 
metonym for her adversity, Ann's 'worrying' articulates her moral response to her social and 
economic circumstances. Moreover, her agency is partly constituted in a St. Helenian cultural 
discourse on the self, a discourse that sets out her core commitments. St. Helenians represent their 
society as a tight-knit community, characterised by relations of reciprocity and strong family 
bonds. Breaches in social relations, inequality, oppression, exclusion, and poverty are rarely 
acknowledged in public discourse because they challenge the preferred version of St. Helena's 
public narrative. Ann does not feel part of this narrative; her experience of adversity jars with the 
117 
preferred story and clashes with the sociocentric discourse on Ihe self that it depends upon. As 
such, her experience of 'depression' represents a forrn of anoMic suffering, an individual embodied 
response to anomie. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the majority of Helenians are socially included, particularly 
through their involvement in strong extended family networks. St. Helena may well be 
geographically remote, but, as Section 5.1 showed, the experience of many Saints is of involvement 
in a strong community life. For example, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s who had returned to the 
island after spending most of her adult life working in the UK said (Text 7): 
Text 7 
1, myself, don't find it isolated. But, not to me, because I was used to this, I was 
brought up to it [ ... ] So, err : No! I would never : say thank you : even if you gave 
me a ticket now to go to the UK. Go anywhere in the world that I want to go, I 
wouldn't. 
(b) Social conflict 
Some female informants described situations of domestic conflict in their narratives of distress. 
Such conflict was typically between a woman and her partner, but, in a few cases, conflict between 
other family members was reported. Heavy drinking among men was sometimes associated with 
accounts of domestic conflict. For example, one St. Helenian woman cited domestic conflict as the 
source of her personal distress ('My husband upset me, aye'), eventuating in her admission to 
hospital (See Appendix A6.3). Another woman in her 20s explained that her experience of 
'depression' had started because she "didn't get on so well" with her partner. She described how 
her partner would go out at the weekend. She felt trapped and resented the fact that he would go out 
drinking, leaving her alone with their young children to take care of. He would often come back 
late and there would be rows. Similarly, a woman in her 30s with young children depicted the 
relational context of her suffering as follows: 
Text 8 
Financial problems, but on top of that the children they up to mischief and stuff and 
A sometimes my boyfriend come drinks all night and he comes in and we 
have a row. 
A woman in her 40s complained of chronic pain for which the doctors could find no medical cause. 
She believes that this pain was caused by 'stress'. This 'stress' is metonymically associated with 
her insecure employment situation. Marital conflict associated with her husband's drinking was 
cited as another source of her distress. Another woman in her 40s identified the relationship with 
her husband as a source of 'stress' ('Stress with the husband'). For instance, when her husband is 
drunk, she said, he can 'make trouble': 
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Text 9 
Well, sometimes it [the headaches] can be due to stress with the husband, y'know, 
when he do go be drunk and make trouble. They do, if he gets drink. But, it's very 
seldom, and there. 
Arguments with her husband and his persistent complaining make her feel 'down' at times (Text 
10): 
Text 10 
There's times when I'm down sometimes Might be things don't go right like or 
something like will go wrong. Y'know, we may have jus' a little argument 
sometimes. Don't be much, y'know. Most time he come from work, his work is 
finish, house clean, dinner cook, but he find somethin' to say. I suppos', sometimes 
[her husband] get angry o'er nothing [ ... jI tell him perhaps he have trouble with high blood pressure [ ... ] The way the husband get at certain times o'er nothing, 6 cos almost like a row in the house, you fancy. And, the noise get too much for you, 
that kind of way. 
In some cases, social conflict was reported between family members other than husband and wife. 
For instance, a woman in her 20s reported that she had had not been sleeping properly and had 
been diagnosed as a 'bit depressed'. She explained her distress as the consequence of 'rows in the 
home' and described how a member of her family drinks heavily during the weekend and, when he 
returns home, arguments follow. These rows had caused her to 'worry' and this, in turn, had 
interfered with her sleeping. 
In another example, a middle-aged St. Helenian woman reported experiencing 'panic attacks' and 
was keen to find out what they meant: 'What I cannot understand is where these panic attacks came 
frornT Nevertheless, as her narrative unfolded it became clear that her experience of 'panic' was 
associated with her domestic social position, a role that involved washing, cleaning, cooking, and 
ironing. She understood 'happiness' to mean the fulfilment of this role, as well as being adequately 
provided for materially. She often feels 'unhappy' or 'miserable'. Rehearsing the communal 
ideology, she questioned the legitimacy of her own suffering. Why, she asked, should she 
experience suffering in such a place as St. Helena, a place where 'you can walk free. Here on the 
island, we're free. The windows :I can go to sleep with the windows open and nobody will harrn 
rneT She reasoned that, since she is materially provided for and feels secure, she has no cause for 
'worry'; for example, she has 'nothing to worry over like where you gonna get the next meal from, 
nothing like that'. As a consequence of her household role, she has very few social contacts beyond 
her domestic setting and does not socialise very much. All of her direct family live abroad. Her first 
experience of 'panic' was depicted as a response to a breach in a relationship with a close relative: 
'That is something that spark something off in me. It did build up in me'. Her 'panic attacks' have 
recurred ever since. 
Another example comes from a woman in her 50s who reported suffering from 'headaches'. The 
ions with her son. main source of her personal distress was a breach in her relati I She believed that 
the root cause of this breach ý, ý'as her son's excessive drinking. When he drinks, she said, "that's the 
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time he gets on worse always arguments" and he causes 'trouble in the home'. Althouolh she 
believed that his disruptive behaviour was due to 'too much drink', she also linked it to the fact that 
he was unable to find full-time paid employment: 'Sometimes he would up at something else, like 
his job. He not got a proper job. I can't help it that he not got a proper job at the moment'. His 
behaviour in the home represents a breach in filial duty and reciprocity: 'He still not the right kind 
of son to me'. In her view, this breach in social relations was the principal cause of her headaches: 
"It [the headaches] could be worries. It could be from, as I say : the boy is sometimes jus' the 
opposite in the home". 
Economic adversity 
Alongside social adversity, economic adversity was also commonly portrayed as a setting or source 
of personal distress. These individual accounts drew on a widely held common-sense explanatory 
system that linked personal distress or 'worry' to social or economic adversity. In their discourse 
on distress, St. Helenians identified two kinds of economic adversity: (a) 'Financial worries' or 
everyday economic concerns; (b) More severe hardship, or, as one Saint described it, 'poverty- 
stress'. 
(a) 'Financial worries' 
Many St. Helenians cited ongoing financial difficulties as a common source of 'worry' or 'stress'. 
For instance, one male informant explained: 
Text 11 
Well, maybe many a thing they like to have, but they can't afford it. Maybe, some 
of those that get upset are on so much and they can't afford it. They get maybe, 
well, uptight, because they can't get what they want. They can't afford it. 
In Text 11, financial difficulties are interpreted as a source of 'worry' because they constrain 
agency, making it more difficult for a person to 'get what they want'. Similarly, a middle-aged St. 
Helenian woman understood 'worry' as an individual response to financial difficulties (Text 12): 
Text 12 
To worry will be like, err, say, you got financial problems Say, you got an 
account somewhere in the shop and, y'know : like at the end of the month, you 
have to pay. You will be worry how you gonna pay that. 
In Text 13, a St. Helenian woman in her 70s identifies financial difficulties as a source of 'worry': 
Text 13 
Say you had bills to pay for and you couldn't manage it, then it would be been in a 
lot of worry and stress, that type of thing, owing people money I wouldn't be able 
to sleep at night. 
Similarly, another St. Helenian woman associated 'worries' wIth financial difficultles and 
economic insecurity (Text 14): 
Text 14 
I'm sure people would [worry], because I cannot see how you can make one pound 
in money go further than I can make one pound in money go. Now some of these 
people, theirs husband is earning forty-eight pound, and they borrow money [to pay 
for a house], so they got to pay back fifteen pounds out of their forty-eight pounds. 
Whatever they got left to buy food and clothing, and they got children. I would 
imagine that it would be a lot of worries to them. I know it would be to me. 
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These examples illustrate how the common belief among Saints that financial difficulties are a 
common source of 'worry' and personal distress. Indeed, economic concerns are widespread 
among the population and the sociornoral idioms of 'worry' and 'stress' are commonly used to 
articulate such core concerns. For example, a woman in her 70s reported that her only source of 
income was 'a bit of money off the dole' and that 'it is not enough, but there is nothing you can do 
about it'. Even though she and her partner budget carefully (i. e. they 'work around'), their 
economic adversity is a source of 'stress' (Text 15): 
Text 15 
1 fancy to myself that there is a bit of stress, because you gotta find this for this 
month. Next one, you gotta find something else. And the water is so expensive, you 
know what I mean [ ... ] Bit of light. You gotta 'ave a bit of electric. 
Similarly, a woman in her 60s described financial difficulties as part of the context of her 
experience of personal distress. Since her husband's death, she has had to struggle on her own on a 
small income to support herself and her home: 'The house needs repairing and things like that and I 
think about it and err money is difficult' and "sometimes you don't have the money to do things 
with [ ... ] to repair the house and things like that". 
(b) Economic hardship ('poverty-stress') 
'Financial worries' expressed anything from more prolonged hardship to the everyday experience 
of not being able to pay a bill. Some informants believed that more severe economic hardship or 
poverty is a common source of personal distress among St. Helenians. For instance, a St. Helenian 
man in his 60s associated distress with economic disadvantage. He believed that poverty is a 
common cause of distress in his rural district ('People living in stress-poverty, in need [ ... ] They 
need to be maintained'). Moreover, he believed that some groups are more at risk of 'poverty- 
stress' than others. Women, for instance, belong to a different 'class' to men. Some 'classes' of 
people live in 'poverty' and are, therefore, vulnerable to 'stress' (Text 16): 
Text 16 
People in different classes will be in a different situation They will have a 
different feeling and would be living in poverty-stress Not everyone can 
overcome it [stress]. It depends on what does it occur from. 
He maintained that households whose members are in full employment and receive a 'fair wage', 
or where both husband and wife have a job, are less likely to struggle financially. He compared the 
situation of working households with that of lone parents who are not in paid employment and who 
'live with problems and stress - in poverty', what he described as 'poverty-stress'. This, he said, 
was because such households were not been 'maintained'. Moreover, he believed that, in 
comparison with men, women are more vulnerable to stress because of their domestic role. On his 
view, the male domestic role is to economically provide for the household. The woman's role, on 
the other hand, is to clean the home and to raise the children. The occupation of these roles means 
that men and women experience different sets of pressures: 'Women have different ideas and 
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feelings about certain things and women have the biggest burden. ' He gave the example of a lone 
parent: 'She has children and not even a home of her own [ ... ] so she is under strain'. He believed 
that such poverty had been partly caused by the withdrawal of British citizenship. 
Indeed, the situation of some informants fitted with this description. Some were lone parents whose 
personal distress was partly constituted by their experience of economic hardship. Such hardship 
was often associated with relationship breakdown and limited access to social capital and social 
support. For instance, one lone parent described her situation as one of poverty and ongoing zD 
economic insecurity. The impact of economic adversity on her children further exacerbated her 
personal distress and was partly a consequence of divorce: "'Cos of my financial problems -I been 
divorced - the children suffer. I mean everybody suffer through a divorce, but of late : like my 
children : because I can't give them certain things"'. Such adversity figured strongly in her 
narrative of distress (Text 17): 
Text 17 
It's just financial. I always look at it as financial problems because sometimes 
like, err two weeks ago we didn't have no money at all. So, I was worfied the whole 
week, how we was to survive. I didn't have anything to put on their plate, aye. And 
my [name of relative] tfied to help 'em out, aye. I was just getting 'em up and I was 
just givin' them bread and marg' and the cups of tea. Like, I was going insane [ ... J It's a vicious circle. If you got no electricity, you got no lighting, you can't plug the 
kettle in for the baby's ri-fflk. So, you pay for the electricity and you got no food. 
While such hardship was partly the consequence of a relationship breakdown, inadequate levels of 
social and economic support available to lone parents also generated it. Moreover, she felt that she 
had receved little support from the wider community: "You don't get much support from the 
people y'know". 
Some informants described how economic adversity had caused difficulties in their relationships. 
For example, a woman in her 20s described how economic difficulties and problems accessing 
social-security benefits had put her relationship with her partner under pressure. She would 
grumble at her children for wasting anything and she cited a few occasions when they had 
completely run out of food. She was forced to borrow money in order to survive. 
Disruption of agency 
The 'St. Helenian predicament' has negative implications for St. Helenians' sense of personal 
agency and for their capacity to maintain a positive social identity in the face of social and 
economic circumstances that disrupt traditional sociocentric notions of agency and identity. Two 
ways in which adverse relational settings and events disrupt agency and produce anomic suffering 
are distinguished: (a) a disruption in social identity associated with positional suffering (e. g. 
Bourdieu, 1999); (b) the experience of entrapment (e. g. Brown et al, 1995). 
122 
(a) Positional suffering 
Some informants' experiences of personal distress were rooted in a breach between lived 
experience and a public discourse on gender roles and identity. The capacity to meet gendered 
social expectations was somehow disrupted. This kind of distress conformed to the definition of 
anorMc suffering presented in Chapter 1. 
What Saints 'worry' about depends on their core concerns and their distinctions of worth so that 
discourse on 'worry' expresses their moral agency. 'Worries', concerns, what matters, emanate 
from a St. Helenian discourse on the self and the communal ideology portrayed above. Social 
identity is anchored in social position and the performance of proscribed social roles. In St. 
Helenian society, a traditional gender division of labour in both the home and the labour market 
constitutes masculine and feminine social identities (See Section 5.2 for a discussion on gender 
roles on St. Helena). Men and women on St. Helena perform different social roles and act out a 
gendered public narrative. Embedded in these lived out stories are different sets of expectations, 
core concerns, and distinctions of worth. In this way, a gendered sense of agency emanates from 
social position. The way that men and women articulate and express their thoughts, feelings, and 
experiences of suffering are bound to be patterned by such differences. For example, a woman in 
her 50s who lived alone in an outlying district described how she had once occupied a traditional 
role as a 'home keeper' and had never engaged in paid employment until her husband had died. 
Unable to keep herself economically after her husband's death and unable to find paid 
employment, she was forced to claim a meagre social-security allowance in order to survive. Text 
18 describes the source of her depressed feelings: 
Text 18 
Well if you got somethin' in the house like to do or a bit o'gardenin' or somethin'. 
So, okay, I gotta do all that myself. I got nobody to do it for me, so I got no other 
choice, but to do it myself, aye [ ... ] When you got somethin' to do, aye : say that 
you got somethin' to do. I'm a woman. It come to man's job - I've gotta do it. So, 
you get depressed. 
Her feelings of distress are partly a response to a disruption of her personal agency and social 
identity. The relational setting she inhabits is at odds with a gender discourse that prescribes clearly 
defined domestic roles for men and women. In Text 19, she uses the term 'boredom' to signify her 
evaluative response to the relational setting she inhabits: 
Text 19 
It gets boring in the house all the time, I would say Bored to yourself and you 
don't feel right. You get, like, out o' way to yourself when you got somethin' to do 
and you can't do it. 
A woman in her 60s associated her experience of depression with the circumstances that followed 
her husband's death. She lived alone in an isolated part of the island and most of her immediate 
family, including her children, had ermgrated. For much of her life her domestic role had been to 
'keep home' as her own mother had done. After her husband's death, she had continued to 'keep 
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home', but was also required to take over some of the tasks traditionally carried out by St. Helenian 
men (e. g. feeding animals, collecting wood, doing maintenance work on the home). She found it 
difficult adapting to the new situation ('I found it difficult to cope being on my own'). A breach in 
her usual social experience following the loss of her husband was articulated in a breakdown in her 
agency, in her ability to 'cope'. This difficulty in coping precipitated the onset of her 'depression' 
(Text 20): 
Text 20 
1 suppose where I couldn't do things like I used to do After my husband died, I 
had animals to look after and I had a place to look after. That's why I got depressed 
I suppose where I had too much to do. I had animals to look after, the house to look 
after [ ... II had to do the things like getting wood and looking after the animals. You just had to do it, because nobody else to do it At that time, things was 
difficult. 
In Text 20 she articulates her moral response to this disruption using an illness idiom of 
'depression'. She also uses an idiom of 'worry' to express her core concerns (Text 21). These 
concerns, in turn, are grounded in her social identity and express her difficulty in performing her 
domestic tasks. 
Text 21 
Sometimes I worry over things I do worry about the house; I can't do things 
like I used to do [ ... jI had animals and I can't look after them like I used to and 
then I worry over them. 
In Text 20, 'worry' is associated with a disruption in agency. Her agency, in turn, is partly 
constituted as her capacity to perform her domestic role. She 'worries' when she cannot 'cope': 'If 
something to get done, and you can't get it done'. These 'worries' were interpreted as the principal 
source of 'depression': "I suppose I worry because the things I couldn't do. I think that's what 
started it [her experience of depression]". This eventuated in a visit to the doctor and the symbolic 
transformation of social suffering into 'depression'. Her breakdown in coping became reconfigured 
as illness experience: 'I suppose when I had a lot to do and I got depressed'. 
Similarly, a woman in her 70s described how she had been required to take on extra domestic tasks 
since her husband had taken up the sick role. As well as carrying out her usual (ferrunised) 
household role ('indoor work'), she had taken over some of her husband's former duties ('outside 
work') (Text 22): 
Text 22 
1 fancy that, sometimes, the work gets the best of me. Well, sometimes, have the 
indoor work. I have the outside work to do. It's only occasionally, not all the time. 
Put it this way to you : at times, like where he got animals like. But although this 
gotta be done like [ ... ] Well, then with my housework, at times, now, I feel now :I feel so: I can sit an' have a cry. But that's not all the time. 
In Text 22, she expresses dramatises her distress as 'having a cry'. The force of this description is 4n I 
to express her evaluation of a situation that she finds difficult to cope with. In Text 23, she 
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describes her distress (i. e. 'out of passion') as a response to her difficulties in coping with these 
extra demands: 
Text 23 
1 do this work e'eryday. But, of late, just occasionally, I get that way. I get that 
feelin' that I jus' want to cry. Sometimes, I don't do nothin'. I jus' let it happen. I 
get ill-tempered with myself, out of passion. Perhaps, I think that I can't get the 
jobs done. 
The next example comes from a rniddle-aged woman who suffered from 'tiredness', 'headaches', 
and complained of 'feeling depressed'. These embodied experiences of personal distress were 
associated with her domestic role. She complained that she has no time for herself since she is 
expected to both maintain the home, to cook, wash, and clean, as well as take care of livestock and 
collect wood, domestic tasks traditionally carried out by men. Similarly, another married woman in 
her 40s accounted for 'headaches', 'stress', and 'feeling down' in terrns of her domestic role. She 
has several grown-up children most of whom have left St. Helena to work abroad and occupies a 
traditional domestic role as a home keeper. She described an average day: 
Text 24 
Every day : work. I like err clean the house. I clean up the house. I house clean. I 
clean up. 
This informant described how she had experienced 'headaches' since she was a teenager and how 
they had increased in severity after she had children (e. g. 'It got worse as I got older and had 
children'). In Text 25, she situates her 'worrying' in the context of her proscribed role as mother 
and home keeper: 
Text 25 
It's only the housework because he [her husband] do the woodwork. I don't have to 
go for wood. So I jus' clean the house and cook the dinner, that's all. But I mean 
it's no rush 'cos I got no babies now. But, when they were very young, it was more 
worrying, because was nappies to put out, clothes, the shop to do, y'know. 
On St. Helena, the men traditionally collect the wood, fix the house, tend the animals, while the 
women clean, cook, shop, wash, and care (See Section 5.2). Text 26 expresses this informant's 
disillusionment with her domestic role: 
Text 26 
Like, err, they do the woodwork [son and husband]. I only got the housework to do. 
Just like: it's just one thing o'er and o'er. And you get tired with it. And, 
sometimes, certain things get too much for you. 
She complained of 'tiredness', 'weariness', and that she sometimes finds her home environment 
'stressful'. She perforrns a traditional female role in the household, but finds the domestic routine 
repetitive and mundane, feeling trapped by it. In Text 27, a vocabulary of 'down', 'stress', and 
'tiredness' are used to express the embodied response to the misery of her social position and a 
breakdown in her sense of agency: 
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Text 27 
Sometimes it is :I fancy like, with me, like, I feel down now. Perhaps, now, or 
tomorrow, he [her partner] go to work. [ ... ]I think to myself: 'I gotta soak down a 
lot of clothes. I gotta get these out'. And, I settle down. And, I look at it. And, I 
don't feel like doin' this. I say to myself now: "I shouldn't of been soak all this 
down 'cos I don't feel like doin' it". But, sometimes, I sit down and wash them out. 
If I feel I got energy, then I will soak down more sometime. [ ... ]I like washing 
clothes and cleanin' the house, but it's jus' that, at certain times, I don't feel like 
doin' it. But, it gotta be done, y'know. But, if I sick, I know it's different. ( ... I Like, 
perhaps, our bedding in the bath. I wash the clothes and I get tired, aye, that kind of 
way. Perhaps, I do leave the work. I put the clothes down to wash, but I leave them. 
I don't feel like washing them up. Like, it too much for me. 
This speaker's lived experience of distress is articulated here as a breakdown in agency and in her 
motivation to perform her domestic role (Text 27). She went on to say that when she feels down or 
dull, "if I feel that kind of way, then I will save it [her domestic chores] for tomorrow, y'know". 
She went on to contrast the mundane activities associated with her domestic role with 'pleasure'. 
Her 'pleasure' is to go for walks and engage socially with others: 'When you talk to other people 
and go out you feel better [ ... ] You can talk to them about all sorts of things and feel better like'. 
'Happiness' is located outside of the domestic social space and is associated with social 
engagement: 
Text 28 
Happy is, like, err, to be : sometimes, I fancy it is : if you go out with the other 
people, like, and talk to them. An' enjoy yourself been out a little. An' then come 
in. That's the time when I feel happier. 
Another example comes from a St. Helenian woman in her 60s, a widow who lives alone. She has 
several grown-up children, some of whom work overseas. Her social position as mother and home 
keeper set the parameters on her everyday lived experience: "Jus' everyday life, aye. Y'know, you 
got to do the homework, you got to care for the children, you got to care for the home, you got to 
do the shoppin"'. Her personal distress was embodied as 'headaches'. In Text 29, she accounts for 
her experience of 'headaches' as a response to her 'worries': 
Text 29 
Well, as the family increased, 
then you would find it more difficult. 
So, then, that would give you headaches, 
because you trying your best 
to cope every sort of thing, 
to keep the home, 
to keep the children clean. 
In those years, 
I had a fan-lily to care for, aye, 
because I got married early. 
There was all homework 
to be done, shopping, caring for the children, aye. 
And wages wasn't so big at that time. 
And, erm, I mean, 
you had [to buy] every little thing out of this bit of money. 
We had to find things for the home. 
We had to find clothing for the children. 
And, I mean, you have to find a second or third lot [of 
clothing] because of weather conditions. 
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Sometimes, all this worry - 
You got to sort it out 
And see how you can cope with it. 
In this generic, habitual narrative, the speaker uses a low degree of narrativity to describe an 
ongoing recurrent experience of positional suffering that occurred at some unspecified point in the 
past (Text 29). The text depicts the speaker's ongoing difficulties ('all this worry') and articulates 
her core concerns. These concerns emanate from her social role as 'home keeper', wife, and 
mother. Her use of the term, 'worry', partly expresses her experience of economic hardship and so 
articulates her family's position within St. Helena's social structure. The 'worry' associated with 
the performance of her role as a mother while living in a situation of economic adversity finds its 
embodiment in 'headaches'. 
The economic changes of the 1990s and high levels of outward rMigration have tended to disrupt 
the gendered organisation of labour, thereby challenging the gender identities that depend on them. 
A gap has emerged between the lived experience of many Saints and the traditional social scripts 
that they hitherto have been expected to perform and conform to. Even though many women are 
now actively engaged in the labour market, there is still an expectation that they will continue to 
perform traditional domestic duties. By becoming more work-orientated, and, in some cases, taking 
up more secure, better paid work than their male partners, women's traditional role as home keeper 
and mother becomes challenged. The traditional masculine role as the economic provider has 
similarly been challenged by St. Helena's economic difficulties. Since the performance of such 
scripts form the basis for a positive social identity and a sense of agency, their disruption can 
present a threat to personal identity and can potentially precipitate a breakdown in agency. The 
traditional domestic division of labour becomes disrupted where men are unable to perform a 
provider role within the household because of chronic depression in the local labour market. In 
such circumstances, a fundamental source of a positive masculine identity moves out of many 
men's reach; limited employment possibilities on St. Helena in combination with the constraints 
placed upon access to overseas employment implies that many St. Helenian men are unable to 
achieve a culturally valued social identity. A generalised situation of anorMe prevails; where men's 
agency is socially disrupted in this way, the social suffering that results can be described as 
tanomic'. 
Given a proscription against the expression of distress, adversity, problems, or emotion amongst 
men, there are few outlets for such suffering. This may explain the high levels of drinking on St. 
Helena (See Chapter 6 and Appendix A6.1). In such circumstances, alcoholism or uncontrolled 
alcohol consumption represents a parody or symbolic inverse of a positive masculine identity. For 
example, a man in his 50s with dependants to support found that being out of paid employment left 
him feeling 'redundant'. Before describing his predicament, he presented an account of his working 
life in a short burst of narrative clauses (Text 30): 
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Text 30 
1 start off workin' sixteen years old workin' for [name of 
organisation]. 
By the time I eighteen, 
I 'ad to wear orders again. 
I had a couple o'years like that 
And then I went to [names place of work] - like contract. 
Only six months at a time. 
Comehome. 
Work on the three-day. 
Now, spent many years on that. 
The reason why he had sought employment overseas was simply 'to try and get some money'. 
However, he went on to say that "it didn't help much" and hinted at his current economic plight 
when he said: "You can't buy e'erything that you want to buy, aye". He is therefore forced to 
support his family on a very low income received from 'social services'. He spends some of his 
time seeking out food (e. g. gardening): "Most of the thing I do everyday now is I came home, try : 
I go an' look for food [inaudible, whispering]". Nevertheless, without a job, he complained, 
"there's not'ing to do. " His work had been an important source of his social identity as a man, but 
being out of paid employment has made him feel 'tired' (Text 3 1): 
Text 31 
Yes, sometimes I get fed-up-to-yourself goin' through the same ol' thing over an' 
over. Like, I that :I at home now. I mean, when I used to go to work, then I come 
home, I do the same thing as I doin' now. Now, I'm home all the time, an' you sort 
o' get tired and fed-up. 
He went on to describe pain behind his eyes that he attributed to his drinking alcohol ("Probably 
the beer take the sugar out o' your blood or some'ing like that"). He sometimes experiences 
'dizziness' and has problems sleeping, waking up in the iniddle of the night "when you can't go to 
sleep", he said, "you thinking about all things". 
Gender is perhaps the dominant axis around which social identity is constructed on St. Helena so 
that the way that agency becomes disrupted is also gendered. Personal distress often follows a 
breach or inversion in the social order of things; for instance, where the play of gendered positions 
is disrupted by illness, death, migration, unemployment, or relationship breakdown. In turn, these 
breaches and the relational settings within which personal distress are situated are constituted by 
macro social, economic, and political forces that are usually outside of individual control. The 'St. 
Helenian predicament' is an important source of personal distress and social suffering among St. 
Helenians. 
(b) Entrapment 
A few Saints expressed feelings of being trapped on St. Helena. This relational setting of 
entrapment is constituted by limited access to economic resources or employment, low levels of 
social or political participation, remoteness, and practical or social barriers to exit. For example, an 
elderly St. Helenian man living in an outlying area said that, without citizenship rights, Saints are 
128 
trapped on St. Helena: 'Us are all prisoners on our own island'. A St. Helenian man in his 30s had 
only ever been to Ascension Island and expressed curiosity about the 'other side'. He would like to 
see more of the world but his responsibility to his family keeps him on the island. He said that he 
would not be able to afford to leave anyhow. In addition, he has no family connections 'out there' 
so that "there's nowhere to go. It's like a prison. " He sometimes finds it difficult when friends 
leave because he wishes that he could join them. 
The number of St. Helenians treated for 'high blood pressure' has rapidly accelerated over the past 
two decades (CMO, 1999). 11 A lay explanatory system that accounts for illness (e. g. high blood 
pressure) in terms of adversity and distress forms an important part of a St. Helenian discourse on 
illness and distress. One male informant, for instance, believed that these high rates of treatment 
symbolised high levels of distress among St. Helenians. He attributed increasing levels of distress 
to rising levels of relative deprivation and econorMc modemisation: 'St. Helena', he claimed, 'has 
changed and continues to change, and the financial situation is contributing to worry, anxiety, and 
everything'. He also believed that the introduction of a 'modem way of living' on St. Helena had 
involved a shift towards materialism. 'Saints', he said, 'are not as contented as our fathers and 
parents were'. This is partly because they perceive themselves as materially deprived in relation to 
others: 'We want to have the things like our neighbours and friends have'. Saints, he said, had been 
more content in the past than they are today. In recent years, they have been introduced to 
television and other media and they have become increasingly well educated. He maintained that 
their expectations have therefore risen. In addition, access to overseas employment over the past 
decade has meant that the incomes of many Saint families have increased and, again, this has raised 
material expectations even further. The problem, as he saw it, is that many Saints have not been 
able to meet these expectations or share in the new prosperity. He described children who 'nag 
their parents' for toys that their parents could not afford. He pointed out that many of the Saints 
who have been able build their own houses in recent years have worked on Ascension Island or the 
Falkland Islands or have a high-status job with SHG. In order to improve their economic situation, 
many Saints have been forced to leave their home and their families ('If I do want to try and build 
myself a home and so I need to go to the Falklands'). However, many St. Helenian men have not 
been able to gain access to overseas employment. He described how these men have watched on as 
their peers have gone overseas and have benefited economically. Naturally, they have come to ask 
themselves: 'Why them, and not meT This informant believed that the Saints who have succeeded 
in accessing overseas work have often come from relatively advantaged families to begin with. 
Those who stay, he said, 'are stuck in the mud' and become "pee'd off because they can't get 
anywhere. " He believed that one response to such adversity was to drink heavily: "What does a guy 
do when he can't get anywhere? He takes his ten pounds and blows his problems out of the 
window". 
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For some Saints, it is not entrapment on, but entrapment in St. Helena that is the difficulty. Many of 
the accounts described above involved an experience of entrapment in adverse social and econorruc 
situations that partly constituted their experiences of personal distress. Gender interacts with class 
structure and econorrac inequalities to generate a particular configuration of affliction and 
positional suffering across the social field. As the accounts above have shown, the experience of 
entrapment among some St. Helenian women is associated with econorruc hardship, lone 
parenthood, and the performance of traditional domestic roles. On the other hand, some St. 
Helenian men, for instance, are entrapped in unemployment, a 'three-day week', or insecure, low- 
paid jobs from which there is little prospect of escaping. A few informants' experiences of personal 
distress had been associated with feeling entrapped in adverse employment situations from which 
they could see no escape. For example, a St. Helenian man in his 40s depicted his experience of 
distress as a response to powerlessness. Text 32 depicts his frustration in his attempts to promote 
change: 
Text 32 
If you are a forward moving kind of person, you want to see things get done and 
you're always hitting the wall. Oh, my word [ ... ] And, you get to the stage where 
you realise you can't go on forever fighting, and fighting, and fighting, pushing, 
pushing, pushing. 
These feelings of frustration and powerlessness became embodied as 'stress' and 'headaches'. 
Moreover, he found living on St. Helena a 'little bit claustrophobic' and this amplified his feelings 
of distress: 
Text 33 
You can't get very far here. Even with work. I mean no matter where I go, 
somebody who was goin' to ask me something about work. You can't have a break 
from anything. It doesn't matter if it is Saturday, Sunday, or the evenings. You've 
got to go and check yourself out somewhere by yourself. And, then what happens? 
Somebody thinks you're loony. But that isn't the case. You need solitude 
sometimes. You cannot go anywhere on the island unless somebody will see [ ... ] 
That's the problem. Maybe if you haven't experienced anything else, then it doesn't 
matter. We don't miss it. It isn't a problem. 
The next case study is that of a St. Helenian man is in his 30s (who I call Colin) who told a story 
about a prolonged experience of 'stress'. He accounted for this experience by contextualising his 
descriptions of 'stress' in relation to an array of social and biographical contexts and events. For 
instance, he depicted his affliction in his Personal narrative by concatenating descriptions of these 
contexts and events one upon on top of the other. This discourse was characterised by a low level 
of narrativity and the locus of control was projected into the social environment so that he was 
positioned in a passive role in relation to the events depicted. He used the past conditional tense to 
describe repeated experiences and to express ambiguity about the sequencing and timing of events 
(e. g. 'it would have been' or 'you would have'). He rhetorically used the second person to 
normallse and distance himself from his experience of social adversity. This also signalled that 
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events were outside of his control and that anyone else would have become distressed under similar 
circumstances. 
Social ostracism and teasing are examples of what Loudon (1970) described as forms of 'canalised 
aggression' on Tristan da Cunha. The theme of ostracism ran through one set of these 
contextualised descriptions. The close-knit nature of island life means that the power of ostracism 
is unusually strong on St. Helena. As Colin said: "You're too well known. As you know, 
everybody knows everybody in St. Helena". His experience of ostracism demonstrates its immense 
force as an informal social sanction in remote, 'tight-knit' communities (Text 34): 
Text 34 
We didn't have helpful neighbours as everybody else had, y'know. Err, when you 
needed something, no one had it. And, erm, y'know, it's like walkin' in the town, 
y'know, and, err, you could count on your fingers how many people that actually 
said: 'How your doin'T, y'know. There was a lot : there would be a lot of: 'Hellos'. 
There would be very few: 'How you doingsT, or actually stoppin' for an answer. 
Anybody can say: 'Hello'. 
In addition to social ostracism, his children were teased at school: "The kids would go to school 
and: 'I had a hard time from so and so'. Why? The fan-lilies are all so, so, so big here". This shows 
how Colin's experience of affliction had taken place in relational settings that were framed by the 
'St. Helenian predicament'. The macro factors that constituted Colin's affliction included St. 
Helena's remoteness, the limited employment opportunities available, and the tight-knit nature of 
St. Helenian society. This remoteness, for example, meant that Colin was trapped in an adverse 
relational setting. He could not escape from a situation that was causing him considerable distress. 
Given St. Helena's size and economic situation, work opportunities are limited. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, this was reinforced by the removal of full British citizenship rights. The low pay and 
firruts on the amount of time Colin could take off work meant that it was impossible for him to 
escape. The pressure just built up: 
Text 35 
1 mean its [St. Helena's] uniqueness is what hurts it so much. I couldn't leave from: 
'cos where do I go? [ ... ]I said: 'Oh well, I'll take some leave', y'know. 
You take 
leave. An' erm you spending the time at home because [laughs], where else do you 
go? I could've gotten to Cape Town an' back again if I'd 'ave pushed Martin Smith 
[Capt of the RMS St. Helena] a bit. No, but I mean, y'know, you couldn't wind 
down, y'know. 
The relationship between Colin's experiences of distress and his social circumstances were 
mediated by his social and cultural identity. The relational settings of his affliction contradict a 
dominant communal ideology that celebrates social connectedness, reciprocity, and inclusion. This 
relates back to the earlier discussion about 'ambivalence in belonging' in Section 5.1. St. Helenian 
cultural identity underpins a sense of belonging to St. Helenian society. Affliction and social 
adversity can erode the sentiments of affiliation and belonging. Colin's affliction challenges 
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preferred representations of both St. Helenian society and St. Helenian masculinity. His sentiments 
of belonging are therefore tempered by ambivalence: 
Text 36 
Although not many people would agree that people can get stressed on St. Helena, I 
think more so than anywhere else. [ ... j erm : it's erm [in terms ofl stress, it's a bad 
place. You can't get away from it. It depends y'know. I mean, what the problem is, 
y'know. I mean everybody's got their problems, but you can't move. You've got a 
choice : either, stay an' deal with it, y'know, or leave an' try an' find a life. But, 
see, that : that's the thing -I don't think I could ever up an' go an' sail away 
Tbat's my home. 
The dominant communal ideology has the function of maintaining the social order. Yet, the 
coherence of this ideology is undermined by the presence of affliction, adversity, and social 
suffering. Such suffering therefore contributes to the 'ambivalence in belonging' depicted in 
Section 5.1; adversity and affliction point to exit and departure. Some Saints are practically unable 
to escape from the sources of their affliction. Nonetheless, despite the 'predicament' that St. Helena 
is in, it is probable that the majority of Saints who are still resident on the island have no 
overwhelming desire to exit. The Island of St. Helena, after all, remains their Atlantic home and a 
touchstone for a unique Saint identity. 
5.4 The social regulation of affliction 
At the end of a collection of studies on the theme of communal ideology, Falk Moore (1975) asked: 
'When discrepancies exist between ideology and social reality, what do people do? [ ... ] What 
happens when a community that idealises communal harmony is faced with internal conflicts and 
contradictionsT (1975: 210). How, for instance, does St. Helenian society respond to the threat 
presented to the coherence of its dominant communal ideology by breaches in social relations, 
economic adversity, anomie, by the 'St. Helenian predicament'? 
Apart from its grammatical meaning, there are at least two other meanings of the term 'voice'. First 
and most obviously, 'voice' is that which is spoken with. Second, 'voice' is a person's power or 
capacity to articulate their thoughts and feelings, evaluations and concerns. In this way, 'voice' 
both articulates and emanates from a sense of personal agency. It is often said (particularly among 
non-St. Helenians) that Saints do not speak up, that they do not express themselves openly in public 
settings, and that they have no 'voice' in this second sense. Writing in the 1970s, Edith Timrn, a St. 
Helenian, claimed that Saints do not speak up because of a 'lack of confidence': "The lack of 
confidence in today's islander often causes a psychological inferiority, especially in language and 
communication" (1977: 69). She believed that the source of this 'lack of confidence' lay in St. 
Helena's trouble history: 'This weakness seemed to have spilt over and has been handed down 
from the humble lives of our grandfathers. Many of whom were discouraged from voicing 
opinions. Punishments involved being whipped, disembowelled, hung and quartered' (1977: 69). In 
a report"' written in 1958 by the British MP, Cledwyn Hughes, a number of factors were cited to 
explain why St. Helenians were reticent to voice their suffering and express their dissatisfaction: 
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Several factors have combined to produce a subservience and shyness in their 
nature and tardiness to complain or to appeal for help [ ... 
I Tlie great majority suffer 
distress in silence and really outspoken St. Helenians can be numbered on the 
fingers of one hand. This quality in their nature is due to the tenuous memories of 
the days of slavery which die hard in an isolated community; to the very real fear of 
victimization in work; to the virtual monopoly in business enjoyed over generations 
by one private company and to the aloof and often unimaginative rule of the 
Colonial Administration over the years. 'ne Islanders have never been encouraged 
to take a responsible part in Government, which has appeared in a greater or lesser 
degree to be indifferent to their sufferings and aspirations. 
Cledwyn Hughes, 1958: 2 
There may be a residue of truth in these historical accounts. Yet, there is more to the silence of St. 
Helenian voices than St. Helena's silent past. 
Saints lack control of their own affairs in two principal ways. First, Section 5.2 describes how 
UKG's political power over St. Helenian society partly depends on St. Helena's economic fragility 
and its dependency on aid from UKG. This is a source of frustration for many St. Helenians 
because it means that they are not fully in control of their own affairs and how life on their island is 
organised. Indeed, opportunities for political participation and community engagement are limited. 
The second principal way that Saints lack control over their own affairs is rooted in the fact that 
most Saints are dependent on SHG for their economic and social livelihood. SHG is the centre of 
power in a highly taut social field. Island society is characterised by a high degree of economic and 
political centralisation. 102 Society and government interpenetrate one another in complex ways; for 
instance, SHG is the chief progenitor of St. Helena's dominant communal ideology so that informal 
social regulation and formal political and economic controls reinforce one another. SHG is by far 
the main employer on the island. The fact that over 80% of the economically active population 
work for a single employer" means that there is a high degree of overlap between social exclusion 
in St. Helenian society and exclusion from government employment. In such circumstances, it 
becomes difficult to express political dissent or socially critical views; there is a risk that one's 
social position and employment prospects may be damaged as a result. 
'Voice' is also subjugated through powerful normalising practices and an array of informal social 
controls. In a study of ostracism in a Kibbutz during early 1970s, Evens showed how Kibbutz 
ideology worked to 'eliminate the contradiction between the individual and society' (1975: 186). In 
the Kibbutz, there were 'neither police nor courts to enforce the rules. Its chief means is public 
opinion' (1975: 187). Through exhorting self-control and moral virtue, Kibbutz society aspires to 
become a 'society of saints' (1975: 205). 
St. Helena's dominant communal ideology also depicts St. Helena as a 'society of Saints'. This 
ideology and a St. Helenian discourse on 'the self are partly enforced through powerful 
normalising practices that pervade the social field. These are deployed in order to minim] ze the gap 
133 
between the preferred version of things (as depicted In the dOnunant public narrative) and the 
organisation of social and economic life. Moreover, they function to maintain cohesion despite the 
island's considerable social and economic difficulties. They include, for instance: 
0A sociocentric discourse on the self that brokers the relationship between body and society 
and that emphasises independence, strength, resilience, and social harmony; 
0A set of informal normalising social practices that preserve the dominant communal 
ideology and work to maintain the existing social structure (e. g. public opinion, denial of 
voice, gossip, informal ostracism, surveillance, stigmatisation, gossip, social surveillance, 
ostracism); 
0A mixture of formal and informal social, economic and political controls that block freedom 
of expression, limit freedom, and ensure that St. Helenian voices remain unheard; 
0 Migration and exit. 
Everything, including emotional experience, is evaluated from the perspective of the dominant 
communal ideology since it upholds the social order. Individual behaviour or characteristics that 
deviate from a normative discourse on the self are therefore bound to attract a social stigma and a 
negative social response. "' Once stigmatised, an individual or family becomes subject to 
normalising practices that seek to reduce the threat their deviation represents to the existing order 
of things. These practices include, for instance, gossip and teasing, surveillance, exclusion, social 
ostracism, and, ultimately, expulsion. Normalising practices also work through configuring 
affective responses in ways that are consistent with the dominant communal ideology (e. g. by 
inducing shame or embarrassment as an internalised affective response to a perceived deviation 
from the normative script). "' 
St. Helenian society is composed of a tight network of village-like communities that are nestled into 
valleys and stitched across ridges and plateaus around the island. Given the remoteness and the rigidity 
of its social structure, informal social surveillance and a lack of privacy ensure that St. Helenians' 
behaviour remains tightly controlled. This ensures that St. Helenians publicly conform to the 
communal ideology and the dominant discourse on the self. "' Public life blends into private life so 
that there are few secrets on St. Helena. For example, the authors of the UNDP report wrote that 
'St. Helena is a small island where everyone knows everyone else and hence privacy is almost non- 
existent' and that 'because it is a very small place, all relationships and their complexities tend to 
be general knowledge, placing personal and family lives under greater scrutiny than elsewhere' 
(1999: 33). One St. Helenian woman advised: 'Anything you can keep private, you keep, you hold 
on to'. A St. Helenian man observed that: 
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Text 37 
There's a lot of things that people here avoid. Unfortunately, in St. Helena, you talk 
too long to the wrong person an' they draw conclusions from what they see. They 
see two people together. They think: "Oh, they're havin' an affair. " It's ridiculous 
[ ... ] They categorize you, an' that's 
it. 
Among the population of Tristan da Cunha, Loudon (1966) interpreted gossip and teasing in 
functional terms as an acceptable response to social conflict or a breach in social relations. He 
contrasted a public domain of outward appearances with a private, hidden world that lay 'under the 
surface'; a world of conflict, tension, and potentially disruptive emotions. Loudon believed that 
gossip and teasing provided a sanctioned outlet for this hidden world of socially unacceptable 
private feelings and emotions. In this way, they contributed to social cohesion and the maintenance 
of a public narrative of solidarity: 
The people are outwardly most docile and law-abiding, and place great emphasis on 
their unity: under the surface, aggression seems to be canalised into a continuous 
process of gossip, scandalizing, and teasing, which maintains the solidarity, morals 
and values of the community and enables the community to control the competing 
cliques and aspiring individuals within it. 
Loudon, 1966: 104 
St. Helena also requires ways of ensuring that adversity, social conflict, and breaches in social 
relations do not spill over into the public realm. Like Tristan da Cunha, they are partly channelled 
into the normalising practices of gossip and teasing. 
Gossip and stigma are closely related. The subject of gossip is typically an infringement of 
community norms or a breach in social relations resulting in stigmatisation of the afflicted and 
some degree of ostracism. While gossip has a profoundly negative social impact in that it erodes 
bonds of trust and reciprocity, it binds together those who are party to it. For example, a St. 
Helenian woman who suffered from a chronic illness described how she had received little social 
support; that nobody visited her, and that, when she did meet up with friends, she was careful not to 
talk about her problems 'because they have friends too, and probably their friends may not be my 
friends'. The account of a St. Helenian woman in her 30s demonstrates the potentially destructive 
social force of gossip (Text 38): 
Text 38 
To be acceptable on the island, you gotta be talkative and minding everybody else's 
business, I suppose. [ ... ] Nosey and mouth type [ ... ] If you don't happen to have : if I can't go out there, down to the shop, and say: 'Do you know, this happen today T 
and: 'Do you know thaff You don't [? ] conversation so you're not a part of them. 
And they can say really hurtful things. Sometimes, what they say and how they say 
it can sting you up for a life-time [ ... I Really hurtful things about your personal 
appearance, the way you live [ ... ] There are some really hurtful people out there. 
The normalising force of gossip, stigma, teasing, lack of privacy, and the threat of social ostracism tý 
combine to produce a high degree of conformity, homogeneity, and social conservatism in St. 
135 
Helenian society. In addition, it is likely that these normalising forces have a negative impact on II en 
healthcare provision and influence how St. Helenians make use of healthcare services. " 
'Voice' and self-expression are also regulated through the provision of a cultural discourse on the 
self that prescribes self-control. This discourse de-emphasises individual self-expression and 
subjectivity and emphasises conformity. This may be a cultural solution to the problem of 
remoteness, a high degree of social interdependence, and the necessity of getting along with one 
another in a tight-knit community. For instance, the public display of emotional distress conflicts 
with a discourse on the self that prescribes strength and resilience. The expression of personal 
distress and the vocalisation of affliction are therefore stigmatised. They are perceived as a sign of 
'weakness'. A St. Helenian healthcare worker maintained that Saints share a belief that one should 
be able to cope with one's personal difficulties, that one should be strong, 'keep it in', and 'not let 
on'. Both men and women are expected to keep their suffering to themselves. To illustrate how 
Saints 'hold things in', she observed that St. Helenian women are less vocal in expressing their pain 
when they are in labour compared with English women who tend to 'go through the roof'. While 
Saints are expected to put up with their suffering, she believed that 'Europeans' expect a solution, 
something that might help relieve the pain. 108 
On the one hand, St. Helena is represented as a friendly, idyllic island. On the other hand, many 
Saints feel entrapped in a situation constituted by powerful social forces and where there is little 
toleration of free expression. 'Voice' is subjugated for the sake of maintaining social order and 
public harmony. For instance, in her account of St. Helenian language and culture, Timm 
emphasised this high level of social connectedness among Saints and this is associated with an 
intolerance of individual 'outspokenness': 
Although the younger generation differs from the older people who in a sense lack 
moral courage, (reluctant to let a blunt outspokenness interfere with social 
amenities or with friendly relations with other people); yet many customs which 
preserve relationships, bind and unite families and friends, are not only observed, 
but genuinely practiced by the young and old alike. 'Mis oneness, being of the one 
mind, promotes communication and confidence. 
Timm, 1978: 69 
As Turner (1981) has argued, a breach in social relations can threaten to become a more deep- 
seated schism if redressive action is not undertaken to remedy the breach. Where social order or 
cohesion are threatened, where a gulf appears between the preferred story and lived experience, 
then normalising practices are brought into play. 
Ostracism is a powerful sanction against individuals who deviate from prescribed norms and can 
eventuate in exit or expulsion. As Hogenstijn & van Middelkoop put it: 'If your personal identity 
falls outside the social boundaries that come with bein-c-, a Saint on St. Helena, you leave' (2002: 
4.3.6). Migration has another function. A uniquely St. Helenian voice is subdued by the high levels 
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of outward migration. This is partly because migration provides a kind of pressure valve that allows 
for a steady release and controlled diffusion of tension and discontent away from the Island. In an 
essay on 'voice' in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hirschman argued that 'exit' and 
outward migration worked to undermine 'voice' and that the authorities in the GDR used 'forced 
exit to reduce voice' (1993: 185). He gave the meaning of 'voice' a political twist when he defined 
it as an 'act of complaining or of organising to complain or to protest, with the intent of achieving 
directly a recuperation of the quality that has been impaired' (1993: 176). The pressure generated 
by discontent and oppression in the former GDR was relieved through exit and migration: 
'Deterioration generates the pressure of discontent, which will be channelled into voice or exit-, the 
more pressure escapes through exit, the less is available to foment voice' (Hirschman, 1993: 178). 
Exit functioned to silent dissenting voices producing an 'exit-induced vacuum of leadership' 
(Hirschman, 1993: 185). Similarly, on St. Helena, exit and migration function to silence St. 
Helenian voices. This contributes to the reproduction of the existing social structure, the 
maintenance of the existing political order, and the power relations that organise St. Helenian 
society. Dissenting voices are subdued and any pressure for social or political change is channelled 
away. 
On St. Helena social suffering takes many forms: entrapment, subjugation, hardship, oppression, 
social disconnection, a disruption in agency, social exclusion, ostracism, inequality, and breaches 
in social relations. Moreover, during the second half of the 1990s, there was some evidence that St. 
Helena's predicament" had produced a state of anorffle and therefore the conditions for anomic 
suffering. A distinctive St. Helenian identity, dissenting voices, and the public expression of social 
suffering are subjugated through a combination of bureaucratic power, a rigid social structure, 
poverty and unemployment, exit and migration, and normalising practices. These practices work to 
enforce the prescriptions and proscriptions contained in a dominant communal ideology and a 
soclocentric discourse on the self. This dominant discourse prescribes self-control, resourcefulness, 
strength, social harmony, homogeneity, 'Britishness', and loyalty to Britain. 
A restricted agency and an arrested voice combine to produce an ethos"' of disillusionment. One 
afternoon whilst I travelling through an outlying district of the island, I met two men in their 50s 
sitting in a shelter upon a ridge. One of the men said how he spent his days collecting litter in black 
bags along the country roads. The other man looked fixed in misery and incapable of smiling. He 
complained that nothing ever works on St. Helena and presented examples of developments that 
had begun with potential, but which had soon come to nothing. A former Bishop of St. Helena, 
Edward Cannan observed that: "Successive Governors endeavoured to find some way to help the 
economy, but none were successful. St. Helena has well been called 'an Island of lost causes"' 
(1992: 17). One visitor to the Island observed 'a despair about opportunity, and the lack of 
stimulation found in a larger community' (Phillips, 1998: 24). A St. Helenian man described a 
pervasive feeling of disinterest among St. Helenians: "I think a lot of people have lost interest in a 
137 
lot of things. Take like even council an' that sort of stuff, people have lost interest in it y'know". A 
senior religious figure on St. Helena concluded that Saints' attitude to their predicament is one of 
'hopelessness'. "' 
Chapter 6 explores the relationship between agency and how Saints articulate their experiences of 
personal distress and social suffering in a St. Helenian discourse on distress. Where the expression 
of voice and agency are arrested, personal affliction and social suffering is canalised into individual 
experiences of personal distress expressed in a sociomoral discourse on 'worry' and 'stress', an 
illness metaphor of 'depression' and a somatic idiom of 'headaches'. 
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Chapter 6 
Agency and Metonyms of Adversity 
Suggestion: what we deprecate more than everything else is the creation of an 
atmosphere and suggestion; and the killing of faith and confidence; for the psyche 
(soul or mind) undoubtedly reacts on the body and when depressed provides a 
favourable soil for the virus weed to flourish in where otherwise it would have 
perished. Mens sana in corpore sano. Don't forget the Mens Sana! 
Anonymous, St. Helena Magazine, 1946: 7-81 12 
The last chapter explored how cultural processes and macro socio-econornic forces interact to 
produce a particular configuration of social suffering in St. Helenian society. Three principal ways 
that the 'St. Helenian predicament' constitutes social suffering were highlighted: the systematic 
production of social and economic adversity; the provision of a communal ideology, including a 
cultural discourse on the self; the enforcement of a powerful set of normalising practices that 
enforce the dominant public narrative. It was argued that the relational settings that provoke 
personal distress commonly involved a breach in the social order of things or an infringement of 
personal agency. 
This chapter continues with ongoing theoretical discussion from previous chapters and explores 
how St. Helenians articulate distress in response to the social, economic, and political settings 
depicted in Chapter 5. It argues that a St. Helenian discourse on distress articulates Saints' core 
concerns and their sense of moral agency. This discourse therefore emanates from a St. Helenjan 
discourse on the self and society. The following questions are addressed in this chapter: 
0 What kinds of discourse do Saints use to describe, articulate, and interpret personal distress? 
0 What is the relationship between discourse on distress and other local discourses (e. g. cultural 
and social identity, illness, public narratives)? 
0 How do St. Helenians interpret and account for personal distress? How do they differentiate 
distress from illness and sickness? 
0 How is St. Helenian discourse on distress influenced by communal ideology, cultural discourse 
on the self, and the operation of powerful normalising practices? 
It should be noted that the focus of this chapter is on St. Helenian discourse on distress and social 
suffering, and not on psychiatric illness. Appendix A6.1 includes a description of what little is 
known about psychiatric illness on St. Helena and Appendix A6.2 presents a brief account of St. 
Helenian discourse on 'mental illness'. 
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6.1 Metonyms of adversity: 'worry', 'stress', and 'pressure' 
'Worry' 
A psychological discourse on mood and emotion does not figure strongly in St. Helenian discourse 
on distress. This is partly because the public expression of emotion and self-expression more 
generally are socially discouraged. It is also because most St. Helenian discourse on the self and 
body does not include a highly differentiated vocabulary of emotion and mood. Nonetheless, a 
sociomoral idiom of 'worry' provides St. Helenians with a versatile medium for expressing what 
concerns them. 'Worry' is a polysemous term. In St. Helenians' discourse on distress, it signifies: 
A particular kind of thinking activity 
A source of concern or difficulty 
An evaluative response to social adversity 
A form of distress that can become physicalised as tiredness, sleeplessness, and can potentially 
cause chronic illness, 'depression', or 'mental illness' 
'Worry' as 'thinking' 
An idiom of 'worry' was commonly used to describe a particular kind of 'thinking' - evaluative 
'thinking' that expresses 'core concerns'. To 'study' or 'think' are synonyms of to 'worry'. Writing 
around 20 years after Shine, Aldridge (a former Chief Medical Officer of St. Helena) observed that 
many of his patients would use an idiom of 'study' interchangeably with 'worry' (1984: 19). For 
example, a St. Helenian woman in her 30s said that: "When people study, they sit there and think. 
You might say, for instance: 'You sit there studying nonsense again'. " With reference to her 
experience of divorce, an elderly St. Helenian woman said: 'I don't bother to study the thing. ' In 
Text 1, a St. Helenian man in his 40s uses the term 'thinking' to account for the negative impact of 
his work difficulties and his ability to carry out his usual social role: 
Text 1 
Somedays, when you're working, some days, you can do a good day's work. But, 
somedays, when these things happen, you can't do a good day's work because your 
mind is thinking about things. 
A female informant in her 50s associated 'thinking' with 'feeling depressed': 'At times you feel 
depressed. Just comes on its own. Just thinking about something'. A woman in her 60s described 
her experience of distress as 'unhappiness', feeling 'downhearted and thinking all those sorts of 
things'. Her experience of being unhappy involved being haunted by negative thoughts: 'I would 
say when you err : if you're not happy, you get a lot of funny things go through your mind. Weird 
things sometimes, I would say'. In Text 2, she uses a metaphor of being 'haunted' to describe an 
experience that, in turn, disrupted her sleep: 
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Text 2 
1 can't sleep an' that. I say: 'Well, I jus' like a haunted person'. It doesn't mean that 
I done something or that I see ghosts, or anything like that [ ... II get restless. I get haunted that I've done something and I am haunted, y'know. I always say: 'I 
haven't kill anybody in my time'. But, I feel like I'm haunted. I'llat's what we 
Saints usually say: 'We get haunted'. You done something now, and, err it must be 
err come to you, or something like that. 
In Text 2, the speaker draws on a metaphor grounded in a popular St. Helenian discourse on ghosts 
to describe her distress. She is haunted by thoughts about the past and these disrupt her sleep. They 
make her 'restless'. 
'Worry' as a moral idiom 
An idiom of 'worry' is commonly used by St. Helenians to articulate their core concerns, 
distinctions of worth, and articulates a particular kind of relationship between self, action, and 
social setting. It expresses a gap between what is considered important and valuable, on the one 
hand, and social reality, on the other. 
The objects of 'worry' are problems and concerns, what a person cares about. For example, a St. 
Helenian woman in her 60s defined 'worries' as 'problems to cope with'. What Saints 'worry' 
about depends on their social identity. This, in turn, depends on their social position(s) and the 
role(s) they perform. For instance, in informants' discourse on distress, 'worry' was commonly 
associated with financial difficulties (See Section 5.3). For instance, a few informants who were 
mothers cited their children as a common source of 'worry'. A woman in her 60s said that she 
'worries' 'if you got something to pay, and you thinking not like to pay or whatever or if the 
children done anything and you know they not in the wrong or anything like that'. Similarly, a St. 
Helenian woman denied having any 'financial worries', but she did admit to 'worrying' about her 
children and her domestic work; for her, 'worry' was associated with a feeling of being 'burdened'. 
In the case of a St. Helenian woman in her 40s, 'worry' was a function of her role as mother and 
housekeeper: 'When they were very young, it was more worrying because was nappies to put out, 
clothes, the shop to do'. A woman expressed 'worry' about the welfare of her livestock and the 
housework: 'I do worry about the house; I can't do things like I used to do [ ... ]I had animals and I 
can't look after them like I used to and then I worry over them'. Conversely, a sociomoral idiom of 
6worry' can express a lack of concern or disinterest in something (e. g. "I jus' listen to the radio 
sometimes. I don't worry with telly much"). 
Informants commonly used an idiom of 'worry' to describe an embodied feeling that accompanies 
the difficulty in achieving a desired goal. In this sense, 'worry' articulated a subjective response to 
a disruption in agency. For instance, a man in his 40s said that he 'worries' when he "gonna do 
something that is on your mind. I gonna do something, so I gonna think about how I'm gonna do 
it". A woman in her 30s said that she 'worries' when she is unable to do something that she needs 
to do; for instance, when there is 'something to get done and you can't get it done'. A woman in 4D 
her 70s portrayed her personal distress as a breakdom,, n in her sense of agency. This had been 
141 
associated with 'worrying', eventuating in a visit to the doctor; 'worry' articulated her concerns 
about her situation and her difficulty in maintaining a valued social role (e. g. I suppose I worry 
because the things I couldn't do" 
'Worry' as embodied 
Writing in the 1960s, a former medical officer of St. Helena, Ian Shine, observed that St. Helenians 
used the term 'worry' to mean physical discomfort or exertion. In a brief account of St. Helenian 
illness representations, he presented an anecdote in which he asked one of his patients whether they 
ever 'worried'. The patient replied: 'Yes, I worry a bit against the hill when I fetch water' ( 1970: 
35). In his role as doctor, Shine described how he would often inquire about his patients' 'exercise 
tolerance' by asking them: 'Can you worry against the hillT (1970: 35). A few infon-nants used an 
idiom of 'worry' in this way, to refer to a kind of physical exertion. For instance, a St. Helenian 
man in his 70s used the phrase 'got to worry' to refer to an agitated activity that meant: 'Got to do 
it in time, do it quick'. His 'worrying' would start if he 'work hard, walk too quick'. 
A few informants emphasised that 'worry' could become embodied in a variety of ways. For 
instance, a middle-aged St. Helenian woman who expressed 'worry' about her domestic situation 
articulated her experience in somatic terms (e. g. 'In your body it just come up on you'). Some 
informants described how 'worry' had affected their sleep, had made them 'tired', or had been 
associated with 'headaches'. For example, one elderly St. Helenian woman said that when she was 
'worried', she "wouldn't be able to sleep at night". Similarly, another St. Helenian woman in her 
70s described how her worrying had affected her sleep: "If I worry, y'know, I can't get much 
sleep". Another elderly St. Helenian woman linked sleeplessness and 'headaches' with 'worries' 
(Text 3): 
Text 3 
Lots of people think that you must have lots of worries if you can't sleep. You 
go to work. You unhappy. You come home. You can't sleep. You may buy a lot of 
stuff. You can't afford to pay. You lose sleep over things. 
In Text 3, she attributes her sleeping difficulties to 'worry'. She believed that 'worrying' had 
caused her experience of weight loss: "It was the worry. And, I think like: I think that's why I was 
losing weight". 
'Worry' as personal distress 
Idioms of 'stress' and 'feeling depressed' were closely associated with 'worry' in St. Helenian 
discourse on distress. For instance, one St. Helenian woman said that 'worry' was 'what is 
depressed'. Similarly, an elderly St. Helenian woman described 'worry' as 'stress. Like, it means 
that you worried, aye. Sometimes, when you doing something and it get too much for you, you get zn 
quite stressed-to-yourself'. Conversely, an elderly St. Helenian woman said that, when she had 'got 
depressed', she 'could feel that kinda way - quite worried'. 
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Within St. Helenian discourse on distress, 'worry' is partly autonomous from a local discourse on 
6 mental illness' (See Appendix 6.2 for a description of this discourse). Nonetheless, a part of the 
meaning of 'worry' relies on its context within a lay explanatory system that Saints draw upon to 
explain or account for illness (e. g. 'high blood pressure'), illness-like distress (e. g. headache,, or 
depression), and 'mental illness'. For example, a woman in her 70s explained why she had become 
'depressed': "I suppose I worry because the things I couldn't do. I think that's what started it". 
Similarly, a woman in her 20s accounted for her experience of 'depression' as a consequence of 
prolonged period of 'worrying': "It's like :I worry myself too much, aye. In the house, jus I 
worryin' and worryin' and worryin' all the time. An' don't go out nowheres. An' that brings on 
depression". In this way, a sociomoral discourse on 'worry' forms a symbolic relationship between 
the social world (adversity) and the phenomenological world of the body (somatic complaint). As 
such, 'worry' appears at the intersection of discourses on the self, society, illness, and distress. 
'Worry' as metonym of adversity 
'Worry' is commonly used by St. Helenians as a metonym of adversity and points to breaches and 
dislocations in the social and economic domain. Since social adversity and other sources of distress 
are metonymically signified in experiences of distress, the idioms of distress (e. g. worry, stress) are 
used to symbolise such adversity. 'Worry' can also signal powerlessness in the face of adversity 
and express a breach in the relationship between the individual and the collective. The public 
expression of 'worry' is therefore interpretable as a form of social critique. In this way, an idiom of 
worry articulates Saints' deepest concerns and so expresses their cultural identity. 'Worries', then, 
articulate agency just at the point that it comes under threat from adverse relational settings. 
'Stress', 'strain', and 'pressure' 
The physical metaphors of 'stress', 'strain', and 'pressure' form part of St. Helenian discourse on 
distress. 'Stress' refers to a quasi-technical ethnopsychological concept that has slowly diffused 
into St. Helenian discourse on illness and distress, joining a lay idiom of 'worry'. Nonetheless, 
some informants were unfamiliar with the term 'stress'. Those who were familiar with the term 
closely identified it with 'worry'. For example, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s said: 'It is stress 
like it means that you worried, aye [ ... ] Sometimes when you 
doing something and it get too much 
for you, you get quite stressed-to-yourself'. Medical encounters are probably the most likely 
pathway for the diffusion of a discourse on 'stress' and an illness model of distress into St. 
Helenian lay discourse. Doctor-patient consultations act as a catalyst for the med1callsation and 
psychologisation of social suffering partly by shaping how patients interpret their embodied 
experiences and somatic complaints (e. g. 'worry' becomes 'depression'; 'headaches' becomes 
6stress'). For example, one St. Helenian woman described how her doctor had told her that she 
suffered from 'stress': "I asked him [the doctor] what the tablets were for and he said: 'Stress. You 
have stress'. " She was prescribed medication and was told by a different doctor that it had been 
prescribed to treat 'stress'. Before this consultation, she said that she had never heard of 'stress', 
which she dcscribed as: 'Worries or problems to cope with' or "if you have problems an' worries 
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or something". From her point of view, medication had been prescribed to treat her 'worries'. 
Through a displacement of reference, these 'worries', her difficulties and concerns. became 
medicalised as 'stress'. Since 'worry', like 'stress' also indexes social adversity, the medicalisation 
of 'worry' opens up everyday moral experience and social adversity to biomedical intervention. 
Like 'worry', 'stress' metonymically stands for both social adversity and its embodied Impact. It 
expresses a negative moral response to personal and social difficulties. For example, an elderly St. 
Helenian man described 'stress' as 'a feeling, a pressure', as a response to 'what you are confronted 
with; what you are faced with'. Like 'worry', 'stress' was often associated with financial and 
economic difficulties. For example, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s remarked: 
Text 4 
Yes, I fancy to myself that there is a bit of stress, because you gotta find this for this 
month. Next one, you gotta find something else. And, the water is so expensive, 
y'know what I mean. [ ... ] Bit of light - you gotta 'ave a bit of electric. 
Again, like 'worry', 'stress' was sometimes used to describe an impediment encountered in the 
achievement of a goal, as a disruption in agency. For instance, one man said that he felt 'stressed' 
'when trying to do something, but cannot do it right'. Some informants described 'stress' as an 
embodied experience (e. g. 'feeling tired'): "You gotta do this, do that, do the other, like that kind of 
way. I can't do nothing now see that kind of way [ ... ] Get tired out, get tired out like. If I go down 
that hill an' come back again, I tired out. I gotta sit down an' rest". In other cases, 6stress' was 
embodied as 'headaches' or was physicalised in other ways. For example, a middle-aged St. 
Helenian man said how he would get 'headaches' when 'under stress'. Another St. Helenian man in 
his 40s described how his doctor had noticed that he was 'stressed' and prescribed him some 'pills 
to relax the muscles'. He depicted 'stress' in his account as a form of embodied distress: 'I think 
mentally you feel tired, worn out, sometimes there can be tension in the muscles, and the neck, 
maybe some headaches. Shows as frowns on your face'. 
In this discourse on distress, 'stress' and 'strain' are used as synonyms for one another and both are 
associated with a gaseous metaphor of 'pressure'. Like 'stress', 'strain' is metonyrruically 
associated with 'worry' and an idiom of 'thinking'. For instance, a St. Helenian man in his 30s 
defined 'strain' as 'pressure on you; like, worried about things'. Another St. Helenian man in his 
60s identified 'strain' with 'thinking' about a practical problem: "When you think about something 
or something like that, aye - doing something. When you under strain, you find it more difficult to 
do that". Similarly, an elderly St. Helenian woman said that 'strain' was 'when you think about 
anything'. 
Like 'worry' and 'stress', 'strain' and 'pressure' are also used to index social or personal concerns 
For instance, in an evaluative response to her social problems, a St. Helenjan woman in her 30s 
said: 'I still feel a bit under pressure'. A middle-aged St. Helenian woman referred to her children 
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as a source of 'strain': 'At times they give you a strain too sometimes'. A St. Helenjan man in his 
70s defined 'strain' using a metaphor of physical pressure (e. g. 'strain' is 'when your body come 
under pressure'). A rruddle-aged St. Helenian man who worked as a labourer said how he felt 
overworked and 'under strain' because he felt as though he was doing 'the work of three men'. 
Finally, an elderly man said that he felt 'under strain' when there was a problem that he could not 
solve. 
St. Helenian discourse on 'worry' and 'stress' articulates Saints' core concerns and distinctions of 
worth, and provides a vocabulary for registering personal and social difficulties (e. g. financial 
difficulties, social conflict or breaches in social relations, or disruptions in agency). Such adverse 
relational settings are metonymically signified in experiences of distress so that the idioms of 
'worry' and 'stress' come to stand for such adversity. In this way, these idioms articulate St. 
Helenians' moral agency relative to their social position and the performance of prescribed social 
scripts. As such, St. Helenian discourse on distress forms part of a discourse on the self and society 
that partly constitutes agency. 
'Worry' and 'stress' are metonymically displaced across two semantic fields. On the one hand, they 
signify embodied experience. On the other, they point to an adverse relational situation or event. 
They are, therefore, used to forge symbolic relationships between the body and the social field and 
to articulate disruptions of personal agency that occur in both these domains of experience. 
6.2 Illness-like distress: 'depression' and 'getting depressed' 
'Depression' as illness metaphor 
Among St. Helenian informants, an idiom of 'depression' or 'getting depressed' was almost 
exclusively used as an illness metaphor that situated it within a St. Helenian discourse on chronic 
illness. An idiom of 'depression' was not salient in St. Helenians' everyday discourse on distress 
(e. g. 'worry', 'stress', 'thinking', 'headaches', being 'out of passion with oneself'). The term 
'depressed' was rarely ever used to signify dysphoria or to refer to a distinctive form of emotional 
experience independent of its deployment as an illness term. Informants spoke about 'getting 
depressed' rather than 'feeling depressed'. In some informants' accounts, it was clear that their 
experience of personal distress had been reconfigured as 'depression' only through contact with a 
medical practitioner (e. g. see Text 10). An illness discourse on 'depression' had little currency 
beyond this context. Nonetheless, informants who had been told that they were 'depressed' or 
believed that they had had 'depression' expressed uncertainty about what it meant. In a few cases, 
the use of the ethnopsychiatric term 'depression' could be traced back to its origins in a medical 
consultation. For example, a St. Helenian woman in her 30s described how she had visited her 
doctor complaining of feeling 'nervous', 'shaky', and 'trembling'. He had responded by telling her 
that she was 'a bit depressed'. Sim-ilarly, an elderly woman in her 60s used an idiom of 
'unhappiness' to describe her personal distress. She described how she had visited her doctor about 
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her arthritis. She had been 'happy for somebody to talk to' and, Instead of talking about her 
arthritis, she found herself 'crying' and 'talking'. She said how the doctor had prescribed her 
tablets for her distress. Through the transrrussion of an illness discourse on 'depression' grounded 
in the illness metaphor, personal distress becomes reconfigured as illness and in a way that is 
consistent with biomedical knowledge and practice. For instance, a woman in her 30s reported 
symptoms of sleeplessness and tiredness and these were re-configured as 'depression' through the 
medical encounter. After this consultation, she came to speak about her distress as 'depression' 
(e. g. 'I do trouble with depression'). In this process, her 'worries' were reconfigured as the cause of 
an illness called 'depression'. Similarly, a woman in her 60s described how her 'worrying' became 
reconfigured as 'depression' in dialogue with her doctor. Her doctor had 'found out' that she was 
'depressed' by asking come questions (Text 5): 
Text 5 
1 didn't used to feel well sometimes and then I used to go to the doctors for check- 
ups. And, he found out that 1, y'know, I used to get depressed [ ... ] He asked me a few questions; he asked me how I feel, and I explained that 1, y'know, didn't feel 
like I should. Like, I couldn't do my work like I used to; that I didn't have mind to 
do things like I used to. 
She had not visited her doctor because she had 'got depressed'. Her doctor interpreted her 
'worrying' and a breakdown in functioning (e. g. 'feeling tired', 'not being able to things') as 
'depression'. She therefore described her experience of 'getting depressed' as though it were an 
illness. The medicalisation of personal distress and social suffering re-configures it as illness. As it 
is brought under the control of biomedicine and its regime of treatment, personal distress is 
rendered legitimate. 
In the following case study, a woman in her 30s describes how her experience of 'depression' 
involved a loss of sociality, social disconnection, and a breakdown in her sense of agency: "I 
depressed. I was sort of withdrawn first. I didn't say much to anybody [ ... ]I was cracking up. I just 
couldn't cope". She went on to say that on her 'really hard days' she "can't handle to talk, to brush 
my hair, or how I dress". Text 6 describes the social sources of her distress and her feelings of 
hopelessness: 
Text 6 
1 don't see a future. Everything is just deteriorating in front of me. I'm getting on 
more medication, less money, more problems coming in, the children doing 
everything wrong, no control over things. 
Her medication increases as her social problems mount up (Text 6). In this excerpt, she uses an 
idiom of 'control' to depict a breakdown in her agency. A consequence of her 'depression' is that 
she never leaves her home (e. g. " 'cos I is depressed. I can't get out, aye"). Like many of the 
English informants in Chapter 4, she uses an idiom of 'withdrawal' to describe a breakdown in 
sociality, in her disposition to form and maintain social relationships (Text 7): 
146 
Text 7 
Sometimes, I is so withdrawn myself Sometimes, people knock on the door. I 
ignore the knock, 'cos I don't want to see nobody. 71at's when I'm really down. 
This breakdown is rooted in a deep distrust of others and this is part of the context of her distress: 
Text 8 
I can't handle to see people around me. Plus, I don't feel like talking most of the 
time. Sometimes, I is jus' lookin' at myself :I wonder if they are genuine enough to 
help? Or, they just there to help me, and then criticize me or expose me? I don't 
know [ ... 11, sometimes, 
is doubt people. 
As Chapter 5 showed, social disconnection and exclusion are central features of those relational 
settings that foster personal distress among St. Helenians. In Text 8, feelings of withdrawal and 
disconnection represent an intemalisation of her experience of being ostracised from the wider 
community. Adverse relational settings become embodied as personal distress. Such distress then 
comes to symbolise this adversity. 
'Depression' as a breakdown in embodied agency 
In accordance with the illness metaphor, informants' experiences of 'getting depressed' or 
'depression' were embodied as tiredness or difficulties in sleeping. For example, a St. Helenian 
woman in her 50s described how she 'became depressed' following the death of her husband. This 
was embodied as a loss of appetite so that her weight had dropped. She was still not completely 
free of her distress: 'Sometimes, as weeks and days go by, sometimes, you feel yourself a bit 
depressed-to-yourself. At night time, you get no rest'. Similarly, a St. Helenian woman said how a 
one of her relatives would get 'depressed with himself' and this was articulated in an idiom of 
'tiredness' ('I suppose he get tired out with the usual work. He come home tired'). Another 
informant, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s, used an idiom of 'tiredness' to describe a breakdown 
in embodied agency associated with 'getting depressed' (Text 9): 
Text 9 
1 haven't feeling perfectly well and in good health sometimes. I get tired. I don't 
feel like doing anything. 
You get depressed. You don't feel like doing things. 
I don't fancy I been doing things like I used to. Sometimes, I hardly do 
anything. 
Distress was dramatised as 'crying' in a few women's accounts of personal distress (e. g. 
"Sometimes, I feelin' I want to cry. [ ... ] y'know, 
like, sometimes, you cry for no reason"). One 
informant's experience of 'getting depressed' involved all of the somatic symptoms mentioned 
above: "I feel sick. I couldn't eat and I couldn't sleep. I cry a lot, aye. It wouldn't go away [ ... ]I 
lost all my flesh". In the following generic narrative (Text 10), a woman in her 30s depicts her 
experience of 'depression' as an illness experience: 
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Text 10 
Sometimes, I don't sleep well. 
I can be up for the whole night 
At certain times, I get very, very depressed. 
Like when I was here, 
I couldn't eat my food for three days. 
I was so weak. 
And, like, it tense-up inside 
I do trouble with depression 
and that I do have a lot of work on my hands. 
There's no one else here to do the work [ ... ] 
Well, I been suffer from depression for a couple of 
Sometime, last year 
or the year before that, 
I suffer from that there. 
I been had depression before. 
An' [name of doctor] said it was depression. 
He said this time, 
6cos I said to 'im, aye: 
'I think I suffer from too much depression'. 
So. he say: 'Yes', 
he say: 
'T'hat looks like the case' 
It's like, 
I worry myself too much, aye; 
in the house jus' worryin' 
an' worryin' 
an' worryin', all the time. 
An' don't go out nowheres. 
An' that brings on depression 
I feel like 
I don't wanna eat no food. 
I jus' wanna lay down 
an' don't do nothing; 
don't want the children to worry me. 
And I get so weak after. 
I can't walk or 
do anything. 
In this speaker's personal narrative, suffering is portrayed as an embodied illness and the sufferer 
positions herself as passive patient (Text 10). A low level of narrativity is employed to represent 
the unbounded, repeated nature of her experiences of distress. This example illustrates how social 
suffering becomes physicalised as a breakdown in embodied agency, as 'human behavioural 
breakdown'. This breakdown precipitates a medical encounter in which she is diagnosed with 
'depression' and her personal distress in re-configured in terms of the illness metaphor. The take- 
up of an illness identity sanctions her suffering and provides the rationale for biomedical 
intervention. The configuration of her distress on the basis of the illness metaphor partly explains 
the pattern of discourse presented in Text 10. In conformity with the illness metaphor, the speaker 
strongly emphasises the somatic nature of her distress; her experience of 'depression' involves 
tiredness, disruption of sleep, and a loss of appetite. The term 'weak' is used to depict a breakdown 
in her embodied agency. "' A psychological discourse on distress (e. g. a vocabulary of mood or 
emotion) is almost entirely absent. Instead, the speaker physicallses her distress (e. g. she felt 
'tense-up inside'). 
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As I have shown above, Saints make metonymic use of an idiom of 'worry' to articulate both a 
moral response to social adversity and the embodied response to such adversity. The speaker in 
Text 10 attributes the cause of her illness to excessive 'worrying'. Through this symbolic 
connection with 'worry', the embodied experience of 'depression' is re-moralised as both a mask 
and metaphor for social adversity. 
'Depression' as 'mental illness' 
St. Helenian discourse on 'mental illness' is a sociomoral discourse that defines 'mental illness' as 
a deviation from what Is collectively considered to be normal behaviour, as being 'out of control' 
or 'out of order' (See Appendix A6.2). Moreover, 'mental illness' is highly stigmatised on St. 
Helena. Appendix A6.3 shows how St. Helenians' perceptions of 'mental illness' are symbolically 
associated with the island's psychiatric hospital. The relationship between a discourse on 'mental 
illness' and personal distress was ambiguous and ambivalent. St. Helenian informants were 
unlikely to frame their experiences of distress (whether depression or some other form of distress) 
in a discourse on mental illness. As Appendix A6.2 also makes clear, some resisted any linkage 
between their suffering and 'mental illness'. Nonetheless, some non-sufferers, however, classified 
'depression' as a 'mental illness'. For instance, one St. Helenian woman said: 'They call it 
[depression], like, a mental illness'. A nursing assistant at St. Helena's psychiatric hospital 
expressed the belief that 'anxiety' and 'depression' were both forms of 'mental illness', although 
she was not able to distinguish between them. One St. Helenian woman interpreted a relative's 
experience of 'depression' as a 'mental illness': 'She was under a little bit of mental illness, I 
would say, because she used to say she see people and see things. All this is like: is depressed: or 
depression'. 
'Depression' and ordinary suffering 
A few Saints used the terms 'depressed' or 'depression' as metonyms for 'feeling down', 
'thinking', or 'worry'. For example, a St. Helenian woman in her 30s interpreted the term 
'depressed' to mean 'worrying over something'. A man in his 60s used the term 'depressed' to 
mean "when you're thinking about something". A middle-aged St. Helenian woman associated 
'depression' with 'worry': "When you so worried 'bout the children, y'know, at home like". Other 
informants associated 'depression' with 'unhappiness'. For instance, a woman in her 30s said that 
'depression' meant being "really unhappy about the situation you're in". One informant, a woman 
in her 30s, Portrayed 'worry' as part of the experience of 'depression', alongside other somatic 
symptoms: 'You start crying and it creeps up on you and builds up gradually from not sleeping, 
worry, not eating'. Other Saints, however, sought to distinguish ordinary suffering (e. g. 'worry' or 
4unhappiness') from 'depression'. For instance, one informant distinguished 'depression' from 
4stress' (e. g. "It's not stress, it's more depression than anything"). A woman in her 60s pointed out 
that she had been 'unhappy', but not 'depressed'. A St. Helenian man rejected the term, 
'depressed', as a way of depicting his distress. He preferred the ordinary distress term 'thinking': "I 
wouldn't say depressed. Sometimes something happen, an' you jus' thinking 'bout it". 
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Chapter 4 showed how English informants' discourse on distress was organised around an 
orientational metaphor of verticality ('up' and 'down'; 'high' and 'low'). For instance, they often 
used a vocabulary of mood (e. g. 'low', 'down', or 'depressed') to describe their experience of 
ordinary suffering. However, a vocabulary of mood and emotion was less prominent among St. 
Helenians than it was among English informants. A few Saints employed the orientational 
metaphor to depict their suffering. For example, a woman in her 40s who had spent much of her 
life in the UK was one of the few informants to articulate her experience of personal distress using 
the mood idiom 'feeling low'. She was also the only informant to employ a psychological concept 
of 'low self-esteem' to portray her distress. Similarly, a woman in her 30s who said that she had 
suffered from 'depression' used the orientational metaphors of 'down' and 'low' to describe how 
she felt: "Down feelings, low feelings. There don't have to be no reason. Be upset or angry. You 
just get that low feeling. [ ... ] Sometimes, I get it : just blue in the afternoon. I get that down 
feeling". A St. Helenian woman in her 70s equated feeling 'depressed' with feeling 'down': 'If I 
was depressed, I would feel down sort of thing'. A female informant expressed puzzlement about 
the meaning of the term 'depressed', but went on to relate her meaning anecdotally. She equating 
'depressed' with 'feeling down': 
Text 11 
Say, if somebody say to me: 'I'm ugly'. I going to feel down, because this person 
had the guts to tell me in my face: 'I'm ugly'. It will make me feel down, like upset 
to think that person for the guts to tell you. 
Some informants used a metaphor of 'down' to articulate their distress without any mention of 
'depression'. For instance, one informant used it to express her evaluative response to the fact that 
most of her family live overseas (e. g. 'I feel quite down about that'). A St. Heleman woman in her 
40s distinguished 'a bit of strain, a bit of stress' from the 'ups and downs' that made her feel tired. 
The following case study illustrates how the metaphor of 'down' represents an embodied metaphor 
of distress and communicates social suffering. The ethnopsychiatric terms 'depressed' and 
'depression' are altogether absent from this account; it therefore illustrates the independence of an 
idiom of 'down' from the illness discourse on 'depression'. A St. Helenian woman in her 40s (who 
I call Jane) performs a traditional domestic role that she reports finding 'stressful' at times. She 
uses the terms 'stress' and 'fed-up' to describe her evaluative response to domestic adversity. Her 
social adversity is embodied as 'tiredness', a loss of energy, and disrupted sleep (Text 12): 
Text 12 
You get err tired. Tired and fed-up, that kind of way, I fancy. Fed-up like over 
nothing, sometimes. And, then you get tired. 
I fancy it's like de energy. I get weak. 
Some nights, I sleep right through well. And, some nights, like : erm I toss and turn. 
I can't lay to over one side, like. This, my leg, up here, sometimes gets pain. 'Me 
weight might be, y'know. 
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Jane gets 'tired' when she has to do the housework. Domestic adversity erodes her sense of agency, 
culminating in a breakdown in her capacity to perform her proscribed social role. These somatic 
referents and a sociomoral idiom of 'stress' are used to communicate her evaluation of the social 
world that she inhabits. She goes on to say that she often feels 'dull'. Feeling 'dull' involves social 
withdrawal and a breakdown in her motivation to do anything: 
Text 13 
Dull, that kind of way. Like, err, I clunno : like everything is quiet. And sometimes I 
think, lookin' 'round, I say to myself: I don't feel like goin' nowheres". I jus' stay 
here, that kind of way. 
'Feeling dull' and being on her own are associated with periods of time spent 'thinking': "Like I 
think 'bout lot of things sometimes. Certain times, when I by myself, and err erm I just think about 
certain things". The metaphors of 'down' and 'dull' are used to express her feelings of lethargy, 
inertia, and a loss of agency: 'Some days, I feel very fresh and bright. And, some days, I feel down, 
and sleepy, like tired'. On her 'dull days', she does not feel motivated to do anything: I don't feel 
like goin' out nowheres. Then, I feel like I wearified". After a period of feeling 'down', Jane feels 
&up' again: "Somedays, I don't feel like goin' out like, and, somedays, I feel fresh, lot of energy". 
A root metaphor organises both Jane's discourse on distress and her lived experience of adversity. 
On the one hand, 'down' is symbolically associated with dark ('feeling dull'); lethargy and inertia 
('tiredness' and 'feeling wearified'); the inside; social withdrawal; 'thinking'; and inactivity. On 
the other hand, 'up' is symbolically associated with light ('feeling bright'); energy; the outside; 
social engagement; action; and agency. 
The habitual narrative portrayed in Text 14 illustrates this relationship between 'feeling down' and 
Jane's her capacity and motivation to perform her domestic role: 
Text 14 
Sometimes it is 
I fancy like: 
with me, like, 
I feel down, now. 
I think to myself: 
'11 gotta soak down a lot of clothes. 
I gotta get these out". 
And I settle down, 
and I look at it, 
and I don't feel like doin' this. 
I say to myself, now, 
"I shouldn' of been soak all this down 
6cos I don't feel like doin' it. " 
But, sometimes, I sit down 
and wash them out. 
If I feel I got energy, 
then I will soak down more. 
I like washing clothes 
and cleanin' the house. 
But, it's jus' that, at certain times, 
I don't feel like doin' it. 
But, it gotta be done, y'know. r_1 
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In Text 14, repetition and a low degree of narrativity are used to portray the inertia and the 
mundane nature of Jane's domestic work. It also dramatises how this domestic performance is 
disrupted by a breakdown in both her motivation and in her capacity to perform this role. The 
metaphor of 'down' articulates both Jane's social position and her body's revolt against it. 
Nevertheless, the term 'depressed' was principally used among St. Helenian informants as an 
illness term (in conjunction with 'depression'), rather than as an idiom of mood. 'Depression' was 
portrayed as a kind of illness, analogous to a chronic illness. Otherwise, personal distress was 
described in somatic terms or in a sociomoral discourse on 'worry', 'stress', or 'thinking'. 
As Sections 6.4 and 6.5 go on to show, the explanatory and symbolic relationships between 
personal distress and chronic illness form a central organising principle in St. Helenian discourse 
on illness and distress. It is commonly believed, for instance, that personal distress has the power to 
cause illness. As an extension of this explanatory system, Saints also cited 'worry', 'stress', and 
social adversity as possible causes of 'depression' and 'mental illness'. For example, in Text 9, the 
speaker claims that 'worrying' brought on her experience of 'depression'. Similarly, a St. Helenian 
woman believed that 'worry' was a cause of 'depression': "Worry about things, and all the sort of 
things I would imagine would make you depressed". A St. Helenian woman in her 60s believed 
that too much 'worry' could result in 'mental illness': "When you build your mind on something all 
the time, an' worry your mind or something an' then err it get too much for you. And then err your 
brain will get out o' balance". 
St. Helenian discourse on 'depression' forms a semantic bridge between three discursive domains: 
(a) a sociomoral discourse on distress (e. g. 'worry', 'stress'); (b) an illness discourse (e. g. 'high 
blood pressure', 'headaches'); and (c) a discourse on 'mental illness'. Sociomoral idioms of 
distress relates to 'depression' in two ways: as metonym and as possible cause. 'Worry' is 
metonyrrUcally associated with being 'depressed' that, through its translation into an expert 
discourse on 'stress', provides a semantic bridging point between lay and expert discourse on 
suffering. 
Discourse on 'depression' provides a way of expressing social distress in an illness idiom that 
diffuses the political or social significance of suffering. The medicalisation of depression de- 
socialises social suffering through an illness metaphor and so sanctions medical intervention 
grounded in biomedical aetiologies. The term 'depression' itself was almost exclusively used by 
informants as an illness category and was rarely used except by those St. Helenians who had been 
to see a doctor with somatic complaints and who had been told that they were 'depressed' or that 
they suffer from 'depression'. It is through this encounter that medical discourse on distress gains 
its principal foothold in lay discourse. 
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In addition, an illness discourse on 'depression' forms an intertextual bridge between ordinary 
suffering and psychiatric illness. The interpretation of personal distress as 'depressive illness' does 
not necessarily work to remove the stigma associated with such distress. There is a danger that as 
personal distress becomes increasingly medicalised and de-socialised, the stigma associated with 
distress and social adversity is doubled by bringing it into closer proximity to a discourse on 
6 mental illness'. Moreover, the reconfiguration of personal distress into an illness metaphor of 
'depression' is associated with the diffusion of an individualised, psychological discourse on the 
self and a discourse on mood, a new way of talking about the self. This discourse forms a symbolic 
link between the social domain (e. g. social adversity) and the body (e. g. somatic symptoms). This 
constitutes an intermediate psychological zone between body and society is partly woven by an 
expert discourse on distress. 
6.3 Public discourse and personal distress 
Littlewood interprets symptoms of distress as public symbols, claiming that 'culture-bound 
reactions appear to occur where major points of political and cultural opposition are represented in 
a particular situation' and represent dramatic, public 'representations in an individual whose 
personal situation demonstrates these oppositions, and they thus occur in certain well-defined 
situations' (1998: 243). Chapter 5 showed how some experiences of personal distress among St. 
Helenians are produced by particular kinds adversity; situations where agency is disrupted or where 
some breach in social relations has taken place. How such social suffering is expressed and 
experienced is partly determined by the social response and the cultural significance of distress. For 
instance, Kleinman and Kleinman point out that the 'dialectical relationship between depression (or 
for that matter any disorder) and society is mediated by the meanings and legitimacies that 
symptoms take on in local systems of power' (1985: 429). In an edition of Daedalus devoted to the 
theme of social suffering, they wrote that: 'There are communities in which suffering is devalued 
and others in which it is endowed with the utmost significance' (1996: 2). 
The existence of adversity and distress contravenes the preferred image of St. Helenian society as 
depicted in the dominant public narrative. The public expression of distress contravenes a cultural 
discourse on the self that exhorts self-control, resourcefulness, and social connectedness and that 
depicts Saints as independent, adaptable, happy, and friendly. It therefore attracts a social stigma 
and a negative social response. As one informant put it in the Chapter 5 (Text 36): 'Not many 
people would agree that people can get stressed on St. Helena'. In addition, St. Helenian discourse 
on distress can be distinguished from a medico-moral discourse on 'mental illness'. 'Mental illness' 
is constructed as a deviation from normal functioning, as a breakdown in normal behaviour, as a 
loss of control and agency (See Appendix A6.2). As such, it is highly stigmatised. In Section 6.2, it 
was suggested that 'depression' bridges a discursive gap between a discourse on 'mental illness' 
and ordinary suffering. This overlap means that 'depression' picks up some of the stigma 
associated with 'mental illness'. 
153 
In a situation where individual St. Helenian voices are subjugated and the public display of emotion 
is proscribed against, the expression of private distress is also bound to attract a stigmatlislng 
response. Since such distress deviates from proscribed public scripts, it becomes subject to 
normalising practices that channel the way it is expressed into some forms rather than others. Some 
informants believed that personal distress was partly the consequence of a weakness of character. 
For example, one St. Helenian woman in her 30s believed that unemployment was a principal 
cause of 'depression' on St. Helena and that individual 'weakness' accounted for why some 
unemployed people experience distress while others do not: 'Some people have weaker nunds. 
Some are stronger than others'. A St. Helenian man contrasted the 'stress' of individuals living in 
'poverty' ('the problem is not their fault') with those who 'bring their problems on themselves'. 
'Stress' is a sign of 'weakness'. He explained why some people become distressed while others do 
not: "People have got different ideas. People don't face their problems in the same ways [ ... ] 
Depends on their own self [ ... ] Some people are complacent, some are not". He believed that men 
who become distressed in response to economic adversity 'are weaker'; they 'have got a different 
feeling in their self [ ... ] Everyone's got problems, but some people toughen to 
it. Others can't live 
with their burdens. Some will put up with their hardship' while others 'are too weak to stand the 
stress [ ... I Some people's minds build-up. They get tense'. 
One informant believed that a 
combination of excessive drinking and 'weakness' accounted for a breakdown in her 'depression' 
(Text 15): 
Text 15 
That is where my nerves went. That's what ruined my nerves in the first place; like 
from the weakness in the family and the drinking. [ ... ] Maybe, depression runs 
through our family. Maybe, there is a weakness. And, like I say, the problems I had 
in life, like it sort of break your nervous system down. 
The way that personal distress is expressed is grounded in gender identity. Given a masculine 
identity that prescribes self-control, physical strength, independence, and that proscribes against the 
expression of emotion or self-expression, men were much less likely to talk about their experiences 
of distress, illness, or adversity. The following case study is used to illustrate these points. It is 
drawn from the personal narrative of a St. Helenian man in his 30s. In Texts 16 and 17, 'stress' is 
configured as a 'loss of control': 
Text 16 
Stress is : you're in a situation that you can't control, that you can't handle, or any 
situation, y'know. It's jus' gotten on top o' you or you allow yourself to be run 
down by this, that, and the other. Erm, that's what I think stress is. 
'Stress' is described as a relationship between an adverse situation and its embodied impact, a 
situation in which agency has been compromised. In Burke's 'dramatistic' terminology, the 
&i-notivation' for the 'stress' is expressed in a 'scene-agent ratio"" weighted towards the scene. 
Elsewhere in this informant's account, his experience of 'stress' is dramatised in a series of 
scenarios (Text 17): 
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Text 17 
When the children's misbehaving 
I'd be bouncin' off the ceilin'. 
I'd be really shouting 
All I knew was, 
that any little thing would jus' 
you would explode. 
Tired: 
I remember coming to the doctor 
always tired an' run down. 
Erm, my head felt so heavy, y'know. 
Sometimes, you sort of in a world o' your own. 
But, err : start drinkin' more. 
Nothin' was never the same. 
Erm, [sighs] healthwise: 
I think I put on a stack of weight. 
An' then it got to the point 
where you didn't say 
you didn't wanna go [to work], 
you jus' didn't want to go [laughs]. 
In Text 17, the speaker dramatises 'stress' as a 'loss of control', as a breakdown in agency. A 
psychological discourse on mood or emotion is absent in his description. 'Stress' is physicalised in 
a concatenation of behavioural and bodily signs of distress such as excessive drinking, an 
unbalanced diet, lack of self-care, disruption of family relationships, social withdrawal, and a lack 
of interest in work. The speaker presents himself as someone who has lost control. In Texts 16 and 
17, for example, the informant's experience of 'stress' is depicted as a deviation from a cultural 
discourse on the self that constitutes men as independent, strong, and in control. 'Stress' is used as 
a metonym for such disruption; it expresses his agency just as he depicts its breakdown. In the 
following narrativised excerpt (Text 18), he explains how he first became aware that he was 
suffering from 'stress': 
Text 18 
Anybody that I know 
who [laughs] : who would be subjected to stress 
wouldn't want to know 
it existed, y'know what I mean. 
They [the doctors] said: 
'Well, y'know you been erm 
[whispering] stress'. 
'I'm fine. 
I'm not stress', y'know. 
That'd be the first thing, y'know, 
I think any of us would say. 
His initial response to the doctor's suggestion that he might be 'stressed', that something might be 
wrong, was denial. In Text 18, this denial is depicted normatively (e. g. 'any of us would' and 
'anybody that I know'). An implication of his denial was that he took no action to redress his 
difficulties. The severity of the 'stress' escalated until it reached a crisis point in the form of a 
chronic illness. This legitirrýised entry into the sick role and removed Colin from the socially toxi 11-1) ic 
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situation that was producing his 'stress'. Social adversity produced a disruption in agency. His Z: ) 
distress was only redressed once it had erupted into a physical illness. 
Hogenstijn & Van Middelkoop observed that social difficulties are 'kept within the family and 
hardly ever communicated outsiders. But one problem that is very visible is alcoholism' (2002: 
4-3). Chapter 5 hinted at a possible link between social suffering and excessive alcohol 
consumption among men. For example, a female informant said how her husband had 'a 
weakness', 'a non-resistance to drink'. Drinking alcohol, she said, was 'one way in which men feel 
really masculine'. Nonetheless, excessive drinking is not restricted to men. For example, a woman 
in her 30s described how she had begun drinking heavily in response to feelings of isolation: "I 
started drinking because I had nobody to talk to and, like, I'd drink just 'cos it was wearing me 
down". 
Kleinman and Kleinman showed how depressive affect among the Chinese is 'socially and 
culturally unsanctioned and therefore suppressed' (1985: 478). This is partly because it symbolises 
a breach of social harmony and 'poses a threat to social arrangements and symbolic meanings [ ... ] 
Demoralisation, despondency, hopelessness, withdrawal, loss of interest in the social environment 
are asocial. They call basic norms and relations and institutions into question' (1985: 478). 
Therefore, the most disempowered and disadvantaged members of Chinese society are also most 
likely to articulate personal distress in a somatic idiom. As Littlewood (1990) points out, 
Kleinman's Chinese research shows that, in socio-political contexts that demand a high degree of 
consensus, a somatic idiom of distress may be more socially acceptable than other ways of 
communicating distress. 
Sections 6.1 and 6.2 showed that personal distress among St. Helenians is often expressed in a 
sociomoral discourse on 'worry', 'stress', 'thinking', and 'down'. Else, it is expressed in a 
discourse organised around an illness metaphor (e. g. 'depression'). The next section argues that the 
subjugation of voice and the stigma associated with social adversity and personal distress means 
that social suffering is 'canalised' into a more socially acceptable form: a somatic idiom of 
'headaches' and a discourse on chronic illness. 
6.4 'Headaches' as dramatic mask 
Chapter 2 showed that in situations where 'voice' is suppressed, moral concerns, and social 
suffering are canalised into embodied metaphors, somatic idioms of distress, and chronic illness. "' 
Partly because personal distress is tainted by its social origins, it regularly comes into direct 
conflict with hegemonic discourses on self and society. 
During the 1960s, Rawnsley and Loudon (1964) investigated the social and cultural production of rn 
headaches among the adult population of the remote South Atlantic island of Tristan da Cunha 
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(pop. 300). In an epidemiological survey of the island's population, they found that six out of ten of 
adults reported frequent headaches. Their informants attributed these headaches to a range of 
causes including 'strong winds', or 'sunshine', 'worry', or menses. Following their informants' 
cue, Rawnsley and Loudon also claimed that the islanders' 'headaches' were partly 'psychogenic' 
in origin. This view was warranted by the fact that 'respondents themselves said either 
spontaneously or in answer to enquiry that worry and anxiety were among the principal causes' 
(1964: 835). They estimated that around one quarter of the adult population suffered from what 
they described as 'psychogenic headaches'. In addition, they found that women were more likely to 
report 'headaches' than men and they were more likely than men to attribute their headaches to 
psychological causes (e. g. 'worry'). Nonetheless, many of those who complained of headaches 
'stoutly denied' that 'emotional causes' were to blame. Where informants denied such an 
association, Rawnsley and Loudon interpreted such headaches as 'non-psychogenic'. They 
speculated that these headaches might have been caused by emotional causes, but that 'the sufferers 
do not choose to admit the emotional precipitants' (1964: 838). 
These 'psychogenic headaches' were presented in a 'stereotyped manner'. For instance, they were: 
'bi-frontal in distribution, the position often being indicated by a characteristic gesture'; were not 
associated with any other physical symptoms; were relieved by aspirin; occurred weekly or fort- 
nightly; and, in most cases, did not 'interfere with life activities' (1964: 835). Rawnsley and 
Loudon applied the anthropological concept of a ritual of affliction in the context of a functionalist 
explanation of these 'headaches'. They claimed that the 'prophylactic ritual of psychogenic 
headaches' among women on Tristan da Cunha could be understood partly as a function of the 
island's social structure. For instance, women who suffered from 'psychogenic headaches' were 
much more likely to be married to a 'community leader'. Rawnsley and Loudon maintained that the 
6anxiety' associated with such social positions was partly to blame for their increased risk of 
'headaches'. The homogenous and tight-knit nature of the community accounted for why 'anxiety' 
was commonly 'canalised' into a somatic idiom of 'headaches': 
'Me social factor which may be singled out as of cardinal importance in relation to 
psychiatric disorder is the high degree to which important life experiences are 
shared exclusively by members of the community. This is promoted by the small 
size of the population; by the physical proximity of the houses; by the universal 
inter-relatedness of individuals and of families through blood or marriage, and by 
the nature of the economy which requires a good deal of co-operation in certain 
processes. 
Rawnsley and Loudon, 1964: 832 
Like St. Helena, this feature of the island community produced a high degree of 'homogeneity' and 
6a very low tolerance for departures from generally accepted standards of behaviour' (1964: 832). 
They argued that, given the 'extreme homogeneity' and the close-knit nature of the society, 'the 
headache response' to 'anxiety' represented a 'convenient, socially acceptable, common-place 
symbolic reaction' (1964: 838). Similarly, in a later article, Loudon wrote that psychogenic 
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'headaches' 'constitute a form of standardized socially prescribed behaviour which seems to be 
particularly prevalent among those women who are particularly liable to the stresses arising from 
latent conflicts within a most remarkably close-knit homogeneous community' (1966: 106). 
As part of a screening strategy, a small-scale survey was carried out in one of St. Helena's smaller 
districts. Around four in ten out of those who responded reported that they experienced 'headaches' 
(See Appendices A3.8 and A6.1 for a fuller account). Women were three times more likely to 
report that they experience 'headaches' compared with men. The limited size of the sample, a low 
response rate, and other features of this screening exercise mean that the results of the survey 
cannot be reliably generalised to any wider population. Nonetheless, the results are suggestive. One 
of the Island's doctors said that 'headaches' were a common complaint among his patients. ' 16 A 
somatic idiom of 'headaches' figured strongly in informants' discourse on distress alongside the 
metonyms of adversity ('worry' and 'stress'). Informants portrayed their 'headaches' using a 
vocabulary of 'pain', 'tension', 'pressure', and 'strain'. For instance, a former CMO of St. Helena, 
Ian Shine (1970) reported that his patients commonly used the phrase 'a pain in the brains' as a 
synonym for 'headaches'. Similarly, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s described her husband's 
'headaches' as 'pains in the head'. A St. Helenian man in his 70s described his 'headaches' using a 
vocabulary of 'pain': 'I get a headache through the night like I feel the pain come from my back up 
on my head [ ... ] It start from the back of the 
head, and then start from the front over years'. In Text 
19, a woman in her 30s draws on this somatic vocabulary to depict the 'head pain' associated with 
her experience of 'panic attacks': 
Text 19 
When I do have a panic attack, when I do start, I get a pain in my head and that 
head pain is extreme. It feel like my blood don't circulate, like if my brain tubes is 
blocked like. Something like that. And it extremely the pain. 
In Text 19, 'pain' is symbolically associated with 'blockage'. Some informants used the embodied 
metaphors of 'strain' or 'pressure' to portray their 'headaches'. For instance, a St. Helenian woman 
in her 40s described her 'headaches' as a 'strain' that occurred at the front of her head. A St. 
Helenian man in his 30s claimed to have a 'heavy head'. Reports of feeling 'strained', 'tense', or 
'tied-up' were commonly associated with 'headaches' in Saints' discourse on distress. Other 
informants described their 'headaches' using a vocabulary of 'dizziness' or a metaphor of 
'balance'. For example, a man in his 60s described his experience of 'headaches' as 'getting dizzy'. 
Similarly, a St. Helenian woman described how she would experience 'headaches' when she got 
'out of balance' or felt 'dizzy'. 
Some informants' made a distinction between ordinary headaches and more intense, recurrent, and 
prolonged illness-like headaches. The latter were frequently associated with 'pressure', 'stress', and 
tworry'. Informants were able to use such a discourse to signify the sociogenic (as opposed to 
-enic) origin of their headaches. For example, a man his early 50s psycho, I linked his 'head pains' 
158 
to 'pressure': 'Sometimes I got nasty head pains so I take paracetamols and it just wear away 
sometimes. I think sometimes it from pressure'. 'Pressure' is a polysemous term. On the one hand, 
it describes a somatic feeling of 'pressure' in the blood or body and is often centrally located In the 
head. On the other hand, it is metonymically associated with the social adversity and the relational 
settings in which such embodied 'pressure' is felt. For instance, a St. Helenian man in his 30s said 
that 'headaches' are caused by: "Worrying 'bout things and high blood pressure". A middle-aged 
woman said that her 'headaches' would worsen in response to the 'pressure' associated with her 
childcare responsibilities (Text 20): 
Text 20 
Oh, I used to have trouble with the headaches. As the years go by, the children 
was growing up and givin' me a little bit more pressure, y'know. When I think 
a little bit of pressure in there, they come worse y'know. 
A St. Helenian woman in her 40s differentiated between ordinary headaches and more severe 
sociogenic headaches that were associated with 'pressure' in the blood. Ordinary headaches were 
brief, not usually very painful, and were caused by diet (e. g. eating cheese or drinking alcohol) or 
they would just happened 'sometimes when I wake mornings'. These were distinguished from the 
kind of headaches associated with illness experience (e. g. 'headaches' that 'come from flu pains' 
and 'If you feel sick, you get this headaches at the back of your eyes'). These were different again 
from sociogenic headaches that were characterised by their relatively long duration: 'Sometimes, I 
feel out of balance. After a while, you click back again [ ... ] It be in there, just in one place. It don't 
stay there length of days. Just one or two days'. She used a hydraulic metaphor of 'pressure' to link 
such 'headaches' to a breach in social relations. They were produced by a build up of 'pressure' in 
the 'blood' associated with social situations that 'gets your temper up': 'If you get into a lot of 
arguments, then that can boost you up'. The speaker draws on an illness discourse on 'blood 
pressure' in order to articulate a set of metonymic connections between 'headaches', 'high blood 
pressure', and social conflict. Such conflict can make a person 'tense-up inside' and "push your 
blood up. Like ravings. Get your temper up. Get your pressure up. The blood'll go up in your 
eyes". Similarly, a woman in her 60s described 'headaches' as a 'pressure' behind her eyes that she 
gets when she is 'worried' about something. A middle-aged St. Helenian woman said that her 
grown-up children work overseas and that she sometimes 'worries' about them. This 'worry' brings 
on 'migraines'. Similarly, a man in his 50s complained of 'headaches' and believed that they were 
caused by 'tension': 
Text 21 
Sometimes, I get a little bit, like I would say, tied-up-fied, tense-up and things, 
y'know, wondering what the next move could be and things, y'know. And, then, 
you have your own problems to tend to, your work problems. All different 
problems Nve face. 
In Text 2 1, these feelings of being 'tense-up' are depicted as an embodied response to the speaker's 
core concerns: I social difficulties. They articulate his "Sometimes, You go to work and things don't 
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work for you like, that kind of way. Work problems, y'know". This social 'tension' is also 
identified as the source of his 'headaches'. In this way, an implicit connection is made between 
work-related difficulties and his 'headaches'. 
In some cases, the severity, duration, or frequency of illness-like 'headaches' warranted a visit to 
the doctor. For instance, a St. Helenian man in his 60s explained: I had to go to the doctors 
because it [his headaches] was gettin' grand, aye. " In Text 22, a middle-aged St. Helenian woman 
dramatises a medical consultation that involved the diagnosis and treatment of her 'headaches': 
Text 22 
Jus' pains just getting' me top o' the head like that 
like there's a press on top o' my head. 
I explained to the doctor 'bout it. 
I said: 
"Shouldn't be like that, aye". 
So, he give me these tablets 
to take and they : 
when I get that kind o' way. 
He say: 
"Jus' take the tablets", aye. 
He didn't tell me what it was, 
but I told him that it was 
I said: 
"It was the headaches 
that was pressin' down on top of my head like". 
And he say: 
"Oh" : give me some strong tablets that 
I had to take. 
I used to take the Panadols, aye. 
But, like the pains jus' keep greater, aye. 
So, he give me these strong tablets 
Well, after I take 'em, 
I was okay afterwards. 
In this partly narrativised account (Text 22), the speaker presents her 'headaches' as an illness, as 
an object of medical concern. Running through the discourse is a distinction between ordinary 
'headaches' (for which 'Panadols' are taken) and more severe, illness-like 'headaches' that warrant 
a visit to the doctor. She positions herself as a patient in a dramatisation of the palliative ritual of 
the medical consultation in which 'headaches' come to mean something different; through acting 
out the patient role, her 'headaches' are re-described and socially sanctioned as illness. 
The next example is drawn from an account of a St. Helenian woman in her 60s who reported 
suffering from 'headaches'. She distinguished between more severe, sociogenic 'headaches' and 
ordinary 'headaches'. The latter started when she was much younger and are characterized in terms 
their cause (Text 23): 
Text 23 
1 know I used to get headaches when I was younger, but I think that they were just 
ordinary headaches. Probably due to the kind of food we used to eat, due to the 
weather, or anythinL, like that. 
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'Ordinary headaches' are caused by dietary factors or vicissitudes in the weather (Text 23). 
Elsewhere in her account, she remarked that such 'headaches' could come from the 'heat of the 
day' or 'from a cold'. Her experience of 'hot flushes and tight head, the 'bad headaches', began 
more recently and are embodied as 'aches down the neck', a 'splitting head', and 'tiredness'. She 
uses a heat metaphor to articulate these pain sensations: "Sometimes, I get a bit flarey-up, fiery-up, 
but I tend to put up with it. I jus' try to put it out of my mind". She goes on to use a physicalised 
metaphor of a pressurized container ('tight', 'burst', "crackin"') to describe how her head feels 
during a 'headache' episode: 
Text 24 
Well, as I say, like, my head used to get that tight, like. I feel it : feel it want to 
burst, like it feel like crackin' or something. And, sometimes, I get quite sick in the 
body as well, but I didn't mention anything 'bout body feeling like flop :I just feel 
flop down. 
These 'headaches' are illness-like in that they are associated with the feeling of being 'sick in the 
body', with a breakdown in embodied agency (Text 24). She presented her 'headaches' to her 
doctor as 'hot flushes', as repercussive through her body and not just located in her head: 'I told 
him I used to get hot flushes. I get tight head. Get up my head or neck sometimes. If it's in my 
head, it's in my chest'. Text 25 presents a narrative of how this informant first came to visit the 
doctor about her 'headaches'. The force of this discourse is to warrant her claim that her 
'headaches' were caused by 'stress': 
Text 25 
It was two or three years ago 
when I did first go 
and see the doctor because, 
as I said, 
I had this splitting headaches. 
Head used to get really tight 
when I travel against the hill 
or get fast. 
Even if I on the level, 
I used to get tired. 
I used to get pains down my neck and shoulder. 
That's why I went to see the doctor. 
I thought it would bin blood pressure. 
And that was [Name of first doctor]. 
Then, I saw [Name of second doctor]. 
I asked him: 
'What the tablets were forT 
And, he said: 
'Stress. You have stress'. 
This tale of diagnosis (Text 25) warrants her view that her 'splitting headaches' were caused by 
social adversity, metonyrnically signified by the ethnopsychological term, 'stress'. The doctors on 
St. Helena proffered a psychogenic explanation for her 'headaches' and gave her some tablets. 
These medical encounters transformed the meaning of her distress. She went on to explain how she 
would 'all hot, flush-up, and head used to tighten, due to stress'. 'Stress' here means 'worries or 
problems to cope with'. Elsewhere in her account, she described the source of these 'worries' as 
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domestic conflict. Through a displacement of meaning from 'stress' to 'worry', 'headaches' 
become symbolically associated with domestic adversity. More abnormal, severe 11ness-11ke 
'headaches' become a metonym for social adversity through their symbolic association with 
6 stress' and 'worry'. 
St. Helenian woman in her 40s said that she had 'trouble about headaches' which she 
distinguished from 'ordinary headaches' (e. g. 'migraine'). In Text 26, she describes how these 
more severe, painful, illness-like headaches are embodied: 
Text 26 
Ordinary headaches like just come in the forehead part. A slight pain. Might be take 
tablets. Might not. But, if it 'comes too great, if I get it here or here [pointing to her 
head], then if it gets too great for me, then I take the tablets. Sometimes, it take it 
away. Sometimes, it don't take it away 'til I lie down. [ ... I It like a tightening pain in the head, a tightening pain here [gesturing across to the left side of her face]. 
And, sometimes, I get it across the eyes like and down here [gesturing]. [ ... I It 
comes up here sometimes [gesturing again] and down the eye. 'Mat make me sick, 
y'know. I take the pain killers, and lay down and rest. Besides, I got the cold cloth 
there for easement. Sometimes, the cloth take it away. [ ... ] The pain come first. And, once or twice, I been giddy with it too, with these pains and there. [ ... ] It don't be every day. It jus' certain times that it come at me. And, then, I get this pain 
in the head. I get tired with it. And, sleepy sometimes. I not got no sugar 'cos they 
test. No sugar. Tired. Sleepy sometimes. Sittin' down like. [ ... I It jus' come 
sometimes when the pain come. '17hen I get giddy, and I have to sit down and lay 
down. 
In Text 26, the speaker uses a highly physicalised language to describe her headaches, rich in 
metaphor. Yet, there is little evaluative commentary on her experience. Instead, her distress itself 
represents an evaluation of her adverse social circumstances. She distinguishes between two kinds 
of 'headache'. The first kind is associated with her 'monthlies' (i. e. 'blood'). The second kind is 
more severe and is associated with 'weariness', 'tiredness', and feeling 'dizzy'. She uses a 
vocabulary of 'pain' to describe the phenomenology of these 'headaches'; they are described as 'a 
pain' centred around her eyes, 'a pain' that makes her feel 'sick'. She has to stop her usual 
domestic work, 'take rest' and seek medical advice. The doctor said that her 'headaches' were 
caused by the 'sinuses' or 'monthlies' ('blood'): 'He, erm, says it infections. Sometimes, it could 
be the blood. Mostly, from the sinus'. Following her doctor's cue, she believed that 'the blood' 
might be a source of her more severe 'headaches' (as opposed to 'ordinary headaches'). Yet, 
'headaches' caused by the 'monthlies' are 'ordinary'. Their intensity and phenomenology mean 
that they are unlikely to be caused by 'blood' or 'monthlies' (Text 27): 
Text 27 
Most stop here [gesturing to her head]. Sometimes, like the main part is down the 
eye, the side of the face, down thro' the jaw. Sometimes, it goes down through the 
neck, aye. But, I thought like it was the blood problem, monthlies, or something. Cý - But, it too great a pain sometimes. And, err tiredness like, weary and weak, y'know. 
And, sometimes, can be stressful. 
Compared with 'ordinary headaches', more severe, illness-like 'headaches' are associated -with 
c, 'weak and weary'. They are different in kind and so must ha a greater pain and feelings of bein'.. I X, e 
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different causes. The semantic link between 'stress' and 'headaches' makes it possible for her to 
articulate her feelings of distress and unhappiness. 'Headaches' simultaneously mask and embody 
her social adversity; they make it possible for her to express her dissatisfaction with her domestic 
situation in a socially sanctioned way, that is, in a somatic idiom of illness. This symbolic effect is 
made possible by the ambiguity that surrounds the causes of her 'headaches': 
Text 28 
1 think it might be the blood sometimes y'know. I mean, like every month, 
y'know, a woman or a girl like be unwell, and have her monthlies and, then that's 
the problem like. But, I think, sometimes stress too. 
In Text 28, the connection between 'stress' and 'headaches' is presented as indeterminate; her 
'headaches' occur 'at certain times, certain days', on 'sad days', when she feels 'down'. 
These accounts illustrate that social adversity (signified by the metonyms of adversity: 'stress', 
'pressure', and 'worries') were not the only source of 'headaches' mentioned in informants' 
accounts. A variety of other causes were cited, all of which were associated with the body (e. g. 
high blood pressure, diet, or drinking alcohol, flu, or 'monthlies'). For example, one middle-aged 
informant said that she experienced 'headaches' that disrupted her sleep roughly about once every 
week. She distinguished such 'headaches' from those that she gets when she has 'the flu'. A 
woman in her 50s believed that her 'headaches' were caused by high blood pressure. She 
maintained that since she had started taking treatment for high blood pressure, her 'headaches' had 
become less frequent. A man in his 70s believed that his 'headaches' might be caused by the 
'blood' (i. e. high blood pressure): "It could be the blood or something like that. I think :I can't tell 
you what. The doctor don't tell you what really do it". The indeterminacy surrounding the causes of 
'headaches', makes them available for symbolising core concerns and 'worries'; 'headaches' 
provide Saints with a flexible somatic idiom for articulating social adversity in a socially safe way. 
A patient brings a complaint of 'headaches' to their doctor. No biomedical explanation can be 
found. Treatment fails. The doctor tells the patient that the 'headaches' are caused by 'stress'. 
Medical treatment may be provided to redress the situation. In the examples described above, some 
informants collaborated in their doctor's psychogenic interpretation; that their 'headaches' were 
due to 'worries' or 'stress' (and, therefore, social adversity). What happens, then, when a patient 
presents with 'headaches' to a doctor, but no social adversity, no source of 'stress' or 'worry' is 
present? A St. Helenian man in his 30s (who I call Frank) said that he had experienced the same 
recurrent 'headaches' for many years. He described them in an idiom of 'dizziness' and 'weakness' 
(Text 29): 
Text 29 
Feelin' dizzy. Feelin' dizzy. It like : it always something to do with the head. It will 
my flesh Nvill get sweaty. It all goes to the head feelin'. It is silly for me to say, but 
it is like a pain in the head. Err, a agitatin' pain. Feelin' dizzy. And, then, I will 
probably feel weak like. 
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These 'headaches' do not involve severe pain, but are experienced as an 'agitating, pain', so that Zý t7 
one 'must take notice to it' (Text 29). Although this pain is situated 'at the back of the eyes', it Is 
associated with a variety of other somatic symptoms including feeling 'sweaty', 'dizzy'. 'weak', 
and 'faintiness'. After an hour or so, the 'pain' goes away so he feels relieved. Nonetheless, he says 
that he 'never feels right for a week' and "when it leave me, still not feelin' normal. Still feelin' 
dizzy. But, I don't get the sweaty skin - faintiness". Text 30 presents a brief genesis narrative that 
depicts how his 'headaches' began with a breach in his everyday phenomenological experience; 
something was "out o' order". This warranted a visit to the doctor: 
Text 30 
When it first happen, 
I remember it was in January. 
What year it was now, 
I'm not sure. 
But, I was at the [names place]. 
An' I was jus' feelin' out o' order. 
Comehome. 
Take a little rest on the bed. 
I say: 'It'll probably go'. 
Later, got up. 
No, it didn't went. 
An' from that stage onwards, 
it jus' lead 
from jus' one thing to the next. 
I seen jus' about every doctor. 
Not actually no cure. 
I always get a relief at somedays. 
I'm feelin' good. 
Somedays, just the opposite. 
And the [name of doctor] tell me 
what I'm suffering from. 
He: his tellin' me: 
I ask him: 
'What what stress will do? 
What costaphobiaT 
He said: 'Carry on talking 
an' tell me how your feel'. 
An' he say 
that's what I got: 
'Stress. Costaphobia'. 
The psychogenic interpretation of his 'headaches' caused by 'stress' originates in his consultation 
with the doctor (Text 30). This interpretation is warranted by the absence of any organic cause and 
the fact that all the treatments so far prescribed have failed to cure his 'headaches'. Frank has 'no 
idea' what the distress terms 'stress' or 'costaphobia' mean. Nonetheless, he loosely associated 
6stress' with 'depression'. However, he denies that he is 'depressed': "Err, people tell me that, err, 
erm, stress come from depression, but I don't think that I been feelin' bin depressed". As illustrated 
in section 6.2, in the explanatory system that forms part of St. Helenian discourse on distress, 
6worries' are believed to a cause of 'depression'. Similarly, Frank maintained that: "Worries make 
you depressed dependin' on what kinds of worries you got". Like some of the speakers in Section 
6.1, he defined 'worries' as a concomitant of acting or doing. 'Worry' meant: 'I gonna do 
something that is on your mind. I gonna do something. So, I gonna think about how I'm gonna do C, -- 
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it, or something like that'. In Text 3 1, he reasons that, since he has no such 'worries', he cannot be 
'depressed': 
Text 31 
It is something, for instance - now, I don't feel this way - is, for instance, 
something you want, but you can't get. For instance, like owing to moneywise. [ ... ] Like, okay, for instance, err there was somethin' I did need, I want, but I not got the 
money. I need it. I not got the money. 
Moreover, 'depression' is caused by particular kinds of 'worries'. In Text 32, Frank draws on a 
prototypical understanding of 'worry' as a response to financial difficulties. He is keen to resist any 
interpretation that might stigmatise him. Since he has no such financial difficulties, he cannot 
therefore be 'worried': 
Text 32 
But I don't have a problem, a real problem with moneywise. I think :I think people 
wherever you go will have a problem with money, but I don't have that problem. 
What I get, I make do. 
Other St. Helenians collaborate in the psychogenic interpretation of Frank's 'headaches' (Text 32). 
An indeterminate aetiology and a failure of medical treatment point to a cause 'in the mind'. Social 
or economic adversity is commonly believed to produce such mental distress. Frank does not 
believe he has such difficulties. He, therefore, resolutely rejects any 'diagnosis' to do with his 
'mind'. He said that his illness is 'on his mind', not 'in his mind'. 
Rawnsley and Loudon's psychogenic interpretation of 'worry' is worth re-visiting. "' 'Worry' in St. 
Helena does not necessarily indicate psychological disorder (e. g. 'anxiety' or 'depression'). It 
articulates St. Helenians' sociomoral concerns and their distinctions of worth. It does not represent 
a psychologisation of distress. Rather, 'worry' expresses a perceived breach in the relationship 
between an individual and the social world that they inhabit. Moreover, the sociomoral idioms of 
6worry', 'pressure', and 'stress' form a discursive bridge between social adversity and its 
embodiment as 'pain in the head'. Through this symbolic process, 'headaches' become a metonym 
for social adversity. However, the causes of 'headaches' are also indeterminate. Unlike 'worry', 
'headaches' are not necessarily tied to the social field. Their indeterminacy makes it possible to 
express personal distress without publicly admitting to social adversity and this reduces the risk of 
attracting a negative social response; a somatic idiom of 'headaches' provides a relatively safe 
means for communicating distress. They can be interpreted as a dramatic mask for social suffering 
and the expression of core concerns. The threat presented by social adversity and personal distress 
to the existing social order of things is partly neutralised through their symbolic canalisation into 
illness-like 'headaches'; social suffenng and anomic distress are channelled into the clinic. In this 
way, biomedicine comes to play an important role in social regulation and in the maintenance of 
the social order. 
165 
6.5 'High blood pressure' as a metonym of distress 
Towards the end of my fieldwork on St. Helena, I received a letter from an American woman who 
was seeking information an ancestor on St. Helena. In response to this query, I searched the 
Castle's archives and looked up the record of Thomas Woodman in the Parish Records. I 
discovered that Mr Woodman had been buried in the cemetery of Anglican St. Pauls East in 1901. 
The record in the archive also included the inscription on his gravestone. It read: 'Thomas 
Woodman, died 17 Oct 1901,30 years', with a short epitaph. His infant daughter had died not long 
after. Her epitaph read: 'Edith Elizabeth Woodman, born 18 July 1901, died 24 March 1902'. In the 
St. Helena Guardian, 24h Oct 1901, the obituary read: 
Thomas Woodman died at the Civil Hospital after a long illness. He recently had 
some family troubles that brought on brain fever. He seemed to be on the mend, but 
took a relapse and died in a couple of days from heart failure. Being a private in the 
St. Helena Volunteer Sharp Shooters, the deceased was buried the following day 
with Military Honours. Many members of the Corps were present, His Excellency 
the Governor, the Colonel Commanding, who followed the body to the grave, and 
Captain Deason. Private Woodman was a good shot and in the last Annual Course 
Of the Corps made the next highest score. He was also a member of the St. Helena 
Band. 
What is interesting about this account is not whether Thomas Woodman's 'family problems' were 
actually responsible for his 'brain fever', but rather the belief that a family death could trigger a 
'brain fever' resulting in 'heart failure'. Did Thomas Woodman die of a broken heart? Does 
personal distress have the power to cause illness, disease, and even death? Many St. Helenians 
think so. For example, an elderly St. Helenian man believed that 'stress' was a source of 'minor 
ailments'. He associated such 'ailments' with a 'delicate' physical constitution. 'Stress' was 
correspondingly associated with personal 'weakness'. In addition, 'stress' could produce minor 
'ailments'; he said that 'more delicate ones' become ill because they 'can't handle stress'. 
Complaining to a doctor with a minor 'ailment' was therefore interpreted as a sign of personal 
'weakness'. He would only consult with a doctor when he felt 'a very severe pain' and not for the 
flu or 'something minor'. 'You get certain ailments', he said, 'but you have be toughen to it'. Other 
informants claimed that 'worry' or 'stress' could cause 'heart attacks'. For example, a retired man 
who had experienced a string of 'heart attacks' believed that they might have been caused by: 
'Worry, worry the heart or something like that'. Similarly, in a middle-aged St. Helenian man said 
that 'stress' could kill a person; it could 'bring up other things in your body - it can bring on such 
things as a heart attack'. He believed that 'a lot of people lately been dying of heart attacks'. A St. 
Helenian woman in her 30s complained of chest pain that she described as 'a grip, a pricking pain 
that comes and goes'. She said that this 'pain' had been caused by a family death. She believed that 
'heart bum' could be brought on by 'worry, if you worry too much'. A St. Helenian man in his 70s 
believed that 'worry' could bring about 'angina': 'If I worry, if I work hard, walk too quick', he 
said, 'then the angina comes'. Finally, a middle-aged St. Helenian man said that 'some people get 
ternotionally worked up' and, in extreme cases, this could lead to death. He warranted this belief 
with an anecdote about a man who had caught some boys throwing stones. He had become angry 
and chased them away. During the chase, he had a heart attack. The informant rounded his story off 
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with two quotes which he said had come from the Bible: 'An answer when said turns away rage. 
but a word causing pain makes anger to come up' and 'a calm heart is the life of a fleshly 
organism, but jealousy is rottenness to the bones'. 
The availability of an illness metaphor as a means of symbolising adversity partly depends on a 
symbolic connection between the metonyms of adversity (e. g. 'stress', 'worry', and 'pressure') and 
somatic experience. For instance, a St. Helenian nurse observed that her patients would often 
present their feelings of personal distress using a somatic or illness idiom; they would say, for 
instance, they would say that they 'do not feel good' or would complain of 'high blood pressure' as 
a way of expressing their distress. Moreover, as the examples above showed, some informants 
accounted for illness experience and somatic symptoms in terms of a lay discourse on distress. This 
was particularly the case for illnesses for which the doctor could find no biomedical cause or where 
treatment had failed. The explanatory discourse on 'high blood pressure' presents an example of 
this symbolic relationship between St. Helenian discourse on distress and illness. Some informants 
believed that 'worry' and 'stress' were a source of 'high blood pressure'. Sociomoral idioms of 
distress (e. g. 'worries', 'stress', 'thinking') form part of a lay explanatory system in which social 
and economic adversity is used to account for chronic illness (such as 'high blood pressure'). For 
instance, an elderly St. Helenian woman believed that 'worries' are common on St. Helena. She 
warranted this belief by citing the high rates of 'high blood pressure' or 'blood': 'I would imagine 
there must be a lot of worries, because I mean there's a lot of people that got blood'. A woman in 
her 60s believed that high blood pressure could by caused by 'the worries, if you worry over 
anything like that'. A St. Helenian woman in her 70s said blamed her high blood pressure on her 
domestic difficulties: 'I suppose the house needs repairing and things like that and I think about it 
and err money is difficult'. Another St. Helenian informant used a metaphor of 'pressure' in a 
container (i. e. the body) to articulate her belief that 'high blood pressure' was caused by 'holding 
in' feelings or 'bottling up' of 'anger'. This increased the level of 'inner tension' and could bring 
on 'high blood pressure'. This explanatory discourse is grounded in a St. Helenian cultural 
discourse on 'the self' that proscribes against the expression of feeling or pain (as 'weakness') and 
that prescribes 'holding things in' and being 'toughen to it'. For example, a woman in her 30s told 
how she suffers from 'stomach pains', how her stomach 'goes into spasms'. Her doctor had told her 
that her that these 'stomach pains' were caused by 'stress'. Following her doctor's cue, she 
believed that 'stress' disrupted the digestion of certain foods resulting in 'stomach pain'. 
Nonetheless, later on in her account she said that she did not really know what had caused these 
pains because the sources of her 'stress' (e. g. relationship and work-related difficulties) were no 
longer present, yet she still experienced 'stomach pain'. This gap in the logic of her account was 
filled with 'a weak stomach': 'I have always had a weak stomach. It's genetic'. Nonetheless, she 
subsequently went on to describe herself as someone who had never felt the need to 'kick out' or 
'get out at anybody'. Instead, she said that she 'bundles up', 'bundles things up inside'. 
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Within St. Helenian discourse on distress, 'worry', 'stress', and 'pressure' are perceived to be a 
source of 'high blood pressure' so that, the latter comes to stand for private distress and, therefore, 
the adversity it represents. This explanatory system then becomes available as a way of accounting 
for putatively high rates of hypertension on St. Helena in terms of social and economic adversity 
(CMO, 1999; UNDP, 1999). Nonetheless, 'worry' and 'stress' are not the only perceived sources of 
high blood pressure. Like 'headaches', the causes of high blood pressure are indeterminate so that 
it can be used discursively to convey a range of meanings. For example, a few informants believed 
that diet could cause 'high blood pressure'. Indeed, St. Helena's CMO (1999) also identified 
dietary factors as a possible reason for the high levels of hypertension on the island. For example, a 
middle-aged woman believed that either 'worry' or her diet could cause her blood pressure to 
increase: "It's like worries, must be. Sometimes, the food that do it. If I eat curry, that does it. It 
could be biteness". A woman in her 50s believed that it was caused by 'what you eat, your diet, and 
everything'. Similarly, a St. Helenian woman in her 60s who suffered from high blood pressure 
believed that 'eating a little salt causes it'. A man in his 40s blamed it on 'stress' ('I think it was 
stress'). Nonetheless, elsewhere in his account, he proposed a different explanation ('I think I 
inherited it'). 
Why do some Saints employ metonyms of adversity (e. g. 'worry' and 'stress') to account for high 
blood pressure and somatic complaints such as headaches? How do they come to symbolize 
distress and adversity in this way? Personal distress and affliction points to the existence of socio- 
economic adversity. They symbolise a breach in the social order of things. They therefore 
contravene the dominant communal ideology; the public presentation of affliction or distress 
clashes with the normative expectations enshrined in a St. Heleman discourse on the self. 
Moreover, a breach between normative expectations and lived experience can produce anomic 
suffering; for example, where an individual is systematically prevented from realising a culturally 
valued social identity, or where an individual's biographical experience deviates from the preferred 
image of things as depicted in a society's public narratives. 
Public displays of adversity, affliction, and distress therefore attract a social stigma. For example, 
the expression of distress risks a provoking a perception that one is 'weak'. Afflicted individuals 
and those experiencing adversity are, therefore, more likely to become subject to powerful 
normalising practices (See Chapter 5 for an account of these). A central function of these practices 
is to contain and neutrallse the threat presented by social suffering and adversity to social stability 
and cohesion. In this way, social suffering is rendered private and unspoken. 
Nonetheless, without the availability of some form of redress, distress threatens to produce a more 
deep-seated social schism. Like every society, St. Helena must provide alternative means of 
providing redress for distress and affliction. For some, migration and exit provide a means of 
redress and an escape route from adversity. For others, it is a way of expressing discontent. As 
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Chapter 5 argued, migration and exit functions to maintain homogeneity, cohesion, and the existing 
social structure by cleansing society of potential sources of change, resistance, creativity, and 
leadership. 
For those who remain, a somatic idiom of distress and the illness metaphor provide a mask for 
expressing social suffering in a way that is socially acceptable in a close tight-knit community. The 
(biomedical) healthcare system is relatively well developed on St. Helena. Social care and mental 
healthcare provision, for instance, have been historically neglected and chronically under resourced 
in comparison with mainstream healthcare provision (See Appendix A6.1-3 for a description of 
public health, social care, and mental healthcare provision on St. Helena). Saints who experience 
adversity and distress are likely to seek out medical help, particularly when other sources of social 
support are unavailable. Personal distress is commonly physicalised in a somatic complaint of 
'headaches' (caused by 'pressure', 'worry', and 'stress'). In other cases, it is experienced as a 
breakdown in embodied agency and as an illness-like affliction (e. g. 'depression'). 
The metonyms of adversity (e. g. 'stress', 'worry', 'pressure', 'thinking', 'tense-up', 'out of 
passion') are commonly employed to account for chronic illness (e. g. 'high blood pressure') and 
'headaches'. Nonetheless, the source of the latter remains indeterminate; 'headaches', for instance, 
can be caused by anything from diet to the weather. The ambiguity surrounding their origins makes 
them symbolically available for the masked communication of personal distress; they offer Saints a 
symbolic way to voice discontent and private affliction by minimizing the social risk involved in 
doing so. As Section 1.2 showed, the body becomes an important source of resistance when other 
avenues of redress are unavailable. Consequently, adversity is bound to present itself in the clinic. 
When agency breaks down and the voice has been silenced, the body falls sick. 
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Chapter 7 
Agency and Discourse on Distress 
In an essay on experience, Bruner (1986a) pointed to a gulf between embodied experience and its 
symbolic manifestation in language. This gulf has been a central theme in this thesis. 'Some 
experiences', Bruner says, 'are inchoate, in that we simply do not understand what we are 
experiencing, either because the experiences are not storyable, or because we lack the performative 
and narrative resources, or because the vocabulary is lacking' (1986a: 6-7). This thesis has 
examined some of the ways that 'inchoate' experiences of personal distress are signified in English 
discourse. It has shown how discourse on distress articulates agency whilst it depicts its breakdown 
and has pointed to how suffering often remains unexpressed where the symbolic resources are 
unavailable for expressing it or because the agency upon which 'voice' depends has been radically 
disrupted. This thesis has also explored the ways that cultural processes partly constitute the social 
experience, expression, and meaning of personal distress, and has examined the relevance of the 
concept of agency for a social theory of social suffering. The discussion has been grounded in two 
case studies (Bristol and St. Helena) and in contemporary medical anthropological and sociological 
theory and evidence. This final chapter draws together what has been learned. 
7.1 English discourse on distress 
English informants' descriptions of distress were composed of a mixture of lay and expert 
categories and metaphors of illness, agency, mood, emotion, and feeling. Infon-nants' experiences 
of distress were interpreted in half-explanations, evaluative discourse, fragments of narrative, and 
thick contextualised accounts. Their accounts commonly depicted the drama of personal distress as 
an interplay between, self, agency, and social adversity. The organisation and grammatical 
structure of informants' discourse on distress conveyed traces of their experiences. Some accounts, 
for instance, were characterised by a low level of narrativity, Mirraicking the disruptive and 
disorganised nature of their experiences of distress. The kinds of adversity highlighted in 
informants' accounts were contingent on social position, role, and identity. 
Four interlocking discursive domains were differentiated in informants' discourse on distress. First, 
illness provided a metaphor around which many infon-nants constructed their representations and 
interpretations of distress (e. g. 'panic attacks', 'depression', 'anxiety', 'stress'). Dominant expert 
discourses on distress transform the moral and social dimensions of personal suffering into a 
disorder of mood, behaviour or functioning based on an illness metaphor. In some cases, 
informants' accounts depicted a social transition from active agent to passive patient. In this 
transformation, suffering is naturalised and its social significance neutrallsed. The illness metaphor 
is part of the symbolic process through which sickness is made out of social adversity. Second, 
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English informants employed a psychological idiom of distress, metaphors of mood (e. g. 'feeling 4n 
low' or 'down') and an ethnopsychology of emotion (e. g. 'sadness', 'anxiety', 'hopelessness') to 
articulate their experiences of personal distress. Third, personal distress was commonly depicted as 
a breakdown in embodied agency and was often associated with social disconnection, 'withdrawal', 
and a disruption of usual social roles and relationships. An idiom of agency was commonly used to 
depict the experience of 'human behavioural breakdown' (e. g. 'unable to cope', 'loss of control'). 
In addition, some informants depicted the recovering self in terms of a recovery of control, a 
restoration of personal agency, and social engagement. These accounts demonstrate that 
'depression' is more than just an 'interpretive disorder' or a disorder of cognitive process. It is also 
a social illness: a disorder of agency and of sociality. Fourth, sociomoral idioms of distress 
('stress', 'worry', and 'pressure') were used metonyn-tically to signify both the embodied 
experience of personal distress and the social adversity that produced it, thereby forming a 
symbolic bridge between the two. These metonyms of adversity were also used to express negative 
evaluations of such adversity and, in this way, articulated infon-nants' core concerns, and their 
sense of moral agency. 
The personal distress (e. g. 'stress', 'anxiety', 'panic', and 'depression') involves an erosion of 
agency. In some cases, agency can break down altogether. Experiences of personal distress are 
conurionly inchoate, disorganised, generalised, repeated, and indeterminate. They therefore resist 
narrativisation so that the discourse depicting such distress is characterised by a low degree of 
narrativity. It rarely conforms to cultural definitions of a well-rounded, emplotted story, with a 
clear beginning, middle, and an end. Moreover, 'the self' is regularly positioned in a passive mode, 
as having lost control, rather than as an active agent, in control of events, and driving the plot 
forward. For those in the midst of their suffering, it is likely to be more difficult to arrange ongoing 
experience into a temporal sequence and to create a plot that renders it coherent. A more fluid 
concept of 'narrativity' is therefore required to cope with the contingency and indeterminacy that 
characterise lay discourse on distress and the broken language of suffering. 
Clear-cut explanations for private distress were rare in English informants' accounts. Personal 
distress was rarely represented in seamless, flowing narratives. Instead, informants' discourse 
consisted of highly contextualised descriptions of repeated, habitual, and overlapping events and 
experiences. Contingent narratives provided informants with a flexible discursive form for 
depicting and interpreting their experiences of distress by loosely contextualising them in relation 
to biographical and relational contexts. Within such accounts, a multiplicity of contextual factors 
were symbolically or causally linked with informants' past and present suffering. This discourse 
often depicted a negative dialectic between self and society, involving a downward spiral of social 
disconnection and a breakdown in agency. In many cases, this breakdown precipitated entry into 
the sick role. 
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Expert discourses on distress (e. g. biomedical, psychological, psychoanalytic) were found to enter 
informants' discourse on distress in three ways. First, some informants employed expert 
vocabulary, categories, and metaphors in their descriptions of distress. Second, expert discourses 
partly constituted the experience of personal distress; how it was symbolised, expressed, evaluated, 
and responded to (e. g. the illness metaphor). Third, English informants drew eclectically from a 
wide range of expert explanatory systems in order to account for their suffering. These systems 
were often implicit in informants' contexualised accounts and were rarely presented spontaneously 
in the form of precise explanatory statements. 
Ethnographic approaches to social research that depend on in-depth interviews alone restrict the 
kinds of theoretical questions that can be asked. The employment of a broader range of 
ethnographic methods is required in order to explore the relationship between macro social and 
economic processes, personal affliction, and the local relational settings in which such affliction 
takes place. The second case study (St. Helena) made use of a wider range of social research 
methods, including in-depth interviews, in order to explore this relationship in more depth in the 
context of a small-scale, developed English-speaking society. 
7.2 St. Helenian discourse on distress 
On St. Helena, cultural processes and macro social and economic forces interact to produce a 
particular pattern of affliction and personal distress. It was argued in Chapter 5 that a St. Helenian 
discourse on the self and society works to legitimise and reproduce the existing social and 
economic order. This discourse specifies what it is to be a St. Helenian and articulates an array of 
social identities linked with social roles and positions (e. g. in relation to the domestic division of 
labour or labour-market position). Individual conformity with this communal ideology is ensured 
through the operation of powerful normalising practices (e. g. gossip, social surveillance, denial of 
voice, ostracism, and migration). Yet, this dominant public discourse clashes with the lived 
experience of many St. Helenians. In many cases, personal distress was depicted as sociogenic in 
origin and represented an evaluative response to adversity. Informants linked their experiences of 
personal distress to a limited range of relational contexts: poverty, breaches in social relations, 
social disconnection, exclusion, ostracism, loss, illness, entrapment and a loss of agency. Saints' 
discourse on distress therefore articulated their core concerns and their distinctions of worth. For 
instance, reports of financial difficulties and economic adversity were common in their accounts. 
Saints rarely cited individual or dispositional factors as the source of their distress, although some 
non-sufferers viewed personal distress as a sign of 'weakness'. This may have reflected a high 
degree of stigma associated with the presence of personal distress and social adversity. Some 
informants' distress took the form of anorruc suffenng produced by a breach in social relations or a 
contradiction between lived experience and the social expectations or norms implicit in the 
dominant communal ideology. To the extent that some St. Helenians are prevented from realising a 
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positive social or cultural identity (as Saints, as British citizens, as men or as women), anorruc 
suffering becomes more likely. 
The 'St. Helenian predicament' was characterised in Chapter 5. To use a Saint phrase, St. Helena is 
6 in between'; it is situated somewhere between the traditional and the modem, between an English 
past and a globalised future, and between two continents. This predicament is a function of the 
island's remoteness, social and economic policies, unusually high levels outward migration, a rigid 
social structure, economic fragility, the presence of a powerful state apparatus, and rapid socio- 
economic change. It was argued that this 'predicament' systematically generates the local relational 
contexts within which personal distress and private affliction occur. As St. Helena modernizes, a 
cleavage opens up between ideological representations of St. Helenian society and social and 
economic reality. In addition, there are signs that increased outward migration, new inequalities, 
globalisation, and a growing culture of individualism and materialism are contributing to an erosion 
of traditional social ties and sources of social connection. 
St. Helenian discourse on distress consists of a semantic web of related terms organised around a 
cluster of root metaphors, ontologies, symbolic associations, and explanatory systems. Narrativity 
was not prominent in St. Helenians' discourse on illness and distress. This discourse was composed 
of four overlapping discursive domains: 
0 Metonyms of adversity (e. g. 'worry', 'stress', 'pressure', 'down', 'thinking') 
0A somatic idioms of distress (e. g. 'tiredness', 'tense-up', 'headaches') 
0 Discourse on illness (e. g. 'depression', 'stress', 'heart attack', 'high blood pressure', 
'headaches') 
0A discourse on 'mental illness' (e. g. 'depression', 'stress', 'crack', "out o' order", "out o' 
balance") 
A sociomoral idiom of 'worry' and a quasi-expert discourse on 'stress' were common ways that St. 
Helenians articulated their experience of social adversity. The idioms of 'worry' and 'stress' have 
both an external (the object of 'worry') and an internal (the embodied experience of 'worry') 
referent. They link the body to social (dis)order by articulating core concerns and by 
metonyn-ýically representing adverse relational settings. 
Such idioms of distress articulate distinctions of worth grounded in a socio-centric discourse on the 
self and a St. Helenian communal ideology. By articulating social concerns, discourse on distress 
points to disruptions and dislocations in the social order. It therefore threatens the coherence of St. 
Helena's dominant communal ideology and presents a challenge to the existing order of things. The 
embodied experience of distress represents an inversion of St. Helena's preferred public narrative. 
It contradicts the preferred story of self-control, independence, resilience, resourcefulness, 
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happiness, friendliness, and reciprocity. The display of private distress is therefore perceived as a 
sign of 'weakness'. It therefore attracts a negative social response and so becomes subject to 
regulation by normalising forces. The stigma attached to private distress and individual self- 
expression is a way of marginalizing difference, of denying versions of the self and society that 
clash with the preferred story. 
A somatic idiom is used to articulate social suffering (e. g. 'headaches' or a metaphor of chronic 
illness). This is partly explained by the power of such normalising or homogenising forces and a 
proscription against social critique (i. e. 'doing down St. Helena') or expressing private distress (e. g. 
'weakness'). Social or economic adversity is sometimes embodied in a way that disrupts everyday 
social and behavioural functioning. Such disruption sometimes results in a visit to a doctor. It is at 
this point that social adversity and personal distress are reconfigured as illness experience and, in 
more severe cases, as depressive illness. As healthcare provision develops and expands on the 
Island, an expert discourse on distress is likely to become more prevalent, gradually displacing 
sociomoral idioms of affliction. 
St. Helenian discourse on distress relies on a dialectical relationship between the social and the 
somatic in a way that bypasses the psychological. Many St. Helenian informants believed that 
tworry' or 'stress' can cause 'headaches' and chronic illness. 'Worry' and 'stress' link social 
adversity, on the one hand, and the experience of embodied suffering in the form of 'headaches' 
and chronic illness, on the other. There was some evidence that this way of interpreting somatic 
experience had originated in dialogues with the island's doctors. Doctors who, being unable to 
explain a patient's symptoms within a biomedical framework, collaborate in the patient's view that 
'worry' and 'stress' can cause illness and produce somatic complaints. A somatic idiom and the 
illness metaphor then become culturally available as a means of symbolising social adversity. 
'Headaches', for instance, become available as a way of signifying personal and social distress. 
The ambiguity surrounding the causes of 'headaches' and some forms of chronic illness makes 
them available for expressing private distress and social adversity in a coded way, thereby avoiding 
a negative social response. 
Nonetheless, the reconfiguration of social suffering as illness means that the individual's body 
becomes the target for intervention rather than the social body. This denies agency while it 
simultaneously works to restore it. Moreover, this reconfiguration works to preserve social 
cohesion and stability. This is partly achieved by reducing the threat posed by individual distress 
and social adversity to the communal ideology. The enforcement of this ideology sustains the 
political and socio-econon-lic order, the same order that systematically produces social and anomic 
suffering in the first place. 
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The medicalisation of social suffering takes place as part of a wider process of de-traditionalisation 
and socio-economic modernisation on St. Helena. As well as fostering the diffusion of an ideology 
of individualism and materialism, social and economic modernisation brings with it a 
psychologised discourse on the self and, therefore, a new way of talking about suffering. Moreover, 
the cultural diffusion of expert discourses on distress into St. Helenian lay discourse carries with it 
a particular interpretation of human agency, a view of the self as an autonomous, self-deterrruning, 
disengaged individual. 
7.3 A dialectical relationship between expert and lay discourses on distress 
(a) The experience and expression of personal distress is partly constituted in a 
cultural discourse on the self, body, and society. 
A discourse-based approach to the social analysis of personal distress and affliction foregrounds 
the constitutive power of language as a social practice and as a form of symbolic activity. 
Discourse on distress has been interpreted from three main perspectives in this thesis: first, as a 
means of representing and expressing embodied experiences of social suffering and human 
behavioural. breakdown; second, as a cultural performance enacted to achieve a diversity of 
interpretive and social ends; third, as a means of interpreting and evaluating experience. 
As Chapter 2 showed, symbolic or discursive processes pattern the phenomenology of distress. 
Personal distress is produced out of a dialectical relationship between bodily feelings or sensations 
and their symbolisation. These processes determine how emotions and somatic processes are 
identified, bound, categorized, articulated, expressed, and interpreted. Symbolic processes 
themselves are embodied; they are as real as the somatic experiences that they represent and 
constitute. 
This thesis has highlighted the relevance of the analytic concepts of agency, metaphor, and 
narrativity in research on social suffering and distress. Narrativisation and the use of trope are 
fundamental discursive strategies through which English speakers depict, articulate, and interpret 
their embodied experiences of suffering. Attention to narrativity facilitates an understanding of 
how embodied experiences of distress are produced out of the interplay between agency, social 
setting, biography and social structure. Narrativity and trope also provide a means of expressing the 
contingency and indeterminacy of personal distress and affliction. 
(b) Lay discourse on distress is part of and emanates from a society's lay discourse on 
the self and body. 
Discourses on the self, body, and society are among the principal mechanisms through which 
stress. culture influences the experience, expression, and meaning of personal di Such a discourse 
articulates an indigenous psychology or ethnopsychology. Individuals and conu-nunities interpret zn 
and partly constitute themselves in terms of such a discourse. Self and agency mediate the impact 
of adverse relational settings and life events onto the body. In developed English-speaking 
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societies, for instance, how distress is embodied is contingent upon a Euro-American discourse on 
the self; distress is articulated as both a breakdown in agency and sociality, as a disruption of both 
embodied and social functioning. 
(c) Biomedical discourse on distress is culturally contingent. 
Critical medical anthropologists and a new cross-cultural psychiatry have demonstrated the cultural 
contingency of biomedical or psychiatric discourse on distress and the therapeutic practices for 
which this discourse provides the rationale. "' The 'emotional pathologies' or 'neurotic disorders' 
represent a culturally and historically contingent set of interpretive categories that organise the 
interpretation and therapeutic response to personal distress and affliction in developed English- 
speaking societies (Kleinman, 1977; Kleinman and Good, 1985; Gaines, 1992a, 1992b). Psychiatric 
diagnostic categories cluster together sets of cultural idioms of distress (symptoms) into syndromes 
or cultural scripts for the expression of personal distress. For instance, a somatic idiom of 
'melancholia' was common in English society up until the seventeenth century (Littlewood and 
Lipsedge, 1982; Jadhav, 1996). With the ascent of Modernism, this discourse was displaced by the 
current psychological category of 'depression' (Littlewood, 1985). Jadhav, for instance, has traced 
the etymology of the term 'depression' to the 17thCentury, where it was originally used as a spatial 
metaphor. It subsequently acquired a gravitational dimension, making it possible to articulate mood 
states that move up and down along a vertical axis (1996: 18). Simýilarly, Jackson (1986) has traced 
the genealogy of 'depression' to its lay origins in a metaphor of being weighed down by sadness or 
sorrow. What began as an embodied metaphor became re-constituted in expert discourse on distress 
as a 'syndrome', prototypically defined as cluster of 'symptoms'. Taylor, for instance, has 
suggested that the most common forms of psychopathology in western societies reflect the state of 
the modem self. According to Taylor, this self lives in constant fear of losing a sense of meaning or 
significance, of 'a fracturing of world and body space' in which 'nothing is worth doing' (1989: 18). 
This predicament of the western self is reflected in a recent historical shift from an expert discourse 
on hysteria, phobia, and fixation in the early part of the 20'bCentury, to a contemporary discourse 
on ego loss, low self-esteem, futility, and depression. 
Anthropologists and cross-cultural psychiatrists have demonstrated that the experience, expression, 
and social response to psychiatric illness and the ethnopsychiatric categories used to interpret them 
vary considerably across different socio-cultural settings (e. g. see Chapters I and 2). Since 
biomedical categories and explanatory systems for mental well being and psychiatric illness are 
contingent on English and North American cultural understandings, social practices, and lay 
discourses (on the self, body, and society), they cannot be reliably generallsed to other socio- 
cultural settings. For instance, Jadhav point out that in non-western societies 'depression' provides: 
"A consensus taxonomy amongst health professionals who share a common (western medical) 
epistemology, and this is not the same as being culturally 'valid' among the general population" 
(1995: 24). "' 
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(d) Expert discourses on distress are contingent on a dominant cultural discourse on 
the self and body that articulates a Euro-American indigenous psychology or 
ethnopsychology. 
Biomedical discourse is grounded in a dominant Euro-American discourse on human nature, the 
self, and society. 120 Gordon (1988), for instance, has shown how biomedical knowledge and In 
practice are deeply rooted in an ideological discourse on Individualism, the dominant discourse on 
the self and society in late capitalist societies such as United States and Britain. "' AccordinOr to 
Kirmayer, dualistic thinking about the self grounds the practice of biomedicine where, on the one 
hand, the patient is conceptualised as a body-object, as a 'biochemical machine' and as the 'passive 
known', while, on the other hand, the physician is positioned as agent, as 'active knower' (1988: 
59). Such dualistic thinking is grounded in systems of dyadic power relations around which 
developed English-speaking societies are organised and which partly constitutes both expert and 
lay discourse in such societies. 
Cultural assumptions about the nature of the self and body are also implicit in concepts of 
psychiatric illness and the biomedical concept of the 'psychiatrically diseased person' (Fabrega, 
1992: 98). 122 Western schemes of psychiatric diagnosis and classification are contingent on a Euro- 
American cultural discourse on the self grounded in an ideology of individualism and organised 
around a Cartesian dualism of mind and body (Gaines, 1992b). For example, Kirmayer has argued 
that experiences of trauma, loss, and violence among Canadian refugees are evaluated and 
interpreted in terms of the 'adamantine self' (2002: 726). 
(e) Social -scientific explanatory systems of distress are grounded in lay explanatory 
systems (e. g. 'interpretive repertoires', cultural genres of accounting for action and 
experience). 
Social-scientific explanatory discourse on distress (see Chapter 1) is grounded in a broader Euro- 
American cultural discourse on the self and society. As Young (1980) showed with the 
psychological discourse on stress, this discourse appropriates and formalises common-sense 
explanatory systems and reflects them back as objective and scientific. The 'common-sense' 
explanatory systems of English speakers draw on a dramatic metaphor and a vocabulary of agency 
in order to depict and account for action and experience. Lived-out social dramas are depicted and 
interpreted in a vocabulary of act, action, actor, character, scene, setting, situation, circumstance, 
purpose, and motivation. This 'interpretive repertoire' provides the members of such societies with 
a shared language for making sense of action and for communicating experience. The interpretive 
frameworks and explanatory systems developed by social scientists in order to account for 
affliction and distress are inescapably grounded in lay explanatory systems. The narratives, 
metaphors, and rhetoric that make up lay explanatory systems are transformed into highly 
deterymnate explanatory frameworks that are presented in a way that render their social 
contingency invisible. Once lay explanatory systems have been re-constituted into an expert 
discourse, they can then be used to organise expert practices and interventions (diagnosing, 
planning, implementing, intervening, reviewing, studying, investigating, etc. ). Moreover, the 4ý 
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interpretive repertoires of medical anthropology and sociology ultimately originate in lay discourse 
on the self and society. The principle of reflexivity requires an acknowledgement of the cultural 
contingency and indeterminacy of the interpretations of social scientists in the same way that they 
have pointed to the cultural contingency and indeterminacy of lay knowledge and explanatory 
systems. 
(f) Expert discourse on distress (root metaphors, explanatory systems, ontologies, 
narratives, and accounting frameworks) gradually diffuses into lay discourse on 
distress. 
The relationship between expert and lay discourse on distress is dialectical. Psychiatric discourse. 
for instance, is organised around metaphors of disease and disorder and is echoed by and 
reconfigured in lay discourse on distress and mental illness. The medicalisation of personal distress 
and affliction (and, therefore, social adversity) involves the displacement of a sociomoral discourse 
on distress that reflects personal and social concerns. Expert discourse on distress partly constitutes 
the experience and expression of distress in developed English-speaking societies through the 
provision of an illness metaphor. The root metaphors of illness and sickness organise the 
experience and meaning of distress in such societies. Both lay and expert discourse on 'depression', 
for example, are grounded in an illness metaphor that transforms suffering into something a person 
'has', recovers from, and for which they seek and are expected to conform to medical treatment. 
This metaphor organises the therapeutic response to 'depression' as well as its modes of 
presentation. It is grounded in an analogy between the experience of chronic illness and personal 
distress; both involve a breakdown in agency, social disconnection, and biographical disruption. 
Moreover, both can involve entry into the sick role and temporary withdrawal from usual social 
roles and responsibilities. 
This symbolic and social process of medicalisation through the illness metaphor (e. g. the 
cernotional pathologies': 'depression', 'panic attacks', 'anxiety', 'stress') underpins and is 
functionally related to the support available. This metaphor legitimises biomedical intervention and 
treatment (both for the patient and the healer) and bridges the gap between a lay discourse on mood 
and agency and a biomedical discourse on psychiatric disorder. Illness talk is something that both 
doctor and patient can understand. However, with more severe distress such as depressive illness, 
entry into the sick role is more than just a consequence of the illness; the sickness is also part of the 
illness. 
Expert and lay discourse on distress are not wholly commensurable. Kirmayer (1988) has pointed 
out that biomedical discourse is concerned with diagnosis, explanation, and is less concerned with 
the moral and social importance of illness and disease. He argues that the lay perspective on illness 
and disease is principally a moral one, characterised by a concern with issues of blame and 
in ompeting views responsibility rather than aetiology (1988: 80). This 
difference is grounded in two c 
of human agency. Lay discourse on distress is rooted in a view of agency as evaluative, moral, and 
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social, while expert discourse relies on a view of human agency as disengaged, autonomous, 
rational, and individuallsed. Instead of reproducing conventional notions about self and societv, 
expert discourse on distress sometimes conflicts with lay representations. 
Yet, the meaning of expert discourses on distress is transformed as they are selectively re- 
appropriated and assimilated back into lay discourse. The vocabulary of mental pathology becomes 
re-grounded in everyday social experience and ordinary talk and comes to take on a range of social 
functions (e. g. justifying, explaining, legitimising, labelling). Expert categories of distress become 
transformed into embodied metaphors and metonyms of adversity and are employed to express 
core concerns or evaluations of social experience. The examples presented in this thesis have 
shown how speakers creatively make use of the expert categories of 'depression' and 'stress' in 
order to express their moral response to social affliction and adversity. As it enters into lay 
conversations, expert discourse on distress becomes reconstituted as a sociomoral discourse. In this 
way, lay discourse on distress articulates core concerns and so articulates agency, just at the point 
that agency has become disrupted. 
(g) Expert interpretive and explanatory systems diffuse into lay conversations and are 
assimilated into common-sense explanatory systems and interpretive repertoires. 
Common-sense explanatory systems in contemporary western societies often take the form of what 
Linde describes as 'popularised versions of formal theories' or 'popularised expert systems' (1986: 
189). While expert explanatory systems are grounded in popular explanatory systems, expert 
explanatory systems re-enter lay discourse, eventually becoming part of common-sense 
understanding (Linde, 1986: 194-5). In this way, they re-constitute the meaning of distress. 
Moreover, as they become assimilated into lay discourse, these explanatory systems function to re- 
constitute the experience, expression, meaning, and therapeutic response to distress and affliction, 
bringing common-sense understanding into line with dominant therapeutic practices. For instance, 
in St. Helenians' accounts of medical encounters, sufferers assimilated the stress-based 
psychogenic interpretations made by doctors and came to interpret their somatic symptoms in a 
different way. 
(h) Expert discourses on distress partly constitute and legitimise a dominant cultural 
discourse on the self, body, and society. 
Expert discourses on distress (e. g. psychiatric or psychological) deploy an array of metaphors, 
idioms, tropes, ontological categories, and explanatory systems for making sense of action and 
experience. As these discourses diffuse into lay discourse, they transform how people talk about 
and make sense of themselves and others. As they enter into lay conversations, they re-work 
subjectivity to fit in with their own metaphors. Section 3.3 discussed how these discourses 
reproduce a dominant cultural discourse on human agency and reinforces a particular view of the 
self, body, and society. For instance, in his genealogical study of multiple personality disorder, 
Hacking argued that expert knowledge in psychiatry 'affects the way in which individual human 
beings come to conceive of themselves' (1995: 68). Similarly, Rose maintained that expert LI 
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psychological knowledge has played a critical role in the development of the current western 
C regime of the self' (1998: 39). Young (1980) has shown how expert 'discourse on stress' functions 
to reproduce and legitimise conventional knowledge about human nature and society, and the 
relationship between them. Similarly, expert biomedical and psychological discourse on distress 
are contingent upon and reinforce a culturally dominant Euro-American view of human agency as 
individualised, autonomous, disengaged, psychologised, rational, de-socialised, separate, and 
detached. 
7.4 Agency, social relations, and affliction 
An understanding of the social distribution of social suffering among the populations of developed 
English-speaking societies requires understanding how symbolic and cultural processes partly 
constitute the relationship between social adversity, affliction, and distress, and how distress is 
articulated and responded to. How do social structure, agency, and cultural processes combine to 
generate particular configurations of social suffering in developed English-speaking societies such 
as Britain or St. Helena? How social suffering become distributed throughout the social field 
depends on a range social and cultural processes. These include: 
0 The provision of a comi-nunal ideology and a cultural discourse on the self, body, and society. 
The latter articulates a society's indigenous psychology or ethnopsychology. 
The operation of 'normalising practices' (e. g. social stigma, ostracism, gossip, social 
exclusion) 
0 The social circulation of lay and expert discourses on distress that dialectically shape one 
another and which are employed by sufferers to symbolise and interpret their experiences. 
The interpretation, evaluation, and social response to adversity. 
0 The cultural, personal, and social significance of distress (e. g. evaluation, explanation, 
consequences, biographical and social context, symbolic significance). 
Local patterns of social and therapeutic response. 
A structure of hierarchically arranged social positions to which are attached identities and 
roles. 
The production of adversity as a consequence of macro social and economic processes. The 
local relational settings that produce private distress are themselves generated and reproduced 
through a diversity of cultural processes and social practices. 
The material and symbolic relationships between society and the self are bridged by local relational 
settings. Two kinds of relational settings stand out in the anthropological, sociological, and 
epidemiological literature on distress and affliction: first, those settings that involve social 
disconnection and a significant breach or a disruption in core social relationships; second, relational 
settings that systematically disrupt personal agency and erode the conditions for meaningful action. 
Kleinman and Kleinman, for instance, characterise the circumstances that commonly produce 
'depression as affect' across societies as 'something to do with loss of crucial social relationships, 
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withdrawal from established social structural positions, and underryuning of cultural norms guiding 
the self (1985: 478). British medical sociology and social psychiatry have documented how social- 
economic settings and life events that undermine agency or disrupt valued social relationships play 
a central aetiological role in depression. Similarly, in developed English-speaking societies such as 
Britain and St. Helena, personal distress is associated with breakdowns or disruptions in personal 
relationships, interpersonal conflict, loss, powerlessness, entrapment, chronic illness, social 
exclusion, isolation, and in the performance of valued social roles. 
Social structure partly constitutes biography, experience, and agency through its impact on local 
relational settings. These relational settings systematically convey the destructive (and 
constructive) force of macro social and economic structures to individual bodies. Social suffering 
in developed English-speaking societies refers to the systematic ways that individual lives and 
relationships become disrupted and undermined by destructive economic forces, social inequalities, 
and relations of power that pervade the social field. The risk of adversity and the form that 
affliction takes is influenced by the sufferer's social position and the social roles that they perform. 
Adversity resonates in individual bodies as personal distress and becomes embodied as a 
breakdown in human agency. Where location in the social structure is associated with adverse 
relational settings and increased exposure to negative life events, then 'human behavioural 
breakdown', and a disruption in the capacity to perform usual social roles becomes more likely. 
Littlewood says that 'depression' provides a 'flexible way of articulating specific difficulties' 
(1998: 239). How adversity becomes embodied is contingent on how agency is constituted. The 
self mediates the relationship between phenomenological and social experience. The embodied 
impact of life events and relational settings is contingent on how they are interpreted and evaluated. 
The latter depends on an individual's social identity and their sense of agency, their core concerns, 
affiliations, interests, and distinctions of worth as articulated in a Euro-American discourse on the 
self. The social structures of developed English-speaking societies provide the conditions for the 
performance of a diversity of social roles and social identities. Identities, commitments, and core 
concerns are therefore socially distributed according to social position along lines of social 
structure; for instance, according to gender, age, social class, and ethnicity. Where social and 
economic circumstances erode the conditions for the accomplishment of a positively valued social 
identity, then personal distress becomes more likely. 
In biomedical discourse on distress, cultural and symbolic processes are not restricted to shaping 
illness experience or for causing variation in its expression. Cultural and symbolic processes are 
responsible for more than the surface or 'pathoplastic' manifestations of personal distress. They are 
also part of its social aetiology and influence its phenomenology. For instance, both local relational 
settings and cultural processes mediate the impact of macro social and economic forces on the 
body. Without taking such processes into account, it is not possible to make sense of how social 
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suffering becomes unequally distributed throughout the social field in developed English-speaking 
societies. 
Personal distress occurs as a breakdown in personal agency in developed English-speaknig 
societies. How agency breaks down depends on how agency is constituted; the way that personal 
distress is experienced, articulated, interpreted, and responded to is contingent on a western cultural 
discourse on the self. In such societies, social identities (e. g. gender, class, ethnicity) constitute 
distress differently and this partly explains how social suffering becomes socially distributed. Lay 
discourse on distress is a moral discourse in that it articulates core concerns, judgements, and 
evaluations; it communicates agency while depicting its breakdown. Personal distress often 
involves a loss of independence, difficulties in coping or control, disruptions in social ties and 
employment, and a breakdown in embodied agency. A person in distress therefore deviates from a 
proscribed public narrative on the self that exhorts self-control. Finally, in developed English- 
speaking societies, personal distress becomes medically reconfigured in a discourse organised 
around the illness metaphor. 
The 'neurotic disorders' and the 'emotional pathologies' of developed English-speaking societies 
commonly originate in breaches in social relations or ruptures in the social order of things: in such 
cases, they can be interpreted as 'rituals of affliction' (see Section 1.2). Loudon pointed out that 
such rituals make it possible to articulate private stress in public settings without attracting a 
negative social response. They represent an 'acceptable standardized mode of public behaviour that 
can be used symbolically by individuals in circumstances of psychic stress' (1966: 104). Although 
individuals enact them, they are performed in a socially controlled and formallsed fashion and are 
both 'a means of saying something about the state of affairs both within the social system and 
within the personality system' (1966: 104). Both expert and lay discourse on distress in developed 
English-speaking societies have become organised around an illness metaphor. This metaphor 
rationalises and legitin-ýises the enactment of private distress as an illness experience. Social 
suffering and the affliction that arises out of breaches in the social order are redressed through the 
restorative ritual of the medical encounter, followed by entry into the sick role, treatment, recovery, 
and biographical reconstruction. Yet by constituting the person as the passive bodily object of 
biomedical intervention, the medicalisation of social affliction denies agency just at the moment 
that it hopes to restore it. 
Social cohesion in developed English-speaking societies is partly sustained by ameliorating the 
disorder that arises in individual bodies in response to social and economic adversity. While often 
contributing to the relief of affliction and distress, biomedical discourse and treatment also work to 
bring sufferers back into conformity with normative expectations and to maintain individual 
functioning. The medicalisation of social suffering has just this function: to cleanse such societies 
of sources of instability in the social body and to maintain its smooth internal social and economic 
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functioning. Partly through the medicalisation of social suffering and affliction achieved through 
the illness metaphor, the biomedical -dominated healthcare system comes to play a crucial 
maintenance role in such societies. 
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Appendices to Chapter 3 
The interpretive framework used in this thesis evolved during the course of the research. How this 
framework evolved is traced out in the appendices that follow. Later interpretive frameworks came 
to encompass and build upon earlier ones without completely replacing them. In the early stages of 
the research, it was anticipated that the interpretation would involve a combination of qualitative 
analysis (A3.1) and narrative analysis (A3.2). As the research progressed, other features of 
discourse and forms of rhetoric (particularly metaphor and dramatisation) became more prominent 
(A3.3). Finally, discourse analysis came to provide a way of drawing together these different 
approaches to interpretation under a common interpretive framework (A3.4). 
A3.1 Methods of interpretation: qualitative analysis 
The first and most mechanical of the interpretive frameworks used in this thesis was that of 
qualitative analysis. This describes a family of techniques for classifying, categorising, condensing, 
and representing large amounts of textual data. Qualitative analysis is a minimal form of textual 
analysis that involves a range of systematic procedures for summarising and describing the content 
of qualitative data (e. g. interview transcripts; fieldnotes) (e. g. Bryman & Burgess, 1994; Coffey 
and Atkinson, 1995). This involves the identification of core categories, patterns, themes, and 
regularities across large amounts of data, collected from a range of different sources (e. g. 
individual cases). Typically, core themes or categories are identified through multiple readings of 
the textualised data. The data are then coded or indexed according to these themes and categories 
and then re-organised according to these categories. This facilitates comparison across cases and 
the production of theoretically informed description. In ethnography and qualitative research, 
interpretation moves from the unique case or event to a description of general processes in order to 
produce theoretically informed description. Data are collected from an emic perspective and are 
then interpreted from an etic point of view (e. g. in relation to social or cultural theory). On this 
view, the overall aim of qualitative analysis is to develop theory. 
A3.2 Narrative analysis and a prototype concept of narrative 
Narrative analysis was the second interpretive framework that has been drawn upon in this thesis. 
In his description of the 'experience of illness' approach in medical sociology, Conrad (1990) 
expressed a preference for narrative over categorical analysis. On his view, the latter 'shatters' the 
data whilst narrative analysis stresses the importance of the sufferer's story, attending to form as 
well as content. In addition, a narrative-based approach provides a way of exploring the 
relationship between biographical events, social context, and the experiences of illness and distress. 
The concept of narrative and the narrative-based approach to discourse and social analysis were 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Here, the concept of narrativity is defined and a prototype 
definition of narrative is characterised. 
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Narrativity 
Carrithers (1990) has characterised 'narrativity' as the capacity for generating narrat, ves, a special 
kind of cognition that is 'embodied in narratives' involving the representation of 'complex nets of 
actions'. Still, 'narrativity' is only a property of the mind because it is a property of discourse. One 
way of thinking about narrative is as the function of a discursive process of narrativisation. 
'Narrativisation' involves the temporalisation and emplotment of events and happenings. 
'Temporalisation' refers to the active process of arranging representations of events and 
experiences into a temporal sequence or in a chronological order. 'Plot' specifies the logic of a 
narrative and involves the specification of causality. Ricoeur, for instance, defines 'plot' as 'the 
intelligible whole that governs a succession of events in any story' so that 'a story is made out of 
events to the extent that plot makes events into a story' (198 1b: 167). 'Emplotment' is a discursive 
process that specifies the causal relations between chronologised, organising them into a 
configuration of events. For instance, Somers has defined 'narrative' as: 'Constellations of 
relationships (connected parts) embedded in time and space constituted by causal emplotment' 
(1994: 616). Ricoeur describes the function of 'emplotment' as 'to compose a story' by deriving 'a 
configuration from a succession' (1991: 427). Embodied experiences and events take place in 
chronological time. Experiences are encoded in the body and discursive processes such as 
narrativisation symbolically re-configure them in order to generate new meanings. 'A narrative', 
then, is unit of discourse that has been narrativised. In narrative discourse, clauses, episodes, 
scenes, and events are ordered chronologically and emplotted in order to create an intelligible 
whole. 
Discourse units can be more or less narrativised and narratives can be more or less emplotted. For 
example, Chapters 3 and 4 discussed how discourse on illness and distress often exhibits narrative 
incoherence. Discrete stretches of narrativised talk often fall short of Labov's formal definition; 
oral narratives do not always re-capitulate discrete events in a temporal sequence or in the past 
tense. Narratives defined according to the formal definition differ from other kinds of narrative 
discourse units. For instance, 'generic narratives' deploy indefinite past tenses (e. g. would, used to) 
to describe how things happened in the past (Linde, 1986). Another type of narrative is the 
'pseudonarrative', a temporally ordered encoding [ ... ] of an essentially non-temporal structure' 
(Linde, 1986: 186). Moreover, narrativised discourse is often hypothetical, counterfactual, habitual, 
or 'low in narrativity' (Linde, 1992; Carranza, 1998). 12' For instance, in a study of American 
divorce stories, speakers made use of a variety of narrative genres to account for their experiences, 
including 'narratives' that told of habitual, repeated events or events that were difficult to locate 
temporally (Riessman, 1989). 
Experiences of illness and distress are commonly depicted as disruptive and disordered, with events 
that are overlapping, undefined, and recurrent. The discourse depicting such events regularly 
deviates from formal linguistic definitions of 'narrative'. This does not mean that narrativity is 
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absent. A more flexible notion of 'narrative' is required to facilitate the interpretation of such 
discourse. 
Conceptual resources for this task are available in the field of narratology (Bal, 1985; Prince, 
1982). Prince has developed a prototypical view of 'narrative' in which discourse is characterised 
as having more or less narrativity. 'Narrativity' is the property that narratives have in common, so 
that a prototypical narrative is a discursive construction that has a high degree of narrativity. Prince 
(1982) characterises a 'prototypical narrative' in terms of a set of properties including: a beginning- 
middle-end structure; a representation of discrete and positive events; temporalisation and the 
presence of a sequence of narrative clauses; the presence of a conflict situation; audience 
recognition that what is being told is a narrative. 
A stretch of discourse that is low in narrativity (i. e. a 'low-narrativity narrative') shares in these 
features, but not all of them (Carranza, 1998). For instance, the experiences being recounted may 
not involve discrete, neatly time-bounded events and, as such, may resist narrativisation. Causality 
often remains implicit or unspecified in such narratives. Instead, contextualised descriptions of 
events and experiences are presented. 
Interpretive framework for narrative analysis 
The approach to narrative analysis applied in the research reported here was adapted from 
Riessman's approach to the analysis of personal narratives and discrete narrative discourse units 
(Riessman, 1993,2002). Narrative analysis represents a distinctive interpretive genre in social 
science and has been used to conduct both social and discourse analysis of narrative accounts 
across a range of disciplines (including medical sociology and anthropology). Nonetheless, 
narrative analysis can be usefully situated within a broader discourse-analytic approach. After all, 
narrative is one among many symbolic forms available to speakers for expressing meaning and 
producing coherence in discourse. On this view, narrative analysis involves an explication of: how 
a narrative is organised; its ideational meaning; its social force and rhetorical function; the social 
context of its production; its constitutive power; the intertextual relations between personal 
narrative and public discourse. The framework used for the interpretation of narrativised discourse 
units has the following features: 
0 Detailed transcription of in-depth interviews. 
0 Identification of the point or function of the narrative. What is the social force of the 
narrativised discourse? How is the speaker using narrativity? 
* Selection of a sample of narrative segments or extended stretches of talk for detailed 
interpretation. Discourse is selected only within certain thematic domains. These domains are 
determined by the theoretical or research interests and questions of the interpreter. 
Extraction of the narrative segment(s). 
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0 Parsing into paragraphs (grouped by theme) and presentation of the excerpt(s) in numbered 
clauses. 124 
0 Identification of themes (i. e. recurring content) that contributes to the narrative's thematic 
coherence (i. e. What is the story about? ). Monks (1996) emphasises how these themes are 
related to notions of personhood in western cultural settings. They point to the speaker's core 
concems. 
9 Textual description in terms of structure"' and genre 
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- How does the discourse achieve 
narrative coherence? What degree of narrativity is present in the text? 
Identification of plot, major sub-plots, and root metaphors. 
Analysis of narrative rhetoric with particular attention to positioning and performance of self 
in personal narratives and the identification of 'narrative positions' and the different 
perspectives on experience that each affords (Monks, 1996; Riessman, 2001,2002; Hyden, 
1995a). "' 
0A comparative approach exploring similarities and differences among informants' narratives. 
0 Intertextuality. How does the speaker's narrative draw upon other cultural discourses? What 
public narratives do speakers employ in their self-presentations? 
Riessman (2002) points out that the boundaries of narrative discourse are rarely clearly defined. 
Where the boundaries of a particular narrative segment are set is partly by theoretical concerns. 
Some speakers mark out a story with exit and entry talk. According to Bruner (1990), the act of 
story telling has a number of features that differentiate it from other speech acts. A signal is made 
before a speech act is initiated which informs the listener that what is about to be said is a story; a 
preamble indicates whether or not it is a true story or a fictional one; the genre within which the 
narrative falls is usually indicated. 
This scheme represents a flexible analytic framework for analysis of both discrete narrative 
discourse units and personal narratives that typically unfold over the course of a conversation (See 
Chapter 3 for a definition of different levels of discourse). It is not a 'step-by-step' guide for how to 
do narrative analysis and particular features may be foregrounded over others depending on the 
interpretive aims of the researcher. 
A3.3 Rhetorical analysis: drama and trope 
There is a danger that a narrow focus on narrative in discourse and social analysis means that many 
important forms of symbolic activity become neglected. Discourse on health and illness is wrought 
out of metaphor and an array of figurative and discursive processes. Discourse on illness or distress 
are rhetorically employed by both sufferers and non-sufferers to achieve a range of social ends. 
Burke conceives of language as 'a species of action, symbolic action [ ... ] and its nature is such that 
it can be used as a tool' (1966: 248). Ricouer character'ses 'rhetor1c' as the art of 'saying i it well' 
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(1986: 10). The employment of rhetorical discourse partly aims at persuasion. According to Burke 
(1969), for instance, 'rhetoric' refers to the use of language that aims to manipulate the response of 
the audience through symbolic means. 
Chapters 2 and 3 described some of the discursive concepts that make up the interpretive repertoire 
of medical anthropologists. These can be viewed as different kinds of rhetoric that speakers use to 
perform a variety of social tasks and include, for instance: trope (e. g. metaphor and metoný, my); 
explanation; dramatisation; and subject positioning. Narratives can also be interpreted as a form of 
rhetoric. "' 
Trope 
'Trope' refers to the figurative use of language. 'Figures of speech', for instance, are examples of 
tropes. A 'figure of speech' is language that deviates from ordinary language to achieve some 
special meaning (Abrams, 1981). Three of the most common tropes are discussed here: 'metaphor', 
'synecdoche', and 'metonyrn'. 
Burke defines 'metaphor' as a point of view on something, as a 'device for seeing one thing in 
terms of another', or as a way of looking at something in terms of something else with which there 
is a resemblance (1969: 503). 'Metaphors' convey non-literal meaning. They provide speakers with 
a symbolic means of constructing new meanings in terms of existing ones. In this way, 'metaphor' 
represents an opportunity for individual creation. New, uncertain, or unfamiliar experiences trigger 
what Fernandez (1986) calls the 'play of tropes'. Metaphor symbolically mediates the relationship 
between body and consciousness, and provides a creative means of representing inchoate 
experiences and situations (Fernandez, 1982,1996). The provision of a stock of metaphors for 
articulating and organising experience is one of the principal symbolic pathways through which 
culture constitutes illness experience and personal distress. 
Lakoff and Johnson characterise metaphor as a mode of representation, a mode of understanding, 
and as a psychological construct or entity. They argue that the 'primary function' of metaphor is as 
a mode of understanding in which one thing is conceived in terms of another (1980: 36). 
Nonetheless, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphor and metonymy are more than 
mere figments of discourse, or modes of understanding. They are figurative concepts that structure 
experience (thought, feeling, and action). Lakoff and Johnson say how metaphor involves 
experiencing 'one thing in terms of another'. However, they reify metaphorical discourse as a 
4construct' or an 'entity' that has partial independence from language: 'metaphor' becomes a 
cognitive scheme rather than a figure of speech. On this psychological view of metaphor, 
metaphorical discourse merely signifies extra- I ingui stic metaphorical concepts and cognitive 
processes. 
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Ricoeur, on the other hand, interprets metaphor as a discursive event. He emphasises the creative 
function of metaphor when he calls it 'a momentary creation in language' or 'a semantic 
innovation'. It is both 'a strategy of discourse' and a 'rhetorical process by which discourse 
unleashes the power that certain fictions have to re-describe reality' (1986: 7). Metaphor as a 
discursive event centres on the 'metaphorical word'; yet the meaning of metaphor is conveyed by 
the 'metaphorical statement' within which this word is embedded (Ricoeur, 1991: 305). 
A 'metonym' is a figure of speech where one thing is used to stand for another and where they 
have been closely related together in experience (Abrams, 1981). Lakoff and Johnson present an 
entity-based definition of 'metonymy' as the use of 'one entity to refer to another that is related to 
it' (1980: 35). They also depict it as a mode of representation. On this view, 'metonymy' 'has 
primarily a referential function' in that it 'allows us to use one entity to stand for another' (1980: 
36). Burke, on the other hand, characterises 'metonymy' as a special kind of synecdoche that 
involves a reduction. 'Metonymy', he says, is unidirectional, and moves 'from a quality to a 
quantity', mind to matter, incorporeal to corporeal, intangible to tangible, abstract to concrete 
(1969: 509). 
'Synecdoche' is a form of representation in which one thing is used to stand for another thing, for 
instance, where the part is figuratively used to stands for the whole (Abrams, 198 1). Lakoff and 
Johnson (1980), on the other hand, interpret 'synecdoche' as a special form of metonymy in which 
the part stands for the whole. Burke (1969) gives the example of a cause standing for an effect, an 
effect for a cause, or an equation where the equivalence is bi-directional. For instance, a symptom 
that signifies an underlying disease process is a kind of synecdoche. Burke describes the 'noblest 
synecdoche' as the identity of microcosm and macrocosm (1969: 508). 
The drama of social relations 
According to Turner, processes of social experience are composed of sequences of events and the 
internal responses to them (1986: 35). These events and processes are driven by social structure 
(i. e. 'relations which are relatively constant and consistent' (Turner, 1981: 147)). The 'social 
drama' is a spontaneous 'structure of experience', a 'protoaesthetic' form that patterns social 
processes and a community's movement through time (Turner, 1981,1986). It has four stages: 
breach; crisis; redress; schism or reintegration. The social drama begins with 'a breach' in the 
6customary order of group life' (1986: 39) in which 'a person or subgroup breaks a rule, 
deliberately or by inward compulsion, in a public settings. Conflicts between individuals, and 
factions follow the original breach, revealing hidden clashes of character, interest, and ambition' 
(1986: 35). As this breach in the social order grows, it comes to threaten the unity and continuity of 
the group; the crisis phase involves a 'juncture in relations, resulting in conflict'. It is in this phase 
that the underlying structural contradictions that generated the breach become 'slowly visible'. In 
order to linut the spread of the breach, redressive mechanisms or adjustments are implemented (e. g. 
redressive rituals, prophylactic life-crIsIs ceremonies, or rituals of affliction). Like initiatory rites, 
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these redressive rituals contain within them a 'liMinal phase' in which the individual is detached 
from everyday life and ordinary pre-occupatIons: 'a no-man's land betwixt and between the 
structural past and the structural future' (1986: 41). The nature of these redressive mechanisms 
varies according to the nature of the crisis. They can include, for instance, personal advice, 
arbitration, legal proceedings, and the performance of public rituals (1981: 147). Fourth, if these 
redressive measures are successful, then the endpoint of the process is re-integration. If these 
measures to redress the situation fail or are absent, then this increases the chance that a more deep- 
seated social schism or breakdown in group life will occur. 
Turner argued that there is a dialectical relationship between the real social dramas as they are lived 
(as described above) and 'genres of cultural performance' (e. g. the aesthetic form of the stage 
drama) (1981: 149). Stage drama, for instance, is rooted in social processes and 'recurrent forms of 
social experience - social dramas'. Conversely, Turner maintained that 'the aesthetic form of the 
theatre is inherent in the sociocultural' (1986: 42). The lived-out social drama relies on an 'implicit 
rhetorical structure' that draws on 'theatrical and fictional models' (1981: 150). 
Burke's 'dramatism' articulates the structure of an Anglo-American discourse on agency grounded 
in the root metaphors of narrative and drama. 'Dramatism' is a technique for analysing language 
not in terms of the information it conveys, its signification, but as modes of action. Burke asks, for 
instance: 'What is involved, when we say what people are doing and why they are doing iff 
'Dramatism' has two functions in social analysis. On the one hand, it provides a conceptual 
framework for a social theory about human relations (Ruekert, 1982) and for interpreting discourse 
as a social practice (Watson, 1973). Burke's 'dramatistic' framework provides a way of describing 
this dynamic aspect of narrative discourse in terms of the motivation of an action or experience. An 
account of the motive of an act or event involves specifying each of the following: 
0 'Act' refers to 'what happened in thought or deed' (Burke, 1969: XV). 
0 'Scene' refers to 'the background to the act; the situation in which it occurred'; 'the scene 
contains the act'. 'Scene', for example, includes proximate social setting, social structure, 
communal ideology and cultural practices (1969: 3). 
0 'Agent' refers to the person who 'performed the act' (1996: XV) and "embraces not only all 
words general or specific for person, actor, character, individual, hero, villain, father, doctor, 
engineer, but also any words, moral or functional, for patient, and words for the motivational 41) 
properties of agents, such as 'drives, ' 'instincts, ' 'states of rmnd'. "(1969: 20). 
'Agency' refers to the 'means or instruments used' to achieve a particular purpose (1969: XV). 
0 'Purpose' refers to 'why the act/event took place'. For instance, it refers to the goals of the 
person perfom-iing an action (1969: XV). 
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The relations between terms of this 'pentad' are specified in Burke's theory of rhetoric. He 
describes the relationships between the elements of the pentad as 'principles of determination' or 
4 ratios'. These make up the 'motive' of the event, act, or experience and can be located in the 
agent, in a quality of an agent, or in some aspect of the scene or setting. 
The 'scene-act ratio' articulates the interdependency of act and scene. Either the 'scene contains the 
act', or the ratio can be reversed and the act can modify or change some feature of the scene or 
setting. In Burke's scheme, the scene-agent ratio is the relationship of person to place, the 
correlation between the qualities inherent in the scene and the qualities of those agents who are cast 
into it. Burke gives the example of brutalizing situations that yield brutalised characters. Here 
'scene' becomes the 'motive-force' behind the qualities of the person or agent. The concept of 'a 
role' articulates this relationship. Burke says that 'a role' is 'summed up in slogans [ ... ] that 
characterise the agent's situation or strategy [ ... ] The 'role' involves properties both intrinsic to the 
agent and developed with relation to the scene and other agents' (Burke, 1969: 511). 'A role', then, 
incorporates both the agent's characteristics and the agent's relationships with others. 
Another ratio is relevant here, particularly as a way of conceptuallsing how life events form the 
agent and how biographical experience constitutes selfhood. The 'act-agent ratio', the ratio of self- 
determination, is the relationship between the action and the agent, the relation here being temporal 
or consequential where the 'agent is the author of his acts'. Where there is a high degree of 
'consistency' between act and agent, action takes place in accordance with the qualities of the 
agent, rather than in response to features of the scene or setting. 
Positioning 
In their discourse on illness or suffering, speakers actively perform and position themselves and 
their experience. Some contemporary narrative analysts have turned their attention to the 
performative function of narrative and the active production of meaning and the presentation of the 
self (e. g. Monks, 1996; Riessman, 2001,2002). English speakers use a variety of grammatical 
devices and discursive forms to position themselves in their accounts and to represent their agency 
in relation to what is being recounted. I have emphasised the role of narrativity in this respect. For 
instance, narrators may position themselves: in relation to the audience; as persons occupying a 
social role; as agents in control of the action depicted; as passive receivers of such action; and they 
often position themselves in their discourse in ways that present a 'preferred self' or in ways that 
are consistent with their social identity (Riessman, 2001). Harr6 and Van Langenhove define 
'positioning' as 'the assignment of fluid 'parts' or 'roles' to speakers in the discursive construction 
of personal stories' (1991: 7). For instance, the way that speakers position themselves in their talk 
about illness or suffering expresses their moral viewpoint on what has taken place (Hyden, 1995a, 
1995b; Riessman, 1990). 
191 
A3.4 Interpretive framework for discourse analysis 
The final interpretive framework drawn upon in this research was that of discourse analysis. The 
aim of discourse analysis is the systematic interpretation of discourse typically fixed in texts. This 
involves a description of central features of such texts, how coherence and meaning are achieved 
and an account of how the text was produced. Fairclough's approach to discourse analysis was 
adapted for use in this research (Fairclough, 1992). For other approaches to discourse analysis see 
Burman and Parker (1993), Van Dijk (1985), and Gee (1990). 
Language has many functions and so discourse can convey multiple meanings. For instance, 
language can be viewed as a system of signs (de Saussure, 1993); as text (Barthes, 1977); as a 
means of expression (Taylor, 1985); as speech act (Austin, 1962); as 'symbolic action' (Burke, 
1966); as tool (Wittgenstein, 1978); as an acquired linguistic competence determined by an innate 
cognitive language faculty (Chomsky, 1976: 40-43); as cultural practice (Duranti, 1997); as social 
practice (Fairclough, 1992). These multiple functions of language means that discourse can be 
interpreted from a range of different perspectives. As Fairclough says: 'Texts are usually highly 
ambivalent and open to multiple interpretations' (1992: 75). Broadly speaking, three types of 
linguistic meaning can be usefully distinguished: sense, reference, and social force. Similarly, 
following Halliday (1978), Fairclough points to three interdependent functions of language: textual, 
ideational or referential, and interpersonal. Sense can be distinguished from reference. What is said 
(text) is distinct from about what it is said (ideational meaning) (Ricoeur, 1991). The sense of 
discourse (e. g. a word, a sentence, or a text) refers to its 'immanent design', the architecture of the 
text and its semantic context within a broader discourse. The meaning of discourse also depends on 
its relationship with the extra-linguistic. As Ricoeur has said, reference points in two directions: 
outwards, towards the world; and inwards, reflectively towards the self. Fairclough (1992) calls this 
the 'ideational function' of discourse - what it is being used to express or say about the world. This 
function of discourse also includes a constitutive function, the 'role of discourse in constituting, 
reproducing, challenging, and restructuring systems of knowledge and belief' (Fairclough, 1992: 
169). 
'Speech' is also a form of social action (Burke, 1969) and the meaning of any speech act is a matter 
of both convention and intention (Searle, 1965). On the one hand, 'speech' is produced by 'a being 
with intentions' in order to perform a range of illocutionary acts. On the other, 'speech acts' are 
governed by conventions and 'rules of use'. One function of language use is to produce an effect in 
the listener or audience. Austin (1962) called this the 'force' of the linguistic act. The linguistic act 
and the intention behind the act are distinct. As Ricouer says: "What is said of the subject is one 
thing: what I 'do' in saying that is another thing: I may make a mere description, or give an order, 
or formulate a wish, or give a warning, etc. Hence the polarity between the locutionary act (the act 
of saying) and the illocutionary act (that which I do in saying)" (1991: 306). The interpretation of 
any speech act must therefore take into account the agency of the speaker. To say that speakers use 
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discourse (e. g. narratives and explanations) to perform a range of social tasks is to say that 
discursive acts are partly a function of such agency and that the interpretation of discourse is 
therefore contingent on a view about human agency. In the end, the interpretation of lay and expert, 
popular and biomedical discourse on illness and distress is fundamentally indeterminate. This is 
partly because the meaning of a discourse unit is contingent on the agency and creativity of 
producers and receivers of discourse. 
Moreover, discourse partly constitutes identities and the social relations upon which they depend. 
Fairclough distinguishes between two interpersonal functions of language: an 'identity' and a 
'relational' function (1992: 64) (See section on 'discourse as social practice' below for a more 
detailed account of this). 
Discourse analysis applied to ethnographic texts 
The first scheme of discourse analysis employed in this thesis was that of Agar and Hobbs (1982). 
They tailored a discourse-analytic approach to the interpretation of ethnographic data centred on an 
analysis of three types of coherence: thematic, global, and local. 'Thematic coherence' refers to the 
threads of thematic unity or chunks of content that recur producing coherence in the text. Themes 
might also include the use of particular discursive devices or narrative strategies. Within Agar and 
Hobbs' interpretive scheme, the 'local coherence' of discourse refers to the coherence relations or 
'relations of continuation' between utterances and larger discursive segments. These include 
relations of elaboration, narrative, logical relations, relations of reversal, contrast, association, 
temporality, explanation, and so on. Narrative relations between clauses or utterances are therefore 
only one of the many ways that speakers achieve coherence in discourse. 'Global coherence' refers 
to the relation of individual utterances or sequences of utterances to the overall global goals of the 
speaker, what the speaker is doing with his/her speech. The speaker is assumed to develop a 
6conversational or narrative plan' or strategy (Agar and Hobbes, 1982: 5) with sub-goals so that the 
speech is regulated by this plan as well as by the social context in which the speech is produced 
(e. g. the responses of the audience or listener). 
Agar and Hobbes' ethnographic approach to discourse analysis, however, was found to have many 
limitations. First, it ignores the social and constitutive functions of discourse and the relationship 
between a discourse unit and wider public discourses. Second, this approach places too much 
emphasis on the concept of 'coherence' so that sense, reference, and force become confused. Third, 
this framework ignores the social context of discourse production. Fourth, its account of textual 
analysis (e. g. in terms thematic, local, and global coherence) is limited; it is unclear how the three 
types of coherence systematically relate in the production of a text. A broader framework is 
therefore required, a framework grounded in a social theory of discourse. 
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A framework for interpreting discourse 
According to Ricouer, the hen-neneutic interpretation of discourse hinges on the relationship 
between 'sense' (what is said and its internal organisation) and 'reference' (what it is said about, 'a 
power to refer to reality outside of language' (1986: 6)). Similarly, discourse analysis aims to trace 
the explanatory connections between: the sense of a text, how it is constructed; its referential or 
ideational meaning; its social force; how it is produced, distributed, and consumed; the social 
practices that it forms part of (e. g. its constitutive power) (Fairclough, 1992). Fairclough's 
approach to discourse analysis has three dimensions: (a) textual analysis; (b) discursive practice; 
(c) social practice. Textual analysis is descriptive, while interpretation involves an account of the 
discursive and social functions of the text. 
(a) Textual analysis 
'A text' refers to a unit of either spoken or written language (Halliday, 1978). The first dimension 
of Fairclough's scheme for discourse analysis (textual analysis) involves a description of 'what 
elements and episodes are combined in what ways and what order' (Fairclough, 1992: 75). Textual 
analysis involves a description of a text's structure, how it achieves cohesion, grammar, and 
vocabulary. For instance, textual analysis involves describing how sentences are linked together to 
form larger units; that is, how cohesion is achieved using a variety of semantic and syntactic 
devices (e. g. themes, repetition, synonyms, metaphors). Textual analysis involves an explication of 
text structure. The units of textual analysis range from an entire manuscript, paragraphs, sentences, 
and words. These elements may include for instance units of text at different levels: narratives, 
explanations, idiomatic phrases, wording, lexicalisation, and so on. Textual analysis also involves 
describing the vocabulary used in the text (e. g. metaphor, idiom, classification, etc. ). 'Idiom', for 
instance, has become a central analytic term in interpretive medical anthropology. Everyday 
English talk in is full of idiomatic terms and phrases that do not always comply with the strict 
grammar of the language. From a grammatical point of view, an 'idiom' is 'a compound word or 
phrase whose meaning is not deducible from the meaning of the words of which it is composed' 
(Davidson, 1996: 27). Because of their non-literal meaning, idiomatic phrases depend for their 
comprehension on shared local meanings. 
(b) Discursive practice 
According to Fairclough, the interpretation of texts takes place at two levels. At the first level, 
interpretation aims to elucidate the 'processes of text Production'. Fairclough highlights three 
features of discursive practice: force, coherence, and intertextuality. The 'force of a text' is its 
6action component', what it is used to do socially (Fairclough, 1992). A 'coherent text' is one in 
which the parts are related in such a way that the whole makes sense (1992: 83). According to 
Fairclough, 'coherence' is a feature of interpretation rather than of texts and so can be distinguished 
from relations of 'cohesion' within a text. 'Intertextuality' refers to the relationships between texts: 
'The property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly 
demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so 
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forth' (1992: 84). An analysis of a text's intertextuality involves an account of the relationships 
between the discourse represented in the text and the resources that are drawn upon to produce the 
text. For example, this might involve accounting for a particular text in terms of public narratives 
about gender or illness. 
(c) Social practice 
Discursive events are represented linguistically in texts, but they are also a fonn of social practice. 
At this level of interpretation, discourse analysis aims to account for texts in ten-ns of their role in 
'wider social practices' (Fairclough, 1992: 198). The production and interpretation of discourse is 
determined by the kinds of social practices that they form part of. Fairclough says, for instance, that 
'texts are produced in specific ways in specific social contexts' (1992: 78). 'Discursive practices' 
are contingent on more than just the social context of language use. They are contingent on social 
structure. 
Moreover, viewing discourse as a 'social practice' means foregrounding its constitutive power. 
Discourse more than just represents or signifies the world. It constitutes it. Fairclough points to 
three ways in which it is 'socially' constitutive, distinguishing between the relational and the 
ideational functions of discourse. First, discourse as a social practice constructs social identities and 
subject positions. Second, it contributes to the production and reproduction of social relations and 
social structure (class, norms, conventions, class) (1992: 64). Third, discourse as social practice has 
an 'ideational' function in that it contributes to the production of belief and knowledge. The 
constitutive power and the ideological function of discourse are discussed in more detail in the next 
section. 
The constitutive force of discourse 
Following Dilthey, Bruner distinguishes between 'reality', 'experience', and its 'expression'. The 
relationship between experience and its symbolic expression is dialectical; while 'experience 
structures expressions', 'expressions also structure experience' (Bruner, 1986a: 6). A society's 
indigenous psychology is articulated in a cultural discourse on the self and body. Through the 
dialectical process of 'socialisation', emerging 'selves' come to interpret themselves and others in 
terms of such a discourse. Agency and experience are partly constituted hermeneutically and, 
therefore, discursively. Taylor emphasises the constitutive function of language when he says that 
it 'not only serve to depict the world and ourselves, it also helps to constitute our lives. Certain 
ways of being, of feeling, of relating to each other are only possible given certain linguistic 
resources' (1985: 10-11). Moreover, Taylor points out that since languages and patterns of social 
relations vary cross-culturally, the ways that 'selves' are constituted and how they articulate their 
distinctions of worth are also bound to vary across cultures. 
In developed English-speaking societies such as Britain, selves are partly constituted in a dominant 
Euro-American discourse on the self, body, and society. "' This discourse articulates a Euro- 
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American folk psychology. Chapter 2 pointed out that the dominant discourse on the self in 
developed English-speaking societies depicts a disengaged view of agency and an indiv, dualised, 
psychological concept of the self. This fails to take into account the social contingency of agency, 
that 'an individual is constituted by the language and culture which can only be maintained and 
renewed in the communities he is part of' (Taylor, 1985: 8). 
'Agency' is articulated in English discourse using a variety of grammatical and figurative devices 
and discursive forms. The English language furnishes members of English speech communities 
with the linguistic resources, and interpretive frameworks for making sense of, classifyingo 
expressing, accounting for, and explaining action and experience. English speakers make strategic 
use of pronouns, case, voice, and subject positioning to represent the person and to partly constitute 
their agency. Harre and Muhlhausler (1990), for instance, have argued that, in English-speaking 
societies, a dualistic, bifurcated concept of 'the person' is constituted by English grammatical 
constructions. They characterise English pronominal usage by a double indexicality in which the 
first person pronoun 'F indexes and positions a speaker-subject whilst indexing the body of the 
speaker as object, as a passive centre of experience. 
Narrative discourse partly constitutes action and experience (Mattingly, 1998; Gergen and Gergen, 
1983; MacIntyre, 1984). Riessman says that narratives 'construct experience by telling about it' 
(1993: 40). As with metaphor, the strategic language user draws on the stock of scripts available in 
the speech community 130 to which they belong to create new story lines out of existing materials to 
achieve a variety of social ends. Since the discursive process of narrating is creative and is a 
function of the narrator's agency, how the story will end can never be predicted in advance. 
Through narrativisation, autobiographical memories are reorganised into a 'narrative of the self' 
(Neisser and Fivush, 1994) or experience is configured into a 'self-narrative' (Gergen and Gergen, 
1983). This narrativisation process draws on cultural discourses on the self. These cultural 
discourses depict and articulate agency and embody a society's core values, its distinctions of 
worth. For instance, in late capitalist English-speaking societies such as Britain, 'the self' is 
commonly conceived as an individual life project, a personal narrative that bridges the gap between 
cradle and grave. The idea of 'biography' itself has become a popularised cultural template for 
identity production within highly individualised western societies. 
According to Bruner, such narratives of the self have constitutive power; they form 'recipes for 
structuring experience' (1987: 31). Speakers draw on the collective narratives of the speech 
community to which they belong in order to perform their own self-stories (Somers, 1994; Linde, 
1996; Skultans, 1997). Somers, for instance, maintains that 'people are guided to act in certain 
c ways, and not others, on the basis of projections, expectations, and memories from a multipli ity 
but ultimately limited repertoire of available social, public, and cultural narratives'. Such narratIN, es 
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are 'attached to cultural and institutional formations larger than the single individual', for example, 
'the narratives of one's family' or 'those of the workplace (organisational myths), church. 
government and nation' (1994: 619). These relational settings and the social practices that take 
place within them are the pathways through which culturally available narratives are assirrillated 
and accommodated by individuals. In addition, macro social and economic forces (systemic 
properties of societies) impinge and partly constitute these processes of self-making through their 
impact on the local social spaces that individuals inhabit: 
People's experiences as workers, for example, are inextricably interconnected with 
the larger matrix of relations that shaped their lives - their regional locations, the 
practical workings of the legal system, family patterns - as well as the particular 
stories (of honour, of ethnicity, of gender, of local community, of greed, etc. ) used 
to account for the events that happening to them ... I Identity-formation takes shape 
within these relational settings of contested but patterned relations among 
narratives, people, and institutions. 
Somers, 1994: 625-6 
Discursive practices both express and constitute social position. Different social identities are 
associated with different ways of talking and differences in how feeling and thought are 
symbolised. In addition, it is through participation in discursive practices that people come to 
constitute and interpret themselves relative to their social position(s). As Fairclough says, 
"discourse contributes first of all to the construction of what are variously referred to as 'social 
identities' and 'subject positions' for social 'subjects' and types of 'self' " (1992: 64). Similarly, 
Kirmayer maintains that 'narratives of the self act to position the person in place and time vis-a-vis 
family, community, larger social and political institutions' (2002: 126). In late capitalist societies, 
these cultural discourses partly constitute identity in relation to a structure of social positions 
defined by relations of class, power, race, marriage, and kinship. 
Wittgenstein (1978) maintained that 'language' is a fundamentally public phenomenon, that the 
idea of a 'private language' is incoherent. Moreover, 'discourse' is partly constituted by the social 
context of its production, the social identity of speakers, and the linguistic resources available to 
them as members of a speech community. In this sense, communities are formed through dialogue 
and conversation. Language mediates between person and society and is the principal 'symbolic 
process' through which social relations are constituted. Ingold (1986), for instance, says that the 
primary process in talk is the unfolding of social relations. Speaking and talking are primary 
sources of sociality and personhood and 'facilitate forms of social action in a field of constitutive 
social relations which are themselves the sources of meaning' (1986: 25). Discursive practices 
articulate the relationship between body and society and partly constitute the relational settings that 
mediate the impact of social structures on the individual. 
The concept of 'Ideology' plays a central role in critical social theory. For Keat and Urry, for 
instance, the critical analysis of 'ideology' involves forming an account of how social formations 
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and structural processes generate and sustain subjective beliefs. Such analysis involves 'an 
examination of the ways in which people perceive, and act in, the situations located within these 
structures' (1975: 278). Instead of viewing 'ideology' as a reified set of ideas 131 , it can be usefully 
viewed as a property of discourse. Fairclough has shown how language is penetrated by power and 
social structure. On this view, 'discourse' represents 'a mode of political and ideological practice' 
(1992: 67). Ideological discourse, for example, represents 'internalised social structures, norms and 
conventions' (1992: 187). Discourse is ideological to the extent that it reproduces or legitimises 
power relations and incorporates 'significations which contribute to sustaining or restructuring 
power relations' (Fairclough, 1992: 91). On this view, discourse as an ideological practice 
contributes to the production and reproduction of existing power relations and social structure. 
Fairclough says, for instance, that 'discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and 
changes power relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) between 
which power relations entertain' (1992: 67). 
'Social structure', in turn, conditions the relational settings inhabited by individuals, constraining 
the possibilities of action and experience. For instance, Lock and Scheper-Hughes point to the 
'codes and social scripts' that work to support social structures partly by configuring selves in a 
way that makes them vulnerable to illness and distress: 
Whenever inequalities and hierarchy are institutionalised, they will of necessity be 
imposed by means of a dominant cultural ideology, which is likely to inflict a 
negative self-image, distress, and often ill health on the underprivileged and 
disenfranchised. 
Lock and Scheper-Hughes, 1996: 44 
Nonetheless, it is important not to overstate the case for the constitutive power of discourse. For 
instance, the relationship between discourse and embodied experience is dialectical. While 
speakers creatively use linguistic symbols to express their bodily and social experiences, in the last 
instance, their talk is constrained by the embodied nature of such experience. For instance, while 
narratives partly constitute lives, they simultaneously encode the speakers' agency and mimic the 
structure of human action (Mattingly, 1998). 
A3.5 Topic guide 
The following themes were covered in the in-depth interviews with informants in the two Bristol 
samples: 
0 Personal and social characteristics (e. g. age, employment status, occupation, marital status, 
family type) 
tress (e. g. stress, fear, panic, depression, anxiety, etc. ) The experience of personal ds 
The meaning and causes of discourse on distress 
Biographical context of distress 
Coping 
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" Social support 
" Social response to dlistress and mental-health difficulties 
" Help seeking and contact with professionals 
Consequences of distress (e. g. impact of distress on work, relationships, social identity) 
Experience of recovery 
Experience of treatment and diagnosis 
In-depth interviews with St. Helenians who had experienced personal distress or illness covered 
these same themes. However, informal interviews meetings in St. Helena also covered a broad 
range of social themes and issues. In addition to the above, the following themes were appended to 
the topic guide in-depth interviews with St. Helenian informants. This list evolved as the fieldwork 
proceeded and indexes some of the core themes to emerge in discussions with St. Helenians. To 
some extent, the remainder of the topic guide therefore represents some of the core concerns of St. 
Helenians: 
Experience of living on St. Helena 
St. Helenian identity; Britishness and British citizenship 
" Family and social roles 
" Employment and unemployment 
" Social and economic adversity 
" Migration 
" Normalising practices (e. g. gossip, ostracism, and stigma) 
" Life history and biography 
" Experience and beliefs relating to health and illness 
" Understandings about emotions and mental health 
" Social response to distress and mental health difficulties 
A3.6 Interpretation of the Bristol data 
A 'framework approach' to qualitative analysis was used in the thematic analysis of the data from 
the combined samples (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). "' The first step was a 'farruliarisation' process 
through which core themes were identified. Some of these themes were pre-specified in the 
research questions and in the central theoretical concepts guiding the research. Others were 
grounded in the data. These categories were organised under three overarching domains of content: 
the experience of distress and its consequences; the meaning of distress (e. g. explanation, 
narration); and the experience of social support, coping, social response, treatment, and recovery. 
This yielded a coding frame that was then systematically applied to the transcripts (See below). "I 
Three charts were constructed, one for each content domain. The columns of each chart 
corresponded with the core categories identified within each 
domain, while the rows represented zn I 
individual cases. "' The data was then coded"' using this 
framework of cate-jories. Text C) 1= 
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corresponding with these categories was then lifted from their original context in the transcripts and 
arranged according to thematic category in three sets of tables. Instances of each category were 
indexed in the table with a key word or 'emergent code', a distilled summary of the textual data 
phrase and illustrative quotes with a textual reference (i. e. line number). Emergent codes close to 
the data were recorded in the charts in repeated readings of the data and interpretive notes were 
taken examining relationships and patterns in the texts developing theoretical concepts grounded in 
the data. The use of trope, idiomatic phrases, and explanations were also noted in these charts. 
During this farrfiliarisation phase, discrete narrative excerpts and extended stretches of narrativised 
discourse were marked out for more detailed interpretation later and these were categorised 
according to the core themes running through them. 
The Bristol fieldwork was limited in a variety of ways. The urban setting in which the fieldwork 
was conducted limited the kinds of theoretical questions that could be asked. In addition, the 
recruitment strategies were only partially successful. This was partly a question of access and 
resources, but also the reflected the sensitivity surrounding the topic of the research. Ideally, a 
community survey would have been conducted in order to select a small sample of informants in 
defined geographical area. Although such a survey was considered at the outset, the logistical 
resources that would have been required to carry out such a survey were not available. The two 
methods described were therefore deployed. 
Thematic framework used to interpret the Bristol data 
Content domain 1: Experience and expression of distress 
0 Personal distress as illness 
0 The vicissitudes of mood 
0 Emotional distress and vocabularies of emotion 
Idioms of distress 
0 Embodiment of distress 
0 Loss of agency and human behavioural breakdown 
0 Social disconnection and biographical disruption 
Content domain 2: The meaning of distress 
Biographical explanations (e. g. childhood; relationships; loss; work-related; etc. ) 
Biomedical explanations 
Psychological or character-based explanations 
Contingent narratives; contexualised accounts of personal distress 
Content domain 3: Experience of support, coping, treatment, and recovery 
Ways of coping 
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" Social support and social response 
" Doctor-patient encounter and diagnosis 
" Experience of treatment 
" Non-medical professional 'help' 
" Experience of recovery 
A3.7 Interpretation of the St. Helena data 
Fieldwork on St. Helena was followed by an extended period of transcription, classification, and 
collation preceding analysis and interpretation. All interviews were fully transcribed verbatim. Data 
from St. Helena included field notes, interview transcripts, correspondence, primary documents, 
notes from documentary sources, demographic, social and economic data; information about health 
and social care on the island. A different approach was therefore needed to interpret this data than 
was applied to the Bristol data. In a series of readings of this material ('fatnillarisation'), the data 
was indexed and organising concepts and themes were identified. These were organised into the 
thematic framework presented in the following section. Burke's 'dramatistic' framework was used 
as a broad overarching framework for interpreting the fieldwork data. "' The data were organised 
into these broad thematic categories and relationships were systematically explored between them. 
The theoretical interpretation of the data was refined through multiple readings in a cyclical 
process. Detailed interpretive notes were taken elucidating these theoretical concepts (e. g. 'stigma' 
or 'worry') and their relationships. Moreover, this process of interpretation continued into the 
writing up phase; this represented the final stage in the overall interpretation of the data in terms of 
its interplay with theory. 
Thematic framework used to interpret the St. Helena data 
(1) 'Scene' 
(a) 'Relational setting' 
" Financial or economic adversity 
" Work/employment and relationships 
" Social capital and social support 
" Social roles and social position 
" Stigma, ostracism, isolation, disconnection, exclusion 
" Migration 
(b) 'Distal setting9 
0 Economy (e. g. unemployment, labour migration, low pay) 
0 Political institutions and statutory services (e. g. the organisation of healthcare and social 
welfare - interaction of social welfarelhealth-care systems; social security system; housing) 
Religious institutions and practices 
0 Social structure 
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Geographical/envirom-nental setting (e. g. remoteness, scarcity) 
Normalising practices 
(2) 'Action' and 'experience' 
" Social adversity/negative life events 
" Experience of personal distress 
" Experience of chronic illness 
" Consequences of distress and illness (e. g. impact on relationships, work) 
" Therapeutic process (e. g. encounter with doctor or other healer; treatment; diagnosis) 
Recovery 
(3) 'Agent' 
0 Personal and social characteristics (e. g. social and cultural, marital status, age, gender, socio- 
economic position) 
0 Knowledge and belief (e. g. discourse on self, body, illness, distress, society) 
0 Biography 
(4) 'Agency' 
In Burke's scheme, 'agency' is defined as the purpose of the action moving the drama forward. I 
use the term 'agency' polysemously to mean: an agent's sense of purpose; the capacity or power 
for action; a property of the self, and the conditions that make meaningful action possible 
(including discursive action). 
A3.8 A small-scale community survey 
The self-administered, 12-item General Health Questionnaire (GHQ-12) is a screening instrument 
designed to identify 'common mental disorders' and to differentiate psychiatric from non- 
psychiatric cases in community samples (Goldberg, 1978; Goldberg and Williams, 1988). It has 
been used widely in community-based epidemiological surveys of psychological distress (e. g. 
Weich et al, 2001). The GHQ-12 forms a composite scale that aims to indicate changes in mental 
state and breaks in normal functioning (i. e. in the previous few weeks). The items of the scale ask 
about the presence or absence of common signs of mental distress (e. g. difficulties sleeping or 
concentrating). A high score on the scale indicates the possible presence of psychological ill health. 
The GHQ- 12 was developed for use within the UK and is grounded in an expert view of what 
constitutes English lay discourse on distress (for example, it uses the term 'tonic'). The underlying 
assumption is that the discourse used to articulate distress across all English-speaking societies and 
across different social categories is the same. As fieldwork on St. Helena proceeded, it became 
clear that 'headaches' were a common idiom of distress among St. Helenians. Partly in response to 
a suggestion from St. Helena's CMO, the GHQ-12 was supplemented with an additional question 
asking respondents whether they had suffered from 'headaches'. The questionnaire was then 
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piloted in interviews with a few St. Helenian informants. Based on these responses, the wording of 
the GHQ-12 was modified so that St. Helenians could more readily understand it. 
Each item on the scale was scored positively or negatively yielding a score out of 12 (excluding the 
'headaches' item). A recent British study used a score of three as a threshold in order to identify 
cases of 'common mental disorder' in a community-based survey (Weich et al, 2001). In the 
screening exercise reported here, a much lower threshold was applied; if any (at least one) of the 
items were scored positively, then this was taken to indicate the possible presence of psychological 
ill health or mental distress. 
The questionnaire was sent with a covering letter explaining the nature of the research to all the 
adults in the chosen district. A combination of St. Helena's telephone directory and the 1998 
electoral register (SHG, 1998) was used to compile a sampling list of all those resident in the 
outlying district. A number of adults living in the district were not listed on either. Of the 
approximately 232 adults living in this outlying district, around one in ten had left the island since 
the last census and some had relocated to another part of the island. This highlighted the degree to 
which the district was 'closed' or 'bounded'. There were therefore 194 valid cases (excluding those 
who had migrated). Of those listed, 84% were still resident in the outlying district. Only 71 (around 
37% of valid cases) returned the self-administered GHQ-12. In some cases, the questionnaire was 
administered by telephone or face-to-face interview. 
The average age of respondents was 49 and over 60% of respondents were over 45. This high 
representation of older people may have been partly because a high proportion of St. Helenian 
young people were working overseas at the time of the fieldwork. In addition, there were slightly 
more men than women listed in the sampling frame (56% of the 232 adults listed were men). 
However, female residents of the district were more likely to respond than male residents (47% of 
the 71 respondents were men). The results of this survey are reported in Appendix A6.1. 
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Appendices to Chapter 6 
A6.1 Mental health on St. Helena 
There is little documentation or research available on the health of the St. Helenian population and 
little is known about illness experience among Saints. Even less is known about mental health or 
psychiatric illness among St. Helenians. There is no epidemiological or administrative data 
available on mental health. Nevertheless, what anecdotal evidence exists points to a concern about 
levels of distress on St. Helena, and the lack of provision of services for individuals who 
experience such distress. 
As long ago as 1955, St. Helena's Senior Medical Officer wrote in an annual report wrote that: 
'The anxiety state is as could be expected on a small island - fairly prevalent'. Similarly, in the 
following year, the Social Work Officer of St. Helena described 'mothers sunk in apathy, 
engendered by financial strain, ill-health, and sometimes mental disharmony'. "' During the 1960s, 
a former Senior Medical Officer of St. Helena, Dr Ian Shine conducted a study of local disease 
patterns (e. g. diabetes) in order to test the hypothesis that such patterns were due to 'genetical 
abnormalities' associated with the island's physical isolation (1970: 2). In his account of this 
medical research, he commented on the mental health of the inhabitants. 'Hysteria', he said, 'is a 
common neurotic manifestation (generally attributed to the evil eye by the islanders), although 
anxiety and depressive states are seen more frequently' (1970: 32). 
There is no evidence on the mental health and well being of the St. Helenian population except a 
review of mental-health service provision conducted by a former medical officer on St. Helena, Dr 
Stephen Aldridge, in the early 1980s (1984,1994). This review included a needs assessment of 
mental-health difficulties on the island. Aldridge claimed that "there is no shortage of severe 
mental illness on St. Helena" and he argued that this placed a pressure on mainstream healthcare 
provision: 'Severe mental illness (psychosis) constitutes the largest single continuing care problem 
facing the health care services on St. Helena. More persons are resident in institutions suffering 
from psychosis than the bed occupancy rate at the General Hospital for all other problems 
combined' (1984: 25-26). 
Aldridge applied ICD-9 diagnostic criteria to St. Helenian patients who were admitted into hospital 
for mental-health related difficulties during 1982 and 1983. He found that there were at least 59 
individuals with 'functional psychosis"" and, of those with affective psychosis (N=19), 14 were 
female, three times the number of men. The median age of onset was in the early 50s (Aldridge, 
1984: 25). Aside from cases of 'psychosis', he reported 18 cases of 'neurotic depression' and 7 
cases of 'hysteria', and 2 suicides (one of which was linked to psychosis). In a later paper, Aldridge 
(1994) estimated there were around 50 cases of individuals suffering from schizophrenia with a 
population prevalence of 1.1%. 139 
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In his original report, Aldridge (1984) also highlighted the 'increasing medical, psychiatric and 
social problems relating to alcohol consumption', with 14 reported cases of 'chronic alcoholism'. 
In addition, there was one alcohol-related suicide, a case of 'delirium tremens', and a death from 
cirrhosis. He also highlighted 'episodic uncontrolled overindulgence' of alcohol as a health-related 
problem, but noted that there was no way of knowing how widespread this was: 'On the island of 
St. Helena', he reported, 'alcoholism not only exists, but there is every indication that it is a 
growing problem' (1984: 27). Aldridge pointed out that 'problem drinking' was predominantly a 
male preoccupation and hypothesised that heavy drinking habits may have been learned during 
periods of time working on Ascension Island. 
More recently, the CMO expressed a concern about excessive alcohol consumption on the island. 
Although no evidence is presented to support this claim, the CMO's report argued that: 'There is 
known to be a significant alcohol abuse problem on the island' (1999: 25). Similarly, the authors of 
the UNDP report maintained that 'substance abuse is a problem especially in relation to alcohol 
and tobacco where consumption per capita is high' (1999: 32). They linked the occurrence of 
domestic violence on St. Helena with 'problem drinking': 'Alcoholism and its associated crime and 
domestic violence is one of the island's major social problems' (1999: 35). They claim that 
'domestic violence especially against female partners is still regarded in some quarters as 
acceptable behaviour although attitudes are beginning to change. Most domestic violence revolves 
around alcohol abuse' (1999: 38). They report that many of the referrals made to the social-care 
officer are for marital and family conflict and, in many cases, such adversity is associated with 
alcohol abuse (UNDP, 1999). "' 
The CMO estimated that, in 1998, just over 7% of the island's overall drugs budget was spent on 
anti-depressants (1999: 15). In his annual report for 1998, the CMO described the community 
nursing team as a 'surrogate psychology service' (1999: 25). "' This suggested the need for the 
employment of a psychologist to support the mental well being of those suffering from mental 
distress on the island. 
Limited evidence about levels of distress comes from a small-scale screening survey that was 
conducted in an outlying district of St. Helena. A description of the context and methods used in 
this survey is described in Appendix A3.8. Around three out of every ten respondents (N=22) 
indicated the possible presence of mental distress (scored highly on at least one of the twelve items 
of the modified GHQ-12), even though it was sometimes unclear whether this was a result of a 
physical illness (See Table A6.1). The questionnaire also asked respondents whether they had 
experienced any 'headaches'. More respondents complained of headaches (i. e. around four in ten 
respondents) than indicated the presence of possible 'distress'. Conversely, 7 out of 10 of those 
who reported headaches also reported positively on at least one indicator of 'distress'. Table A6.1 
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shows this positive relationship between the likelihood of reporting headaches and the likelihood of 
scoring positively on at least one item of the modified version of the GHQ- 12. 
Table A6.1 Percentage of respondents in a small-scale community survey reporting 
'headaches' and 'mental distress' 
No 'headaches' 'Headaches'* Total Total 
Row % Row %%N 
No distress 67 33 100 49 
Distress" 45 55 100 22 
All 61 39 100 71 
Gave a positive response to a question asking whether respondents experience headaches 
* Reported experience of distress on at least one item of the modified GHQ- 12 
Over half of those who responded (53%, N=38) indicated that they either experience headaches or 
scored positively on one of the other twelve indicators of 'mental distress' (See Table A6.2). 
Table A6.2 Percentage of respondents in a small-scale community survey reporting 
'headaches' and 'mental distress' by sex 
'Headaches' Distress Total Total 
Row% Row% Col % N 
Male 18 21 46 33 
Female 58 40 54 38 
Total 100 71 
Although the numbers are small, three times as many of the female respondents reported 
'headaches' and twice as many women as men scored positively on the GHQ-12 (on at least one 
item) (See Table A6.2). 
A6.2 St. Helenian discourse on 'mental illness' 
Among St. Helenians, the term 'mental' is a pejorative term and is used to express a judgement 
about someone's character, rather than to describe someone who is ill. It is used to describe 
someone who, in his or her overt behaviour, deviates from what is considered normal functioning. 
According to Aldridge, St. Helenians use the term 'mental' to describe: 
Persons exhibiting behaviour which is clearly abnormal and unacceptable. In 
general terms this means excitable behaviour often accompanied by speech that 
fails to make complete sense and in a situation which is exposed to the public. A 
man who locks himself away and withdraws would not qualify for this adjective; it 
is more likely to be the person who goes round upsetting all the neighbours who 
would be described as 'mental'. 
Aldridge, 1984: 19-20 
'Mental illness' is attributed to a person who behaves abnormally or who exhibits behaviour that is 
'disorderly', 'not normal', or 'insensible'. One St. Helenian woman, for example, described 
someone with a mental-health difficulty as "not well in his mind' and that he was 'doing things that 
he wasn't supposed to be doing". According to a middle-aged St. Helenian man, a man who is 
206 
'mental' "don't know what he doing properly [ ... ] doin' the things he not suppos'd to be doinQ*'. 
One informant who had experienced an episode of prolonged and severe distress in the past 
reported: "I had mental problems and all that. I was doing all the wrong things and stuff like that. " 
A St. Helenian man in his 60s described people who have a 'mental illness' as 'not sure of 
themselves', 'their mind is not regulated properly', and 'their rrund is affected'. A St. Helenian man 
in his 30s thought that 'mental' meant, "talking insensible, delirious-like. [ ... ] Part of your memorN 
is gone. A part of your senses is mýissing 'cos you won't do the things that me and you do". Some 
St. Helenians depicted 'mental illness' using a metaphor of balance. A man in his 50s said that the 
term 'mental' meant 'off-sided, off-balance'. A middle-aged man described another man's 
treatment for a 'mental illness' as the 'only thing that will keep him in balance'. One St. Helenian 
described how another man had been admitted to the Island's hospital for adults with psychiatric 
difficulties because he had 'got frustrated [ ... ] mental, mental, mental, disturbed [ ... Ia little bit off 
balance'. A St. Helenian man in his 60s described a relative as swearing, arguing, as not behaving 
in an 'orderly way' and that 'mental illness' was when "your brain get out o' balance". 
These remarks from St. Helenians illustrate how 'mental illness' is conceived as a breakdown in 
usual behaviour and as a breakdown in agency. It implies a deviation from behavioural 
expectations and from what it is to be a person as articulated in the dominant St. Helenian discourse 
on the self (See Chapter 5). Such deviation therefore attracts a high degree of stigma and places the 
sufferer at risk of social ostracism. Aldridge, for example, observed that a physical explanation for 
an individual's abnormal behaviour was therefore more acceptable than a psychiatric interpretation. 
He used the example of 'nerves' to illustrate the point: "The family will agree that the person has a 
problem and that it may be due to 'nerves', but in no way will they accept that he is 'mental"' 
(1984: 19). 
Given the existence of a sociocentric discourse on the self, 'mental illness' blights entire families. 
Stigma is conveyed from one person to another through close association extending to the 
sufferer's family. Aldridge observed that family members therefore resist adrrussion to St. Helena's 
mental hospital. Similarly, one St. Helenian healthcare worker expressed the belief that an 
individual is more likely to be perceived as having a mental-health difficulty if another family 
member had experienced a mental-health difficulty in the past. 
The high degree of stigma associated with anything to do with psychiatric illness affects the social 
response to personal and social distress (See Chapter 6). For example, one female informant who 
had experienced 'depression' said that she had received little social support or understanding from 
other Saints. It is likely that Saints would be reticent to admit personal or social 
distress to the 
island's doctors. This may be one of the reasons why such suffering 
is articulated using a somatic 
idiorn (See Chapter 6). 
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A6.3 Public health and mental-health service provision on St. Helena 
The provision of support for individuals experiencing personal distress or 'mental illness' cannot 
be understood without a preliminary description of the structure of St. Helena's healthcare system. 
St. Helena has a well-developed healthcare system with 'comprehensive health services' available 
to all St. Helenians. The Public Health Department is one of SHG's executive departments. In 
1998, public expenditure on health constituted around 10% of St. Helena's GNP and around 17% 
of SHG's recurrent budget is spent on public health (UNDP, 1999). St. Helena's healthcare system 
has been developed in partnership with the UK's National Health Service and consists of: 
"A 42-bed UK National Health Service-style general hospital for acute medical and surgical 
care. 
" Three medical doctors and a dentist employed from overseas. 
"A network of seven outpatient clinics distributed around the island where people living in 
outlying areas who might find it difficult accessing services in Jamestown can consult with a 
doctor or community nurse. 
"A hospital-based nursing team; a community nursing team; auxillary healthcare workers 
including physiotherapist; an expatriate nurse tutor. The community nursing service provides 
home visits, injections, bathing and RX, vaccination, family planning, cervical smears (CMO, 
1999). In 1998, two-thirds of the nurses had not formal nursing qualifications. 
" Ancillary services such as a laboratory, radiology service, and a dispensary. 
A residential unit for adults who suffer from psychiatric illness. 
A residential unit for people with a physical disability or learning difficulty. 
Source: Chief Medical Officer of St. Helena (1999) 
At the time of the research, there was a limited social-care service. SHG's Social Service 
Department was responsible for the provision of financial support, personal, social care, 
community services, and government housing (UNDP, 1999: 39). In 2000, a St. Helenian social- 
welfare officer co-ordinated a limited social care service on the Island. His role involved 
adjudicating in domestic conflicts, needs assessments, providing advice, and support to more 
disadvantaged members of the community. In 2000, a consultant was employed from a social-work 
organisation in the UK to evaluate St. Helena's social-service provision (Evans, 1999). He reported 
that SHG provides a basic social-care service and expressed 'serious concerns' about both the 
quality and level of provision for both children and adults. Spending on social care was considered 
a low priority with E15 per capita in 1999/2000 being spent on social care compared with E89 per 
annum being spent on the Police Service (Evans, 1999: 3). He made the point that the Social 
Services Department's core work was not social work, but employment schemes, provision of 
benefits, and housing. Most referrals to the Social Services Department were for financial help 
rather than for social support. However, Evans described requests 
for financial support as 'the 
presenting problem'. Indeed, it is possible that, in many cases, an array of social and personal 
difficulties lie behind such requests for economic aid. 
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Evans' report recommended changes in the organisation of social care on St. Helena. For example, 
he recommended the secondment of a social-work manager and two qualified social workers to 
develop good practice in social care and to establish social work on St. Helena. The Social Services 
Department was dissolved in 2000. Responsibility for social care was taken over by the island's 
Public Health Department. In 2002, a social worker employed by the UKG's Department for 
Interriational Development was appointed for an initial two-year period. 
The fact that services to support poor families and individuals experiencing personal distress are 
poorly developed may partly be a consequence of the stigma associated with socio-economic 
adversity, personal distress, and 'mental illness'. Aldridge (1984) reviewed the services available to 
vulnerable adults on the island including the elderly, those experiencing a long-term mental-health 
difficulty, adults with a leaming difficulty, and individuals with a physical disability. He was 
highly critical of the adequacy of the health and social service support available to patients 
suffering from 'mental illness': 'Mental health', he said, 'was the most neglected area of healthcare 
on St. Helena' (1984: 5). These inadequacies included negligence of certification and record 
keeping, and more generally 'a marked and serious lack of appreciation of 'mental illness' and its 
effective treatment' (1984: 6). In a later article, Aldridge maintained that existing mental-health 
facilities (prior to 1984) were underdeveloped in the early 1980s. In the first half of the century, 
adults with a mental-health difficulty lived in the poor house in Jamestown. This became 
dilapidated, so a new mental hospital was built up and this was opened in 1954 (called Sundale). 
The management of the mental hospital switched from the Poor Relief Board to the island's 
Medical Department. The new hospital had 20 beds, was gender segregated and there was 
accommodation for 'patients under restraint', a treatment room, dining area, and ward 
accommodation. In the Senior Medical Officer's report for 1954 reported that 'the grounds are all 
contained by a high wall and are laid out as lawns, flower-gardens and vegetable gardens' (1955: 
4). Aldridge describes the mental hospital (prior to its re-development) as though it had the 
appearance of a prison: 
Existence was stark and without any views behind 10 foot walls. Patients were 
clothed from a paltry pool of hospital clothing. Haircuts were convict-like. Patients 
were routinely locked into cells at 6prn because there was no night staff provision. 
There was no evidence that any patient had been medically examined since 1978. 
Disguised beneath a superficial tranquillity the mental hospital had all the hallmarks 
of a bad institution. 
Aldridge, 1994: 790-1 
In 1958, the new mental hospital had 13 patients. In 1982, there were still around that number with 
around 15 long-term 'inmates', five of whom were 'without the necessary certification' (Aldridge, 
1994: 790). Between 1954 and 1983, there had been around 248 admissions to Sundale. Around 
one third of admissions had no 'valid legal certification to justify their admission' (Aldridge, 1984: 
33). For those who had had medical records, there was inadequate information and insufficient 
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detail for identifying a diagnosis. Only around one fifth of records were adequate. Aldridge was 
highly critical of this lack of certification and inadequate record keeping. He was also cnt1cal of the 
fact that the Mental Health Ordinance of 1956 (SHG, 1956) also covered the categories of 'moral 
defective' and 'epileptic' (the provisions of this Ordinance were still in effect at the time that 
Aldridge was writing). Based on an analysis of administrative data and the lack of any valid 
certification, he stated that: 'It is obvious from the scanty records at the Mental Hospital that some 
patients have been admitted there in the past either because of immoral conduct or else because of 
inconvenient social behaviour' (1984: 83). The Hospital had functioned as more than just a 
'receptacle for the mentally ill'. It was also used 'as a threat to people who would best be described 
as social nuisances who were occasionally placed there for a few days as a lesson if they didn't 
mend their ways they might be left there for all time' (1984: 30). 
In his original report, Aldridge made a series of recommendations for improving and modernising 
the support, treatment, and rehabilitation of individuals with severe 'mental illness'. To the credit 
of SHG, many of his recommendations were implemented. In a follow-up article published in 
1994, he described this process of modernisation in detail. It involved major structural changes to 
improve the image of Sundale, the mental hospital. Local staff were trained and all nurses attending 
local training programs were required to rotate through various mental health areas to broaden their 
experience. A Mental Health Ordinance based on the 1983 Mental Health Amendment Act of 
England and Wales became law in 1986. 
St. Helena's mental hospital has played a historically important role in the functioning of St. 
Helenian society. The fear and stigma associated with the mental hospital is metonymically 
associated with social ostracism and exclusion, so that it has contributed to the production of a high 
degree of conformity. Referring to the patients in Sundale, one middle-aged St. Helenian woman 
said: "They get up to things that they're not suppos'd to". Another informant described how, as a 
child, her Grandmother would threaten her if she misbehaved: "Behave, or I'll send you to the 
Sundale, " she would say. She said that, as children, they would dare each other to go as close as 
possible to the high walls. Sometimes, she said, she could hear the screaming of the 'Inmates' 
through the walls. 
Perched high up on a cliff overlooking Jamestown, the Castle, and the sea, Sundale is still St. 
Helena's psychiatric hospital. The Head of Nursing has overall managerial responsibility for 
Sundale's nursing staff, but a nursing officer based at the hospital is responsible for its day-to-day 
management-"' The CMO visits Sundale once a week. There were around twelve patients resident 
at the hospital, mostly elderly St. Helenians suffering from a long-term 'mental illness'. Only two 
are men. On rare occasions, acute cases are adrrutted. "' According to the island's CPN, acute 
admissions usually consist of the same people being re-adn-iitted periodically. Younger people 
suffering from a mental-health difficulty are more likely to be taken care of in the community. 
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The stigma associated with 'mental illness' finds its public and symbolic manifestation in Sundale. 
Aldridge noted that 'there has developed a strong and Inappropriate degree of prejudice against the 
mental hospital itself and against patients who have been there' (1984: 19). St. Helena's 
community psychiatric nurse said that, because of this stigma, her clients in the community are 
hesitant to visit Sundale to meet with her. There is a fear of becoming tarnished by an association 
with Sundale and, therefore, with 'mental illness'. 
The meaning of psychiatric illness ('mental' or 'crack') among St. Helenians is associated with 
admission to Sundale. As one informant said: 'People go to the mental hospital because they 
crack'). One woman in her 30s used an idiom of 'mental illness' to describe a woman whose 
behaviour is sometimes "out o' order". Being "out o' order", "off-balance" is symbolically linked 
with Sundale (Text 1): 
Text 1 
She nuts. Sometimes, she go into Sundale. Sometimes, you'll walk in and 
you'll find her sitting there crying. And, sometimes, she can get really violent, but 
not with strangers. [ ... ] If she in a bad mood and she want to screams at you, and, 
once she got that out, she a different person. 
One woman in her 20s believed that once a person had been admitted to Sundale, other members of 
the community would brand them as 'nuts' and stop talking with them. Another informant 
maintained that once a person had been admitted to Sundale, they are treated differently by other 
St. Helenians. She said that Saints do not treat former patients at Sundale as if they had been ill, 
'like you had diabetes'. Rather, she maintained that 'you are treated as if you are crack'. Any 
association with Sundale is highly stigmatising and results in ostracism (Text 2): 
Text 2 
They think you're crazy. They look at you as someone who is completely : it's hard 
to explain. You're classed differently. They look on you differently. They don't 
want to socialise with you. They think you was completely nuts. 
Another woman spoke openly about the stigma associated with admission to Sundale. She said that 
people think of you as 'crazy' and that 'it carries on with you': "You can carry it around with you 
for the rest of your life. You're out of your mind". She believed that lack of understanding about 
about mental health difficulties is part of the problem ("They don't understand"). 
At the time of the fieldwork in 2000, St. Helena's CPN was attached to Sundale but was based 
-nunity-nursing team. Many patients are taken care of in the community. In 2000, within the comi 
the CPN had a caseload of around 50 individuals living in the community. According to the CPN, 
the mental-health difficulties of many of these individuals remained undiagnosed, despite the fact 
that most received some form of medication. Writing in the early 1980s, Aldri II 1: ) idge maintained that 
individuals experiencing mental-health difficulties would be taken care of in the community 'until 
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a crisis intervenes which may be a social problem, an illness or a behavioural problem' (1984: 7). 
In special or urgent cases, psychiatrists from the UK or Cape Town have been commissioned to 
conduct assessments on St. Helena. Members of the community nursing team also provide high 
levels of personal support to people living in the community (CMO, 1999: 25). In addition, a non- 
St. Helenian Salvation Army Captain was available for limited one-to-one counselling for those 
experiencing social adversity or personal distress. The island's doctors play a central role in 
treating individuals experiencing mental-health difficulties and personal distress. In 1998, the 
Public Health Department purchased an ECT machine for use at the General Hospital. The CMO 
reports that this would be used 'to control a variety of psychiatric disorders by the delivery of a 
carefully controlled electric shock to specific areas of the brain' (CMO, 1999: 11). 
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Notes 
'Within tile Context 01' a Study 01' tile idiollis Of distress used anlong I la\ ik Bialunin ýýoiucn, NIL hici dcluicd iis 
'a broad ranoc of Icelim, states including vulnerability, appiclicilsioll, inadequacy. dlo, ýItislilclloli, ýIlpplc,, scd ýIlwcl ; Ind 
other anxiety states' ( 1981: 403). Fo II owing Nichici ( 1981: 403), 1 use tIIC te IIIIdI st Ics"' to ICIcIIo ýil I it II av oI it dvc I" c 
feeling or emotion states and experiences. These are paitIv constituted hv (he socio culltual ( oII(c\l III \k III( It IhcV occul 
English lay discourse oil distress, for instance, includes it rich \ociil)til; ll'V lot- dCNCIihIII1-' ý111L-h ('111hOdIL-ol C\pVI-ICuCCS: lot 
instance, anxiety and Icar, pitnic, depression, sticss, \voirv, ouih. low sell cs(ccin, hopcic'"lic. 11.11. 
The Bi-ilish Psvchiim-ic Moi-biefitv Sto-re 
*v 
opci-ationalised the concept of 'niental (11"oldcl, llslllý it lc\lsod vel'sioll of 
CIS-R (ONS, 2001: 15). Neurotic cfisordcl-S include (ICI)ICNSiOll and auXicIv disoldcl, IIII\L-d depic"'sioll ýIlld ý111\ielv 
disorder. Disorder is defined in terms of' functionality. 'Neurotic disordcis' afe 'chiuactciiwd hv ýt vanotý, of symptoms 
such as fatigue and sleep problems, 1,01"Ictfullicss and concentration difficultics, illitahillINI, wolly Imilic, hopelessness, 
and obsessions and compulsions, which arc present to such it deorce that they cause plohlems ýkilh dailv ; Icilvitics iind 
distress' (ONS, 2001: 15). 
The anns of this research were influenced at the outset by Good's suggestiolls Oil tile kill(]', Of quesholl" thal it[) 
interpretive study of illness and distress might I-ocus oil (Good, 1977: 53ý Good o t1l. 1985). In applyino it bloadel (11coly 
of meaning to medical anthropology, Good outlined an werida for research applyin" Such ;I (h(-OIV to HIC 01 
illness (See Good, 1977: 53). 
" The term 'agency' is used in this thesis to ret'cr to the necessary conditions for action 10 IAC plilCc. It Is al"O Ilwd 10 
mean the power or capacity to let and an agent's degree of' consciousness Of that capacity. 'Agci)cv' also iclcis to tile 
degree of' external constraint that is placed upon action and is dialectically opposed to social structure. 11 wpic. sent's the 
dift'crence between behaviour and action or that motivational property ol'actioll (flat directs it towafds the achicvenlent of 
a desired or valued end-state. 
5 'Trope' refers to figurative language u. se. Figures of' speech, for instance, are examples of nopc's. Bulke (1909) 
charactcrised fOur master tropes in English language use including: metaphor, nictonyin, synecdoclic, and noriv. The 
interpretation Ot'diSCOUrse oil distress in this thesis makes use of- cxlensi\c use of the Concept.,, of Inclaphol and Inclonvill. 
These are discussed in more (Ictail in Appendix A3.3. 
6 For example, I diathesis-stress actiological model underlies Brown and Ilarris's pioneering lescarch Oil depfe's'slon 
among working-class women in London (e.. g. Brown and Harris, 1978). Other examples include: Brown ct (d, 1995ý 
Finlay-Jones & Brown, 1981; Bebhington ct al, 1991ý Bilulco ei al, 199Sý Brown ei al, 1987ý Bioýýn and Moiiin, 1997ý 
Wcich et (j/, 200 1. 
7 The take Lip ot'a social identity is relative to the social positions and roles that all uldi\idIIJI inhahilsý who people (ake 
themselves to be (or are taken to be by others) is partly I function of' their social and economic posihon iind tile social 
relationships that they arc engaged in (e. g. class, race, Ctlillicitv, Occupation, rider). Social identitN, has both an objechvc 
and subýjective referent. Social structure is determinant and partIv constitutes social identity all(] personal aocticv. As it 
socially diff'crentiated set of' positions and roles, it is partly independent of' the individuals who inhabit them. Golfinan 
(1963) defined 'social identity' as the social categories and attributes of- all individual. Following Gol'lluall, in this thesis 
social identity is used to rel'er to the internalisation of' social positions and roles. and the social categories that arc Used to 
describe them. 
8 Such research includes, tor example, ethnographic research of community or institution-based programs lot- individuals 
experiencing psychiatric illness (e. g. Estrof 1985), ci I 
-1 - -OSS-CUItUral psychiatric and medical anthropolooical tescill-ch oil 
psychosocial distress and psychiatric illness in developed English-speaking societies (e. g. Kleinnian, 1980: Yount, 
Kirniayer, 1995; Parsons and Wakeley, 199 1ý Jadhav et al, 2001 ): qualitative sociological studies of' depression iind 
distress (e. g. Karp. 1996ý O'Connor and Nazroo, 2002-, Nairne & Smith. 1985ý Becker, 1998ý Rowe. 1978). 111 Britain, it 
few non-epiderniological surveys have been conducted of' people who have experienced emotional distress and 
psychiatric illness asking them about their experiences of' treatment, ways of' coping. views oil services (c. g. Menial 
Health Foundation, 1996; Rogers et id, 1993). Anthropologists ha,, e also mounted critiques of' 1310111CL11CHIC and IIaVC 
conducted ethnographic studies of' western psychiatry (e. g. Lindenbaurn & Lock, 1993ý Good, 1994ý Kleinman, 19M 
11-uhrinarm, 2000; Young, 1995; Lock and Gordon, 19M Littlewood, 1998,2000). 
Examples include: Baer et al (1986), Your)(, ( 1980). Lock and Gordon ( 1988), and Taussio ( 1980). 
'Neurasthenia' is a physical disease characterised by exhaustion Of'(IlC nervous system (Kleinman, 1980). 
'Social Structure' is used in the Durkliciinjan sense to refer to I relatively stable systcni of'power relations that oclicrate 
a set of social locations, roles, or positions (e. g. class, gender, race) within which social identities and biographies are 
forged. The ontology Of StrUCtUralist sociology relies on Durkheirn's splitting of' the individual into it social Ca 
conscience collective') and psychological part ('individual consciousness') (Durkheini, 1953). 'File concept of- society 
depends on tile idea that the seffhas I social part (i. e. social identity) that is a function ot'a supra-indiVidUal Whole. This 
social part of the self is configured through participation in society, througgh engagement in social relations. For 
Durkheim, 'psychology' is tile science of the individual mind while the social part ofthe self bridges the , a[) between file 
individual and society. Society is emergent, is more than the surn of' its part-inclMduals, and is the proper object of' 
sociological investigation. Durkheim grounded this new autonomous science of* sociology in an ontology of the 
individual and society and a positivist epistemology in which social phenomena are conceived as Aacts in nature'. 
12 Following Brown et al (1995). entrapment is used here to mean the experience of powerlessness while liýiilv In an 
adverse social or economic situation that is difficult to escape from. 
13 Loudon defined ritual as symbolic or non-instruniental, prescribed and repetitive behaviour ( 1966: 103). Ritualistic 
action or behaviour is symbolic in that it says 'something about the state of affairs, particularly about the social coridi(ion 
of those taking part in the ritual' ( 1966: 103). Rituals do not necessarilv clianoc things. I-or example, Van Gennep ( 1900) 
distinguished between rituals that announce a change in social position (c. o. *ritcs of' passage') front those that reinforce 
and real'Firm belief and re-invigorate ideology. 
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14 In the United States, the classification sysicill illost colliniollIv II'L, d fol slall"11(%il, ( IIIII( ý11, ýInd Ic"(%m 11 plilposcs ýIlc 
the fourth edition ofthc Diagnostic (ItIII Statistical MaIIII(II of Afewtof (ASA. 191) 1) (; il,, o kno\\ n I,, I YSNI IV'). 
Is The Collaborative Studv mi Stolidell-flised As. sesmicill of 1h'1)le'AAII'C 'AMIR'd LICI)ICSý1011 III -IJIM11, Switzerland, Iran, and Canada in order to investigate cioss-cultlllýll tffld dIII('WII('L-s III tind 10 
develop cross-culturally valid standardised instrument. " Iol idcIItiIN 1112 Mid dIJ2110SIM! (ICI)ICY', 1011 III It-SCMA Jild Chili(-ýIl 
work (Sartorius et al, 1983). 
Medical anthropologys principal concern has been to appIv Mino, naphic Incillods to dcvcIop an undcl"Llildlili, of the 
relationship between culture and illness. Medical arithiopology cnicigcd as a distilict suh IIcId (if alilhlopoloý'N dullng, ihc 
1950's. Good identified four 'orienting approaches' to illness rcpicscIl(: ItIoII.,, In 1IIcdIc; II jilthlopoloiv (199-4: 36): an 
empiricist or 'I'olk-beliel' niodelý a cognitive or eflinoinc(lichic appioach (C. g. Gal 10 1 99-1ý I. Ilt/, I 988)ý ;I IIILIAHIII 
, 
I! ccliticd 
approach (e. g. Good, 1977ý Kleinman, 1980,1988)ý I ctitical approach (c. g. Sinjýci. 1989: Scht, pet-Iluglics, 1991). A 
fil'th can be added: a functionalist, process-orientated appioach that pic-datcs 111o'st of Ille"C (e. g. 1,011doll, 1900ý 'I'llIJIL-1. 
1967,1968). This older tradition links with I critical sliain in current inedical aildliopologv ýIlld ploNidcs a coliccptual 
bridging point between structural sociology and medical anthropolooN 
17 For instance, Nazroo and O'Connoi point out that slandardi/ed rescatch instruillents 'pelfolill Illconsi"Wil(IN, across 
different ethnic groups' (2002: 9). This May also apply to SOCLII-I)SyChialric epidcIlliology ýIs %vell, whcIC coillpalisolls 
are made between different social groups in their experience of psychiatric illness or psychosocial dislics". 
is For example, see Jadhav et al ( 1996,2001), Littlewood ( 1990), Fabrega ( 1992). ýind Kitmayer ( 1989). 
For example, see Kleinman and Good ( 1985), Kleinman ( 1980), Littlewood 1090), ýinkl Jenkins ( ]991 
For example, see Kleinman ( 1986), Kirinayer ( 1989), Kirmayer and Young 1998), ýInd Lldha" ( 1990). Thele ýIlc many 
other 'idionis of' distress' of' which the 'sonlatic, and file 'psycholooical, ale just INvo. These include, fol instalic-L., 
cosmological, sociomoral, interpersonal, and political Idioms of distress (KIcinniari, 1986ý Kninaycr and Youn, ý!, 1998). 2 'For example, see Ragurain et al (2001), K lei ninan (1986), Nichter (1981 ), and Wei ss (-I ell (2001 ). 
22 The Studv of Ethnic MinoritY PsYchiatt'ic 1/hIess ill flit, Community (EN1 P1 R 10 had I %ý o Imi is: a quant ital I , III-\ cy of 
psychiatric illness across ethnic groups and a qualitative study exploring ethnic and Cultural differences Ill inclital licalth 
(Nazroo & O'Connor, 2002). The qualitative part of the I-NIPIRIC study Nvas based Oil in-depth, cxplorýltoly quAitatiNe 
interviews with I sample of' respondents from different ethnic groups in FAigland (Black Uanhhcan, hidion, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Chinese, Irish, White British) and ainied to irivesti,! atc ethnic and CIII(Mal differences in understanding and 
the context of' mental distress aniong these groups and how, these context shape their experience of disticss (Na/roo and 
O'Connor, 2002). 
2ý For example, in psychiatric discourse, 'soniatisation' refers to either a 'somatic clinical presentations of atf ective, 
anxiety, or other psychiatric disorders' or it reters, to a specific catcoory of psychiatlic disordel (C. L,. 'the solliatolorill 
disorders'). (Kirmayer and Young, 1999: 420ý APA, 1994). It is important to note that 'soniatisation' has a more general 
reference than the'so mati sati oil' ot'distress. For example, Kleinnian and Kleinman ( 1985) point Out 111M 'SonlatiSatioll' is 
not limited to depressive disorder and may not represent pathology at 111. 
24 A psychological idiom of distress employed by NvIiitc Britons has also been contrasted NN ith the use of a sonlatic idiom 
of distress in the past (Jadhav, 1996; Nicholson, 1995). 'Melancholia'. for instance, "as expressed and articulated 
somatically and has only recently conic to be replaced by the psychological idiom of depression. 
2' For example, see Raguram et al (2001 ), Parsons and Wakeley ( 1991 ), Kirinaver ( 1981)), and Nichter ( 198 11. 
2') The term 'articulates' is used ill the linguis(ic sense, as de Saussure defined it as 'the division of a chain of speech into 
syllables, or to the division ofthe chain ofrileanings into ineaningful units' ( 1993: 10). 
27 Eiscriburg's distinction between illness and disease grounds the 'experience of' illness" approach in British inedical 
sociological research oil chronic illness (Conrad, 1990). Following Eiscribun, ( 1977), Conrad described 'discase' is the 
7 
underlying physiological process' ill contrast to 'illness', the 'social phenomena that may or may not rest oil disease as I 
foundation' (1990: 1259). This tradition ot'social research is distinctive in that the knowiedge it produces is , rounded in 
illness experience and therefore in patient's account,, and narratives. Research within this paradigin has involved the 
ongoing development of all expert discourse on illness organised around a string ol'cojiccpt.,,. nictaphois and explanatory 
systems: illness career, coping strategies, stignia, biographical disruption and reconstruction, illness nairative, experience 
of treatment and 'loss of'sell- (e. g. Charmaz, 1983; Williams, 1984ý Bury, 1991 ). 
2' The social psychologists Potter and Wetherell developed the discourse-analytic concept of' an 'interpretive repertoire' 
defined as 'a lexicon or register of terms and metaphors drawn upon to characterise and evaluate actions, and events* 
(1987: 138). 
2" According to Garro (1994), 'explanatory models' have been applied in two principal ways in research oil illness; first, 
as a clinical assessment tool; second, as a way of' representing the cognitive basis of' talk about illness at the individual 
level. 
'Operational thinking' refers to thought that is abstract, rational, logical (consistent with syllopstic reasoning), and 
'boundary maintaining' (Young, 1981: 332). In 'pre-operational thinking', 'theoretical knowledpe' I-, tvpically organiscd 
around symbolic associations, clusters of prototypes, and concrete inia-cry rather than around causal I-cliltiOllShipS and 
chains of syllogistic reasoning; boundaries are fuzzy and a weak separation is made between concepts Or representations 
and the objects or events that they orgamse (Young, 1981 1 31 For narrative-hased approaches to research oil illness experience in medical sociology and anthropology see, for 
example, Hyden (1997), Kleinman ( 1988), Brody (1987), and Frank ( 1995). 
32 For example, see Frank ( 1995), Robinson (1990), Williams ( 1984). Hyden ( 1997). 'Illness narratives' are constructed 
using literary and cultural conventions (Tonkin, 1992). Various classificatory scheme.,, have been deNeloped to categorize 
the genres ofillness narrative. For instance, Frank ( 1995) identified three different genres of- illness narrative: restitution, 
chaos, or quest narratives each with their own distinctive plot line. Robinson ( 1990) has distinouished between illness 
narratives that are progressive, chaotic, or restitutive. 
33 A 'speech event' refers to the social context in which discourse units are produced and excham-, cd (I IN Inc.,,, 1964). 
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Riessinan (2002) characterises the interpretive stlatcgy used III such lcscalch ý1', 'Iewlal Slit, polill" oIII 
that it is typical fit this approach lor analyst's story to nicioc with inteipictation. 
ý5 According to Fairclough, the 'force' of a text i's its action Component', Mlat it I" hL. 111g, u"ed to do "ocialIv. Tlw, (; III hc 
contrasted with the text's idcational meaning ( 1992: 82). 
3" According to Searle. such rules 'constitute, in that they (-'clicratc flew 101*111's Of hcha\lolil of ý101%11v. 'R(-ýIllallvc 1111c, ", 
oil the ollict-liand, work to regulate activities that pre-exist of ýIrc indc-perldclu of IlIcsc luk-, I 190s: 138 1 ; Q). 
17 Tile Iollownio were used as sources of "Llidance oil tile c(lillogi aphic appl 0ý1( It 1: (. IILl ImIll 1989). Bel Ilal (I II 
Duranti 11997), Btir,, ess 11985), 1 ianiniersley and Atkinson 11980). 
38 1-1 1 ere is a loll, tradition of' comparative sociological re. wal-Ch that has SOUI-'Ill tO 01C Jild 
if d -t-crences between lar"-scale societies k1loly, 1987). The difference hemcell cOIIIp; II; III\C soclologv alld Ill-dcptll, 
qualitative research in a single social setting is analogous with file difference hctýýccll illc old closs-cultul; ll I)ky(. Ill; ltlv 
and medical anthropology. 
3L) The approach to in-depth interviewing use(] in the research repoiled in this IlICSI's felled Oil (Ile ap pl Oý It'll L", dCVCIOpCd 
by Mishler(1986a, 1986b, 1991): Hollowayand Jet'letson (1997). 
4( 1 For example, see the l'ollowing oil the case-study approach to social lescalch: Mill" Y111 I PYN), N/111shicl 
( 1986a), Riessinan ( 1990, -2002), Crapanzano ( 1985). 41 Fetterman describes this way of' sclecting informants in ethiloglaphy as 'judgemental saillpling, stich (II; II 
'etlinographers rely off their judgement to select file most appropriate members of the stihcultilic of unit, hascd Oil tile 
research question' 11989: 43). Within the grounded-Ilicory approach 10 Llualitali, ýc wscarch, fill,, is known ; I,, 'Ihcolctlcýll 
sanipling, ' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
42 Standard orthography was used to transcribe the recorded interviews. 
43 Tristan da Cunha is a dependency of' St. Helena, and is the smallest and tenloicst populated Island In tile \volld. It is 
situated in the South Atlantic (37*6S, 12*20W). Originating Iroin Btitaill, Italv, St. I Iclefla and America, there alc alound 
300 people live on Tristan da Cunha (Evans, 1994). 
44 01' these, around 2(Xc were visitors, V/c expatriate, and 977( were St. Helcilialls 1999). The ellu filet Mcd 
population of' St. Helena, including Ascension Island, the Falkland Islands, and tile UK is o%cr 6,000. Of Ilicsc, 712 
(121/0 were living on Ascension Islandý 314 (517c) were living oil the Falkland lslandsý 2'1c (or 115) \Ncrc resident 
elsewhere, principally the UK (DEPDa, 1999). 
45 For example, St. Helenians who were in i-cceipt ot'social-sccurity benefits, ý\Iio were not fit pill(] cruployincill, or wit() 
had experienced social inarginah/atioll within the small island community. 
4(' According to tile 1998 Census, the size of' tile district's population was approxiinatcly 373 adults and children 
1999,1). 
47 See Turner (1975) and Ortner (1973) oil the idea of a 'toot nictaphor'. A 'foot inclaphor' is a 'hasic mialogy, lor 
understanding one domain of'experience in terms ol'another (Turner, 1975: 26). According to Ginner. a 'roo( inclaphor' is 
a kind of' 'key symbol' that possesses a high de-ree of' po), ver to 'elaborate' upon and organise 'conceptual experience' 
(1973: 1342). 
48 1 use the terms 'sociality' or 'social agency' to mean both the disposition ind the capacity to nutiate an(] maintain 
social relationships. Personal distress tends to undcrini ties sociality ill this sense. 
411 Some ifforinants linked physical disruption with their use of' anti-depressants. I have tried as much as possible in this 
account to restrict iyiy tocus on only those accounts where treatment was not inentioncd. 
'(' Within Burke's dramatistic 1rainework, the agent-setting ratio is one way ot'l-cpresenting the 'motivation' of the action. 
See Appendix A3.3 for a discussion ot'the drarnatistic franiework and the concept of' 'inotivation'. 
51 Bury (2001) distinguished between two concepts of' illness. A 'categorical* concept of- illness relies oil a clear 
demarcation between 'normal' and 'pathological' experience. A 'spectral' concept of' illness articulates tile relationship 
between health and illness dirnensionallyý the line drawn between normal and pathological experience is partly socialiv 
produced. 'The occurrence of illness', says Bury, 'especially chronic illness, is here csserifially emergent fit character, 
depending strongly on social circumstance and societal reaction' (2001: 269). 
52 Parsons 11951 ) depicted the 'sick role' as a temporary social role that has the aini of'rcstoring patients back to it state of 
health. It is characterised in terms ol'a set of expectations, oblig , ations, and privilcoes. 
For instance, occupants ot'tlic 'sick 
role' are expected to seek and cooperate with medical advice and are required to abstain 1'rorn usual social roles and the 
l'ult-ilment of social responsibilities (e. g. employment and I'anlilv obljiýations). Moreover, proto-patients most he 
considered to be in need of care or be unable to recover without support. The doctor's role is defined is the Inverse of tile 
patient's and this role is invested with considerable power and autonomy. This power is legitirnised by (he medical 
doctor's objectivity, disengagement, rationality, and command of' expert knowledge gained in if protracted period of 
training, 
53 The thernatic categories used in this analysis included: ways of copingý social response and social support: contact \VIth 
healthcare workers; experience of medication; non-ruedical support; recovery (e. g. biographical reconstruction and 
recovery of agency). 
54 For the distinction between explanation and explanatory systems, see Section 3.1. 
55 What Bury describes as 'contingent narratives' ret'ers to narratives that express beliel's about the origins ol'(fiseasc, the I Z11 
proximate causes ot'iliness episodes and the impact of symptoms oil everyday lit'e. The), 'describe events, their proximate 
causes, and their unfolding events' (2001: 274). Bury distinguishes 'contingent narratives' trom 'moral, or 'core 
narratives'. 'Moral narratives' give an account of personal or social transformation, linking individual experience to 
social context, and involve the 'virtuous presentation of self. Core narratives are *deep cultural lornis', genrcs, symbolic 
repertoires that speakers draw upon to tell their stories. 
-"' Turner describes 'subjunctivity' as 'all that may be, inight be, could be, perhaps even should be' 11981: 153). 
57 The approach taken is analogous to that taken by Jenkins 1199 1,1996) in her research oil emotional distress and social 
SLII*fcriiig among El Salvadorans (See Section 2.1 ) 
58 Browne, A. Banished Islanders are British Again. lit Die Sundav Observer, 12"' May 2002. 
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" Globahsation has wrought what Bihcau ( 1997) cAls a 'the cicolis'llion of cullille", In L'Olllcllipolýilv ýkc'. Iofll "ociolic" 
and has required a re-working of' tile concept Of cultural identify. Coiln I'l (1/ hchk, ccil 1111co lc), Cl" of cullul; ll 
identity within t lie context of- Canadian society (cited in I iibcau, 1997: 17), ThcY as,, ocu it c 'iooll idcn I ny' wi Of a Ile 1 ,0 n',, 
culture ol'origin and the society within which tlicv arc socialiscd. 'CullCuShip I(ICH16", Oil the OlIWl I, IMSC(I Oil (lie 
attainment of' civil rights and the right to participate in if host countiv to \\'Inch a person Im" nln'[ awd. I'llialIv, a 
'reconstructed identify , ret'cis to a hybrid identitv dc,, cloped Nvithin tile cultufal ( oIIIc\I of .1 hO', I ', Ok'l('IV (cited In lill)CM1, 1997: 17). 
United Nations Development Programme, 1999 
St. Helena Day Address by Mrs Lillian Crowic quoted in ýVircbird 111)()0: 18). 
62 11le St. Helena News is the St. Helena's govern men( -Colu 101 led newspaper : 111d I'S tile only nc%k'q); lpCI Oil file IsLind. 63 Bibeau (1997) 
64 A number of' themes were identified in an analysis of St. 11cleniall public (11"coul'sc and cililloglaphic (Lilýl, C. I-'. 1ý1(110 
broadcasts, magazines, newspapers, newsletters, pamphlets: olficial discouisc including SIIG and UKG report.,,, Imchn , L, papers and policy docunicntsý other public documents '; Ile[) as [OUTIS111 Of. ill"c"Iflicill and discu"slon" 
with St. Helemans and English expatriate \vorkers of- those with link,, to (lie island. 
"' 01'fice ot'Chicf Secretary's, 01'fice, 2000 
66 Quoted 1rorn St. Helena day address by Mrs Lillian Crowic reproduced in VVir, 44id ( 1990.18). 
"7 'Social capital' is a property of' communities Chalactensed by high level'. of civic cn'mi! Clucn(. stiong, coliIIIIIIIII(v 
networks and by shared norms of trust and reciprocity (Putnarn, 2001 
(Is Shelley Diaper, an undergraduate student of' linouistics at the Uni, ýcfsitv ot Wales institute ill Caldill snidied dw S1. 
Helenian dialect ill 1999. In a personal communication \vith tile ainhol, , he said that tile St. 11cicluill) dialect Il'id 
undergone some degree of' 'creolisation': that is, there has been soine simplification of the Ianguýi , Le altholl , vh 
it lelllýlill', 
very much like English. Some of' these silliplifications in grallifilal and pholloloov Include: ah"Cill all\illýlly ýCfh, tile 
oinission ot'part tense markers ('ed')ý use participle tornis ot"thc verb 'to he' of- 'it) do'. 
Ferguson clefines 'cliglossia' as 'a particular kind ot'standirdi/alion wilefe two valictics of a larlinlageem'st side hv "Ide 
throughout a community, with each having a definite role to play' 1,1959: 237). 
70 The 'high' and 'low' varieties of- 'cligiossia' have clif1cf-crit grammatical 'structure",. '. vith tile low, val-lety heing if 
simplified version ol'the 'high' variety. The bulk ot'the lexicon is shared, hill the high variety include", telln's and Icallicd 
expressions that have no equivalent in the 'low' variety. and, conversely, (lie latter includes populal exple"sions and local 
names with no equivalent in the 'higher' variety (Ferguson, 1959). 
71 In I personal communication with the author (December 1999) 
72 The sources used in this description ol'the 'St. Helenian pictlicanient' also included inteiv ievvs/111cctings with ollicial", 
experts, and workers employed by UKG or SHG, 
73 For instance, real tood costs are much higher than in the UIKý for instance, fit the aveiago St. Helenian household. 
almost one half of household incomes is spent on tood (St. Helena Expenditure Suiveys tor the years 1980,1987/1988, 
1993). 
74 According to a UKG development advisor, 'a depressed labour market' oil St. I Iclena "'Lis indicate(] hv the high I Life of 
unemployment; low numbers of' seff-eniployed; a low spread of' employee incomes: low level of returns to education: 
lack of' economic opportunities (cited in Development and Economic Planning Department (St. Helena Government), 
1999b. Povert), Assessment oil St. Helena). 
75 S010,, lon & Co are a principal retailer oil the island and are also involved in insurance, ['arming, and insurance (SIIG, 
2000). The St. Helena Government are the dominant shareholders ill Solonlon & Co. 
76 Statement by Chief Secretary of St. Helena to St. Helena's Legislative Council (in 15"' March 1996. Reproduced if) a 
supplement to St. Helena News, 10(38), 22"d March 1996. 
77 This White Paper applied to all of' Britain's remaining 'Overscas Dependent Territories', now known Lis 'British 
Overseas Territories'. 
7' Appendix ol'the UKG's 1999 white paper, A Partnership. tor Progress and Prosperi1v 79 This involved the establishment of a St. Helena Development Agency in 1995, a QlTANG0 set III) to foster the 
development of a private sector on St. Helena (e. g. through the provision of- loans and grants, in(] business advice), 
Private sector development during the second halt' of' the 1990s also included I policy of' capital investment and tile 
switching of government resources from consumption to production (SHG. 2000: 7). 
8" Statement by Chief- Secretary of* St. Helena to St. Helena's Legislative Council 
81 Wages range trorn Lin average of E24 per week tor individuals who are clefined Lis 'unernploved': to C40 to E60 per 
week for manual workersý average incomes then increase incrementally (depending on position) I"Or those are 'salaried, 
workers within the Castle's bl_ireaucracyý clerks and secretaries are at bottom of* tile pay scale, Iollowed by middle 
managers, senior managers, skilled engineers and techniciansý senior 'eXCCLItives' head the pay scale and earn between 
f 15,000 and E20,000 per annum (SHG, 2000). Similarly, income tax Surveys during the 1990s showed that incomes were 
highest Ior legislators (councillors), senior officials. and manai-Ters, and lovve st ter unskilled 'clementary %Norkcrs, 
(DEPD, 1999b). 
82 This unemployment rate reduces to around 14% of resident St. Helenians workii-ILT overseas Lire Included In tile 
calculation. 
83 one third ol'those who were classified as 'unemployed' in the 1998 Census ot'St. Helena's population "'ere employed 
on the 'three-day week' (DEPD, 1999a). 
84 St. Helenian men had already been migrating to Ascension Island ,, nice the 1960s. Most of- these positions were 
unaccompanied, with few opportunities for women. Since 1982, the Falkland Islands have provided Lin important source 
of' employment, offering much greater salaries than are available on St. Helena. Much of' these jobs are to support tile 
military presence on the Falkland Islands. They are primarily unskilled, serni-skilled manual, or service-sector jobs in 
catering and construction. 
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8S The proportion of' offshore workers who ale male depends Oil lilt, (lest I lim loll T1,0111on'lliv. Ino"I of Ihc cillplovinclu 
opportunities on Ascension Island have been 'unaccompanied' (i. e. lit) plOVISIOll I', IMI(IC IM (ICI)CIRIJ1110, III 199X, (IICIC 
were twice as many men working oil Ascension Island as ýt, olucrl (N. "PI). 1999,1). The IIIOIC It'( cull oppolhilutics oil (he 
Falkland Islands, however, have attracted all even balance Of InalC and leinalc Sl. Helcluall" The simillcl IIIIIIIN-1 who 
head to the LJK have tended to be women. Between 1994 and 1998, aiound One [find of ; 111 olishoic %t. 01kcis wclc Icinalc 
(UNDP, 1999). 
X6 11,1958, the British MP Cledwyn Hughes Was IIlVl(Cd 10 SL HCICIIA 10 JSSC. S. S (Ile ', OCIJI ; Illd (-(()jIOIIIIc , Illl; ltlOll 01 (he 
island and to produce a report for the British Lahom Paity. 
87 Reported in St. lielena News, 1(9), 19"' November 1999. 
8" Nonetheless, much of (lie data upon which this Poveriv 1%, tessinelit "'as based AIC CuhL-I HIM-11ý11)IC 01 MICC(IO(Al, SO it Is 
difficult to form any gleneralisalions about levels of' poverty oil tile island. The atilhol of tile Tý N liltv/ I IcColullicildcd 
further research. 
89 By the end of tile 1990s, the income generated hy offshoic employment \%as at iccold icýcjs ýIt O\vI C2ru Ile[ allnuln 
(Royle, 2001; Hogenstijil and van Middelkoop, 2002). 
91) This refers to tile situation 
before the recent growth in ernplovinent opportunitics hcc; nue a\ ýulahlc oil Ascension Island 
and the Falkland Islands. 
91 This view is corroborated ill tile UNDP report. Ili tile late 1990s, ovciscas icinut; mccs %kcic still llowlnýL, h; Ick to St. 
Helena, but 'not to the same extent as in the past' (UNDIP, 1999: 39). 
92 St. Helena Government Economist Ili a personal communication with tile auilio, (I-'cbIu; jjy, 2()0()) 
93 St. Helena Government, Income and Tax Surveys for the vears 1987/88,1990/01, ýuid 1993-94 to 1997-98 
94 Nil. 
95 The number of' male workers decreased between 1990/91 and IQQ7/98 while tile nuinhct (if Icinale 1, ýo(kcis oil S(. 
Heleria increased (DEPD, 1999h: 7). 
96 For example, the Internet, information technology, telephone, and satellite television 
97 Most Of- tile employruent positions overseas are only available to those Who aIC Single Or 'IIIIaCCOIupduICd'. 111 1998/99. 
more than 100 parents who had left St. Helena to work overseas left childien \01h iclatives Or 111CMIS Oil the Island 
(LJNDP, 1999). The authors ofthe LJNDP report suggest that there may be Inaliv more I'llrillies "khele one palclit (Iisllallý 
the mother) has remained, whilst the partner has left to work, oveiscas. lit addition, inaliv eldclIv Saints ale withoul tile 
social support that the extended family once Providedý in many cases, some or all of their children ha\C nurialcd 
overseas, some never to return ( 1999: 37). 
It is possible that two ofthe most important pLiblic-health implications of' socio-ccollonlic challve oil S(, I Mena include 
an increase in fertility rates and in levels ot'social and personal distress. Nonetheless, the true licallh impact of sociA and 
economic modernisation on St. Helena is currently Unknown. 
9" Fertility raics oil St. Helena dropped dramatically during the 1980, s and 1990s (UNDI), 1999ý CN10,1999). Some 
observers have linked these plummeting fertility rates to recent economic change and high lc\cls of out\v; Ird linglatlon 
(e. g. LJNDP, 1999ý CMO, 1999). One proposed explanation for (Ilis is that younger St. Helenialls have beef) Icluclant to 
begin a family when facing the prospect of' several vears of' absence froin tile island and (lie impact of migration oil 
relationships. For instance, the authors of the LJNDP report speCUIa(C that 'tile fall Ill (Ile birth late has alluost CcIIaiIIIV 
been sharper because ofthe arnount ot-overseas working. Young people are reluctant 10 have Children it they know there 
is a strong possibility that they will have to leave them ill the care of- relatives to go overseas for \voik' ( 1999: 37). 
This increase in rates of' treatment does not indicate that the real, underlying rate of' hypertension oil St Helena has 
increased over the past two decades. This rise is likely to have been produced by the ongoing, modernization and 
development of' St. Helena's healthcare system over recent decades. As screening, progranis for hypertension lime 
developed and become more extensive, this is bound to have increased tile numbers of' St. Ifelcilians treated for 
hypertension. It is impossible to tell whether there has been I real increase in rates of hypertension or not, because there 
are no epidemiological data available. 
1(" In 1958, the British MP Cledwyn Hughes was invited to St. Helena to assess tile social and economic . "iluation of' (lie island and to produce a report for the British Labour Party. 
102 For instance, Hogenstijn and van Middelkoop point out that it I.,, (lie 'political structure that organiscs society' ()It St. 
Helena (2002: 4.4.2). 
103 Including economic or. ganisations that are controlled by SHG and para-statal organisations. 
104 'Stigma' reters to a negative evaluation of all attribute or a social category (Got'I'man, 1963). Following Gottiliall, 
Evens defined 'stigma' as 'an attribute constituting a special discrepancy between the socially legitinlised expectations of' 
a person and actuality ot'a person' (1975: 168). 
'()5 Ili all ethnographic Study of' a Malaysian village, Scott described the social function of 'shanie' as 'a concern for the 
good opinion of one's neighbors and friends, which circumscribes behavior within the moral boundaries created by 
shared values' (1985: 17). Writing within an American cultural context, Goffinall depicts 'sharne' as the personal 
response to the possession of'a stigniatised attribute or of belonging, to a stiginatised social catc-oiN 
'('6 For instance, Hogenstijn & van Middelkoop eiriphasised this high degree of social control in their account of St. 
Helenians' spatial identities. 'Social control', they point out, 'is so total that criminal offences are reported weekly in tile 
newspaper with tile person who committed tile crime often written Ili full' (2002: 4.3). They observed that being, placed 
under constant (social) observation can 'sometimes be felt physically: the eyes peering at you from the back' (2002: 4.3). 
107 The use of' specialist services and the results of medical tests are difficult to keep C0111-ILICIltial. For instance. tile 
authors of the UNDP report observed that 'it is almost impossible to have a pregnancy termination Ili secret. This Ic'Ids (o 
sorne women preferring to go to the expense of- travelling to the (Jutted Kingdom or South Africa for terminations' 
(UNDP, 1999: 33). He says how these breaches ill confidentiality may prevent people seeking help w1lo Lire experiencing 
a stigmatised health problem. The authors of the UNDP report cite the example of'sonlebody who was runloured to have 
contracted AIDS: 'This lack of' confidentiality may also prevent individuals seeking medical attention for conditionisl 
which may have a social stigma attached to them in particular AIDS. The health department has alreadN lmd to oil one 
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occasion make a public declaration that to its knowledge no one oil the 111V %%liell 11111will', 111; 11 
someone had AIDS were rit'e(ILICIO a blood sample being sent toCapcTown foi ; inalNsis' (UNDII, 1909: 3; ), ")' This is reminiscent of- Evens' observations Made ill a study of slignia ; in(] ill a Kihhul/. lie found 111.11 
anything that deviated from an ideology Ot- SC11--COntrOl Mid NCII-ICS11allit becanic "ligillah"cd Ol hc(allw a soulcc of 
embarrassment. lie found that women in the Kibbutz who 'cricd out wlicli gi%llw, hilth \\(-I(- Llillciscd'. Molco%cl, 
exhortation to sell' control had more comprehensive manifestations. as ill thc pl osci i pt 1011 Oil c\pIcs"Ing allihilloll, '111d 
members of' the Kibbutz were 'embarrasscd about taking to hed 101 nullor ilhic"', oI \kclc lln%ýllhllg to admit that lhcý 
were iIV( 1975: 187). 
'()9 For example, the 'St. Helenian predicanicrit' is defined by CCOllOllliC and political dependclicý Oil Billaill. a firld ýocl; ll 
structure. the remoteness, undemocratic ex-colorlial political institutions, a high 1c\Cl of dependclicv Oil govc1lilliclit, llic 
tight-knit nature ofthe society, the absence of citizenship rights, powcilul norillah. "111.1! plactice's, hlý'h lcýcls Of 11111111; l1loll, 
social disconnection, economic hardship. 
''('Gregory Bateson developed the notion of' 'ethos, LIS a conceptual too] fol undLISIAndill, ' Idiluld C111tUtC Mid 
character ( 1987: 107). He defined lethos, as 'tile expression of' a Cuhtllallý Stallddldi/Cd 01 Oft!; l1lis, 111011 (11 111C 
instincts and emotions of (lie individuals' ( 1987: 108). For example, a -Balilic'sc c1ho's, ICIC111 to ill(- %Aucs, Illoti%c", and 
emotions that underlic the patternS underlying Balinese lives, the oriýanisatioll of Balilic'sc , o(, lc(v, and It"CUkulal 
practices (1987: 116). Jenkins (1991) appliCd all adapted version of' this concept of 'c(hos' in lict intcl-pictation of 
'nerves' and 'depression' arriong Salvadorans as a response to in oppressive political cillos in 1: 1 Salvadol. Thlou'01 
'long-term exposure to this political ethos" she says. 'tile experience (it tile livcd hodv, is shot 111tough kvith anxictv, 
terror, and despair' ( 1991: 149). 
111 Ill a personal communication with the author 
112 St. Helena M agazine. 'V aria', Jaii. 1946,520,7-8. 
113 This use of the term 'weak' contrasts with its pejorative employnicnt as all evaluative telln that Nlonifics a 'wcaknes"', 
ot'character (see, for example, Section 6.3). 
1" See Appendix A3.3 for the definition ot'the 'scenc-act ratio' and a description of Bulke". '(1millatistic, 11-alnewolk, 
115 See, tor instance, Jenkins ( 1991 ), Scheper-Huolics ( 1992), ýjlld London ( 1964) lot- c\amp1cs, 
1"' In a personal communication with the author 
117 An alternative interpretation of Rawnsley and Loudon*s 'epideiniological daul, is possible licic. Thc plevalence lalcs 
that they report do not necessarily indicate the prevalence of' 'psychogenic licadaches' ýjs a . olujtic cxpicsslon of 
underlying emotional distress or disorder. Rather, they illay signil'y that the frequency with ý\liich those who repoi(cd 
such headaches sought to account for their) using a local explanatory system (e. g. 'worry' as, a sourcc of' 'hCadaChC,, '). 
Rawnsley and Loudon used an expert discourse oil 'anxiety' to refranic their informants' discourse oil 'wolf-v', I ligh 
levels ot' 'anxiety' among certain groups were then used to explain (lie social distribution of 'licadaches' oil (lie Island 
even though their explanation appeared to have its origins in the lay explanatory system employed hv their informants. 
Rawnsley and Loudon also used the expert term 'stress' as a gloss for the cinic term 'worry'. Yet, it was uncical holil 
their account whether 'stress' and 'anxiety' were used locally as a common idiorn of- distress. This ic-in(cipretation of 
Rawnsley and Loudon's epidemiological survey of Tristan da Cunha point.,, to a general dilficulty with epidellijoiogical 
surveys ot'the 'neurotic disorders'. The prevalence rates reported in such surveys part1v sionil-v ill ,-c prevalence of social1v 
structured and culturally mcchatcd ways of expressina adversityý that is, how both ways of- articulating, d1S(l_Cs. S and 
exposure to adversity are distributed within a population. 
For example, see Gaines (1992a, 1992h), Young (1980), Little\\, ood (1998), Scheper-Hughes (1993). and FahreL'a 
(1992). 
119 The diagnostic categories of psychiatric discourse may even lack validity as a nicans of interpreting and classitNillo 
distress among sonic social groups Within developed English-speaking societies. This is because Such discourse is no( 
systematically developed on tile basis of lay understandings and so may not even have cultuial validity "ithin developed 
English-speaking societies. 
12') For example, see Games (1992), Good ( 1994). Kirmayer ( 1988), and Youno ( 1980) lot accounts of' how cxpci-t 
knowledge and discourse on distress are contin-crit oil Euro-Aincrican l'olk psychologgics and discourse oil tile sell and 
body. 
12 1 The terin 'individualism' refers to an ideological discourse on tile Sell' and Society that valoriscs tile indi\ idual aýs tile 
ultimate source of- value. This discourse Constitutes the individual as a rational, self-deterininim-, aucricy and detined in 
terms of' set of rights (e. u. privacy, self-determination, etc) and freedoms (c. u. of- specch. from noti-intcrterence, of 
inovenient, etc. ) (Lukcs, 1990). This ideology de-emphasises tile sell's social contingcricy and tile importance oI 
communal relationships as a source of value. This ideology is the dominant discourse oil the sell' in late capitalist 
societies such as Britain or the United Suites. 
122 For example, see Littlewood (1990), Marsclla et al ( 1985). Jadhav ( 1996), and Nichter ( 198 1 
123 Carranza (1998) describes 'habitual narratives' as 'low-iiarrativitv' narratives because they deviate from definitions of- 
a prototypical narrative. 
124 'Clauses' arc the most basic unit of meaning ill discourse (Fairclouill, 1992). Thcy are graniniatical constructions that 
minimally consist of a subýject and a finite verb. Unlike clauses, utterance.,, and spoken sentences do not always this 
subject-verh structure. 
125 In English-speaking societies, oral story-like accounts typically consist of' the following components: (i) tile scene is 
set; 00 the characters are introducedý (iii) actions, events and happenings over time are desciihed: 00 the action il)\ol\; c.,, 
a conflict; (v) this rises to a resolution; (vi) the story comes to an end. Labov's structural Scheme lOl narrati\e analysis is 
relevant here. This involves parsing the narrative discourse unit in(o the lollowing parts: ahstractý orientation: 
complicating action; resolution; evaluation; coda (useful for interpreting narrative excerpts) (Labov, 1976). 
12" 'Oral genres' are discursive styles that speakers draw upon (as members of- a particulat Speech community) to 
communicate experience. Many schemes have developed for the classification of' narrati), c genic in developed English- 
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speaking societies: e. g. tragic vcrsus conuc. regicssive , cisus piogIcssI\c (( ; cI '_'cli alld ( ; cl ý, cll, 198.1 ), 'Itm 0 
'pseudonarratives', hypothetical, counterl'actual, and habitual Ilarlillive" Wallýlll/; I, P)QS' I jildc, 1992) 
127 'Narrative positions' are associated ", fill if particular perspective oil c\pcilcilk. c. Iýol c\ýInlplc, Molik" dc"(Ilhcý (Ilk'III 
structural positions which makes sense of' it pill ticulal , as jumaposihOll 01 StatCHICIIIIN hý I)IM IdilIg it ICICICIlt C 1)(11111 10' 
particular perspective' (I 996i 457). 
12' Explanatory discourse and narrative are discussed in Chapter 3. 
129 For example, locally available explanatory systems, cultinal scripts, public 11,111allve", onlologics, and ldcolorle". 
130 Guniperz defined a 'speech community' if,, 'any human aggiegate Chillaciclised hN icgukil ýInd fic(lucill ilitcl'icliOn hy 
means of' a shared body of' verbal signs, and set OIT 1,10111 similill ilgolci! atcs by dillcicilk, cs In lalwuýlýc us; l)ýc 
(1968: 219). 
13 1 For instance, an example of' this can be found in I study of stignia and watacisin fit if Kibhut/, l: \cII,, dc,, cilbcd 
'ideology' as 'a systematic, selt'-rctlective set of' idcas' of- its 'an ills(Ilutionallwd and 111ý, IIIY soplil"llý; l1cd hodv of 
directive ideas' ( 1975: 205). 
132 This approach to qualitative analysis \kas also used in the FINIPIRIC study dc. sciibcd fit Clmptci 2 ((YConnoi and 
Nazroo, 2002). 
133 The 'coding trarne' used in this analysis is presented fit Appcridi\ A3.6. 
134 'Charting' is an analytical device lor rearranging qualitative data according to key thellics and coic concepts (I it I c 
and Spencer, 1994). It I'acifitates comparison and gencralisation across cases. 
135 'A code' is ,I category or low-level concept. Coding involves moving 1111OL1011 (he dill; I IMC-hy-1111C 111,11t 111110 HIM', (11 
discourse (e. g. words, utterances, phrases, narratives, explanations) with pFC-CXiStIug Of it pilOll L'MCg'OIICs Of il"Ing (11CM 
to produce newly emergent concepts. In the process of'codino. codes r-cpic"Clullh! C011CCI)l'ý aic linked to Thcw 
'ire then taken to indicate of- instantiate file concept. 
136 For instance, 'scene' or 'setting' wits distinguished 1'rom individual ('a9CIIC) ChalaCICTISHCs, 'df_'CTIL'V*, and 'aCtiOll, Of 
experience'. See Appendix A3.4 fOr dchnitions of these categories and it description of Bulke'', draluali"tic, ffalllcý%Olk 
(Burke, 1969). 
137 Annual report ol'St. Helena's Social Work Wficer (1957). 
138 Including what Aldridge describes as 'ifflective, schizophrenic, paranoic psychosis' ( 1984ý 25). 
"9 This estimate was based on the contents of' a niental-licalth register initiated fit 11), -, 2. This tegislet included all [tic 
'active cases' 'brought to the attention of- the medical services in whom there is subs(antial psvchianic disordcl* 
(Aldridge, 1984: 18), e. g. psychosis its dcfined in ICD-9. 'Active cascs' reters to those individuals 'with svillptolils of Oil Z71 
treatment' (Aldridge, 1984: 25). Aldridge made it clear that the Rcoister exclude(] those patients with it millor psychiatric 
upset such as 'minor depressive symptoms' ( 1994: 23). The data used to estimate (lie extent of' seveic p. svchiatfIc Illness 
oil St. Helena was unlikely to provide a reliable basis tOr calculating population morbidity rates to[' J)SýCllidtlit. ' IliVIC"S. 
Aldridge acknowledged the limits ol'the data upon which his estimates werc based. 
140 However, no evidence is presented to support these claims about alcoliol use all(] its putame iclanonship with 
violence and aggression. 
"I The activity of' the community nursing tearn has increased dramatically fit recent vears. In 1995, there \, %cic 18-1 
community visits made by this team. By 1998, (his had increased to 299 visits. It is possible that the Increased aCtIVI(V 01 
the community nursing team during this period may have be partly (life to increasim, rates of' social distre,, s. It inav also 
have been associated with expansion of' the role Of (he C01111111.11litV nursing team to encompass if broader set (it' public 
health concerns on the island. 
142 For instance, at the time of fieldwork, she managed a junior sister, a statT nurse, I senior nurse. and I_1VC nursing 
assistant. 
143 Personal communication with St Helena's community psychiatric nurse 
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